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ABSTRACT
'The Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion Among Turks in London' is a study
of a micro-Muslim community in Britain. Earlier research on Islam and Muslims in
Britain concentrated predominantly on Islam amongst South-Asian Muslims
although there is a large degree of diversity in the expression of cultural and
religious identity among Muslim communities in Britain. This thesis seeks to come
to an understanding of the politics of ethnicity, identity and religion among Turkish
Muslims who are a part of this diversity. The main objective of this research is to
analyse how Turkish identity is constructed and what are the roles of family,
culture, organisations and religious groups in the reproduction and transmission of
traditional values to the young generation. This research is expected to fill a gap in
research on micro-Muslim communities in Britain.
Research methods involved participant observation, in-depth interviews and a survey.
Seventeen months of fieldwork in the north-east London and two months fieldwork in
Berlin were carried out to collect ethnographic data. During the research, 77 people were
interviewed in-depth, 93 young Turks participated in a survey and 29 people took part
in group interviews.
The thesis begins with a brief account of immigration to Western Europe in general
and to Britain in particular. Then, a discussion of theoretical issues on migration,
ethnicity and the development of identity is presented where the major
anthropological and sociological theories are examined.
Turkish immigration to Western Europe in general and to Britain in particular is outlined
in Chapter Four and issues concerning family, kinship and reproduction of traditional
values are examined in Chapter Five wherein it is argued that Turkish identity is
reinforced by the reproduction of family values and kin relations in London. It is also
demonstrated in this Chapter that new types of relations are established which are based
on wider social networks.
Continuity and change in the identity construction of the young Turkish generation are
discussed by analysing their attitudes towards language, culture, family, sexuality and
religion in Chapters Six and Seven. The process of institutionalisation and analysis of the
influence of Turkish organisations on the politics of identity and its expression are
presented in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten. The institutionalisation of Islam is analysed
in relation to identity and religious diversity within the Turkish community. The politics
of main Islamic groups are also analysed to explain how religion and politics are related
and the extent to which religious movements in the country of origin influence Islamic
organisations abroad.
This research shows that family relations and social networks have played an important
role on every stage of immigration and settlement Traditional values are constantly
reproduced within Turkish families as an expression of identity and every effort is made
to ensure that the young generation are not alienated from these values. However, there
is an emergent identity construction taking place among the young generation, generally
inspired by the 'local' experience. This suggests that the emergent Turkish identity
accommodates continuity and change in relation to Turkish culture, sometimes
producing tension between generations. For the young generation traditions, culture and
religion are increasingly becoming values for 'symbolic' attachment.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Population movements have been a permanent feature of human history. In
many quarters of the globe, one can observe the emergence of multicultural
societies as a result of voluntary immigration, population exchange or flow of
refugees which involved a massive volume of human groups throughout
history. These migratory waves are conditioned by varying forces such as
wars and ethnic clashes, economic demise or industrial development, and
political pressures which determined the direction and nature of population
movements. Whether it is voluntary or forced, migration has become a global
phenomenon with a wide range of social, cultural, economic and political
consequences.
Issues revolving around religion, nationality and ethnic identity, as well as
politics of the international community with regard to immigration and
citizenship play a central tole in shaping current developments. Nevertheless,
earlier decades which coincided with industrial development and economic
growth differ somewhat in the composition of ethnic groups and construction
of identity as belonging to a nation, ethnie or religion. The immigration of
workers from underdeveloped countries to industrialised Western Europe
which needed a workforce in the 1950s and 1960s, changed the cultural and
religious landscape of countries such as Germany, France, The Netherlands
and Great Britain. The arrival of foreigners with their own social customs,
cultural characteristics such as different language, religion, food and dress, as
well as organisations such as Mosques, Synagogues and Qurdwaras, entered
the public domain. A large flow of immigrant workers as well as an influx of
refugees in recent years and their settlement established heterogeneous and
multicultural communities across Western Europe.
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1.1. Labour Migration to Western Europe
As mentioned above, the movement of people from one place to another for
work and livelihood has been a prevalent issue throughout human history. In the
second half of the twentieth century, economic and demographic structures have
created an enormous amount of labour migration towards industrialised
countries where local recruitment failed to meet labour demand during
industrial expansion. Foreign workers were needed to solve the problem of
labour shortage and to keep up with economic development
Economic motivation played a primary role in labour migration from
underdeveloped countries as many were unemployed or underemployed
because of the inability of their own economy to absorb the labour force.
Conversely, developed countries offered new and relatively highly paid jobs.
Since both sides, labour-importing and labour-sending countries, have seen some
benefit in the movements of workers, it has been encouraged and special
arrangements have been made to accelerate this process. Western Europe has
always been a significant centre for immigration, as well as emigration in an
industrialised setting which absorbed large numbers of immigrant workers from
different parts of the world both before and after the Second World War.
International labour migration to and from Western Europe has been a recurring
theme for the last two and a half centuries. As Werner points out 'migrations of
substantial population groups across the borders of their home countries have
continually occurred over the course of history. Only the external circumstances,
the socio-economic and political motivations for migrations, have changed over
time' (Werner, 1986, p. 543). The pattern of migration to Western Europe was
influenced by the diffusion of information, political developments, economic
pressures and relations between the sending and receiving countries'.
As far as the more recent migration to Western Europe is concerned, four main
phases can be established. The first phase of migration to Western Europe soon
after the Second World War is characterised by a refugee movement from
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Eastern Europe to Germany and Benelux countries and the immigration of
workers to France, Britain and the Netherlands from their former colonies in
Africa, the West Indies and Asia. The second phase has seen migration flows
within the European Economic Community (EEC) and within the Nordic Labour
Market between the late 1950s and early 1960s. The third phase of migration to
Western Europe is characterised by the large migratory labour force movement
from the Mediterranean region to several countries such as West Germany,
Belgium, France and Switzerland. During this phase of labour migration, which
lasted until the oil crisis in 1973, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and Turkey
became main sources of migrant workers. The fourth phase is marked by a
fundamental change in European migration following the oil crisis in 1973. As
Straubhaar points out (1988, p. 53-54), this change took place mainly in the
politics of labour migration which was reflected by the introduction of restrictive
measures concerning migration to Europe. The worker-receiving European
countries became either very selective and restrictive or adopted a policy of
terminating labour recruitment from abroad.
Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Britain have a long
history of a voluminous influx of foreigners as workers, refugees and asylum
seekers (Rudolph, 1994, p. 113). It was estimated that there was a total of 800,000
foreign workers in Germany as early as 1907, and they made up 4.1 per cent of
the total labour force. The 1910 census showed a total of 1,259,880 foreign
residents in Germany including dependants of the migrants (Castle and Kosack,
1973, p. 19; Power, 1979, p. 10). France has a similar history as a country of
immigration which goes back to the 1850s. Since that time, France has adopted a
policy of importing foreign labourers to replace the landless proletariat who
moved into the new industrial areas. By 1886, for example, there were more than
one million foreigners constituting three per cent of the total population in
France. The number of foreign residents rose from 1.4 million in 1919 to 2.5
million in 1926 and three million in 1930, making up seven per cent of the total
population in France (Power, 1979, p. 11). Switzerland and the Netherlands also
had foreign workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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Switzerland experienced large-scale immigration in the early 1880s and by 1910
there was a total of 552,000 foreigners in Switzerland, making up 14 per cent of
the whole population (Castle and Kosack, 1973, P. 20). The Netherlands, as
Entzinger (1994, p. 93) points out, had a long history of colonialism and opened
its doors to neighbouring countries which shaped the history of immigration in
that country. It is noted that the Netherlands had 53,000 non-Dutch residents as
early as in 1899. The number of foreigners were 175,000 in 1930.
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of immigrant workers
in West European countries. The industrialisation and expansion of the economy
after the Second World War opened a new era in the history of labour migration
to Europe. Germany, for example, signed bilateral agreements with several
countries between 1960 and 1968 in order to alleviate the labour shortage 2. From
the early 1960s onwards, labour migration to West Germany continued in
increasing volume and, by 1966, the number of foreign workers had grown to 1.3
million. In 1968, however, due to the ensuing economic recession, the number of
immigrant workers was reduced to one 'million. But recovery and expansion in
the German economy absorbed an increasing volume of the foreign workforce,
reaching 2.6 million in 1973. In addition, families of immigrant workers began to
arrive and the union of families doubled the number of foreign residents to
almost four million by 1973. Similarly, France accelerated the import of foreign
labour towards the mid-1950s and in the early 1960s Spanish migration to
industrial cities in France took off. This was followed by the Portuguese labour
migration after 1966 (Withol de Wenden, 1994a, p. 69). The British experience is
explained in section 1.2.
Labour immigration to Western Europe ceased in 1973 due to economic
repercussions of the oil crisis in the same year. The labour receiving countries
introduced restrictive measures to prevent further immigration. In Germany, for
example, the Federal Government issued the Auslanderstop (Stopping foreign
employment) in late November 1973 (Booth, 1992, p. 111). Although a reduction
in the number of foreign workers was observed, the effect of such restrictive
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measures on the size of foreign residents remained minimal. The number of
foreigners continued to increase in different foims. In the Netherlands, for
example, the number of foreigners increased to 350,500 in 1976 and reached
640,600 in the early 1990s. The current number of non-Dutch residents stands at
around 780,000 in the Netherlands comprising almost five per cent of the total
population. It was recorded, on the other hand that in 1981 the total number of
foreigners in Belgium was 885,700 which made up nine per cent of the total
population. As Table 1.1. shows, during the following years the number of
foreigners in Belgium continued to increase, by almost 20,000 a year, reaching a
total of 904,500, making up 9.1 per cent of the total population in 1990.
Table 1.1: Stock of foreign population in selected European countries
(Thousands)
1984	 1986	 1990	 1993
Belgium	 897.6
France
Germany	 4363.7
Netherlands	 558.7
Sweden	 390.6
Switzerland	 932.4
United Kingdom 1601.0
8625
4240.5
591.8
401.0
978.7
1839.0
904.5
3596.6
5342.5
692.4
483.7
1 100.3
1723.0
920.6
6 878.1
779.8
507.5
1260.3
2001.0
Source: SOPEMI, 1995
In a similar vein, the foreign population of Switzerland increased to 892.800 in
1980, making up 14.1 per cent of the total population. The ratio rose to 14.5 per
cent in 1985 with a slight increase in the number of foreigners totalling 939,700. In
1990, the number of foreigners living in Switzerland rose to 1,100,300 making up
16.3 per cent of the population. Table 1.1. shows that Germany has the largest
foreign population (almost seven million), despite restrictive policies, followed
by France which has more than 3.5 million people of foreign origin.
The migratory flow to Western Europe resulted in the formation of a large
number of foreign groups within different industrial centres. Industrialised West
European countries had a foreign population of 12.5 million in 1986, of which
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about 5.5 million were designated migrant workers (Werner, 1986, P. 543). The
volume of migrants in Western Europe steadily increased to 18 million over the
years (Fassmann and M-unz, 1994, p. 6). In addition to legal immigrants,
according to one estimation (Power, 1984, p. 5), there are also one million or
more illegal immigrants working in Europe.
	 •
The migrant labour force displays a variety of national and ethnic origins.
Foreign workers from the Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey migrated to countries where there was no
colonial link. The colonial links of France, Britain, and the Netherlands, on the
other hand, resulted in labour import from former colonies; for example,
migrants from India, Pakistan and the West Indies came to Britain, and people
from North Africa and former French colonies chose to move to France. People
from Surinam, Indonesia and the Antilles, former Dutch possessions, came to the
Netherlands.
1.2. Immigration to Britain
Britain was one of the first countries to accommodate a large number of
immigrant workers. In the ninetenth century, the industrial revolution easily
absorbed the surplus of unemployed labour from the countryside. Rapidly
expanding industry required more manpower. Therefore, the British employers
turned their attention towards Ireland to satisfy the labour demand. By 1851,
there were 727,326 Irish immigrants which constituted 2.9 per cent of the total
population of England and Wales. The next immigrant group to arrive in Britain
was very different in tenns of migration motivation. About 120,000 Jews settled
in Britain between 1875 and 1914 as refugees who had to leave Russia to escape
religious and political persecution (Castles and Kosack, 1973, p. 17).
During the inter-war period, migration to Britain, like other West European
countries, slowed down in comparison to the scale of migration before the First
World War. The reasons were, firstly, the difficulty to find employment for
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returning servicemen in the army in the immediate post-war period and
secondly, the depressed state of the economy from 1929 onwards. Like France,
Britain had also repatriated almost all immigrant workers recruited from the
colonies during the war. Coleman (1994, p. 39) points out that migration to
Britain contrasts with the experience of most other West European countries with
the effect that most of the immigrants did not come from mainland Europe, but
instead came from Ireland and even more from colonies or former colonies, i.e.
New Commonwealth'.
The immigration of coloured people has also been an important feature of
immigration to Britain with implications for race and racism. Although small
black minority communities existed in Britain prior to the 1950s, the
overwhelming majority of the current black population owe their residency to
the migration which took place after the Second World War . The post-war wave
of black and Asian migration to Britain started in the lath 1940s, and gathered
momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. Coleman (1994, p: 39) notes that the first
significant group of foreigners to arrive after the war was the West Indians who
came to Britain in 1948 and added their numbers to the small black population
comprising West Indians and West Africans. Economic development and
industrial expansion in Britain during the post-war period caused a labour
shortage which compelled employers to seek foreign workers and, accordingly,
this period was marked by an influx of people from The Irish Republic,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and New Commonwealth countries.
Migration to Britain is seen as a response to various factors such as economic and
demographic conditions in the countries involved which might be called push
factors and economic incentives and advantages in Britain as pull factors.
Economic factors dominated other factors in the decision to 'migrate (Booth, 1992,
p. 15). Since 1945, thousands of people have come to Britain for work. The
numbers of immigrants in Britain doubled between 1951 and 1961, from 250,000
to 541,000. The total number of immigrants from India, Pakistan and the West
Indies reached 669,640 between 1955 and 1968 (Castle and Kosack, 1973, p. 31).
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As Table 1.2. shows, the number of those with non-white ethnic backgrounds
steadily increased over the years to three million which is 5.5 per cent of the total
population.
Table 1.2: Resident population by ethnic group in Great Britain, 1991
Ethnic group	 Number (thousands)	 Per cent of total population
All groups	 54,889	 100.0
White	 51,874	 94.5
Other groups	 3,015	 5.5
Black Caribbean	 500	 0.9
Black African	 212	 0.4
Black other	 178	 0.3
Black Total	 891	 1.6
Indian	 840	 1.5
Pakistani	 477	 0.9
Bangladeshi	 163	 0.3
Chinese	 157	 0.3
Other Groups
-Asian	 198	 0.4
-Other	 290	 0.5
(non Asian)
Source: 1991 Census adapted from A. Teague (1993) 'Ethnic group: first results from the 1991 Census',
Population Trends, Summer, 1993, pp. 22-17
It should be pointed out that the figures in the above table are derived from the
1991 Census data which means that the current number of residents with an
ethnic background must have increased.
1.3. Settlement and Emergence of Ethnic Communities
Immigration to West European countries resulted in the settlement of foreigners
in the receiving counties in increasing proportions against expectations of
return to the country of origin. Despite the widespread attempt in 1973/4, to
control or prevent further migration as noted by Cross (1986, p. 55), the
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proportion of foreign workers continued to rise. Family reunion arid the growth
of the young generation led ID the establishment of organisations and institutions
that addressed welfare, cultural and religious needs of the ethnic communities.
Further developments, such as economic investments and demand for political
participation in the receiving countries, suggested that immigrant workers, as
they were once called, were becoming rooted in the host society and were
becoming a part of it with their distinct cultural characteristics and religious
values, thus changing the cultural and religious landscape of Western cities.
Heisler contends (1986, p. 77) that 'the foreign workers, migrant workers or
guestworkers of the 1950s and 1960s have become permanent or at least quasi-
permanent settlers in the 1980s.' Accordingly, questions arising from
immigration and ethnic community issues have opened new avenues of research
such as the nature of ethnic groups, construction and maintenance of culturally
distinct identity, reproduction of traditional value systems and religious practices
along with their institutional forms and, more recently, the position of ethnic
minority youth in European cities. Moreover, debates on citizenship and political
participation have recently entered into academia in a more powerful way than
ever.
The research presented in this thesis concentrates on an under-researched ethnic
community in Britain. It addresses the emergence of the Turkish ethnic
community in London and deals with how traditional Turkish culture and
Islamic values are reproduced within the British context The roles of ethnic and
religious organisations are examined in order to understand the process of
identity formation and the transmission of values to the young generation. The
contention I follow in the thesis is that the Turkish community is a part of a larger
Muslim community in Europe which is negotiating and building up a 'European
Islam'. I also try to establish that diversity, in terms of cultural values and
religious commitment, is an important feature of the Turkish community in
London. Thus, in the analysis of identity formation and the reproduction of
traditional values, this diversity will be taken into account as one of the
explanatory points since Muslim communities do not have a monolithic nature.
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A review of the literature reveals that most of the research on Muslims in Britain
has focused on Asian Muslims. It can be argued that Islam in Britain is usually
equated with Asian Islam in the public imagination. This clearly indicates that
the Turks, as a micro-community within the larger Islamic 'Um_ma' (Nation), are
not included in studies on Islam in Britain. A content analysis of recent
publications such as D. Joly's (1995) Britannia's Crescent: Making a Place for
Muslims in British Society; P. Lewis's (1994) Islamic Britain, Religion, Politics and
Identity Among British Muslims; and M. Anwar's (1994) Young Muslims in
Britain lends support to the foregoing argument that 'Islam' and 'Muslims' as
broad concepts in Britain do not include the Turkish community. It should be
pointed out that any generalisation about Islam and Muslim societies in
Britain, drawing upon studies on micro-communities, would be misleading
due to the great diversity within Islamic societies. The expression of Islamic
values and identity is also varied. This thesis seeks to understand Turkish
Islam as represented by the Turkish community in London. I believe that this
research contributes greatly to the current debate on Muslim identity in a
broader sense.
Before moving onto the structure of the thesis, I would like to mention that
this research also benefited from fieldwork on Turks in Berlin. The research
in Berlin provided comparative data which contributed to an understanding
of the Turkish community/ies in a cross-national context. The development
of a transnational Islam within the context of Western Europe will also
benefit from the findings of this research because Islamic organisations
among Turkish communities in Europe are functioning across national
borders, on the one hand, and they are developing links with other
transnational Islamic movements on the other.
It is useful at this point to give some information about the organisation of
chapters and their contents. Chapter One, 'Introduction', provides a review of
immigration to Western Europe in general and to Britain in particular.
Chapter Two deals with methodological issues including details of my
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research which involved participant observation, in-depth interviews and a
survey. Chapter Three contains a discussion of theoretical issues on
migration, ethnicity and identity. In this Chapter, principal theories on the
causes and consequences of migration are examined; the emergence of
immigrant communities and the concept of ethnicity are discussed in relation
to identity and a sense of belonging; situational and primordial approaches to
ethnicity and development of identity are also discussed in the light of
anthropological and sociological discourses. Chapter Four describes Turkish
immigration to Western Europe in general and to Britain in particular. The
settlement trends and demographic structure are included in this Chapter.
Chapter Five examines issues concerning family, kinship and the reproduction of
traditional values. It is argued in this Chapter that the Turkish identity is
reinforced by the reproduction of family values and kin relations in London. This
Chapter also demonstrates that new types of relations are established which are
based on wider social networks. Chapter Six focuses on the young generation
within the Turkish community in London and analyses their attitudes towards
language, culture, family and sexuality as variables which influence identity
formation among the youth. Chapter Seven analyses various dimensions of
religious commitment of the young generation. In this Chapter, the data on the
religious attitudes and practices of young Turks in particular are examined.
Chapter Eight examines the process of institutionalisation among Turks in
London and analyses the ways in which these organisations were established.
More importantly, this Chapter explains how Turkish organisations influence the
politics of identity and its expression among the Turkish community in London.
The institutionalisation of Islam and the establishment of religious organisations
among Turks in London is discussed in Chapter Nine. This Chapter begins with
an outline of religion and politics in Turkey and moves on to how religious
movements in the country of origin influence Islamic organisations abroad. This
Chapter also looks at the development of religious diversity within the Turkish
community and analyses the politics of main Islamic groups with regard to
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reproduction of Islamic values, reconstruction of religious identity and its
maintenance in a non-Muslim society. Chapter Ten explains how religion and
politics are related among Turks in Europe in general and in London in
particular. The cases of two religio-political organisations in London are studied.
These case studies demonstrate how political identity is legitimised by using
religious discourse. Chapter Eleven draws main conclusions based on the
findings of the research.
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Chapter One: Notes
1. For an evaluation of the patterns of migration to Western Europe, see Fassmann and
Munz (1994).
2. The following countries signed bilateral agreement with Germany: Spain in 1960;
Greece in 1960 (renewed in 1962); Turkey in 1961 (revised in 1964 and came into effect in
1968); Portugal in 1964, Italy 1965; and Yugoslavia in 1968 signed bilateral agreements
with Germany as six main sources of labour supply for the expanding German
economy(Power, 1979, P. 12; Werner, 1986, p. 544; Booth, 1992, p. 110).
3. For the history of Irish immigration, see Jackson (1963); for the history and analysis of
Asian immigration to the UK, see Anwar (Anwar, 1979; Anwar, 1985; Anwar; 1995b;
Robinson, 1986; Shaw, 1988; Lewis, 1994).
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Chapter Two
Methodology
The social and cultural aspects of immigrant communities in Europe started
to receive more attention in recent years as it became increasingly obvious
that immigrants were beginning to build up ethnic communities in the
receiving countries despite categorical resistance to recognising such a
process by political establishments. The emergence of ethnic communities
with distinct cultural, religious and linguistic structures, and the growth of a
young generation of immigrant descent, added a new dimension to research
on migrants. The focus of research relating to immigrant groups varied and
anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists became increasingly
interested in the social, cultural and political aspects of emerging ethnic
communities. The involvement of experts and researchers in the study of
immigrant and ethnic communities produced a plethora of literature based
on the methods used in each academic discipline which these experts and
researchers claimed to follow. My research has benefited from many of this
earlier research on immigration, ethnicity and identity.
2.1. Personal Encounters
Labour immigration from Turkey is only four decades old. It entered the
public imagination during the annual holidays of workers, and as a flow of
information circulated in the neighbourhood by their kin and relatives.
Generations of mid-sixties and seventies repeatedly heard socially
constructed stories and narratives about the lives of Turkish immigrants. I
should note here that in early 1989 I made contact with the Turkish
community and attended several public meetings and functions organised by
Turks during the course of my MA studies in London. During my studies at
the University of London, I established good relations with several people.
These early encounters provided the initial experience which sparked my
interest in studying the Turkish community in London. However, for the
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purpose of this research project, the first contact with the Turkish community
was made in April 1993 as part of my fieldwork.
After starting my fieldwork in London, I realised that my previous
observations, participation in various meetings and ceremonies as well as
meetings with my old contacts were all excellent sources of background
information. Given the fact that there is a big lacunae of literature on the
Turkish community in England, particularly in contrast to other ethnic
groups, these early encounters helped me in the initial stages of the research.
While looking for ways to develop an effective strategy to cover a wider set of
social groups in order to portray a representative picture of the community
under study, I re-contacted old acquaintances and revived old friendships. I
felt that I had never been totally cut off from the London context Many issues
and previous experiences had survived in my imagination even when I
returned to Turkey in 1990 after completing my MA course. I attribute this to
the fact that I continued communicating with some of the acquaintances and
exchanged letters, discussing many of the concerns recorded in this research.
Moreover, I developed a deeper interest in reading literature and news about
Turkish communities in Europe. Thus, I had an intellectual readiness and a
fundamental urge to carry out such research even before entering the field.
The collection of data involved fieldwork, participant observation, in-depth
interviews and specially designed questionnaires. As mentioned above, the
fieldwork started in April 1993 and lasted until September 1994. Although,
the fieldwork took 17 months of intensive research, I have always followed
subsequent developments and have updated data accordingly. In the summer
of 1993, I carried out fieldwork in Berlin, in Germany. This research trip not
only enabled me to collect data to understand the Turkish community in
London and in Berlin in a comparative perspective, but also facilitated access
to literature on the lives of Turks in Germany. In this research, I have used
interdisciplinary methods to collect as much information as possible. In what
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follows, I will discuss the methods which were used and describe my
experiences during the process of collecting data.
2.2. Ethnographic Method
One of the indispensable tools of the ethnographic method is participant
observation. This involves gathering data in the natural social setting in
which researchers have access to the meaning of events and social
interactions as understood by the group or the organisation under study. This
method compensates for some of the shortcomings of experimental methods,
statistical measures, survey research and questionnaires, as these approaches
have limitations in extracting detailed information. Burgess (1984, p. 79) notes
that
'participant observation facilitates the collection of data on social
interaction; on situations as they occur rather than on artificial
situations (as in experimental research) or constructs of artificial
situations that are provided by the researcher (as in survey research).
The value of being a participant observer lies in the opportunity that
is available to collect rich and detailed data based on observations in
natural settings'.
Harvey (1990, p. 9) shares the same views about the advantages of
ethnographic approach based on fieldwork and participant observation. He
argues that the strength of the ethnographic approach is the 'insights it
provides of social phenomena in their natural setting. For some, this is recast
in phenomenological terms and ethnography has increasingly tended to be
used as a procedure for gaining an understanding of social settings from the
subject's point of view'. Harvey also asserts that 'immersion in a field of
study allows the ethnographer to gain an understanding of the process
operating in the subject group, institution, or community. Thus, the emphasis
for most ethnography is usually on forms of social interaction and the
meanings which lie behind these'. Moreover, ethnographic method avoids the
risk stemming from reliance on a single kind of information as it has the
methodological flexibility of using potential data sources (Hammersley and
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Atkinson, 1993, P. 24). An important advantage in the case of fieldwork and
ethnographic research is to obtain verbal accounts and narratives of
individuals in their own language.
During my fieldwork research two languages were used: I spoke only
Turkish in Berlin and Turkish and English in London. I noticed that the older
generation communicated in Turkish within their families and community.
The young generation, in contrast to their parents, used English
overwhelmingly in their social interaction. A third group used both
languages simultaneously and switched between Turkish and English
whenever they felt more comfortable with one of these languages to express
their feelings and ideas. This group mainly comprised the young generation.
Different typologies' of participant observers were developed according to
their role during the course of research. The basic typology devised by Gold
(1958, cited in Burgess, 1984) described four field roles for the researchers as
'the complete participant', 'the participant-as-observer', 'the observer as
participant', and 'the complete observer' 2. In my field research I mainly
assumed the role as 'participant-as-observer' in order to gain access to a
wider group of participants in their social interactions and I managed to
establish a large network of contacts with various sections of the Turkish
community to capture the meaning they attributed to culture, tradition,
ethnicity, religion and identity within the context of a multicultural society.
The reason for adopting such a role was to 'get close' to the activities and
everyday experiences of the Turkish community. 'Getting close', according to
Emerson and his associates (1995, p. 1-2) requires 'physical and social
proximity to the daily rounds of people's lives and activities; the field
researcher must be able to take positions in the midst of the key sites and
scenes of other's lives in order to observe and understand them'. During the
course of fieldwork I tried to take such a role to see from the inside what is
meaningful and important to members of groups and organisations in the
Turkish community. On the other hand, I tried to avoid situations which run
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the risk of leading me to become a 'native' which would have disrupted
observation and might have hindered my gaining a fuller insight into and
understanding of the group activities and multiple experiences of those
observed and their variations in the setting.
As I was familiar with the setting of the Turkish community before I began
the fieldwork, I did not have much difficulty in locating Turkish institutions,
organisations and supplementary schools as contact points in order to enter
into the matrix of the social and natural setting of the community. I visited
cultural establishments, welfare organisations, religious and political
institutions as well as supplementary weekend schools. I attended meetings,
ceremonies, lectures and numerous other activities of these organisations to
observe the process while it was taking place. I had the opportunity to
participate in a variety of situations in which I came to know the informants
and the groups more closely. I attended events as diverse as cultural
meetings, religious ceremonies, festivals, political meetings and marches, and
classes held . at supplementary schools during which I collected the insider's
use of concepts and their meaning as ascribed by the informants. Once trust
was established between the informants and me, I was invited to meetings,
ceremonies,. weddings, Bayrams (feasts of religious significance which take
place twice a year) celebrations, sunrtet (circumcision) and birthday parties.
At times, my role as participant observer required following particular
groups even outside England as they established wide networks of
relationships. In two cases, for example, I visited Belgium to observe annual
meetings of a religio-political organisation which has branches in most
European countries. These field trips enabled me to meet the leaders of the
organisation and interview them.
During the research, I was involved in two voluntary projects to gain the
confidence of people and collect data while working in the community. One
of the voluntary posts was offered by St Ann's Hospital in Haringey which
had launched an awareness campaign for the Turkish community. The six-
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month project involved a short training and outreach work which entailed
contacting Turkish organisations, community centres and cafés where
meetings were held on drug use, drug related diseases and available
resources for help. I was involved in the first three months of the project and
met numerous people. At times, discussions went beyond talking about drug-
related issues and much wider issues concerning the community were
frequently discussed. Sometimes, people asked me to act as an interpreter for
them, talk to their children about studying and chair some of their meetings.
After three months, I decided to leave the project as it started drawing me
into the role of a 'native' thereby risking my detachment from the
community.
The second voluntary work was offered by Ikra Primary school sponsored by
Aziziye Mosque (see Chapter Nine). This active participation and observation
lasted for eight weeks during which I was required to teach basic values of
Turkish culture and concepts of Islamic faith. The teaching role allowed me to
meet parents and have lengthy talks about cultural and religious issues as
well as their expectations from the new school. However, I soon realised that
my role as participant observer was becoming overshadowed by the teaching
post Moreover, I had a different approach to teaching which was not
approved of by the Mosque administration. I felt at this time that any dispute
over teaching methods would involve me more deeply in the affairs of the
school and might damage my good relations with the school administration
and Mosque officials. Such a development, I thought, might have resulted in
my losing contacts and would go beyond the limits of my role as a researcher.
I decided, therefore, .to leave the teaching post to avoid these risks, but I
continued to visit the Mosque and participated in discussions for research
purposes. I recorded my observations once left I had the field drawing upon
the 'mental map' gained during the observations. In some cases, I noted
salient points, using some key words in order to remember the details of the
scene. I did this, for example, when I watched a public meeting noting how
many people were there, an estimate of age and gender distribution etc.; or
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when I was listening to sermons in the Mosques, I noted which verses were
referred to or what issues were brought forward.
2.3. Conducting Interviews and Taking Notes
In the present research, semi-structured in-depth interviews and 'interviews
as conversations' (Burgess, 1992, p. 107), with the purpose of exploring issues
were carried out in order to collect detailed data from the informants. As
structured interviews have limitations generated by previous planning and
also the risk of manipulating the interviewee by leading the conversation
along the line of interview forms, I chose to undertake semi-structured or
unstructured interviews as they give more flexibility to the researcher and the
informants. In each case, I made use of an interview guide. Since I was
interviewing various people and visiting different organisations, I devised
several interview guides for each interview. When interviewing cultural,
religious and religio-political organisations, I had a set of questions which
were sometimes expanded in the course of an interview or were modified
along the lines of a conversation. Similarly, interviewing the older generation
and the younger generation required different sets of questions. Initial
conversations before the formal interviews always helped me to modify the
questions.
When a contact was made, I asked the informants to arrange meetings with
their parents, children and kin so that the research might achieve a more
representative sample. On the whole I received a supportive response from
the respondents. As presented in Table 2.1., various people in the Turkish
community were interviewed in depth.
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Table 2.1: Number of in-depth interviews
Categories	 Number
Young People 
Male	 21
Female	 15
Representatives of Organisations 	 9
Employers	 5
Workers	 12
Imams	 4
Berlin sample	 11
Total	 77
In addition to depth-interviews, 29 people took part in group interviews. 16
parents from Turkey and 13 parents of Turkish-Cypriot origin were
interviewed. Interviews took place mainly in four settings: home; school;
work place; offices of organisations and Mosques. In a few cases, informants
agreed to be interviewed in a café to provide a more convivial setting. In
addition to interviews With individuals, group interviews in the form of
informal discussions took place especially with representatives of
organisations and young people during supplementary classes held at the
weekends. I was allowed to record some of the interviews and in most cases I
used key words and concepts to turn the interviews and observation data into
a text Interviews took place in Turkish, English and Turkish-English. As
mentioned earlier, the older generation used Turkish during the interviews
and conversations which I translated later into English during the writing
down of details after the interviews. Young people, on the other hand, used
both languages. Before the interview they were asked which lang-uage 3 they
would feel more comfortable with in expressing their ideas and feelings.
One of the difficulties I encountered during the fieldwork was interviewing
female informants. The same difficulty was experienced by other male
researchers who carried out research on the Muslim community which
designates different roles to genders according to the way in which the
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women's sphere is separated from the men's. This problem becomes more
pronounced when the segregation of sexes is observed more strictly. Anwar
(1985, p. 227) notes, for example, that he had some difficulties in talking to
women in families where purdah was practised. I had similar experiences in
my efforts to gain access to the 'women's world'. The reluctance of Muslim
women to speak stems from the fact that any contact with unrelated males is
not approved of by parents and the community. In order to overcome this
cultural barrier, I tried to interview ladies in the presence of their husbands
or children. In some cases I benefited from female friend/s who acted as a
mediator between the women informants and me and arranged meetings
with them during which the mediators were also present
2.4. Survey of the Young Generation
In addition to the participant observation and in-depth interviews, a
questionnaire was also used4 to obtain a quantitative picture of the young
generation and their attitudos towards family, culture, language, tradition
and religion. This data also helped me to establish a behavioural pattern
among young Turks with regard to friendship, identification, moral values
and religious practices. Before giving a final form to the questionnaire, a pilot
study was carried out with an early version of the questionnaire, in
agreement with Oppenheim's (1992, p. 47) view that 'questionnaires do not
emerge fully fledged'. A supplementary school was approached for the pilot
study of the first draft of the questionnaire and 12 respondents participated in
order to determine whether the questions were properly understood by them.
During and after the administration of the questionnaires, respondents were
encouraged to give their opinions on the clarity and relevance of the
questions asked. In the light of discussions with the respondents, some of the
questions were either modified or rephrased to enable the respondents to
understand the questions more easily. The pilot study also revealed that some
of the questions needed to be replaced with more relevant and open-ended
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questions. Parental origin, for example, was added in the final form of the
questionnaire.
The questionnaire consisted of two parts ( see Appendix ) : the first part was
mainly concerned with questions on age, sex, birthplace, family background,
attitudes towards Turkish culture, sexual morality and friendship. The early
draft of the first part contained 33 questions but the final form included 40
questions. The second part of the questionnaire was designed to obtain
information on the religious beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of the young
generation. The pilot study had included 26 questions on the dimensions of
religious commitment The final form of the questionnaire contained 20
questions after omitting, replacing or modifying the questions in the earlier
draft One hundred and ten questionnaires were distributed in three
locations, of which 104 were collected. Eleven of the collected forms were not
included in the statistical analysis either because some pages were missing or
because only a few questions were answered. Therefore, quantitative analysis
included 93 questionnaires of which 42 were filled in by male respondents
and 51 by female respondents. Some of the respondents were interviewed in
depth after the collection of the questionnaires. They were either interviewed
when they had finished their supplementary classes or later at an arranged
time suitable to them. 21 male and 15 female young Turks from this group
were interviewed.
During the course of research I encountered a few situations which had a
brief emotional impact on me and caused frustration at times. As mentioned
earlier, I did not have much difficulty in gaining access and making contacts
for most of the time. Nevertheless, on a few occasions, I received
discouraging personal reactions from some people whom I approached for
information. In one case, for example, I was accused of being a Turkish
intelligence officer trying to gather information about Turks and Kurds from
Turkey in order to report this to the Turkish Embassy in London. Several
times I was asked who my sponsor was, implying that I was supplying
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information to my sponsors. When I was accused of being a spy or an agent,
my initial feelings were disappointment and frustration. I tried to avoid
further discussions on such issues and tried to explain to the informants that
my concern had nothing to do with issues that any agent would be interested
in. In these cases I made it clear that any information would be treated with
confidence and research findings would be used only for the purposes of my
thesis.
The issue of confidentiality occurred several times during the research and
the respondents were assured that the information was being collected in
order to understand various issues concerning the Turkish community. In one
case, for example, I approached a Turkish women's organisation, explained
my research project and asked if they would provide some information about
the organisational and clientele structure of the group as well as about their
activities and programmes. The person concerned reacted strongly and
explained that they were not going to reveal the identity of their members
and the activities they were involved in. This particular telephone
conversation lasted more than ten minutes during which I explained that I
respected the sensitivities and concerns of the organisation. Despite my
assurances of confidentiality, I failed to persuade her to provide information
for this research. These two cases helped me to develop a more refined
attitude towards the reactions of the informants whose concerns and
sensitivities led them to a non-co-operative approach. However, such cases
were very few and I believe that access to a sufficient representation of the
Turkish community was achieved. The data collected by means of participant
observation, in-depth interviews and questionnaires helped me overcome the
shortcomings generated by such situations as described above.
In addition to collecting ethnographic data, I used several libraries to reach a
large corpus of published material. The Resources Centre at the Centre for
Research in Ethnic Relations and the library of the University of Warwick
were used frequently. I also visited the libraries of the London School of
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Economics, the School of Oriental and African Studies and the Central
Library of the University of London. In Berlin, I benefited from the libraries
of the Frei Universitat and Berliner Institut fur Vergleichende
Sozialforschung. It should also be pointed out that some secondary sources
and documents written in Turkish were also used during my research.
Publications of Turkish organisations such as annual reports, magazines,
leaflets and handouts, as well as press releases in Turkish, were collected
during the course of my research and where relevant have been used for this
thesis.
The next Chapter deals with the theoretical issues which help define a general
framework for studying the Turkish community in London. The discussion of
principal theories on migration, ethnicity and identity will put my study of
the Turkish community in London in a wider theoretical context Therefore,
Chapter Three will include a review of some of the literature addressing the
causes and consequences of migration, aspects of ethnicity and development
of identity in relation to immigrant ethnic communities.
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Chapter Two: Notes
1. See Burgess (1984), pp. 80-81.
2. The role as 'the complete participant' involves the concealment of observer
dimension that results in concealed observation; the role as 'the participant-as-
observer' does not require concealment of observation, rather it involves observation
as well as participation by establishing contacts and relationships with the
informants the researcher targets; the role as 'the observer-as-participant' involves
formal and short interaction with the informants and the informants are explained
the role of the observer; the role as the complete observer refers to a situation in
which the observer does not have a prolonged interaction with the informants
except fairly brief listening and monitoring.
3. See Table 6.11. for the language preferences of Turkish youth in London.
4. For a discussion on the integration of fieldwork and survey, see Sieber, D. S. (1991)
'Integration of Fieldwork and Survey Methods' in Robert G. Burgess (ed.) Field
Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual, Routledge, London, pp. 177-188.
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Chapter Three
Migration, Ethnicity And Ethnic Identity: Theoretical Issues
This Chapter examines the nature of population movements, which, have been
taking place throughout human history, by using an interdisciplinary approach.
An attempt will be made to identify and explain the determining variables in the
processes of migration. In order to provide an analytical explanatory framework,
sociological, anthropological, historical and geographical literature will be used.
This will enable me to explore the dynamics of migration in detail. The
discussion, then, will focus on the theories of ethnicity. Some of the literature on
primordial and situational approaches to the question of ethnicity will also be
reviewed. In the latter part of this Chapter, the development of ethnic identity
and its components will be examined. Overall, the relevant literature will help to
understand the developments in the Turkish community in London in a wider
theoretical framework
3.1. Recurrent Human Experience: Population Movements
It has already been noted that migration is still a world-wide phenomenon today.
Movements of individuals and groups from one location to another have been
taking place since the origin of man (Lewis, 1982, p. 1). Especially over the last
three or four decades, immigration has emerged as a major force throughout the
world (Massey et al, 1993, p. 431). Social, economic and political factors have
caused and still cause displacement and disenchantment and these have
important influences on the decision-making processes of people. These factors
may result in movements of the population as a result of dissatisfaction with the
present conditions. Prevalent migratory movements take place on two levels if
the geographical location, spatial direction and political boundaries are taken into
consideration. Internal migration refers to a movement of a population within a
defined border of a politico-geographical setting, whereas international
migration entails a movement beyond a politically defined boundary. The main
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concern of this Chapter is international migration as it is relevant to the
conceptual analysis of ethnicity and identity among immigrants.
Any endeavour to review the literature on migration is confronted by certain
difficulties due to the variety and diversity of theories. Regarding the problems
one experiences while reviewing the literature on migration, Cohen (1987, p. 33)
points out that the existence of many general theories, middle-range hypothesis,
laws, casual staiments and propositions make it difficult to provide a general
model of migration that is related to the level of theorisation attempted by
researchers. However, despite the complexity of this subject, a brief review of the
literature will reveal that many social scientists have been involved in the study
of migratory movements in varying degrees.
As Lewis (1982, p. 3) elucidates, each discipline brings its own distinctive
perspective to bear on the process. Among the variety of approaches, economists,
for example, have focused their attention on job patterns, employment and
economic opportunities, while the role of migration in population growth has
been a primary concern in the approach of demographers. On the other hand,
sociologists have explored the character of the migrants, formation of groups and
organisations, racism, political participation and social change caused by
migration. The focus of attention for anthropologists has been problems faced by
migrant groups within the host society with reference to ethnic identity, culture,
the reproduction of traditional values and their transmission to young
generations. The geographer's main contribution has been to emphasise the
special patterning of population settlement and locational features involved in
migration. As one may observe from the foregoing • discussion, an
interdisciplinary approach in migration studies can produce more fruitful results
as this covers many issues relating to the phenomenon of migration. Massey and
his associates (1993, p. 432) argue that, at present, there is no single, coherent
theory of international migration. Therefore 'current patterns and trends in
immigration suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory
processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone, or
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by focusing on a single level of analysis. Rather, their complex, multifaceted
nature requires a sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives,
levels, and assumptions'.
Although studies on migration provide detailed data on characteristics, patterns
and dynamics of such movements, these studies often fail to provide details on
historic and comparative processes. International 'migration studies, as Kritz and
Keely argue (1981, introduction), 'should be placed in a broad and comparative
context with other ethnic groups'. A comparative approach to the study of
migration will enable the researchers to identify the conditions leading to
similarities and differences in migration patterns to various countries. Holmes
(1991, p. 191) warns, for example, that in considering migration and the British
society we should guard against concentrating exclusively on emigrations. In
other words, he argues that we need to answer questions which not only relate to
the British migrants such as who left Britain and where they went to, but also
questions involving international migration, such as who came to Britain and
what such groups experienced after their arrival. Holmes (p. 201) notes that the
sociologists have dominated academic research on immigration in Britain. The
weight of emphasis in this sociological literature centres on black and Asian
immigration since 1945. Taking a historical approach, Holmes urges the
intending researcher who is concerned with migration to Britain to recover the
history of communities in order to construct a general history of immigrants and
minorities.
3.2. Nature of Migration
The passing of frontiers by individuals and groups from one place of settlement
or a. recognised administrative unit to another is still being perpetuated through a
variety of reasons, among them economic, social and political factors play
determining roles. In an analysis of population movements, several questions
arise in relation to the processes involved. As Lewis (1982, p. 1) puts it
'migration is a major cause of change since it can be viewed as an independent as
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well as a dependent variable in the examination of change'. At this level of
conceptual analysis, questions such as 'What are the causes of migration?' What
kinds of variables are influential in decision-making processes of people who
display migratory behaviour?' 'What are the consequences of migration and
settlement in a new area?' 'How can one relate a migratory movement to social
change in different segments of society?' 'To what degree does migration play a
role in the formation of minority-ethnic communities?' and 'What repercussions
does it have on successive generations?' beg analytical answers. In what follows,
I shall try to provide an account of migration which is aimed at answering the
preceding questions.
One of the earliest works on migration was presented by Ravenstin at a
conference more than a century ago. In his celebrated essay 'Laws of Migration',
which was published in 1885, Ravenstein (p. 198) tries to establish general laws
of human migration. Although Ravertstpin draws his conclusions from a corpus
of data on internal migration, he gives some insight that may be related to
international population movements concerning the direction of the 'currents of
migrations'. In his second essay under the same title, Ravenstein (1889) elaborates
further on internal migration in Britain, drawing general conclusions. On the
significance of Ravensin's work Grigg (1977, p. 41) remarks that these essays,
though published more than one hundred years ago, form the basis of the most
modern research on migration. After Ravenstein, many works appeared to
explain the dynamics of migratory movements and analyse the consequences of
population movements from the perspective of host countries as well as from the
perspective of the sending countries.
Eisenstadt (1954, p. 1) defines migration: 'as the physical transition of an
individual or a group from one society to another. This transition usually
involves abandoning one social setting and entering another and a different one'.
This definition emphasises the fact that migration is a complex phenomenon. Not
only does it consist of a physical displacement, but more importantly it entails a
significant degree of social change in one's environment in many respects
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through settling in an alien societal structure. Other writers emphasise the spatial
character of migration. For example, Jackson (1986, P. 2) states that 'migration
implies movement of individuals and groups between two societies; that which
they have left and that to which they have come. The process is usually achieved
by physical movement and consequent change of residence and other
circumstances... Such processes involve paradigm shift which makes it difficult if
not impossible to go back to the old ways'. Here, Jackson touches upon an
important issue which he calls 'paradigm shift/ which explains cognitive changes
taking place as a result of migration experience. Spatial and geographical
movements have implications for the perceptual features of immigrants in that
traditionally loaded meanings of some concepts may fade away through the
fusion of novel ideas and expectations by social interaction, school, media. and
new social groupings.
The migration of individuals and groups may be prompted by a variety of
factors which are of an economic, social and political nature. The weight and
selectivity of these factors depend on the conditions surrounding a given
community. Research on migration tends to place more emphasis on the
economic factors as an effective and driving force. Beijer (1969, p. 48), for
example, regards the economic factor as one of the most important factors in
voluntary international migration. The importance of the economic factor on the
decision-making processes of migrant groups has also been pointed out by
Ravensthin (1885, p. 198), the premier of migration studies in social sciences, who
states that currents of migration flow in the direction of commercial and
industrial centres. Writing in 1889 (p. 286) he noted that 'the desire in most men
to better themselves in material respects plays a decisive role in migratory
movements'.
3.2.1. Push-Pull Model
To explain the causes of migration, a model, based on push-pull factors, has been
suggested. In my view, this model only partly explains the phenomenon under
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investigation due to the reductionist nature of the push-pull approach to a multi-
sided human experience which, in fact, requires a wider model of explanation
combining interdisciplinary assumptions and findings.
If migration is seen as a response by individuals to a series of economic, social
and economic stimuli within the environment, then such a stimuli may take the
form of attractiveness or vice versa. If the changes generated by such stimuli
within the social environment or in the value system of individuals appear
satisfactory the probability of migration will be very low. On the other hand, if
these changes cause a feeling of dissatisfaction among individuals, then a desire
to migrate is likely to be generated (Lewis, 1982, p. 99). Jackson (1986, p. 13)
explores the underlying background of the push-pull model which, according to
him, takes its roots from the conception of man in society. He argues that in the
middle of the nineteenth century, man was conceived as a rational and Homo
economicus being who was able to respond to varying degrees of pressures from
outside to minimise the effect of discomfort and ID maximise advantages
available to him. In this model in which material considerations are emphasised,
push factors were defined as those which drive people from their place of origin,
while pull factors were identified as those which operate by attracting people
through providing opportunities by which the migrants assume that the new
environment meets with their expectations and satisfies their needs.
Push factors are generally of an economic nature, such as lack of access to land,
lack of employment, low wages, uncontrolled population increase, and
fragmentation of land holdings because of inheritance customs and laws (Lewis,
1982, p. 101; Robinson, 1986, p. 27). In the case of refugees and asylum seekers, on
the other hand, the political climate is the main push factor for immigration.
Policies of oppressive regimes which do not recognise freedom of expression and
the persecution of individuals because of their political or religious beliefs force
people to seek places where their beliefs can be expressed.
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In contrast to push factors, pull factors are predominantly of an economic nature
such as new job opportunities, better living standards, upward economic
mobility and attractive urban alternatives, as opposed to rural sources of a
downward social mobility (Jackson, 1986, p. 14; Lewis, 1982, p. 101-2; Robinson,
1986, p. 27). In addition to economic pull factors, it should be borne in mind that
democratic policies which respect human rights and recognise freedom of
expression are increasingly becoming a pull factor for political dissidents,
religious minorities and war victims.
3.2.2. Micro-Macro Model and New Economics Migration Theory
Various theoretical models (Massey et al., 1993) explains why international
migration begins. Macro theory, for example, suggests that geographic
differences in the supply and demand for labour, as well as resulting differential
wages caused by the market forces, motivate workers to move from one low-
wage country to another high-wage country. Micro theory, on the other hand,
implies that individual rational actors decide to migrate as a result of their cost-
benefit calculation. According to this model potential migrants estimate the costs
and benefits of moving to alternative international locations where they can be
more productive and gain higher wages after calculating the consequences of
migration such as learning a new language, looking for work, difficulty in
adapting to a new social environment and the psychological strains of leaving the
homeland and family.
However, the new economics migration theory suggests that migration decisions
are not taken by isolated actors, but by larger units of related individuals such as
family members and households. Collective expectations to increase the
economic profile of the family are at the very root of migratory decisions. One
can argue that the emergence of social networks as human/social capital
perpetuates international migration through interpersonal ties based on kinship,
friendship and shared community origin which reduces the costs and risks of the
movement Gurak and Caces (1992, p. 151) point out that social networks link
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populations in sending and receiving countries in a dynamic way which
provides a mechanism for interpreting data obtained through the flow of
information as a migration system evolves.
3.2.3. World-Systems Theory
In addition to assumptions of the causes and origins of migration drawn by these
foregoing theories, one should also look at the ideological links which are
conducive to migration without which any analysis of international migration
and its current shape would be incomplete. As Massey and his associates (1993,
p. 444) suggest, drawing on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems
theory, the origins of international migration are not linked to the 'bifurcation of
the labour market within particular national economies, but to the structure of
the world market that has developed and expanded since the sixteenth century'.
The world systems theory argues that 'the process of economic globalisation
creates cultural links between core capitalist countries and their hinterlands
within the developing world. In many cases, these cultural links are long-
standing, reflecting a colonial past in which core countries established
administrative and educational systems that mirrored their own in order to
govern and exploit a peripheral region'. The colonial experiences of Pakistanis
and Indians under British rule, Algerians and Senegalese as well as Moroccans
and Tunisians under the French (Garson, 1992, p. 81) and subsequent
immigration to the core countries are two main examples of how international
migration is determined by colonial links because of the cultural, linguistic,
administrative and communication links they already have.
Foregoing discussions lead us to the view that the push-pull model addresses
itself to a. certain number of variables involved in the migratory behaviour of
individuals or groups at internal and international level. One should be more
cautious in considering international migration which may generate significant
changes affecting the social and economic structure of the periphery and centre of
sending as well as host countries.
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3.2.4. Socio-psychological Approach
A socio-psychological level of analysis will enable us to go beyond the
boundaries of the reductionist approach which ignores the personality traits of
individuals and aspects of relations as contacts established between individuals
and society. In other words, 'a knowledge of ideal norms and values provides art
insufficient basis for an adequate understanding of the migration process,' thus,
'the attitudes and expectations of concrete individuals must also be taken into
account' (Lewis, 1982, p. 103). Eisenstadt (1954, p. 1-2) advances an explanatory
model on similar lines by making references to psychological components of
migratory decision processes and migratory behaviour. He argues that the
migratory movements of people are prompted and motivated by the migrants
feeling of insecurity and inadequacy in his present environment The original
setting of the migrant prevents him from meeting all his expectations and
fulfilling the roles he would like to. Eisenstadt notes, with reference to
psychological dimensions in the decision-making process of migrants, that 'it is
this feeling of frustration and inadequacy, whatever its cause, that motivates
migration, and it is the existence of some objective opportunity that makes it
possible to realise the aspiration to migrate. For that reason immigrants tend to
develop certain definite expectations in regard to the role they fulfil in their new
country/.
Eisenstadt identifies four main areas with regard to feelings of inadequacy and
insecurity of potential migrants and their expectations in relation to the new
society. He outlines these areas as follows: the first area concerns the 'immigrant
who may feel that his original society does not provide him with enough
facilities for and possibilities of adaptation'. The second social area of contact is
that the migrant 'may be prompted by the feeling that certain goals, mainly
instrumental in nature, cannot be attained within the institutional structure of his
society of origin'. The third is that, 'the migrant may feel that within the old
society he cannot fully gratify his aspirations to solidarity, i.e. to complete mutual
identification with other persons and with the society as a whole'. The last area
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relates to the probability that the migrant 'may feel that his society of origin does
not afford him the chance of attaining a worthwhile and sincere pattern of life (p.
3). Therefore the model advanced by Eisenstadt gives some insight into the
psychological dimensions involved in migration.
Before concluding this short account of migration, I believe that one other
dimension is worth mentioning in the study of migration and subsequent
developments within the immigrant community. This dimension in migration
studies can be labelled 'cultural dimension', since migration processes involve
and produce cultural changes. Without having a knowledge of cultural variables
at work, one cannot advance an adequate explanation of migration processes.
Immigrants differ in their class and cultural background, in their political values
they espouse and they display different cultural characteristics. They also vary in
their religious preferences as well as in their gender, life styles and
identifications. There can be no doubt that all these characteristics and cultural
variables affect the attitude and behaviour of migrants in varying degrees.
Therefore, any attempt to understand the nature of migration with reference to
multicultural societies would be incomplete if these cultural dimensions were to
be ignored. As I will show later, some of these dimensions are directly related to
the migration of Turks to London.
3.3. Consequences of Migration
Migration, as I have noted, is a complex phenomenon which involves economic,
social, cultural, political and psychological variables. When looking at such a
multi-dimensional process of human behaviour, one is always confronted by the
diversity of approaches, lacunae of data on specific issues and varying
explanatory models. In what follows, I will try to develop an explanatory
approach to an understanding of the implications of migration for the immigrant
communities as well as for the receiving societies in a wider context, and how
this relates to the subjects of my study.
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Migration produces a significant change in many respects, especially on the part
of individuals and groups who undergo such an experience. Migratory
movements have, broadly speaking, economic, social, psychological and political
repercussions. The economic consequences of migration relate to issues such as
job patterns, living standards, employment opportunities and the changes in the
economic structures of the sending country through remittances and of the host
country with reference to foreign labour-forces in the industry. Social effects
relate to the formation of minority groups and ethnic communities in a foreign
environment with different cultural values. The relations between majority-
minority, attitudes towards immigrants, gender and generational issues fall into
the category of social consequences of migration. Psychological impacts could
include problems of affecting personality traits and the well-being of immigrants
as well as identity conflicts and the psychological equilibrium of the individuals
concerned. Political implications, on the other hand, are seen in discussions on
race relations, nationality, citizenship and the political participation of
immigrants in the host society.
The effects of migration upon the individual involved can take many fauns.
According to Lewis (1982, p. 182) for example, 'much of it being related to the
extent to which his needs and aspirations are being met in the host community as
well as his own adaptation to new surroundings. In the host community the
migrant has to adapt to a new social, economic, political cultural environment,
although his adaptation may be eased if he joins a group with a similar cultural
background to himself. Immigrant groups are expected to face numerous
problems in their new place of residence, including hostility and exclusion.
Holmes (1991, p. 196) points out that a historical survey of immigrants and
refugees in Britain will disclose a procession of evidence indicating that such
groups encountered both hostility and discrimination. In a survey on British
Social Attitudes, researchers provide some data on prejudice and discrimination
against ethnic groups Gowen & Airey, 1984, p. 9). According to the survey, which
included a sample of 1761 adults in 114 parliamentary constituencies throughout
the UK, nine out of ten people involved thought that Britain was racially
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prejudiced. One in three admitted to being prejudiced against black and Asian
people. Concerning the degree of prejudice in the past and in the future, only one
in six felt that there was less prejudice today than five years ago and only one in
six believed that there would be less prejudice in five years to come.
One of the consequences of the migration process relates to the social behaviour
and social participation of migrants. The migratory process generates narrowing
effects in the realm of social participation. This limitation displays two
dimensions, of which one relates to the availability and diversity of roles that the
immigrants can perform. At least some of the roles which migrants used to
perform in the old society are not avat able any more in the new surroundings.
Therefore, a migrant's life becomes centred in restricted primary membership
groups. On the other hand, various institutional communication channels
between primary membership groups and society as a whole may become
largely severed. Various reference groups of the old community are replaced by
the image of the new society but the migrant still feels attached to the images of
the country of origin ( Eisenstadt, 1954, p. 5).
In his study of Asian migration in Blackburn, Robinson (1986, p. 76-7) argues that
housing represents the first problem which confronts a new migrant upon his
arrival in a new country. Residential clustering, he proposes, can be regarded as
a response to experiences of migrants in the host community. Motives behind
residential concentration which may lead to socially encapsulatory clustering
may well be rooted not only in the attraction of inner city property, but also in a
chain migration system which, to some extent, provides a shelter for the new
migrant against cultural contamination and discrimination. One can argue that
residential segregation due to housing discrimination, chain migration and
containment of ethnic groups by social and economic exclusion may further
exacerbate the creation of ethnic ghettos. The underlying nature of a ghetto what
Herbert (1990, p. 238) calls 'genuine neighbourhoods of foreigners' is its cultural
specificity and boundaries erected by situational variables exerted by the larger
community and accepted by the minority.
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3.3.1. Acculturation, Assimilation and Absorption
Moving from one place to another is always a major event since it entails an
abandoning of not only a spatial setting but also of social relations built around
internalised values, closely attached relatives, friends and significant figures with
whom one identifies. In this new setting one finds varying patterns of cultural
values, social relations and a different lifestyle which has hardly any similarity
with the prevalent customs of the old society. Although the migrant leaves his
original and primary group relations behind, through a physical transition from
one society to another, he always maintains his emotional attachment to his
previous images and values. The migrant's attachment to his national origins,
language, religion and customs on the one hand, and the host society's values on
the other, constitute contrasting poles of cultural systems. The ambiguity
generated by conflicting social and cultural values plays a discomforting role in
the rationale and personality of the new member of society. With this state of
mind the migrant is, from the onset, confronted with several forces which can be
explained under the rubrics of acculturation, assimilation and absorption which
aim to curb the salience of the migrant's identity through the fusion of the host
culture.
Acculturation, assimilation and absorption are broad terms with loose meanings
and these teuns may be used interchangeably if they denote a culture contact No
clear line is drawn between these concepts by social scientists since the contents
of the definitions of each concept juxtapose in dealing with migrants who
encounter different sets of situations in the social and cultural atmosphere.
Gordon (1964, p. 61) points out that both cultural anthropologists and sociologists
have described the processes and results of ethnic meetings under the rubrics of
assimilation and acculturation. Whilst sociologists tend to use the term
assimilation, anthropologists showed more inclination to favour the term
acculturation. Nevertheless, acculturation is usually considered one of the first
phases of assimilation. Assimilation has to be distinguished from acculturation
which may be regarded as accepting single elements of the core society without
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giving up an original identity (Nowotny, 1981, P. 81). Given the ambiguous
nature of the term, acculturation is persistently given 'the meaning of cultural
assimilation, or replacement of one set of cultural traits by another' (Spicer, 1968,
p. 21).
Acculturation, or the acquisition and acceptance of new cultural traits by the
members of an immigrant community, may take place in various ways. The
process of acculturation may remain a relatively superficial learning without
internalisation of the behavioural patterns of the larger society, or it may go
beyond a simple acquisition of knowledge of the new cultural values and
penetrate into the personality of the migrant with substantial behavioural
concomitants (Lewis, 1982, P. 184). In the new social and cultural environment, a
migrant is confronted with varying degrees of acceptance and he will gradually
find himself in a position of acquiring certain elements of the host community's
culture, such as learning a foreign language. The acquisition of language skills,
developing a positive attitude towards the host culture and the willingness to
participate in civic and political life in the new setting may be seen as indices of
integration. It should be pointed out here that integration differs from
assimilation in that an immigrant can preserve his own distinct identity in the
case of integration. The process of assimilation requires a weakening of salience
in expressing a cultural identity (Jackson, 1986, p. 7). Price (1969, P. 196) notes,
with reference to the degree of acculturation, that requirements placed on the
shoulders of individual migrants such as acquiring new knowledge as well as
new attitudes and values may lead to a twofold reaction. The migrant's response
may take a passive form through a deep involvement and identification, or his
reaction may display a pattern of superficial acceptance or further a rejection of
new roles completely.
Assimilation, on the other hand, is defined as 'participation in the culture of
social system and is measured as the degree to which a system unit occupies
positions on culturally relevant status lines'. In a more conventional terminology,
one can denote assimilation as 'the adjustment of nonindigenous members to the
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culture of the dominating society, i. e. the taking over and internalising of the
cultural contents existing there, in short adoption of a foreign ethnic identity'
(Nowotny, 1981, p. 81). Assimilation is also defined as a process in which persons
of diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds come to interact in the life of the larger
community. The disappearance of separate social structures based on ethnic and
racial concepts means that complete assimilation has taken place (Simpson, 1968,
p. 438).
Three main theories are advanced regarding assimilation: 1- Anglo-conformist; 2-
Melting-pot; and 3- Community theory. The Anglo-conformist theory argues that
assimilation is possible and necessary for new settlers (Price, 1969, p. 183). This
theory is based on a one way-process of interactionism that may be formulated
as a (A B– A) process in which subordinate group B is incorporated within
the dominant group A, in such a way that it becomes A with no significant
changes in the cultural structure of A (Hutnik, 1991, p. 26). This theory demands
the complete renunciation of the immigrant's ancestral culture in favour of the
values and behaviour of the larger society (Gordon, 1964, p. 85). The Melting-pot
theory, on the other hand, is based on a two-way process of interaction as Hutnik
(1991, p. 26) portrays in a (A—B – C) process of relations during which
subordinate group B interacts with the dominant A in such a way that both
groups are changed by the interaction and the result is a homogenous amalgam
of both groups represented by C. The Melting-pot theory proposes a bilateral
interaction which is meant to produce melted, blended and reshaped
personalities (Price, 1969, p. 183; Gordon, 1964, p. 85). The Community theory
allows cultural pluralism in an atmosphere where immigrant groups can
maintain and preserve their cultural traits in relation to the values prevalent in
the core society. Each ethnic group is allowed to establish its own communal life,
preserving their cultural heritage while participating in the social and civic life of
the host society (Gordon, 1964, p. 85; Price, 1969, p. 183). Almost all societies in
our contemporary world contain in their social mapping a certain degree of
diversity which supports the assumptions of the Community approach. People of
different racial and ethnic origins, of religious and denominational affiliation and
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of different colours are visible in many societies living together today. This
diversity constitutes multi-cultural societies where cultural pluralism is supposed
to be gaining precedence over the ideas based on racial discrimination and the
cultural suppression of ethnic minorities. The Community theory is more
relevant to this study which is of particular relevance to Turks. However, the rise
of racism and militant nationalism in recent years (Weil, 1991, p. 82; Weissbrod,
1994, p. 222; Skrypietz, 1994, p. 133; Hargreaves & Leaman, 1995, p. 3; Solomos &
Wrench, 1993, p. 7), seems to have shaken the foundations of the Community
theory which presupposes the accommodation of different races, ethnic groups
and cultures.
The assimilation of minority groups into a new socio-cultural context takes place
in different forms and stages. In his much-quoted model of assimilation, Gordon
(1964, p. 71), for example, presents an account of seven types or stages of
assimilation. These are cultural/behavioural assimilation, structural assimilation,
marital assimilation, identificational assimilation, attitude receptional
assimilation, behaviour receptional assimilation and civic assimilation. He argues
(p. 77) that cultural assimilation, acculturation, is likely to be the first type of
assimilation to occur. According to Gordon, structural assimilation is of
phenomenal importance . since: 'once structural assimilation occurs, either
simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation, all of the other types of the
assimilation will naturally follow'. This emphasis clearly indicates that structural
assimilation is regarded as a key stone and the consequence of such a structural
assimilation leads to the giving up of ethnic values and the disappearance of
ethnic identity as a distinctive social unit Price (1969, p. 185-8), on the other
hand, argues that the adjustment of immigrants to their new environment
depends partly on their personal and social backgrounds as well as on their
expectations and motives for migration. The migrant's customs and beliefs are
also significant in this respect He claims that quantitative characteristics of
immigration influence the assimilation, as a large concentration and residential
clustering encourage the formation of encapsulatory communities and strong
institutions which impede the process of assimilation.
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From a sociological point of view, social events, attitudes, stereotypes and
discrimination prevalent in the host society and resources available to the
migrants are among the factors which influence the degree of assimilation. One
of the important indices of absorption, Eisenstadt (1954, p. 12-3) asserts, is
acculturation which is concerned with the extent of the immigrant's acquisition of
new customs, nouns and the role of the receiving society. These roles and values,
imposed upon individuals, are accumulated through in ternalisation of them by
the migrants. Full absorption of migrant groups depends upon abandonment of
the migrants' separate identity within the host community's social structure.
Whatever the indices of complete assimilation might be, Oudehoven and
Willemsen (1989, p. 247) argue that full assimilation may develop a cultural
vacuum among minority group members. They assert that 'the second
generation of immigrants, in particular, may loose their ethnic, religious or
linguistic roots while not being adequately rooted in the majority culture either.
This loss of identity and historical roots -being caught in between several cultural
identities- may result in feelings of alienation or marginality'.
Generational structure, gender differences and the religious affiliation of
migrants and minority groups are important variables which should be taken
into account when considering the process of assimilation that is assumed, in the
words of Park and Burgess (1963, p. 360) 'to entail a process of interpretation and
fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and
attitudes of other persons or groups and, by sharing their experiences and
history, are incorporated with them in common cultural life'. However, in many
cases it is observed that minority members are reluctant to abandon their cultural
and social identities and are not willing to assimilate into the culture of the larger
community (Oudenhoven and Willemsen, 1989, p. 247). Stopes-Roe and
Cochcrane (1987, p. 47) found, for example, in their study of assimilation of
Asians in Britain that generation as a variable has a very strong effect on
identificational, cultural as well as structural assimilation. They noted that young
people scored higher in all these respects than did their parents.
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Citing Human, (1933) Lewis (1982, P. 187) points out that the assimilation process
involves three generations: 'the first generation' tend to establish ethnic groups
and institutions to maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host
society's social, cultural and economic values. Therefore, a reactionary response
curbs the fusionary effect of assimilation among the first generation members of
an ethnic minority. The second category, 'bridge generation', constitutes a
category of individuals who have ambiguous tendencies towards values and
habits of both minority and majority groups. They have a desire, on the one
hand, to preserve parental values at home and, on the other hand, to adopt the
host culture outside. The third category is noted as an 'assimilated generation'
who reject parental institutions and values whilst adopting the cultural pattern of
the core society.
It should be borne in mind that there is a significant difference between the
socialisation experiences of the first and the second or successive generations of
an ethnic community. The first generation individuals migrate to a new setting
with a set of ideas and beliefs. Their socialisation took place in the country of
origin and moulded, to a certain extent, by clearly defined ideals of the home
culture. In the case of the second and subsequent generations, one finds a
different line of socialisation process and personality development The second
generation individuals are exposed to a dual socialisation process, one being at
home by the family and the other being in the larger society by school, peer
groups and the media. The young Turkish generation in London are also
experiencing a similar process of socialisation. There is no doubt that this kind of
dual process of socialisation experience leaves a permanent mark on the
personality of the second generation with concomitant behavioural responses.
The natural outcome of exposure to different cultures is reflected in the form of
identity conflicts which surround the individuals who are influenced by differing
and often conflicting value systems embedded in parental and host cultural
environments.
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Religious beliefs and values are always maintained by the overwhelming
majority of ethnic groups and are reproduced in private and public spheres.
Religious institutions are usually spontaneously established at the same time as
ethnic communities begin to emerge. I argue that strong religious affiliation
among the immigrant groups reduces the effect of assirailationist policies.
Religious beliefs, especially in the case of Muslims, provide a paradigm which
stamps the thought and action of its followers. Internalisation of religious values,
submission of one's will to an ultimate vision of reality and commitment to living
up to its ideals may serve as a strong guard against assimilation. The upholding
of religious values and participation in its institutions, fostering communal
gathering and consciousness, may generate a powerful vehicle against the forces
of alienation. The persistence of a Muslim identity in Europe in the midst of
Western culture lends support to the foregoing argument that religious
commitment and the salience of Islamic identity resist the forces of assimilation.
This argument is directly related to the study of Turks in London.
3.4. Theories of Ethnicity
Various events in different parts of the world in recent years have brought the
problem of ethnicity to the centre of contemporary debate in the social and
political sciences. One consequence of this was to revive anthropology's long
interest in the subject, as reflected by the plethora of publications on ethnicity and
ethnic identity which have appeared during the last couple of years. The
staggering events after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dramatic
political changes and disintegration of the former Soviet Union led to the
emergence of proclamations of independence by many ethnic and national
groups. Durance (1993, p. 21) argues that a new Weltanschauung (style of thought
and life) developed in the midst of recent changes. One of the characteristics of
this Weltanschauung, he asserts, is 'the rediscovery of values linked to "ethnic"
identity (understood primarily in a cultural sense as opposed to a biological
sense)'. Chaos and a lack of central authority have given rise to the tragic
conflicts along ethnic and national lines in the former Soviet Union. Ethnic
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conflict in the former Soviet Union has led ethnic communities to take up arms
and weapons in defence of their territorial independence. Along with the old
Soviet Union, some countries in the Balkans have also become open arenas for
fierce and bloody ethnic conflicts. As Goulbourne observes (1991, p. 12) 'the
assertion of difference between collectivities of people has became the hallmark of
many social and political demands. Whilst in the past similarities between groups
of people formed the basis for unity or collective existence, the growing demand,
or emphasis, today, is for communities to be bound together by the factors which
establish difference from others'.
The resurgence of ethno-nationalism perpetuated by religious and historical
narratives has produced a new Holocaust The problem runs world-wide, for
example, the Bosnian Muslims suffered at the hands of Serbs who are described
as carrying out the 'ethnic cleansing' of Muslims. Racially motivated riots in Los
Angeles after the Rodney King affair in 1992, during which many people were
killed and stores were looted by angry crowds, raised the issue of race and ethnic
tension in an American city. South African history is replete with ethnic clashes
rooted in the racial white-black dichotomy. Occupied territories in Palestine are
yet another example where prevalent ethnic conflict has been on the agenda for
many years. The list could easily be extended by adding other instances where
ethnic differentiation is a source of ongoing conflict such as Burma, Burundi,
Zaire and Rwanda.
All these new developments indicate that ethnic issues have once more gathered
momentum, not only on the regional level with regard to national boundaries,
but also on the international level, affecting international relations. In what
follows I shall examine the issue of ethnicity and ethnic identity through a
general review of theories of ethnicity in order to put my study of the politics of
ethnicity and identity among Turks in London in a wider theoretical context
Ethnicity is an elusive concept, difficult to define with precision (Burgess, 1978, p.
266). Ethnicity as a term is derived from the Greek word ethnikos which is the
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adjective of ethnos, a term referring to a people or a nation. In its contemporary
usage the term 'ethnic' still retains this basic meaning in the sense that it denotes
some degree of coherence and solidarity among people who are aware of having
common origins and interests (Cashmore, 1991, p. 97). Despite its elusivenes,
ethnicity continues to fascinate and perplex (Banks (1996, p. 1) many researchers.
Cohen (1974, Introduction) acknowledges that 'because of its ubiquity, variety of
form, scope and intensity, and its involvement in psychic, social and historical
variables, ethnicity has been defined in a variety of ways, depending on the
discipline, field experience and interests of the investigators.' Psychologists, for
example, seem to be more concerned with the individual processes of
selfperception in relation to ethnic identity whereas anthropologists are more
concerned with the social aspects of group formation and interaction which lead
to the emergence of basic group identity (Sahoro, 1989, p. 98).
It may be argued that one of the underlying features of the contemporary world
is the existence of nation-states. The premise underlying the nation-state involves
a clear definition of political and geographical boundaries. Nevertheless, the
prevalence of nation-states with clearly defined borders has not prevented the
formation of multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies. As Anwar (1985, p. 1) notes,
'most societies in the world today are plural societies, in the sense that they
consist of different ethnic and racial groups. One phenomenon which has
contributed to the formation of such 'plural' societies was the economic
development arising from the growth of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution
which led to great international migrations of labour in the seventeenth,
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'. The United States, Britain and many West
European countries accommodate a significant number of people from non-
native racial and cultural backgrounds. Blacks, Hispanics, Italians and Chinese in
the United States and Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, West Indians in the UK,
Turks and Yugoslavians in Germany and Moroccans and Algerians in France
constitute minority groups within the larger society, having different racial,
linguistic, cultural origins and sometimes religious (as in the case of Indians,
Pakistanis, Turks and Moroccans) affiliation. These minority groups with
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characteristics distinct from the indigenous members of the society form ethnic
groups. Morris (1968, p. 167) defines an ethnic group as: 'a distinct category of
the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own.
The members of such a group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be, bound
together by common ties of race or nationality or culture'.
A review of the literature on ethnicity reveals differing perspectives on ethnicity
and ethnic identity of which primordial, situational and sociobiological
contentions may be useful tools for understanding the nature of ethnicity and the
forces behind the formation of ethnic identity among migrant and minority
groups. The explanation of the concept of ethnicity and ethnic identity in this
thesis is related to the migration experience. With regard to this relation,
Charsley (1974, p. 359) points out that one of the ways in which ethnic groups
appear to be established is a process of migration. This position is also supported
by Hechter (1986, p. 14) who contends that migratory movement as a result of
which two different communities face intergroup relations play a generative role
in the formation of ethnic groups.
Discussions and the theorisation of ethnicity are primarily rooted in
anthropological, ethnological and sociological discourses. An ethnic group is
usually defined in teims of biological, linguistic, cultural and religious criteria
(Liebkin.d, 1989, p. 28). Theories of ethnicity display variety and diversity in their
explanations of the ethnic phenomena. Therefore, a review of the relevant
literature is important for grasping the meaning of ethnicity and the rationale
and forces behind the formation of ethnic groups and ethnic identity.
3.4.1. Primordial Perspective: 'givens' of social existence
The primordial approach to ethnicity may be traced to Edward Shils whose well-
known article on interaction among members of primary groups laid the
foundations for this approach. In his article entitled 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred
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and Civil Ties,' Shils (1957, P. 130-139) touches upon the concept of primordial
attachment in his analysis of the systems of value orientation. Shils argues that
primordial attachments to kin, territory and religious belief systems are
characterised by a state of intense and comprehensive solidarity, coerciveness,
ineffable significance, fervour and passion and sacredness. But he does not
elaborate further on primordial allegiances beyond saying that primordial
attachments are different in nature from attachments to other social units. The
primordial view, which considers ethnicity as an irrational and deep-seated
attachment to kin, territory, culture and religion, is further developed by Clifford
Geertz. Geertz sums up his contention in the following way:
'By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' or
more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the
assumed 'givens' of social existence: immediate contiguity and live
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being
born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular
language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social
practices. These congruities of blood, speech custom and so on, are seem
to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of
themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow
believer, ipso facto as the result of not merely of personal attraction,
tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation but at
least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute importance
attributed to the very tie itself (Geertz, 1973, p. 259).
Geertz argues that ethnicity has deep roots outside the conscious realm of human
life. In his view, ethnicity is not determined by external and circumstantial forces,
but by internalised attachments. Geertz's approach indicates that the
priraordialist approach sees ethnicity, 'as a permanent and fundamental aspect of
human identity, expressed either alone and for its own sake, or in relations with
differently ethnic others' (Banks, 1996, p. 185). According to the primordialist
view as developed by Geeriz, ethnicity has an essentialist character which
ignores the effects of social, cultural and political environment; rather, it argues
that the sense of belonging to an ethic group is rooted in the 'givens' of social
existence and historical experience.
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Isaacs' (1978, p. 30) view on basic group identity and Horowitz's (1978, P. 113)
understanding of ethnicity also echo Geertz's contention of ethnicity as rooted in
primordial attachments derived from the assumed givens of social existence.
Isaacs contends, for example, that the basic group identity is derived from what
is called an ethnic group which is composed of 'primordial affinities and
attachments'. Horowitz, on the other hand, thinks that ethnic identity is generally
acquired at birth, although he remarks that this is a matter of degree, and
ascription is the key characteristic that distinguishes ethnicity from voluntary
association.
For primordialists, Stack (1986, P. 1) argues, a sense of peoplehood forms the
essence of ethnic identity and ethnicity assumes a nature which perpetuates the
expression of basic group identity. This basic group identity is passed down from
one generation to the next, binding the individual to a larger collectivity based on
a common outlook that differentiates members of the group from non-members.
The sociological version of the primordial contention regards linguistic
characteristics, religious beliefs and attitudes, racial features, ethnic origins and
territory as organising principles and bonds of human association throughout
human history. Since these organising principles precede more complex
formations and also prepare the social and historical basis for the latter to be built
on, they are truly primordial. Smith points out that primordial ties have caused
divisions and polarisation between societies and will always do the same on
varying degrees because primordial ties are not likely to disappear with the
alteration of modem conditions. He argues that
'units and sentiments found in the modem world are simply larger and
more effective versions of similar units and sentiments traceable in much
earlier periods of human history; and that, given the characteristics of the
human beings, their propensity to kinship and group belonging and their
need for cultural symbolism for communication and meaning, we should
expect nations and nationalism to be perennial, and, perhaps, universal'
(Smith, 1986, p. 12).
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For Smith (1984, p. 100), shared myths and memories are significant He notes
that shared 'ethnic myths' and memories are peculiar to each nation and
'comprise the ethnic heritage of the nation and include, besides myths and
memories, the values, symbols and traditions associated with a particular
homeland'. Smith (1996) also argues: 'that the process of transmission,
reinterpretation and reconstruction of these elements and of their patterning in
successive generations' need to be explained by exploring social and cultural
dimensions such as 'cognitive maps', 'social memories' and 'public moralities'.
The primordialist view emphasises that irrational attachments are based on
language, a religious value system, racial belonging, ethnicity and territory. This
perspective claims that nations and ethnic groups can be regarded as the natural
units of history and integral elements of the ongoing human experience.
Sociobiologists, on the other hand, argue that ethnicity is an extension of kinship
organisation which constitutes a vehicle to pursue collective goals in the struggle
for survival, van den Berghe (1978, p. 404), a leading theoretician in
sociobiological approach, asserts that 'ethnic groups, for nearly all of human
history, were what genetics call breeding populations, in breeding super families,
in fact, which not only were much more closely related to each other than to even
their closest neighbours, but which, almost without exception, explicitly
recognised that fact, and maintained clear territorial and social boundaries with
other such ethnic groups'. In a later study, van den Berghe (1987, p. 261) argues
that the propensity to give support to kin and ethnic individuals is deeply rooted
in our genetic nature. But he acknowledges that our genetic programming is
designed to be highly flexible and our specific behaviours are adaptive in
response to a wide range of environmental stimuli. He contends that ethnic
sentiments have evolved as an extension of nepotism, the ethnie being conceived
as an extended kin group sharing common biological descent van den Berghe
(1987, p. 250,261) seems to take a synthesising stand on ethnicity; according to
him, ethnicity is not a "given" nor a "constant", but it waxes and wanes in
response to environmental conditions'. Thus, ethnicity is both primordial and
situational.
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As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the primordial approach views
ethnicity as irrational, deep-seated attachments to kin, territory, religion,
language and race. According to this perspective, ethnic sentiments are the
'givens' of social existence. The main advantage of the primordialist endeavour
to penetrate the dynamics of ethnicity and ethnic group behaviour is that it
focuses our attention on the human psyche where the emotional strength of
ethnic allegiances is deeply rooted.
However, the primordialist perspective has not remain immune to criticism. This
approach is criticised on several grounds. McKay (1982, p. 398-98), for example,
argues that primordialists seem to employ deterministic and static terms in their
explanations because 'primordial givens' are not seen to change or to display
dynamic properties, but rather they have a primitive or atavistic nature. He
contends that ethnic phenomenon is not the consequence of some primordial
need, but is a rational, calculated response to certain stimuli. McKay's critique of
the primordial perspective seems to centre on two points, one of which is its
psychological reductionism and, secondly, its cultural determinism since
primordial traits are often viewed as fixed, involuntary and compelling. Stack's
(1986, p. 2) reservations on the primordial perspective lend support to McKay's
criticism. Stack points out that Geertz's emphasis on the unaccountable nature of
primordial attachments does not sit well with the attempts by social scientists to
probe the dynamics of ethnicity. He argues that the primordial approach not only
'infuses a romantic dimension into the study of ethnicity' but also its
conceptualisation comes close to cultural determinism which may lead to the use
of stereotypes. Although the primordial approach fails to explain why ethnicity
disappears during one historical period and re-intensifies during another, Stack
believes that it captures an undeniable aspect of the phenomenon now identified
in terms of ethnicity and ethnonationalism. Geertz's (1973, p. 259-60) following
statement confirms this argument 'the general strength of such primordial
bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person,
from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person, in
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every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow from a sense of
natural -some would say spiritual- affinity than from social interaction'.
3.4.2. Situational Approach: The Ethnic Boundary between 'Us' and 'Them'
There has been a trend away from primordial explanations of ethnicity and
ethnic identity to situationalism which views ethnicity as a rational response to
social, economic and cultural circumstances. The situational approach
emphasises instrumental, contextual, pragmatic and changeable aspects of
ethnicity. As McKay (1982, p. 399) notes, the essential feature of this viewpoint is
as follows: 'renewed ethnic tension and conflict are not the result of any
primordial need to belong, but are due to conscious efforts of individuals and
groups mobilising ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political and
material sources'. The situational view, also referred as the instrumentalist
approach, tends to regard ethnicity 'either as a position or outlook that is adopted
to achieve some specific end or to see it as the outcome of a set of particular
historical and socio-economic circumstances. That is, ethnicity is adopted by.
'choice' (Banks, 1996, p. 185).
The underlying premise of the situational perspective, which argues that ethnic.
mobilisation is not simply an inevitable result of primordial affinities, is that the
essence of ethnic mobilisation is 'situationally determined'. Barth, (1969, p. 10) in
his introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, concedes that 'ethnic groups are
categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have
the characteristic of organising interaction between people'. Barth acknowledges
that different processes are involved in generating and maintaining ethnic
groups. He argues that the ethnic boundary, which is social in essence, defines
the group; and the persistence of ethnic groups as significant units depends on
their display of marked difference in behaviour, i.e. 'persisting cultural
differences' (Barth, 1969, p. 15-16). Boundary variation for Barth, as Wallman
(1990, p. 230) points out,
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'comes in the content given to the ethnic category as a boundary 'vessel'.
That content affects or reflects firmness of the boundary and the
significance of any of the diacritical which differentiate 'us' from them.
The more signs of difference available, the greater the boundary
potential, but even where diacritical abound, there will be times when the
'vessel' is left empty. The metaphor implies that ethnicity is always there,
sometimes cool in the belly (like Azande witchcraft perhaps) but even
then primordial'.
Several features of the analytical model of Barth on ethnicity are established.
Jenkins (1990, p. 174), for example, enumerates the following features of the
Barthian approach: 'In the first place, the analysis of ethnicity starts from the
definition of the situation held by social actors. Second, the focus of attention then
becomes the maintenance of ethnic boundaries; the structured interaction
between 'us' and 'diem' which takes place across the boundary. Third, ethnic
identity depends on ascription, both by members of the ethnic group in question
and by outsiders. Fourth, ethnicity is not fixed, it is situationally defined. Fifth,
ecological issues are particularly influential in determining ethnic identity, in as
much as competition for economic niches plays an important role in the
generation of ethnicity'.
Derived from Barth's arguments, ethnicity is conceptualised as a group identity
that is essentially fluid, depending on how the boundaries of an ethnic group are
drawn in a specific content and, hence, the precise content of ethnic identity is
defined in relation to distinct external stimuli. Theorists of this posture tend to
conceptualise the mobilisation of ethnicity in terms of competition over scarce
economic and, to some extent, political resources, because ethnicity is viewed as
fluid and 'situationally determined. Moreover, situational approach regards
ethnic groups as "interest groups" '. Charsley (1974, p. 363) observes that ethnic
organisation may be established in order to promote or defend some ethnic
interests of a political, economic, religious or cultural nature. The instrumentalist
(situational) perspective, which views ethnic groups as a category of people
gathered around certain interests, attributes the variations in cultural patterns
between different ethnic groups to their commitment to increasing their share of
scarce resources, such as income, good jobs, better housing and schooling as well
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as prestige and political power. The mobilisation of ethnic groups and the pursuit
of ethnic interests are therefore interpreted as a strategy for the achievements of
goals or cultural values shared by the members of an ethnic group (Ballis Lal,
1983, p. 156).
Okamura (1981, p. 453-454) distinguishes between the structural and cognitive
dimensions of situational ethnicity which merges both. The structural aspect of
situational ethnicity denotes: 'the restraints enjoined upon parties within social
situations as a. consequence of the setting of social action, which in this case is
provided by the overall structure of ethnic group relations in a. given society. The
setting also includes the relative political and socio-economic statutes of these
groups, the distribution of occupation, education, income, wealth and other
social and material resources among them, their numerical proportions, and the
immediate prospects for change in any of these areas'. The structural dimension
of ethnicity denotes the significance of ethnicity as an organising principle of
social relations. The other aspect of situational ethnicity, the cognitive, according
to Okamura, 'pertains to the actor's subjective perception of the situation in which
he finds himself and to the salience he attributes to ethnicity as a relevant factor
in that situation'. The cognitive realm, Okamura notes, is concerned with the
person's perception of cultural signs and symbols. Okaraura's ideas on the
cognitive dimension of situational ethnicity largely derive from Barth's (1969, p.
10) assertion that 'ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identifications
...'. Mitchell (1974, p. 16-17) also tends to explain ethnicity on two levels as
behavioural ethnicity which corresponds to Okamura's structural dimension and
cognitive ethnicity which can be traced back to Barth's treatment of ethnicity as a
cognitive category.
Some authors such as Weinreich (1996), on the other hand, use different concepts
to denote the changing nature of ethnicity. He argues that processes situated
within a particular socio-historical context very much influence the formation of
ethnicity. Weinreich prefers using the concept of 'process' and 'context' rather
than situation to denote the circumstantial aspect of individual ethnicity and
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asserts that isocio-historical contexts differ greatly in terms of the particular
distribution of multiple ethnic groups in a country and the nature of the
relationships between the ethnic groups. The historical contexts of economic
migrations, of conquest, apartheid ideologies and ethnic cleansing, and of
genocide and refugee status will have profound impact on the statutes of an
ethnic group'.
However, the situational perspective, with its emphasis on contextual and
rational sources of ethnicity, was also subjected to critical examination. Cohen,
for example, argues that
'the definition of ethnicity as cognition of identity obscures, even nullifies,
the conception of differences in degree of ethnicity. Barth's conception of
ethnic categories as organisational vessels that are fixed, static, always
there even when not relevant to behaviour, suffer from the same
difficulties. His separation between 'vessel' and 'content' makes it
difficult to appreciate the dynamic nature of ethnicity. It also assumes an
inflexible structure of the human psyche and implicitly denies that
personality is an open system given to modifications through continual
socialisation under changing socio-cultural conditions. Unless we
recognise differences in degree of manifestations we shall fail to make
much progress in the analysis of ethnicity' (Cohen, 1974, Introduction).
It has also been argued that the explanations of the ethnic phenomenon, which is
exclusively based on the interest paradigm in political, economic or in other
domains of ethnic group formation, underrate the emotional power of ethnic
bonds and exaggerate the influence of materialism on human behaviour (McKay,
1982, p. 400). The pursuit of interests by itself, Charsley contends (1974, p. 359), is
not an adequate explanation for the formation, development and maintenance of
ethnicity. The situational approach to ethnicity is said to have played down 'the
possibility of the overall mobilisation of the resource of ethnicity in the interests
of a class' (Rex, 1986, p. 28).
It seems that neither a primordialist nor a situational approach to ethnicity can be
dismissed out of hand as explanatory categories. As Scott suggests (1990, p. 167),
both approaches may explain different aspects of ethnicity and ethnic solidarity. I
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would like to close this discussion by quoting an assertion in a recently published
book on ethnicity to point out constant reproduction and re-expression of
ethnicity. This would also reflect the contention of the thesis. Banks (1996, p. 190)
observes that
'the fragmentation and reformulation of macro political structures since
the end of he Cold War, and the rise of 'new genetics' (which will alter
ideas about human reproduction if not everyone's practices), mean that
new folk systems of knowledge are being thrown up every day. These
systems, while local in colour and character, are neither particularistic nor
bounded. They are linked in nested hierarchies, feed off each other, and
make competing claims to authoritativeness and universalism. Ethnicity
lives self-consciously within these systems'.
Thus, both primordial and circumstantial variables are important to an
understanding of ethnicity as 'both types of factors are significant some sort of
ascriptive commonality is after all necessary for a group to be ethnic in any
meaningful sense, but the salience and level of inclusiveness of different
ascriptive characteristics in determining ethnic boundaries varies according to
differences in circumstances' (Chai, 1996, p. 281). The concept of ethnicity and
ethnic identity, therefore, should not be seen as a fixed category. Smith's (1996)
comment on national identity fits this conclusion. He notes that 'national identity
is undoubtedly imagined, but it is equally felt, known and lived'. So is ethnic
identity.
3.4.3. Foundations of 'We' versus 'Them'
I have, so far, reviewed the perspectives on ethnicity and discussed the
underlying premises of primordial and situational approaches to this complex
phenomenon. A review of the literature on this subject revealed that there are
approaches to the concept ethnicity. Burgess (1978, p. 266-267) attributes the
variations of theories to two sets of criteria. According to Burgess, differences
between perspectives on ethnicity stem from a rational-non-rational dichotomy
regarding the sources of ethnicity: a non-rational framework presupposes that
ethnicity is an involuntary, innate or instinctive phenomenon as primordialists
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concede. On the other hand, a rational predisposition views ethnicity essentially
as a voluntary, pragmatic and situational process.
However, as noted earlier, it is suggested that ethnicity should be seen as both
primordial and situational to avoid a one-sided approach. McKay (1982, P. 413)
argues that primordialist and mobilisationist (instrumental, situational)
contentions are not mutually exclusive but, rather, are interrelated. He proposes a
polar model of ethnic phenomena which combines both the primordial and the
situational explanations of ethnicity. Most observers now tend to accept the
eclectic idea that at least to some degree both 'primordial' and 'interest' factors
are involved in ethnicity. It is viewed that under some circumstances, feelings of
cultural unity and ancestral attachments constitute the major source of ethnic
belonging, whereas under other circu_mstances a perception of shared interests
and material purposes are the major source of ethnic allegiance (Yinger, 1986, p.
26).
Whatever the differences in these perspectives, it may be suggested that ethnicity
provides an answer to the question of 'Who am I?' or 'Who are we?' and ethnic
consciousness may facilitate the development of an identity construct based on a
'we' versus 'them' mentality. Ringer and Lawless (1989, p. 18,19) also argue, for
example, that the ethnic group which develops a sense of 'we-ness' is quite aware
that beyond the boundaries of this defined consciousness of 'we-ness' there is a
'they' that constitutes the larger society which plays an important role in the very
being and functioning of the ethnic group. It can be said from the point of the
larger society that those outside its boundaries can also be designated as 'they',
just as the ethnic group's designation of the larger society as a 'they'.
An ethnic community is distinguished from the larger society. The features that
distinguish an ethnic group from the larger society constitute the foundations of
an ethnic community. Various dimensions upon which an ethnic community is
established are recognised as distinctive features of ethnic groups. It is argued
that an ethnic group is distinguished by six basic traits which define 'we' or
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'them'. These are: 1- a collective name; 2- a common myth of descent; 3- a shared
history; 4- a distinctive shared culture; 5- an association with a specific territory;
6- a sense of solidarity (Smith, 1981, p. 66; Smith, 1986, P. 24-30; Burgess, 1978, p.
269; Ringer & Lawless, 1989, p. 5).
In his analysis of an ethnic group, Yinger (1985, p. 159), on the other hand,
proposes a mixture of significant ingredients of ethnic identity as language,
religion, race and ancestral homeland which he later (1994, p. 3-4) reformulates in
three categories. In Yingelis view, an ethnic group has three defining
particularities: '1- The ethnic group is perceived by others in the society to be
different in some combination of the following traits: language, religion, race,
and ancestral homeland with its related culture; 2- the members also perceive
themselves as different; and 3- they participate in shared activities built around
their (real or mythical) common origin and culture'. Ascription by self and
others, as well as participation, are the foundation stone of an ethnic group.
Beyond these theoretical positions, this thesis is concerned not only with
ascription and participation, but also with the reproduction of social, cultural and
religious values among a minority community which are all related to the
concept of ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic belonging ID a culturally distinct
group, i.e. the Turkish community in London.
In the following section, theories of identity development will be reviewed as the
concept of identity is used in conjunction with ethnicity in this thesis. An
understanding of the meaning of identity, its development and maintenance is
essential because a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group is embedded
in the internalisation of such an identity built around certain values and
experiences.
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3.5. Approaches to Identity Development: The Meaning of Identity
Identity is a. multidimensional concept, therefore any attempt to explain the
concept of identity and discussions surrounding the formation of identity, its
components and dimensions, as well as what kinds of variables are crucial in
the development of identity, requires one to adopt a multidisciplinary
approach. Such an approach would produce a better explanatory framework
overcoming the limitations of one-sided approaches to such a complex area of
research: namely, the formation of identity within a multicultural setting and
its relation to ethnicity, culture and religion. This section examines the
concept of identity from social and psychological perspectives and relates it
to how ethnic minorities achieve a sense of identity. It also looks at the
influences of family, religion, culture and group belonging on the formation
and maintenance of identity.
Erikson (1968) recalls in the preface of his seminal, and oft-quoted study of
identity, that Dr. Paul Federn, who was a teacher in the Vienna
Psychoanalytic Institute, asked himself at the end of a series of lectures on the
concept of identity: 'Nun-hab ich mich verstanden'- Now have I understood
myself?- Erikson's recollection of his teacher's self-questioning indicates how
problematic the concept of identity is and how complex are processes
involved. Erikson, one of the forerunners of the systematic study of identity
in terms of conceptualisation, tries to develop a framework to explain what
identity means and how the sense of identity develops from childhood
through adolescence as the titles of his books (Identity: Youth and Crisis, 1968;
Identity and the Life Cycle, 1959) on the subject in question imply. Erikson
(1959, p. 109) ascribes various meanings to the concept of identity. He
contends that identity at one time may 'refer to a conscious sense of individual
identity; at another to an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal
character; at a third, as a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis; and,
finally, as a maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group's ideals and
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identity'. In the literature on this topic, identity is usually referred to as a
sense, attitude and resolution. Marcia (1980, P. 159) defines identity 'as a self-
structure, an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organisation of drives,
abilities, beliefs, and individual history'. Depending on how these structures
are developed, an individual posits himself in relation to others. In his study,
Erikson argues that
'identity formation begins where the usefulness of multiple identification
ends. It arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation
of childhood identifications, and their absorption in a new
configuration, which in turn, is dependent on the process by which a
society (often through subsocieties) identifies the young individual,
recognising him as somebody who had to become the way he is, and
who, being the way he is, is taken for granted' (Erikson, 1959, p. 122).
As Wright (1982, p. 25,71) points out, the concept of identity is usually raised
by means of asking 'Who am I'? In the first instance one gets the impression
that the very wording of the above question denotes self as the only
dimension of identity. Nevertheless, identity is comprised not solely of self
but is more than the private 'Who am I ?'. Thus, one has to ask about other
dimensions of identity (I's) such as environment, society, world view and
culture'.
3.5.1. The Social Dimensions of Identity Development and Ethnic Group
Membership
Human beings are born in societies. As soon as the newly born baby acquires
life, he is surrounded by individuals and institutions. Family members in
early life, peer groups, schools and many other social establishments at a later
period influence the growing child in varying degrees during his life cycle.
The setting in which an individual grows up presents itself as a societal
dimension of identity. Liebkind (1989, P. 52) rightly notes the insufficiency of
sociological theories of minority identity since, as she puts it, 'sociological
theories of minority identity have often neglected the fact that human identity
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has both personal and social aspects. While the content of social identity
derives from membership in various social groups, personal identity derives
from characteristics which distinguish an individual from other members of
the same group(s)'. Markstrom-Adams (1992, p. 174) calls all these
surrounding elements 'social contextual factors'. He argues that 'contextual
factors pertinent to identity formation encompass issues that close social
relationships and the socio-cultural milieu present to the adolescent Identity
formation is not wholly an individualistic process; rather, the social
environment exerts its forms of power and influence'. In relation to identity,
Markstrom-Adam identifies three math social contextual factors that include
family relationships, ethnic and racial group membership and religiosity.
Taking the environmental contexts into account, Kroger (1993, p. 11) argues
that looking at the social dimension has a methodological potential of
allowing researchers to specify features most likely to facilitate the identity
formation process within social institutions. She believes that the roles of
culture, social class, ethnicity and historical ethos are among the contexts
related to identity formation process. With regard to the social dimension of
identity formation, Hitch (1983, p. 118) draws our attention to the meaning of
that dimension. As he points out, 'social' means something more than the
influence of other people, it cannot be limited to the effects of others on an
individual. Identity also means more than a self-description in terms of
qualities. Hitch notes further that 'what may be termed "social identity" is
that aspect of the cognised self which refers to membership of a group, or
category of social significance'. Identity is a psychosocial construct The
community within which the young persons seek to find themselves
constitutes the social dimension of identity (Wright, 1982, p. 81). Erikson
(1959, p. 161) refers to this dimension of identity as ego-aspect as opposed to
self-aspect of identity formation.
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Ethnicity is one of the variables that marks the process of identity formation.
Belonging to an ethnic group enables the members of that group to define
their distinct features by means of comparing themselves with other ethnic,
religious or cultural groups. Apter's (1983, p. 79) argument lends support to
the idea that group membership is a source of developing a sell-concept He
argues that 'one of the most salient forms of self-definition in most people
derives from the membership of groups, both primary and secondary
groups... Extending the `I' and `me' terminology, to a group could be said to
provide a way of giving meaning to 'Me' in terms of 'Us".
The process of identity formation for young people who are members of
ethnic and racial mirtority 2 communities acquires a complex nature due to
several intervening factors. As Markstrom-Adams (1992, p. 176) points out,
one can attribute such complexity to issues of colour, linguistic distinctions,
behavioural differences, physical features and social stereotypes. There
appears in the formation of identity, a culture conflict between majority and
minority cultural values. It is especially important to note that 'sorting
through the two sets of values and selecting those to incorporate into one's
identity may, for some minority individuals, yield a no-win scenario. That is,
adopting an identity consistent with values of the dominant culture may
result in ostracism from one's minority group'. It is well-documented that
children of migrants, even though they are settled, due to contextual
conditions pursue different avenues in their identity development from their
ancestors and peers in the host society (Weinreich, 1986a, p. 231). In this
regard, Weinreich brings to our attention the issue of dual socialisation of
migrant children. His research findings show that children of migrants in
Britain are exposed to a distinctive kind of dual socialisation. He observes
that
'during primary socialisation within their homes they form their early
identifications with their parents and other members of their own
ethnic community. Subsequently, during secondary socialisation at
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school, representing a different culture, and within the wider
community, they form further identifications with significant others
embodying values and aspirations of the subordinate community.
Elements of the latter identifications will be incompatible with the
earlier, home-based, ethnic ones, so that these earlier identifications
become conflicted. Thus, by adolescence, second generation boys and
girls will tend to have conflicted identifications with people of their
own ethnicity' (VVeinreich, 1986b, p. 304).
In another article, Weinreich (1983, p. 157) analyses culture conflict which
derives from differences between the values held by different ethnic groups.
He argues that those who grow up experiencing two distinct and diverse
cultural values are likely to adopt several aspects of these two different sets of
values. Internalising parts of two different value systems means that the
identifications of children and youth cannot be confined to one ethnic group
and its cultural values. A duality of world views, values based on diverse sets
of a cultural 'belongingness' that conflict with each other may also be
interpreted as cultural discontinuity. According to Phinney, as the title of
article Multiple Group Identities: Differentiation, Conflict and Integration suggests,
an important component of the communal culture is the group identities in a
given society. Phinrtey (1993a, p. 47-48) notes that the development of all
youth will be influenced by their identification with social groups, and group
identity is likely to be particularly salient for adolescents from ethnic groups.
Therefore, within a multicultural society, siblings of ethnic communities have
to deal with multiple identities.
3.5.2. Religion and Identity
Historical research on earlier societies reveals that religion played a major
role in the establishment of social identity of individuals. Religion appears to
be a source of identity. Beals (1978, p. 147) argues that 'for the individual,
religion provides subjective access to a universe of meaning by which he is
able to transcend the determinism of social identity and everyday experience.
For the believer, religion opens up an "ultimate" identity that subjectively
situates him as unique and free'. Religion provides a unique
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Weltanschauungen or world-view for its members (Abromson, 1979, P. 6).
Therefore, religious belief was used as an important variable in research on
identity by leading scholars such as Marcia (1966, p. 553). Baumeister (1986,
p. 114) argues that 'a firm religious context can enable the adolescent to
interpret his or her personal experience in terms of religious symbols, such as
the struggle against temptation or redemption. The religious framework also
provides a clear model of how to resolve the adolescent phase by providing a
Erikson (1968, p. 83) also emphasises the role of religion as a deeply rooted
source for coherent identity achievement He suggests that religion
systematises and socialises the first and deepest conflict in life by combining
the dim images of each individual's first providers into collective images of
ancient protectors. Religion also restores the crisis of the life cycle and gives a
new sense of wholeness to things surrounding the individual. Baumeister
(1986, p. 114) also supports the view that religious values have constructive
effects on youth identity formation. A firm religious belief and internalised
moral values provide young adolescents with a powerful guide for behaviour
and constitute an influential ally during identity formation. In the formation
and consolidation of ethnic identity, religion also plays a constructive role.
Moll (1979, p. 37), for example, contends that religion, as the sacralisatiort of
identity, reinforces ethnic identity by delineating the ethnic group from its
surroundings3 . A sense of belonging to a religion which provides a shared
meaning of life for an ethnic group will help its members not only strengthen
their identity but will also define it more clearly vis-à-vis 'others'.
In any discussion of identity, the role of the past and family influence on
identity formation should also be taken into account Erikson wrote as early
as 1959 (p. 109) that the term 'identity' expresses 'an individual's link with
the unique values, fostered by a unique history, of his people'. Wallerstein
(1991b, p. 78) regards the shared past of the given community as an identity.
In the formation of peoplehood as having an identity, the past plays an
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important role. Wallerstein contends that 'pastness is a mode by which
persons are persecuted to act in the present in ways that they might not
otherwise act Fastness is a tool persons use against each other. Fastness is a
central element in the socialisation of individuals, in the maintenance of
group solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation.
Fastness is therefore pre-eminently a moral phenomenon'.
As noted earlier, the identity of an individual or a group is formed,
developed, achieved, changed, preserved and maintained throughout the life
cycle in various identity negotiations. A child's early and foremost
socialisation takes place within the family. The first identity negotiations are
observed between parents and children. Parents and other family members
consciously or unconsciously convey their concepts, attitudes and evaluations
of social characteristics to their children (Liebkind, 1989, p. 53). The child,
surrounded by immediate family members at the first stages of his life and by
peers, school teachers later, looks as Erikson (1959, p. 19) puts it, 'for models
by which to measure himself, and seeks happiness in trying to resemble
them'. 'Parents, siblings, and other family members provide a cultural context
that becomes for the child a lens through which to view the world. The
"correctness" of these values, their representations of objective reality, are
unquestioned and become integral aspects of the child's reality' (Rosenthal,
1987, p. 161). During the early period of their life cycle, parents are the most
immediate sources of identification and role models for children. As the child
grows up, familial relations and values personified by elders play a primary
role in the formation of individual identity. Phinney and Rosenthal (1992, p.
153) found that family influences on the formation and maintenance of ethnic
identity in childhood are very strong and pervasive. They argue that the
family is: 'the source of children's first experiences related to ethnicity and it
is generally with the parents and other family members that children make
their first identifications as part of a group'.
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In the light of foregoing discussions on theoretical issues including
immigration, ethnic-minority community formation, ethnicity and the
development of a sense of belonging to an ethnic group, I will analyse the
case of Turkish ethnicity and identity in London. I will try to explain how
Turkish ethnicity and identity are constructed and how they are expressed.
The role of the family, tradition and religion on the formation of identity will
be discussed in the light of the ethnographic and survey data. However,
before that I would like to examine the process and pattern of Turkish
migration to Britain and other European countries and explain how Turkish
ethnic communities have emerged and evolved.
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Chapter Three: Notes:
1- For a philosophical discussion on identity and identification, see Daniel Kolak
(1993), 'Finding our selves: identification, identity and multiple personality'
Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 363-386; Daniel Kolak (1993) "The
Metaphysics and Metapsychology of Personal Identity: Why Thought Experiments
Matter in Deciding who We Are' American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp.
39-50.
2- For a thorough review of literature on ethnic identity development among youth,
see Phinney, J. S. (1990) 'Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of Research'
Psychological Bulletin, VoL 108, No. 3, pp. 499-514.
3- For a cross-cultural discussion on religion and its influence on ethnic identity, see
Hans Moll (1978) Identity and Religion, Sage Publications, London; for a sociological
analysis of religion-ethnicity relations in America, see Philip E. Hammond & Kee
Warner (1993) 'Religion and Ethnicity in Late-Twentieth-Century America' The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 527, pp. 55-66.
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Chapter Four
Turkish Labour Migration To Western Europe And Britain
The presence of Turks in Europe is not a recent phenomenon. Their presence can
be traced to long before the arrival of Turkish workers in Britain and in other
West European countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A review of the
movement of Turkish people towards Europe will reveal that, although in a
different nature, several thousand Turks came to Europe as early as the thirteenth
century. Inalcik (1993, p. 10) argues that the advent of the Anatolian Turks in the
Balkans dates back to the 1260s. The expansion of the Ottomans extended to
Thrace in the reign of Orhart Ga (1324-1359) whose son Suleyman managed to
establish the first permanent Ottoman base at Gallipoli in Europe from which the
initial conquests of the Balkans were made in subsequent years. Orhan's
conquests in Europe were followed by the settlements of Turkoman nomads in
large numbers from Anatolia.
Ottoman expansion in the Balkans continued gradually and the Ottomans
encouraged immigration to the newly conquered territories. A large number of
Muslim nomads were transferred to the Balkans in Europe as a state policy. In
line with his predecessor, Murat 1(1360-1389) launched an offence from this base
in Europe to conquer Thrace. As his predecessor, Murat I advocated a
programme of mass immigration and settlement of Turkomans in the newly
conquered territories in Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Serbia to strengthen the
Turkish presence in the Balkans (Shaw, 1988, p. 17). Eminov, (1987, p. 280) points
out, for example, that the settlement of Turkish Muslims in Bulgaria dates from
the second half of the fourteenth century. Sofia was conquered in 1386 and,
thereafter, the tide of invasion rolled on which made the Ottoman-Turkish
presence in the Balkans more effective (Yucel, 1987, p. 17). The victory of the
Turkish army at Kosova in 1389 destroyed the last organised resistance in the
Balkans against the Ottoman expansion. This meant that the Turkish presence in
Europe reached as far as Serbia and all of South-eastern Europe (Shaw, 1988, p.
22). It is worth noting here that after the victory in Kosova, the Ottomans
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established a Turco-Muslim presence in the Balkans as the ruling political power.
The conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) by the Ottoman forces in 1452 during
the reign of Mehmet II (1451-1481) was a historical turning point in Turkish
history with regard to the Turkish presence in Europe and the consequent
relations between the Turks and the Europeans.
The military expansion of the Ottoman Turks had not only changed the political
and economic power balance of the region, but the ethnic and demographic
structure of the Balkans was also altered. The arrival of Turkish groups changed
the distribution of the people with regard to ethnic, religious and linguistic
divisions in society. However, ethnic and cultural diversity have always been
maintained through adopting a policy of recognition and tolerance of other
nationals and cultures under the millet' system. The maintenance and
nourishment of ethnic diversity was not only encouraged to promote a multi-
racial society, but such a. diversity was also protected by imperial decrees within
this multi-ethnic empire. The Ottoman bureaucracy seems to have succeeded in
dealing with ethnic groups by devising an administrative system which allowed
the existence and preservation of ethnic diversity.
However, the rise of nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth century
coupled with an irreversible decline in the military and political power of the
Ottomans, opened a new phase. The weakened Ottomans were forced to retreat
from Europe, leaving a substantial number of Turkish-Muslims behind, some of
whom later emigrated to Turkey either forcefully or by bilateral agreements.
Bulgaria2 and Greece3 still have a significant number of Turkish-Muslim
minority population.
4.1. Migration to Europe: Process and Patterns
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, for predominantly economic reasons, a large-
scale labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe became a frequent
phenomenon (see also Chapter Three for pull-push factors). The initial wave of
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Turkish labour migration was mainly directed to West Germany. This may be
attributed to the friendly relations between the two countries. Turkey allied itself
with Germany during the First World War and since then both countries have
sustained good relations. However, labour migration from Turkey was not only
confined to Germany. Migration of workers had also taken place towards several
other West European countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Sweden and Britain. It should be noted that, in contrast to several other
manpower-supplying countries, labour migration was a rather new phenomenon
for Turkey. As mentioned in Chapter One, there was a colonial background of
immigration to France, Britain and the Netherlands. These countries received a
significant number of migrant workers from their former colonies. Turkey differs
in this respect in that as a labour-sending country she had no colonial links with
countries where a large number of Turkish migrant population exists. Whereas,
for example, Britain received immigrants from the West Indies, India and
Pakistan; France turned to Algeria, and the Netherlands hosted migrants from
Indonesia as colonial or ex-colonial territories (Beeley, 1983, p. 25). However,
Turkey had no direct colonial relationship with any of the receiving countries.
Therefore, as noted by Paine (1974, p. 2) this fact should be taken into account
when drawing any general conclusions of labour-exporting experience in
Turkey.
The beginning of organised labour migration from Turkey goes back to October
1961 when Turkey and Germany signed a bilateral agreement for the recruitment
of Turkish workers in Germany. Before 1961, participation of Turkish workers in
post-war labour migration to Western Europe had, at least officially, not taken
place (Martin, 1991, p. 3). Historically speaking, Turkey was a rather late starter
among the main labour-sending countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and
Greece (Paine, 1974, p. 36). Not until the bilateral agreements were signed
between Turkey and several countries after the post-war period did the scale of
Turkish labour migration gather momentum. Turkish migration for recruitment
was organised and regulated through these bilateral agreements. Turkey signed
its first bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961 to send its labour surplus in
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response to the labour demand by Germany. Turkey had also signed similar
agreements with Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1964, France in 1965
and Sweden in 1967 in order to find employment for the highly active working
population.
Most of the bilateral agreements were modified after the 1973-74 economic
recession when employment of foreign labour in Europe was halted. Germany
and other labour-recruiting countries decided to adopt restrictive policies in the
early 1970s, aimed at stopping additional immigrant workers. However, these
restrictive measures did not stop family unification. Germany has been the
dominant receiving country since the signing of the bilateral agreement in
October 1961.
Turkish labour migration to Europe developed in several phases. Abadan-Unat
outlines these major phases in relation to the nature and volume of the
emigration and subsequent developments. She concedes that the first phase
between 1956-1962 has an experimental nature. The initial phase is marked by
'the attempt of semi-official institutions trying to organise an exchange of trainees
(Praktikanip_n), while in reality this already constituted at the time a temporary
form of industrial manpower recruitment'. It was reported, for example, that 12
craftsmen had arrived in Kiel, Germany in 1957 as part of a first agreement
following the application of the Institute of World Economy of the University of
Kiel to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting for a programme to
exchange vocationally trained volunteers. The number of Turkish migrants was
as little as 2700 in 1960 and, in 1963, 27,500 workers left Turkey. The following
phase of Turkish external migration covers 1963-1967 which displayed an
explosive growth, governmental mediation, adjustment to industry and social
life. This phase is characterised by a significant change in the volume and
structure of Turkish labour migration The scale of the migration increased
dramatically following bilateral agreements (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 15). While
family reunions were taking place, settlement patterns of Turkish workers began
to take shape. The economic recession in 1966-67 made most Turkish workers
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redundant Economic recession has caused a rapid decline in the number of guest
workers, from 1.3 million to 900,000 during the recession years of 1966-67
(Holzner, 1987, p. 428). Due to high unemployment rates, many Turks had to
return to Turkey. Their size decreased from 161,000 to 123,000 between
September 1966 and January 1968 (Sen, 1989, p. 24; Penninx, 1982, p. 786).
According to Abadan-Unat, a later phase (1968-1973) is characterised by the
rapid increase of Turkish migrant workers recruited in European countries.
Although the 1967-68 economic recession discouraged many Turks to attempt to
come to Germany for work, after a hesitant period Turkish labour migration to
Germany resumed. From 1968 onwards, Turkish labour migration increased
unexpectedly until Germany decided to end labour recruitment from other
countries (Penninx, 1982, p. 786). Between the two periods of economic crisis,
Germany hosted more than 103,000 Turkish workers in 1973. The percentage of
Turkish women workers also increased in this period. The third phase, as
pointed out by Abadan-Unat (1976, p. 13-18), 'represents both for Turkey and the
major European host countries the achievement of gaining "consciousness" in
regard to the manifold problems of foreign workers'. This means that issues
concerning immigrants such as working conditions and legal matters regulating
their status entered into discussions. The volume of migration and the trend
towards settlement increased awareness among policy makers and the case of
immigrants, so to speak, established itself as a social and political reality in the
countries of origin and immigration. This phase was followed by the second
economic recession in 1973 which had serious implications for migrant workers
and their families.
The Government of Germany decided to close all the labour-recruiting offices
abroad as a first step to halt additional labour immigration. The expectation on
the side of the German authorities was that, while new recruitment was stopped,
the present workers would leave Germany and, thus, the volume of 'guest
workers' would rapidly decline (Holzner, 1987, p. 429). Against this wishful
thinking, a new trend assumed priority in the form of reunification of families in
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Germany. Dependants of foreign workers began to arrive to join their families,
increasing the number of foreign nationals in Germany. This phase (1975-1978) of
Turkish labour migration was marked by 'settling abroad for indefinite periods;
mixed marriages, family migration, educational problems..! (Abadan-Unat, 1986,
p. 337). This period, it can be argued, represents a transformation in the nature of
Turkish labour migration and an emerging ethnic minority community in
Germany. Members of the Turkish labour force were joined by their spouses and
children, showing a tendency to settle in Germany rather than return to Turkey.
The federal authorities in Bonn introduced visa requirements for Turkish
nationals in 1980 and, one year later, in 1981, further restrictive policy was
adopted by dropping the age limit of dependants who wished to join their
parents from eighteen to sixteen. The waiting period for married couples to join
their spouses as alien residents was increased from one year to three years. Other
European countries also imposed similar restrictions to halt migration (Beeley,
1983, p. 27). Despite restrictions and discouragement, family unions continued
and, against the expectations of a return to Turkey, the number of Turks in
Germany steadily increased to almost two million as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Turks in selected European countries
1973
615,827
33,892
30,091
30,527
14,029
6,250
2,011
Germany
France
Netherlands
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Britain
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Total
	
1,552,328	 1,965,577
	
144,790	 254,000
	
154,201	 252,450
	
75,000	 150,000
	
63,587	 90,495
	
17,240	 34,700
	
28,480	 65,000
	
3,086	 5,577
	
5,061	 20,900	 36,001
	
19,710	 48,485	 76,662
	
777,727	 2,108,097	 2,930,392
Sources: SOPEK 1995; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur die Belange der Auslander, 1995; Annual
Report, Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 1984, 1992, 1993; Turkish Employment
Service, Statistics on Turkish Migrant Workers, 1974
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The migration of Turkish workers to other European countries took a similar
course although on a smaller scale and, as Table 4.1. shows, the number of Turks
in several European countries steadily increased and had reached almost three
million by 1995. According to the statistics of the Turkish Ministry of
Employment and Social Security, the second largest Turkish minority
community lives in France. They are mostly concentrated in Paris, Strasbourg,
Marseilles and Lyon. Turks in the Netherlands, on the other hand, are clustered
largely in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht. Austria
accommodates Turkish workers mainly in Vienna, Tirol and Vorarlberg.
Belgium also has a similar pattern of clustering in particular areas such as
Brabant, Limbourg and East Flandre. The concentration of Turkish people can be
attributed to the availability of jobs in these areas, especially during the early
phase of migration and the chain migration determined by social networks and
patronage such as family, kinship and village relations, especially in the latter
period of migration underlined by family union and settlement
4.2. Migration from Cyprus and Turkey to Britain
Available research suggests that migration from Cyprus to Britain started as early
as the 1920s and, by the 1930s almost 1,000 Cypriot immigrants had settled in
Britain. However, early immigrants from Cyprus were exclusively Greek-
Cypriots (Oakley, 1987, p. 31). The annexation of Cyprus by Britain took place in
1914 and, thereafter, residents of Cyprus acquired a new status as subjects of the
British Crown. The migration continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s until the
Second World War. The immigration of Cypriots was regulated through the
issue of affidavits (George and Millerson, 1966/7, p. 278) and passports. The
outbreak of war in 1939 halted Cypriot migration and the issue of affidavits was
suspended to prevent further population movement Hence no further migration
was observed until 1945. There were only a few Turks among these early
immigrants. According to Home Office statistics, for example, the number of
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Turkish-Cypriots recorded between 1933-34 was only three and, in 1936, only
four (Oakley, 1989, P. 518).
Economic stagnation and political instability after the War produced the second
wave of migration from Cyprus. The increase in the volume of Cypriot
immigration led to the introduction of restrictive measures by the early 1950s.
The prospective migrant was expected to have an affidavit of financial support
from someone he knew or was related to in London; he was also expected to
have a working knowledge of English as well as place £30 against the cost of
possible repatriation (Solomos and Woodhams, 1995, p. 240). Despite these
measures, no decrease was observed in the rate of immigration, and on the
contrary, as George and Millerson (1966/7, p. 279-80) note, 'when the strict
requirements of the affidavits were lifted at the outbreak of the E.O.K.A revolt in
Cyprus in 1954, the number of immigrants to this country (Britain) rose
substantially in the following years... The political -unrest in Cyprus, with the
inescapable violence, curfews, economic stagnation and psychological
frustration, added its own share in contributing to the number of immigrants'.
The independence of Cyprus in 1959 and its joining with Commonwealth
countries was a turning point in facilitating a significant number of immigrants
from Cyprus until the Immigration Act of 1962. Within a short space of time, a
significant number of Cypriots had left for Britain and the estimated number of
Cypriots in Britain had risen to 78,486 by 1964. Although the Immigration Act of
1962 prevented large-scale migration from Cyprus, migration of Cypriots still
took place to Britain, but on a much smaller scale, in the form of family union
until 1974-75 when ethnic tension in Cyprus turned to confrontation It is
reported that, following the 1974 war in Cyprus 'several thousands of Cypriots
entered Britain on a short stay basis as unofficial "refugees" from the fighting
and territorial displacement' (Oakley, 1979, p. 13). The number of Cypriots,
regardless of their ethnic origin was 160,000 in the 1980s, of which 20-25 per cent
are said to be Turkish-Cypriots (King, 1982, p. 93).
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It is plausible to argue that Turkish-Cypriots came to Britain during the second
and third wave of migration from Cyprus. As noted earlier, there were a very
small number of Turkish migrants before the Second World War. This trend
changed between 1950-1960 (Sonyel, 1988, P. 12) when Turkish-Cypriots also
started to migrate to Britain for economic reasons. Bhatti (1981, p. 2) points out
that, before the introduction of the 1962 Immigration Act, Turkish-Cypriots made
use of free movement to Britain and, by 1958, their number had reached 8,500.
The partition of Cyprus after the 1974 ethnic clashes produced a second
significant wave of Turkish-Cypriot migration to Britain.
Given the lacunae of sufficient statistical data, it is very difficult to give a precise
figure of either Turkish-Cypriots or Turks from the mainland in Britain.
Statistical information about Cypriots does not distinguish between Turks and
Greeks except the more recent figures extracted from the 1991 census.
Immigration from mainland Turkey is not as well documented as immigration
from Cyprus, due to the small volume of Turks coming from Turkey. Fieldwork
data suggests that migration from Turkey can be traced back to the lath 1960s and
early 1970s. Since there was no bilateral agreement between Turkey and Britain,
as was the case with Germany, for example, no official agency was involved in
facilitating the Turkish migration and consequently Turkish migration did not
gather momentum. Nevertheless, beginning from the mid-1970s an increasing
number of Turks started conning to London on their own initiative using their
social networks and kin relations. The 1980 military coup in Turkey further
motivated not only politically active people but also those who were
disillusioned with economic and political instability, to seek alternative places of
work and residence. Britain appeared to be one of the most suitable places for
prospective immigrants, many of whom came to Britain as visitors and stayed, as
they were not required to have visas until 1989. One can also argue that other
European countries already had an ample number of Turkish immigrants.
Therefore, there was not much to explore there compared to Britain. As many of
the informants told me during interviews, the textile and restaurant industry
attracted many Turkish people who received news about potential vacancies in
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London; and this was in contrast to Berlin, Paris or Rotterdam. There are varying
figures about the size of the Turkish population in Britain. In Table 4.2., the
estimated figures of Turks are presented.
Table 4.1 Number of Mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots
Various estimates
Mainland Turks a- 26,597 b- 65,000
Turkish-Cypriots c- 60,000 d- 45,000 e- 40,000
Total 86,597 110,000 f-115,000 g- 300,000
Sources: a- Owen (1993); b- Annual Report, Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 1992,
1993; c- Nielsen (1989a); d- Anwar (1993) ; Nielsen (1995); c- Bhatti (1981); Ladbury (1977); f- Gazioglu
(1989); g- The Independent, 2 January 1996, based on a statement by a Customs and Excise Officer.
Country of birth statistics suggest that 26,597 mainland-born Turks reside in
Britain. As this figure does not include those who were born in Britain, it can be
argued that the number of mainland Turks is expected to be much higher. It
could also be suggested that all Turkish born Turks might not have necessarily
specified their birthplace as Turkey in the census. The data. provided by the
Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security gives the number of
mainland Turks in Britain as 65,000. This figure is based on the records of the
Turkish Embassy in London. In order to keep a Turkish passport and nationality,
Turkish nationals are required to register with the Consulate. Without such
registration it is not possible to renew or extend Turkish passports or birth
certificates. Newly born children are also registered with the Consulate to ensure
that they do not lose their right of Turkish citizenship. As seen in Table 4.2., it is
very difficult to make an accurate estimate as to the total number of Turks living
in Britain. The above figures, for example, may not include Turks with British
nationality who have not registered with the Consulate. It should also be
remembered that current estimates on Turks do not take asylum-seekers from
Turkey into account As Table 4.3., shows, there are more than 13,000 asylum-
seekers from Turkey. This seems to be a significant figure in proportion to all
Turks living in Britain. Therefore, the recent trend in asylum applications from
88
Turkey should also be examined in order to reach a reliable statistical estimation
about Turks in Britain.
Table 4.3: Applications received for asylum-seekeis, excluding dependants in the United
Kingdom from Turkish nationals between 1987-19954
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
121 337 2,415 1,590 2,110 1,865 1,480 2,045 1,820
Total 13,783
Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Asylum Statistics, Issue, 9/96, 16 May 1996
My observation on the opening of new Turkish-owned businesses in various
fields, the increasing number of social, welfare and religious organisations
addressing a. larger clientele and the growth in the population of school-age
children and asylum-seekers in recent years suggests that the number of Turkish
people from both mainland and Cyprus is somewhere around 125,000.
Nevertheless, due to the nature of data sources it is not possible to verify the
given estimate precisely because the 1991 Census seems to have failed to measure
the Turkish population in Britain accurately, as is the case with the Cypriot
population (Storkey, 1996).
As mentioned earlier, in contrast to migration to other European countries,
Turkish migration from both Turkey and Cyprus to Britain was neither
organised nor regulated by the government This means that emigration centres
were not chosen by the Turkish government policy, as was the case with
immigration to other European countries. Earlier research (Tumertekin, p. 109,
cited in Abadan-Unat, 1974, p. 368) on the immigration and emigration centres in
Turkey suggests that Turkey's immigration provinces are located west of a line
drawn between Samsun and Hatay. The governments policy in Turkey which
gave priority to some areas determined the geographical origins of outward
migration. The Turkish State Planning Organisation divided the country into
three major regions as developed, developing and underdeveloped areas,
according to which priority to migrate abroad was given in reverse order. Similar
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Map 1: Turkey
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privileges for departure were also awarded to those candidates from areas
affected by natural disasters such as drought and floods. Immigration to Britain,
on the other hand, did not take place in a similar fashion in 1RIMS of the areas of
origin in Turkey and Cyprus. Therefore, immigration centres were not chosen by
government policy. Instead, they were largely determined by individual
initiatives which were followed by a chain migration by using social networks. It
is difficult to single out particular centres of migration to Britain especially in the
early stages of migration. However, social networks such as family and kinship
ties, village connections and friendship influenced the migration flow in the later
stages.
During the fieldwork, I came across people from many regions of Turkey and
noticed that certain regions appear to be centres of migration to England. The
northern part of Turkey appears to be one of the sending regions. I met a number
of Turkish people sharing the same geographical origins, especially the city of
Trabzon and its districts. Similarly, the city of Nigde and Aksaray in Central
Anatolia seem to be centres of migration to Britain (see Map 1). During the
fieldwork several informants bold me that there are almost 700 people from one
district of Aksaray living in London The cities of Kastamonu and its environs
towards the west part of Turkey are also centres of out-migration. In addition to
these areas, the research findings suggest that the south-eastern part of Turkey
seems to have supplied a large number of migrants to Britain. The city of
Kahramanmaxas and its districts are the main areas of out-migration in this
region. Turks from Cyprus also have a mixed background in teims of their
geographical origins. Different regions of Cyprus have supplied Turkish
migrants to Britain. Nicosia (Lefkosa), Kyrenia and their districts, for example,
are mentioned as centres of out-migration. During the research I also interviewed
three Turkish-Cypriots from Limassol which is controlled by Greek-Cypriots (see
Map 2).
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Map 2: Cyprus
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4.3. Settlement of Turks/Cypriots in London
The settlement pattern of Turkish immigrants to Britain is similar to that of Greek
Cypriots. Almost all Turks live in Greater London. It may be suggested that the
use of social networks, kinship relations and patronage has perpetuated the
concentration of Turkish people in the same quarters of the city. Oakley (1970, p.
99) notes that, due to a similar clustering of Cypriots in the same area, Camden
Town used to be called 'Little Cyprus'. As shown in Table 4.4., Turks in London
live mostly in north-east London. A much smaller number, on the other hand,
live in Lewisham, Southwark, the City of Westminster, Barnet, Kensington and
Chelsea. Dokur-ayskiewicz (1979, p. 187) found in an earlier research on Turks
that 54 per cent of her respondents in London repor ted that they preferred living
with Turkish neighbours. This finding explains, at least partly, the concentration
of Turkish people in particular locations of London.
Table 4.4: Local concentrations of those born in Cyprus and Turkey
District Born in Cyprus Born in Turkey
Enfield 11,339 1,783
Haringey 7,798 3,890
Barnet 3,944 662
Islington 3,153 1,445
Hackney 2,555 4,783
Southwark 2,297 484
Lewisham 2061 436
Waltham Forest 1,850 867
Brent 1,407
Redbridge 1,388
Westminster, City of 726
Kensington & Chelsea 564
Sum of top ten 37,792 15,640
Great Britain 78,031 26,597
Source: Owen (1993)
I observed a. similar phenomenon during my fieldwork in Berlin (see Map 3)
where Turks have created particular neighbourhoods. I noticed the concentration
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of Turkish migrants in places such as Kreuzberg and Wedding where Turks
were very visible in shops selling ethnic food, in restaurants with Turkish names,
and more importantly by their appearance in tenns of clothing and overt
behaviour. In such an environment a Turk can satisfy many of his daily needs
without having much contact with Germans. In the Turkish quarter of Berlin, I
did not need to speak any German. Shop owners were mostly of Turkish origin
and I discovered that it was not very difficult for many Turks to survive without
knowing much German. Kreuzberg, as Mandel (1990, p. 27) points out, has a
nickname (Little Istanbul) reflecting the origins of its inhabitants and its ethnic
features marked by Turkish lifestyles, shops, cafés and Mosques. In addition, the
underground line passing through this district is named 'Orient Express' which
echoes the image of Little Istanbul, a common joke that Berlin is another province
of Turkey' (Mandel, 1990a, p. 154).
As seen in the table above, Turks predominantly live in north-east London (see
Map 4). The information on housing and employment among Turks, though far
from sufficient, would also contribute to drawing a better picture of the Turkish
community in London. According to the 1991 Census findings, of those who
were born in Turkey (26,597), 14,276 are at an economically active age. Of this
group, 8,525 are in employment and 6,248 are reported to be unemployed. Those
who are reported to be employed are mostly working in catering and textile
industries. Researchs published by the London Borough of Hackney suggests
that some 10 to 15 per cent of Turkish Cypriots and 20 to 30 per cent of the
Turkish mainland community are self-employed workers. The same report
indicates that the unemployment rate among the Turkish community in Hackney
is 35 to 45 per cent The data on housing conditions of Turks in London is also
insufficient The above-cited report notes that, 'some 80 per cent of Turkish
mainlanders live in council housing, 20 per cent of Turkish-Cypriots are owner
occupiers'. As it is evident from the foregoing information, extensive research is
required in order to establish a more representative picture of housing and
employment conditions among the Turkish community in London.
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Map 4: North -East London
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The next Chapter analyses the ethnographic findings on the establishment of
Turkish families and the reproduction of traditional values and social networks.
This Chapter will explain how the traditional family structure was re-established
in London and how kin and social networks were expanded. The politics of
family and marriage in facilitating the construction of Turkish identity will also
be analysed in the following Chapter.
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Chapter Five
Family, Kinship And The Reproduction Of Traditional Values
The emergence of families on foreign soil could be seen as the foundation
stone of the establishment of ethnic communities. The history of immigration
shows that in the early stages of migration it was mostly single men who
migrated to find work. The early migrant workforce in many West European
countries comprised either single men or married men who had left their
families with the intention of returning home after accumulating some
savings. By the time their plans and hopes of returning home had dwindled,
the idea of joining the families left behind merely survived as a myth. As the
title of Anwar's book The Myth of Return (1979) suggests, the majority of the
immigrants subscribed to the idea of return but only a handful of them did
so. Temporary movement of a considerably large number of the labour force
gradually assumed a permanent character. European cities with numerous
foreigners witnessed a process of settlement as a result of family unification,
establishment of ethnic organisations, institutionalisation of religion and
participation of immigrants in economic life through the opening of shops,
factories, retail and wholesale outlets and investing in properties, in addition
to political participation where legally entitled.
5.1. Settlement Trends: Here for Good
The extent of participation in economic life which indicates the permanency
of settlement is striking in Germany. It is noted (Sen, 1993, p. 27) that the
number of businesses owned by immigrants of Turkish origin has reached up
to 35,000, creating 125,000 employment opportunities within the German
economy. The settlement trend can also be seen by comparing return
intentions in 1980 and 1993, and accordingly looking at the figures of home or
property ownership by Turkish workers. The number of Turks who
expressed a. desire to return to Turkey was around 40 per cent in 1980 and
this high percentage dropped dramatically to 17 per cent in 1993. The
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commitment to settle down in Germany generated a demand to invest in
property and accordingly more than 45,000 Turks bought a house and around
135,000 signed a contract to buy some kind of property (Sen, 1993, p. 24).
Anwar's findings regarding another immigrant community lend support to
the foregoing arguments that the myth of return is being replaced by
permanency in the 1990s. Reassessing Pakistanis, Anwar (1995a, p. 256)
observes that 'the myth of return, which was spread in the 1970s, is slowly
diminishing as the children of the first-generation Pakistanis are settling
down after going through the educational system in the UK'.
As the early phase of immigration is characterised by unsettled feelings and
the status of temporary living underlined by the hope of return to the home
country, the latter period of immigration is paradoxically marked by feelings
of permanency evoked by the settlement During the process of change from
that of single and fragmentary working individuals to an ethnic minority
community, families were united by joining together after years of
separation. It could be argued that family union has given rise to the
foundation of a relatively organised ethnic community as opposed to a
fragmented working class, clustering around employment areas with little
social contact
As Castles' book title Here for Good (1987) clearly indicates, guest workers in
Western Europe developed into ethnic minorities. No matter how vehemently
official discourse, such as in Germany, denies the permanent character of
immigration, it is a reality that new ethnic communities have emerged in
European countries. Nevertheless, 'otherness of the migrants continues to be
emphasised' (Thranhardt, 1995, p. 20). Whether the new communities are
seen as 'others' or not, it should be recognised that recent developments
indicate a growing tendency of disillusionment with the myth of return,
implying that the new communities of the host societies are in the process of
taking root and generating multicultural societies. As early as the mid-70s,
Ladbury (1977, p. 309) found a trend of willingness among Turkish-Cypriots
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to settle and live in England. Anwar (199513, p. 278) observes a similar trend
among immigrants from Commonwealth countries. Anwar sees these ethnic
minorities as an integral part of British society for, 'over half of them were
born in the UK and most others have British nationality'.
It could be argued that the reconstruction of families by reunification
following the first phase of single immigration and involvement of the
younger generation in schooling and employment has led to a wide range of
developments. These developments range from economic activities,
investment in various kinds of properties, establishment of social, cultural,
welfare and political institutions to the reproduction of traditional values by
developing social and kinship networks and by transmitting shared ideals
and values which underline the self-perception and identity preference of the
young generation. Thus, although changes are taking place in the family
structure, in the relationships within and outside the family environment,
values and principles are maintained and emphasised by family members as
a small unit and by kinship relations as a wider social network. These are the
main issues examined in this Chapter, in order not only to analyse various
forces affecting identity maintenance, but also to understand the position of
the young generation who are expected to adhere to the same codes of
behaviour. This Chapter also provides a background for the analysis of
continuity, resistance, change and intergenerational differences in
behavioural patterns and attitudes of the first and young generation which is
covered Chapter Six.
The emergence of Turkish families in England echoes the formation of
Turkish families in other West European countries such as Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands and France. A similarity of family formation can
also be drawn with other ethnic minorities which have developed into ethnic
communities such as Pakistanis in Britain. The migration of Turkish people
from Cyprus and Turkey took place mostly on an individual basis, not as
families. Almost all of the early generation came to London as single men,
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either unmarried or leaving their wives and children behind. The intention of
returning, the feeling of insecurity stemming from ambiguous challenges
awaiting the migrants in the destination country, prevented immigrants from
taking their wives and children with them. Since 'village and rural contexts
provide traditional structures that aid in caring for members of the family left
behind' (Wilpert, 1992, P. 180), they felt that their wives and children would
be more safe in the country of origin if left with close kin and relatives,
mostly with parent-in-laws or brothers. A Turkish-Cypriot who came to
London in the mid 1970s justified his own departure from his country and his
family by referring to his plan of return. He explained that
'I came to London soon after Turkey's military intervention in
Cyprus in 1974. I left my wife with my parents on the Turkish
controlled northern part and I was convinced that my family was safe
there protected by the Turkish army. At the time of my departure for
England, we all thought that I would work for a few years and go
back to my family. With the help of my relatives I came to London
and found a job. After four years of working in a garment factory, I
decided to return to Cyprus. When I voiced my intention to my
family they all told me that there was no political settlement in
Cyprus and the future looked bleak. But I did not want to live apart
from my wife and we came to the conclusion that at the earliest
opportunity she would join me and did so in 1981. When she came to
London we decided that our future was in England, though we paid
regular visits to our parents in Cyprus'.
There were similar replies from other informants who came as single men
and brought their families at a later stage. It should be pointed out that until
they realised that the idea of returning home had been replaced by the
intention of settlement, they were not willing to bring their wives and
children. Economic uncertainties and social challenges also influenced the
head of the family to venture out on his own. When asked why he did not
bring his wife and child with him when he came to London in the early 1970s
but decided to bring them later, one Turkish man gave his reasons as follows:
'As you can imagine, it is not an easy experience to leave your home
and come to a place where you know only a handful of relatives and
in my case with no knowledge of English. Coming to London meant
to me a kind of journey to the unknown future at the time of taking
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my decision to leave Turkey. First of all, I never intended to stay in
this new place for such a long time. This is one reason for leaving my
wife and child at home. Even if I decided to stay in England I did not
know what was waiting for me here. I did not know, for example,
whether I could find a job or a place to stay -though I had secured a
promise of help from my cousins-. I had too many questions in my
mind which made me worried about ray future in England. All these
ambiguities and uncertainties evoked a feeling of insecurity that
convinced me to leave my wife with my parents in Turkey'.
This typical reply indicates that migration is seen as a challenge and a
journey to an unfamiliar environment which involves abandoning one social
setting and entering another and a different one (Eisenstadt, 1954, p. 1).
Migration is a risky venture and immigrants do not want to involve their
families the in same risk. But once the feeling of security is established in the
country of destination, then they increasingly tend to unite with their
families. When I asked whether his fears and worries turned out to be true,
the same informant told me:
'Some of my fears were real, they were there and I was glad that I did
not bring my family with me during my first arrival. When I arrived
here, I was completely dependent on my relatives. They found a job
for me in a restaurant and let me stay with them for a while. Then I
rented a room. It would have been really a disaster to bring my wife
and child without arranging a job and accommodation. Had it not
been for my relatives, I would have returned immediately. Thanks to
them I found my way through and after accumulating some money
and starting my take-away kebap shop I gained confidence to fetch
my family'.
Intentions to return to Turkey or Cyprus were strengthened by sending
money home and investing in land, houses and, in some cases opening
savings accounts. The case of a Turkish man who came from the city of
Aksaray (see Map 1) is illustrates this point The 60-year old man who came
to London 25 years ago invested heavily in real estate with the intention to
return. When asked why he continued investing in Turkey, he said:
'I came here on my own and left my family at home. I had three
children at the time and I had to look after them. I started as an
assistant cook in a kebap shop and sent almost half my earnings to
my wife. After working day and night I managed to open a sandwich
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bar in 1975 which turned out to be very profitable. Until then my
family stayed in Turkey. As I accumulated capital, I decided to bring
my family to England for the reasons that my wife and grown-up
daughter could help with the business while my sons could have a
good education. Even at the time of their joining me I intended to
return. So, we started buying houses and furbishing them even
though we were here and visiting Turkey only once a year. Now
looking back, I feel that my wishful thinking of going back home one
day motivated me to invest heavily in Turkey. However, as you can
see, in addition to what I own, my two sons are grown up and
contrary to my expectation of providing them good education they
both own restaurants'.
There were also cases where some single men returned to Turkey or Cyprus
to get married and, after marrying, left their wives at home. After working a
couple of years and becoming financially capable of providing suitable
accommodation, they then brought their wives. A Turkish-Cypriot who
settled in London with three children had an arranged marriage in Cyprus
after working in England for four years. His case displays the need for
achieving a sense of confidence and security before bringing wife and
children. His story is as follows:
'I worked in London in a dry-cleaning shop and saved some money. I
was not happy alone and I wanted to marry. I knew some girls here
but my family wanted me to marry a relative's daughter. Then I went
to Cyprus to see that girl. My mother had a good choice for me and
we got married within two months. Since I spent most of my savings
for the marriage expenses, I could not take my wife with me and
asked her to stay with my family until I saved some money.
Although she did not like the idea at first, she reluctantly agreed to
remain in Cyprus. I worked really hard on my return to London and
in less than two years my wife joined me'.
As Robinson (1986, P. 87-88) indicates, several developments such as changes
in the country of origin, changes in the host society and internal changes
either to the individual migrant or to the entire community acted as forces
for migrants to reconsider their position abroad. Eventually the idea of return
lost its salience by the increasing number of family unions that led to a
permanent settlement The Turkish immigrants in London experienced a
similar process of reconsidering their position and as the history of their
immigration informs, they became a settled community.
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5.2. Re-establishment of Family Structure
As families joined together in London, traditional family structure was
revived and conventional roles and inter-family relations were reproduced.
Within the traditional Turkish family, its members assumed different
responsibilities and duties reflected in the hierarchy of authority which was
rooted in Turkish customs and beliefs. The early immigrants in particular
seemed to have preserved the traditional structure of the Turkish family. This
gives the father the dominant role as 'bread winner' and considers the mother
a 'care taker', responsible for the internal affairs of the family such as looking
after children and carrying out household duties. Immigration to European
countries has changed the nature of the family in many instances from that of
an extended family to a nuclear one. Such changes were already under way
in the country of origin due to internal immigration, urbanisation and socio-
economic developments which influenced the structure and survival of
extended families in Turkey. In a large scale survey (UNICEF, 1991, p. 251), it
was found that 73 per cent of urban families and 67 per cent of all Turkish
families had a nuclear structure. It can be argued that outward immigration
and family unions in a different country have further changed the traditional
family structure. The nuclear family has almost become the norm among the
Turkish community in the countries of immigration.
Stirling (1965, p. 100) observed as early as the 1960s that 'men form the
permanent core of any normal household. The senior man, his sons and
grandsons are born into and remain in the household until his death... the life
long relation between male agnates of this minute lineage is the basis of the
household'. In the traditional Turkish family, the senior man exercises full
authority and control over all other family members, including women and
younger men (White, 1994,  p. 36). Stirling (1965, p. 101) also observed that
the father's authority was emphasised in the traditional Turkish family, never
challenged, and sons were expected to take seriously what their father said
and obey him. As these observations indicate, the traditional structure of the
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Turkish family confers different roles upon family members according to that
authority lies with the elder man of the family, in most cases with the father
since Turkish society was comprised mainly of nuclear families, particularly
in urban areas. The woman is expected to exert a good influence at home and
deal with household chores such as cooking, cleaning, washing and raising
children. Children are under the strict control of their parents and are
expected to obey orders from the elders. The control exercised on girls is
much stricter than on boys, mostly because girls are thought to be more
vulnerable to outside influences and any wrong doing may result in
damaging the reputation of the girl and the honour of the family.
My findings suggest that traditional family values are still important for
older members of the Turkish community in London. Nevertheless, spatial
movements of Turkish immigrants and the reconstruction of traditional
family structures in a culturally different atmosphere has inevitably
challenged the resistance of the underlying family composition of the Turkish
community. On the one hand, immigration to another country where there
are no or only a few relatives made women more dependent on their
husbands in the public sphere. Women who joined their husbands were
mostly confined to the home and deprived of kin relations which are very
important as a source of help and assistance in times of difficulties. The
dependence of women on their men was further exacerbated by the lack of
socialising among the Turkish community. However, in the country of
settlement women have continued to carry out their traditional roles such as
taking responsibility within the internal domains of the family.
In connection with the early phase of ethnic community formation, one can
argue that the conventional roles within the Turkish family were more
vigorously reproduced as a result of responses to circumstantial
developments. The situational position of immigrants also affected relations
between men and women in that most of the men had expended a great deal
of effort in bringing their wives to share their burdens at least
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psychologically. The corollary to this development was that women acquired
a supportive role and, accordingly, their status and treatment assumed a
more favourable nature. While families became united, even the extended
families were transformed into nuclear families consisting of husband, wife
and children. In the early phase of migration, some children were also
entrusted with parents or relatives in the country of origin until the re-
establishment of the family was thought to be complete and better conditions
had been prepared for the children to join them. Meanwhile women were
emancipated, at least from the close control of parent-in-laws who no longer
were able to exercise direct authority over the bride.
Some of the social and familial expectations were lifted in the post-
immigration family, though new duties were also created, and this situation
opened up new avenues for the immigrant women. Once the settlement had
taken place, even with the myth of return at the back of their minds, some
women also started to work in order to contribute to the family income. This
changed their status from that of partners to an economic resource, although
they were still expected to carry out household duties. One respondent whose
wife had started working explained this development as follows:
'As you know, many people came here with the intention of
returning at some stage. But rarely did so. Our case is one among
similar other thousands. When my wife joined me, what we thought
was to work together and save money and return to Turkey in a
shorter time than we planned initially Then, I asked my boss at the
garment factory whether he could give her a job as a machinist.
When he said okay, I borrowed a sewing machine from a friend and
my wife started working at home on a piece basis. After a while we
started sending more money to Turkey and later on decided to buy a
house. Had it not been for the economic assistance of my wife, who
really worked hard, it would not have been possible even to take
such a decision, let alone send more money home'.
As the above informant clearly mentioned, his wife provided additional
income to the family. Working from home as a machinist is a common
practice among the Turkish community in London. Some women either buy
or borrow a sewing machine to work at home to make garments for
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manufacturers. The status of women as economic contributors was further
developed when the Turkish ethnic business started taking root in the host
countries. During my fieldwork I came across dozens of women who worked
as cashiers, shopkeepers, cooks and as manageresses in their family owned
shops and in other businesses owned by Turks.
During my research in Berlin, for example, I regularly frequented a Turkish
restaurant in Kreuzberg (see Map 3) as a customer. I noticed that all the
workers there were women except for a young man. While eating there for
the first time, I had a conversation with a waitress and discussed Turkish
food in Berlin. When I told her that I had come from London to do my
research, she became more interested in talking to me which led to longer
conversations and subsequent visits. I asked her who the owner of the
restaurant was. She said, 'This is our restaurant'. I realised then that this was
a family-owned business and all members of the family were working here
on rotation. The mother was helping the cook and taking care of cleaning
duties and the father was responsible for the food shopping. Three school-age
children were also helping their parents to run the restaurant during their
out-of-school hours. Two of the cleaners working there were also relatives of
the family.
My non-structured interviews revealed that the woman started working
when the family had decided to open a restaurant Until then, she was doing
household work and taking care of the children. She told me that her
husband asked her opinion before taking a final decision on starting a family
business. Her husband's approach to her to ask her opinion and to request
her help in running the restaurant increased her influence in decision making
and negotiating within the family. Similar improvements in the status of
women were also observed among Turkish families in London.
After the establishment of family businesses, the economic contributions of
women were recognised and, in return, subsequent investments were
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documented on shared ownership certificates which included the woman's
name along with the husband's which was a sign of their improved
bargaining position. Changes in the Turkish migrant women's role should
not be seen in isolation from the developments in Turkey where such changes
started to take place in the 1950s. With regard to women's roles in Turkish
society, Acar (1995, p. 107-108) observes, for example, that starting from the
1950s and precipitating after the 1980s, women acquired art increasing
responsibility for their children's education. Another activity that women
shouldered after this period was the organisation and management of
familial relations. Finding spouses for young ones leading to marriage
arrangements and administering necessary activities are mainly within the
domain of women's responsibilities. In addition to these roles, women found
more space in economic and political life in Turkey. Some migrant Turkish
women are also entering public life in London. The number of women
professionals, for example, is increasing. The entrance of women to
professions such as teaching, social work, interpretation, law and journalism
informs us of the change in the status of Turkish women in London. The
Turkish women elected as local councilors in Hackney and Enfield, for
example, may be seen as clear signs of changes in the role of women.
5.3. Kinship, Social Networks and Reproduction of Values
The Turkish community in London has reproduced kinship structures and
social networks as institutions which have facilitated the formation of
ethnically defined entities whose interrelationships and interdependency are
strengthened by traditional sets of relations and social networks. My findings
suggest that kinship relations, patronage and social networks exert their
influence even before migration takes place and a whole set of relationships is
utilised as a mechanism of solidarity and reproduction of values. The case of
the Turkish community in London reveals that kinship relations, patronage
and social networks already established in the country of origin regulated
various areas of activities of an individual who intended to migrate. Both
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morphological (anchorage, density, reachability, range) and interactional
(content, directness, durability, intensity, frequency) characteristics (Mitchell,
1969, P. 12-29) of a network seemed to be instrumental for Turkish people in
the processes of taking a decision to seek work abroad, choosing a spatial
direction, finding a job, settling, and participating in the formation of an
ethnic minority community by taking part in the institutionalisation of the
Turkish identity. In what follows I will analyse how kinship relations and
social networks operate among the Turkish community and the extent to
which they were altered in terms of broadening or curtailment of the social
web as an inevitable consequence of making contact with outside groups.
In order to gain a better understanding of kinship relations and social
networks among the Turkish community in London, it would be useful to
give a short terminological explanationl of what akraba (relative) and akrabalik
(relationship or relatedness) denote. The Turkish term for kin is alcraba which
originates from Arabic. White (1994, p. 121) explains that the term akraba
'provides a broader set of meanings within which proximity, relationship and
kinship are given equal place. Alcraba, which means 'kin' or 'relative' in
Turkish, is derived from the Arabic root qaruba, meaning 'to be near'. Another
form of the same Arabic root qurba, means 'relation, relationship, or kinship".
Delaney (1991, p. 148) points out that, 'akraba and akrabalik do not function
like the English 'relative' or 'relation' and 'kinship', which have other
meanings in other contexts. In Turkish, these words are used only in the
context of 'kinship' but 'not quite the equivalents of 'relative' and 'kinship'
when these terms are defined by consanguinity'.
Stirling (1965, p. 148) observes in his anthropological study of a Turkish town
back in the 1960s that kinship relations appeared to be the single most
important set of social relationships outside the domestic group, and that
kinship activities were observed to be of a very high proportion within the
village community such as visiting each other, spending leisure time together,
helping each other at times of crisis and participating in traditional
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ceremonies like circumcision, marriage and death. Relationships with kin and
relatives form a primary source of security in times of social and economic
crisis, therefore it is important to reproduce these patterns of relationships
(Ozbay, 1995, p. 108).
Current literature on ethnic minority groups suggests that members of a
particular ethnic group re-establish kinship relations and social networks in
the receiving country. Anwar (1985, p. 64; 1995, p. 240) explains how family
and Biradari2 relations operate within the Pakistani community in Britain. He
describes how these institutions have played a role in the process of
migration, job selection, choice of residence, settlement and subsequent
community formation through mutual support The function of Biradari as a
kinship and friendship group occupies a central role as Anwar remarks, 'the
whole way of life of Pakistanis is directly or indirectly related to this
institution'. However, in the new environment, immigrants extend their
relationships beyond primary kin and village networks. This expansion of
kinship and network relationships is engendered by common experiences
and shared interests (Werbner, 1995, p. 214).
Kinship relations and social networks seem to have influenced the behaviour
of individual immigrants from Turkey and Cyprus to a considerable extent
The long term effects of kinship networks and the social web outside the
immediate family may be readily seen in almost all stages of immigration,
settlement and post-settlement of the Turkish community in London. Similar
to the Biradari system among Pakistanis as outlined above, akraba networks
and social acquaintances such as arkadaslik (friendship) and komsuluk
(neighbourhood) not only influenced the decision-making of an individual to
seek a job outside the country, but also played a decisive role in selecting the
country of immigration, finding a job, deciding to settle and participating in
particular groups as an expression of allegiance and identity.
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My observations and interviews both in London and Berlin clearly
demonstrate that kinship relations and social networks were involved in all
stages of migration and community formation as well as in subsequent
developments. Before explaining how and in which contexts and stages
kinship ties and circles of social networks mark the life of an immigrant, I
would like to clarify a tentative difference in the use of the term alcraba,
denoting proximity among those who constitute akraba. Delaney (1991, p. 153-
154) explains how akraba denotes the degree of proximity: 'the principle of
descent is temporal and linear, establishing a unity of identity over time. By
contrast, relationships with those on the ground are seen as spatial. People
who were related are either yakin akraba (close, near relatives) or uzaktan
akraba- alternatively, hisim- (more distant relatives)'. The proximity of
relatives influenced the rendering of services and support to kin on an order
of closeness-)distance/remoteness scale during the process of pre- and post-
migration. In this Chapter, the term akraba will be used in its most embracing
sense which denotes relatives who are related by blood and marriage.
My findings indicate that during the 'pre-migration/decision making
process', kinship relations, social networks and patronage are activated. The
pre-migration/decision making process refers to a stage whereby an
individual is made or has become aware of job opportunities abroad through
a relative or a friend who has already had an experience of working in a
foreign country. Either through letters or annual visits, an individual is
bombarded by the news of a relative or a fellow villager, who has already
started investing money in the vicinity as a constant reminder of employment
opportunities overseas. When asked how he decided to come to London, a
Turkish-Cypriot who owns a travel agency and a music shop, replied that the
information passed on him by his cousin was the starting point of his
departure from Cyprus in 1972. He explained how he became interested in
the idea of coming to London for a job:
'At the time of my cousin's migration to England in the mid-sixties I
was working as a mechanic in a workshop. I heard from my uncle
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that my cousin started working in a dry-cleaning shop owned by an
English. After a while he started sending small amount of money to
his father. Although he did not come to Cyprus for the first two
years, I constantly asked my uncle how he was doing and in each
case I was told that he was making money and working in a
relatively good environment. Then my cousin came for a visit and
told me that mechanics with the level of my experience get a better
payment there. While he was returning to London, I seriously began
planning to go to England'.
A garment factory owner both in Turkey and in London recalled how he was
informed of the work opportunities in England through his elder sister's
husband who had come earlier. This particular informant came from a small
village of Kastamonu in the Western part of Turkey and settled in London for
good but travels to Turkey very often for business purposes. When asked
what made him decide to come to London rather than go elsewhere, and how
he received information about work opportunities in England, he replied:
'When my sister's husband went to London she did not accompany
him immediately and stayed with her in-laws as was the case with
many other families. So there was a constant talk in our house about
working abroad. Especially at the times when my sister visited us,
she always mentioned her husband and talked how he was doing,
when she was going to join him, etc. We heard that he found a job as
a machinist and soon after as a cutter, and accordingly began earning
enough money to send back home. With the money he sent, my
sister's in-laws bought a piece of land within two years. And they
started building a new house just next to us. Obviously this aroused
my interest in getting more information about finding a job in
England and then I started asking more questions to my sister and
wrote letters to her husband who promised to help find a job and
accommodation. After the arrangement of a job and accommodation
I came to London'.
The pre-migration process is marked by the flow of information from
relatives and social networks about the advantages of working abroad (Gura_k
and Caces, 1992, p. 151). In addition to information obtained through letters,
annual visits and a mystification surrounding the earning potential that was
assumed to exist abroad, the scale of investment in Turkey stimulated people
to seek the help of their kin and family friends. This kind of influence and the
search of support is revealed in the following response of a restaurant owner
114
who came from central Turkey in the early 1970s. He told me of his
experience as follows:
'My brother was already employed in Germany, working in a car
factory when I became interested in the idea of working abroad. Our
family was a kind of extended family at the time and his wife and
two children were living with us. Within a very short time, I
remember that my brother sent the first remission. In the following
summer holiday he visited us and came to Turkey with a car. After
three years since his departure, my father managed to buy a house
for him in the town with the remittances and kept some in the bank. I
was single then and as soon as I completed my military service I
decided to go to Germany'.
As mentioned earlier, an immigrant worker's life has always been cloaked in
mystic and, in most cases, idealised. Working conditions, social stress, culture
conflict, lack of communication, the quality of accommodation, legal
provisions, health and training, etc., did not matter for the people whose
minds were fixed on making money and buying land, house and car etc.
Thus the rise in the quality of living standards among immigrants' families
and the visibility of material gain evidenced by the remittances and
investment, assumed a decisive role in the decision making mechanism of a
potential immigrant worker. The informant referred to above, who eventually
came to London, expressed his disappointment with the working conditions
in Germany. When asked if he found what he had expected, he replied:
'My brother bought my ticket and met me at the airport on my
arrival in 1972. After staying with him a year or so and working
casually, mostly illegally, I found out that jobs were scarce in
Germany and the government was making things difficult for new-
comers. While looking for an alternative country, I learned through a
friend that it was possible to find a job in England. When I came to
London in 1973, I started working as a waiter in a Turkish take-away
kebap shop but disappointed by the low rate of payment and long
hours of working. But thank God (Allah'a Sulcur) my patience bore its
fruit in time'.
As pointed out earlier, the pre-migration/decision making process is clearly
marked by the involvement of relatives in informing kin and fellow villagers
about being a migrant worker and in promising help, as a part of the duties
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conferred upon them by kinship relations and by being a member of a social
network. Likewise, the ensuing period, that could be called the 'actual stage
of migration/spatial movemenf is also marked by social network institutions
such as akrabalik (relatedness), komsuluk (neighbourliness), hemsehrilik (being
from the same town/village) as providers of various services needed by the
new arrivals. The support of these networks ranged from giving/lending
money to an individual to pay for the ticket, to meeting him on his arrival as
the first stages of being involved in sponsoring a relative or an acquaintance.
A Turkish-Cypriot who was a cook in Cyprus told me during an interview
that he arrived in London in 1975 with only a few pounds in his pocket As
his story depicts, a common pattern of receiving financial support and shelter
from already established relatives in London was in operation as a
requirement and an obligation of kinship and the social network. When asked
how he had managed to come and survive in London the informant said:
'We were forced by the Greek Cypriots to leave our home during the
military clashes in 1974. When we fled to Turkish controlled northern
part of the Island there was no job. The war had wrecked the
economy and immigration exhausted employment chances. I needed
a job and wrote to my uncle who migrated to England and settled in
the late 1960s, asking him to help me find a job. His reply was a
relief. He wrote to me that he found a job for me as a cook. But I did
not have the resources, neither to pay for the travel nor even for a
cheap accommodation'.
The lack of economic resources forced him to turn to his relatives in Cyprus,
but as he explained, he could not raise enough money to realise his wishes He
therefore wrote once more to his uncle, this time for some money to enable
him to travel to Britain. He continued explaining how committed he was to
coming to London and expressed his gratitude to his uncle. He said:
'My uncle was very kind and generous. As soon as he received my
letter, he sent my ticket money. I bought a ticket and packed my stuff
informing my cousins of my arrival details They met me at the
airport and took home straightaway. Within a week, I started
working in that restaurant which years later I managed to own. Now
looking back I feel that my uncle's attitude and help made me more
closer to them and strengthened our relations'.
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The support that was generated by kinship relations was also extended to
uzak akraba (distant relative) and to komsu (neighbour) and even to arkadas
(friend) at times, widening the scope of kinship to a more flexible social
network. The case of a Turkish man who came from Bursa illustrates the
flexible nature of such kinship networks. This respondent used his former
employer's contacts to come to London and received full support including
accommodation. While working in a tailor shop, a visitor of (indeed, brother
of) the shop owner, who had a job in London talked about the possibilities of
employment and of saving money. As soon as the visitor had left the shop, he
approached his employer and asked whether he could arrange a meeting
with this man so that he could ask more questions about jobs in London. The
shop owner called his brother (visitor) and asked for his help in finding a job
for this young and ambitious man who had lost his parents a long time ago.
The respondent said that since he had become an orphan, his boss had always
been helpful to and protective of him like a father figure. The shop owner
used his influence and negotiated the arrangement for a job and
accommodation with his brother. As the informant explained, his relations
with the boss and his brother became closer over the years, though he was not
related to them by descent This case clearly indicates that kinship relations
transcend tightly defined boundaries of descent and relatedness by blood. He
expressed his feelings for this family in the following way:
'I managed to come London and found a job only because my former
boss in Turkey and his brother here in London extended their
support to me. When I came to London I stayed with this family for
almost three months and they never treated me like an outsider. I
believe that my employer in Turkey played the primary role by
giving a good reference about me. These people were the only ones
that I knew in London. That drew me closer to them and I felt like
being part of the family. This is still the same'.
At the time of the interview, my informant was married with three children
and was still working as a machinist in a garment factory owned by a Turkish
businessman. At a later stage, I also learned that his marriage was also
arranged by the former boss with whom the informant always kept in touch.
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Kinship and social network relations are further strengthened by the more
demanding life style of the new environment in order to cope with the new
challenges that did not exist in the country of origin. The 'post-migration'
period, marked by 'settlement and post-settlement' (Heisler, 1986, p. 77, see
also Figure 5.3.), not only changed the nature of kinship relations, by forcing
members of the immigrant community to seek help outside alcraba since it was
not always available inside, but it also expanded the responsibilities and
obligations of the social network through more varied demands generated by
settling in a culturally, religiously and linguistically different country.
Familial visits, marriage patterns, joint-venture economic enterprises,
schooling of children, establishing welfare organisations and religious
institutions make up the new spheres that play a determining role in
reproducing kinship relations and reconstructing social networks based on
shared experiences as an ethnic minority group settled at the margin of a
larger social system. My findings suggest that the settlement stage (as a
period of second-decision making process) and post-settlement process (as a
continuing phenomenon) are also marked by the relations that prevailed
throughout the first two stages of migration (pre-migration/decision-making
process, migration/spatial movement).
Clustering around one particular area is not an ad hoc decision or a chance
experience. As many informants revealed, it was by deliberate choice, and
settlement in a specific area relatively populated by relatives, friends and
acquaintances who speak the same language and share numerous common
features made certain areas more preferential than others. Chain migration
and the creation of ghettos in industrial areas or in large cities with
employment opportunities, also explain the role of kinship relations and
social networks during the post-settlement stage which regenerates exchange
and reciprocity within a given ethnic minority community. The distribution
of the Turkish community in Green Lanes, Newington Green, Stoke
Newington, Islington and Edmonton in north-east London (see Map 4) lends
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support to the above argument that proximity is engendered by ethnic origin
and various forms of relatedness as sources of economic and social support A
Turkish garment factory owner who came from the city of Kahramanmaras
explained why he preferred living near his elder brother when he got
married. When asked why he chose to buy a house in Edmonton, the
informant replied:
'Before I got married, I was living with my brother who was
managing the family owned garment factory. My parents were also
living in the same house. When I got married I had to move out and
establish a different household since my brother's house could no
longer accommodate a new family. What we did was to buy a
another house nearby my brother so that my wife could stay with my
parents during the day time when I go to factory'.
The case of a Turkish man who came from the city of Trabzon (see Map 1)
also suggests that this pattern of settlement, especially in the early phase of
migration, finding a job and accommodation, was common practice and led
to the emergence of areas populated by a significant number Of Turkish
people. This informant who was a tailor in Trabzon and who tame from
Turkey in the early 1970s, gave me the following response, when asked why
he wanted to live in Stoke Newington:
'I came here as a single person through the help of some hentsehris
(fellow villagers) and shared a room with three others in a house
owned by an English man. We were all hetusehris coming from
Trabzon. It was near Essex Road in Islington and we were spending
most of our time together at work and outside. At this stage, I did not
have an urgent feeling that my neighbourhood should be comprised
of mostly Turkish people. I simply took the existing Turkish
neighbours in the area for granted. But when I married I felt
different, because my wife needed to establish social relations'.
As the above informant explained, while he was single it was not so
important to be right in the midst of the Turkish neighbourhood, simply
because friendship seemed to satisfy his needs on an individual level, as most
people were busy with their work. Moreover, their single status did not
require them to establish a broad social network as compared with married
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people. My findings suggest that marriage and having a wife and children
played an important role in determining the choice of neighbourhood by the
immigrant Turks in London.
Single people had a greater chance of mobility since they did not have such a
wide variety of concerns as married people. The establishment of families
through marriages or reunion of couples produced new concerns. Married
people started asking questions that reflected their concerns in their new
environment Who, for example, could they turn to when they needed help?
What could the wife do when her husband was at work? Where could she
go? Who could help her while she was ill or when she gave birth? These and
similar questions of survival as a consequence of the migration process
caused serious concerns. Therefore, those who came with their families or
married at a later stage sought to live near their kin, relatives, friends, village
men or acquaintances in London.
The establishment of a neighbourhood through clustering around a particular
area constitutes one of the first stages of institutionalisation and reproduction
of values. If we follow the life-cycle of the informant referred to above, we
will see how marriage and familial concerns, which were underlined by
socio-psychological forces, could instill a willingness to move to a Turkish
neighbourhood where social interaction is more easier and the spirit of the
community is revived. When asked if there was a particular reason for living
in Stoke Newington this informant explained:
'Of course there were very important reasons to move from Islington
to where I now live. As I told you earlier, I was single when I came
here first. Two years later I got married and returned with my wife.
Before I went to Turkey, I rented a small flat near Angel. I still
remember my wife's reaction to the new environment on our arrival.
The first thing she asked was who our neighbours were. When she
heard that we did not have any Turkish neighbours and
acquaintances in the vicinity she protested by asking whether I
brought her to an open prison. She never lived in a social isolation
back at home. Since we did not have enough financial resources we
had to live in this small flat for more than a year and then moved to
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another small flat near Dalston, where we knew some Turkish
families who came from Trabzon'.
This informant later moved to a council house on Sandringham Road,
Dalston (see Map 4), after his wife had given birth to their first child, a
daughter. There they had their second child, a son, and according to the
informant, his wife was able to socialise with other Turkish women who
visited each other on several occasions. This opened avenues for seeking and
receiving help based on reciprocity and exchange. This pattern of settlement
around kin and acquaintances was further reinforced even by the recent
marriages of their children years later. The daughter of the family married
her cousin through art arranged marriage and her husband moved to London.
Likewise, her brother married a cousin back in Turkey and his wife joined
him in London. As Figure 5.1. shows, these three families were living in the
same neighbourhood at the time of the fieldwork. It should also be noted here
that the subsequent developments in the area proved, as the informant
expressed, that he had made the right decision. As a religious person who
takes Islam and its teachings seriously, he witnessed the setting up of several
religious institutions and took part in the establishment of the Aziziye
Mosque. It can be argued that the reproduction of traditional forms of Islam
is not only influenced by the significant number of Muslims living in the area
but has also strengthened the idea of living near a Mosque, at least for some
religious people.
Figure 5.1: Familial proximity in a migration context
-Family 1: Father & Mother live on Sandringham Road,
-Family 2: Daughter married with her cousin from mother's side lives in Dalston High Road
-Family 3: Son married with her cousin from father's side lives on Sandringham Road with
his parents within a walking distance from his parents house (see Map 4)
Another typical example is provided by a Turkish-Cypriot photographer who
lives on Hewitt Road, off Green Lanes in Haringey. He came to London in
1973, when he felt threatened by the increasing signs of ethnic conflict in
Cyprus. He is now settled and owns a photo-developing shop as well as
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working for a Northern Cypriot-based newspaper. When asked what made
him buy a house on Hewitt Road, his response was similar to other cases
which suggested that kin relations and social networks as sources of social,
psychological and financial support influenced some individuals when
selecting a particular neighbourhood for settlement In the case of this
respondent, the preferred choice was facilitated by the availability of kin and
social networks on Hewitt Road. He explained how he had settled in Green
Lanes as a. deliberate decision which was underlined by various issues such
as ethnic origin, familial links, social networks and availability of some of the
'ethnic' services in the area. His response sums up a common trend among
the Turkish community. When asked why he settled in this area, this
informant gave his reasons as follows:
'Before I came to London, almost half of my family migrated either to
Turkey or to England. When I came here, my two uncles were about
to open a thy-cleaning shop. On my arrival I stayed with them for a
while and when my younger brother joined me, we rented a room
near their house and continued paying regular visits. After I married,
I rented a flat not far from them. When I decided to buy a house after
saving some money, my uncle told me that there was a house near to
them for sale. It was a good opportunity to buy this house simply
because me and my wife would be very close to our relatives'.
The following pattern of relationships and locational distribution was
observed in a Turkish family which indicates that extended familial and kin
relations assume a complex nature as different localities enter into a kin
circle.
-
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Figure 5.2: Family and Kin Relations in a Turkish family
The informant
-married with a daughter and a son, lives on Hewitt Road (see Map 4)
Informant's younger brother 1:
-married with a Turkish girl from Istanbul, lives in Edmonton
Informant's younger brother 2:
-married with a cousin from London, lives in Istanbul
Informant's father:
-passed away
Informant's mother:
-lives in Istanbul with her son but regularly visits other two sons in London.
Uncle 1: with two sons
-Child 1: married a Turkish-Cypriot, lives on Hewitt Road
-Child 2: married with Turkish-Cypriot, lives in Wood Green
Uncle 2: with three children
-Child 1: (daughter) married with a Turkish-Cypriot man, lives in Turnpike Lane
-Child 2: married with a Turkish-Cypriot, lives in Wood Green
-Child 3: married with his cousin, lives in Istanbul, Turkey
One of the implications of migration and settlement in a different country
was the division of family and kin into two or, as in the case of the above
family (see Figure 5.2.), three locations. This implies that kin relations are
reproduced in different locations simultaneously.
It is common behaviour among Turkish immigrants to cluster in a particular
neighbourhood. A similar phenomenon was observed in Berlin during my
fieldwork. The Kreuzberg area, for example, is referred as 'Little Istanbul'
indicating that the overwhelming majority of the residents are from Turkey
(see Chapter Four). Quantitatively speaking, Turks in Germany far
outnumber the Turkish community in London (see Table 4.1.). Due to the
immigration policy of the German government and the subsequent chain
migration, as well as family reunions, Turks concentrated in several cities
where industry needed foreign labotr. Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Duisburg,
123
Munich and Frankfurt are some of the cities where Turkish quarters have
emerged. In a similar fashion Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Den Haag in The
Netherlands; Brussels in Belgium; Copenhagen and Arhus in Denmark;
Zurich in Switzerland; Stockholm, Malmo and Goteborg in Sweden have
ethnically marked neighbourhoods as these cities have become permanent
homes for Turkish immigrants. In this context, it is plausible to argue that the
cluster of an ethnically distinct group in a particular area may change the
cultural map of the given quarter of a city to a considerable extent Similar to
the concentration of Turks in particular areas in several European cities, the
cluster of Pakistanis in particular localities also adds new characteristics to
the cultural structure of cities. The northern city of Bradford in England, for
example, is called 'Britain's Islamabad' (Lewis, 1995, p. 1) implying that
Bradford has a changing cultural map with its significant number of Muslim
residents from Pakistan.
Economic activities among Turks in Berlin and London also have similarities
in terms of joint ventures and employment of relatives and friends which
establish the trust (guven)3 necessary for preferential treatment and choice. A
comparison of two cases from Berlin and London will explain how trust is
utilised as a mechanism of solidarity among families, friends and religious
groups in creating solidarity in economic activities. By analysing a case of a
joint-venture in Berlin, I would like to illustrate the invention of solidarity
among a second generation group who share a similar educational
background and long-term friendship, strengthened by common ideological
leanings and moral values. The joint-venture under study was formed by five
young Turkish graduates of technical colleges. All had their college education
in Germany and had known each other for a long time. Three people in the
group were school friends, one was a brother of these three classmates and
the fifth was a member of a closely-knit friendship network though older
than the rest of the group. Their friendship became a. more closely-knit
network by their involvement in weekly discussions on cultural and religious
issues.
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My observations of this group suggest that common values, as well as long-
term relationships, seemed to have produced a strong bond and trust as a
residue of social capital. They all had intellectual capital established by their
experience in the industry. What they needed was planning and turning this
social and intellectual capital into a joint-venture economic activity. During
my fieldwork, I had long discussions with three of the group members and
had brief talks with the other two. Our discussions included issues such as
racism, family, religion, marriage (four already had arranged marriages in
Turkey and had brought their wives to Berlin), returning to Turkey, and
economic and political participation. Since they were planning to start a
business, talking about economic activity was one of the primary issues
which indicated that returning to Turkey was out of question, at least for the
time being.
Our talks increased my interest in exploring what kinds of relations had
produced such a circle and sustained it over the years. It seemed to me that
the origins of the trust established among the group could be traced to the
college years where friendship was usually based on ethnic lines. As one of
them said when asked where they met each other first 'Three of us met in
college and strengthened our relationship. Personally, I found it easier to
make friends with my own people. Germans used to avoid us. Over the
years, our friendship extended beyond school hours and we started visiting
each other at home and went out together'. This group also used to have
regular discussion meetings on Islamic issues which they started organising
for college/university students. These meetings were also fruitful for
strengthening their relation in the group. One member of the group told me
that
'During the discussion meetings, in addition to our long-term school
friendship, we realised that we had a great deal in common. We
realised that we had established an enormous trust among us and
wanted to be more productive by bringing our experiences together
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on the basis of this trust. I think our belonging to the same discussion
group unearthed moral virtues that strengthened the feeling of trust'.
At the time of my fieldwork, I observed that they had finally decided to start
a business servicing electrical appliances. All members of the group invested
an equal amount of money and all were expected to provide equal amount of
energy and labour. I have checked the progress of this venture by telephone
and correspondence since my return to England. Foregoing observations on
this joint-venture suggest that it was based on mutual trust It can be argued
that this trust is rooted in being from the same ethnic group, having long-
term relations and in subscribing to the same ideological and religious values.
This case clearly indicates that a social network beyond the immediate family
and kin relations is an important institution of solidarity and choice.
The second case study of a London firm also suggests that trust as social
capital which originated in ethnic origin, kinship, friendship and village
networks is reproduced within the context of ethnic business. During the
fieldwork research in London, I visited a garment factory and noticed that the
workers, machinists, pressers, cleaners etc., were all Turkish. Most of them
came from Turkey; some of them were from Cyprus. This family-owned
factory • is a typical example of many other growing ethnic businesses
established by the Turks. What they have in common is the ethnic
composition of the employees who worked in the workplaces owned by the
Turks in London. The above mentioned factory employed between fifty to
sixty workers depending on the workload. They were, as mentioned above,
all Turkish. As the factory owner explained, at least half of the workers came
from his village and many were related to each other by kin and friendship or
by village origin. Social obligations generated by the network institutions
were met by helping the members of the same social web. In the case of this
garment factory, the owner explained how mutual trust was sustained
particularly in the family itself and between workers and the management in
general. The father and three brothers also took an active part in running the
factory. All three brothers were married and had their own household living
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near each other in Edmonton. The trust in the family is seen as a crucial asset
in achieving a successful result according to the manager of the factory, who
said:
'Except my younger brother who is in a full-time education, my
father and my two younger brothers are working in the factory.
Everybody is responsible for one aspect of the business and as a
manager, I don't have to worry about the conduct of my brothers.
What lies behind this is brotherhood, coming from the same family
which is the basis of trust and responsibility. When I am away, I feel
assured that everything will work as usual, even better, simply
because this is not my factory, but 'ours' (bizim) and this feeling is
shared by everybody in the family. My younger brother was not
studying before but when he saw that we needed a professional
manager for the future, he decided to go back to school to study
marketing and management as a part of his duty towards the family'.
As this statement clearly indicates, family relations instill a sense of
responsibility and obligation towards the family as the basic unit and
reservoir of trust Kin relations, social and village networks open new
avenues of trust embedded in responsibilities towards a relative, friend or a.
village man. As mentioned earlier, the factory under study employed more
than half of its workers from the same village as that from which the owner
came and most of them were related to each other. When asked how this
pattern had emerged, the manager replied:
'Whichever factory you visit in London, like ours, you will see a
similar picture that was coloured by some kind of relatedness either
stemming from kin-village network or in a much wider sense by the
ethnic origin. I have my own relatives among the workers here.
When you are approached by your own kin and village men you can
not simply refuse helping them. Somehow I feel responsible and
obliged to support my relatives and friends. In our case we try to
give them a suitable job. If they don't know anything about the job
we even teach them. You should not see it as an act of mercy, but a
mutual and reciprocal act of solidarity'.
The reciprocity and mutual obligations are strengthened when the employers
in London either request something from their kin or friends in the village of
origin or when they actually visit them. The manager's account above
suggests that both sides benefit from such a network, extending from the
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village to London where network institutions are re-established and
sustained under the patronage of employers of relatives, friends and village
men. This garment factory also employs other Turks who are not related to
the family who owned it In this case a wider network of ethnic community
relations exerts its influence on the manager who sometimes receives a
request from the Imam of a local Mosque, from a president of a Turkish
community organisation or simply from one of his workers who is already
established there and earned trust by his/her conduct, to give a job to a
Turkish fellow friend or villager. One of the workers in the factory, who
found his job through a friend working in this factory, informed me that
without the help of his friend he would not have been able to find this job.
His case is a good illustration of how a wider network, beyond the immediate
family and kin relations works in London. When asked how he managed to
find this job after several months of being unemployed, this respondent
replied:
'I found this job through a very good friend of mine with whom I
worked in the same factory for a long time. Later he moved to this
factory because it was nearer to his flat. While I was working in the
previous factory, I became ill and went to Turkey for almost four
months. When I came back after the recovery, I found that my
previous employer could no longer give me a job. There was no
suitable Vacancy for a machinist. During the recent years too many
people came to London and most of them are willing to work for
longer hours and for less wages. Naturally, employers tend to
employ these people for their benefit. In contrast to previous years, it
is becoming more difficult to find a job on a regular basis. So I had to
try my contacts to arrange a job and called my friend who took a
machinist job in this factory and asked him whether he could talk to
his boss for me. Luckily he was told that the factory had vacancies
and they wanted mature and reliable machinists and finishers. Upon
my friend's reference I was given this job'.
This informant's answer not only indicates the fact that friendship networks
are effectively used but also implies that employment is getting more and
more competitive due to an increasing number of people in the same
industry. Jobs are becoming less available for those who do not have many
skills. Nevertheless, the expansion of business and new sectors such as travel
agencies, banks and import-export . companies conducting business with
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Turkey or Cyprus are creating new jobs for the educated young Turks in
London. One of the oldest Turkish grocery-bakery shops in Green Lanes (see
Map 4) also provides us with the evidence of the extent to which social
networks may determine the nature of the workforce in terms of ethnic
backgrounds, and belonging to a community whose members relate to each
other in the business context as well as in other areas of communal activities.
The owner of the shop came from Cyprus twenty years ago and worked in
different places until he realised that there was a growing market for 'ethnic
food'. The number of Turks was increasing and they preferred to eat their
own ethnic food and use traditional Turkish recipes in their cooking. In
addition to Turks, Greeks also had a similar taste for food such as white
cheese, black olives, aubergine and yoghurt and both communities were also
fond of eating vegetables and fruit from the Mediterranean region. The
development of the ethnic food business could be interpreted as an
expression of ethnic identity in the context of north-east London. One can
draw analogies with the availability of a large variety of Asian foods as well
as the visibility of ethnic and regional dress among the Asian communities in
Britain as identity markers.
The establishment and development of the above mentioned shop through
expansion, to offer more variety to its mostly Turkish customers, inform us of
the social interactions among the Turkish community, established within this
particular quarter. While the community became enlarged through chain
migration, the shop owner grasped a fruitful opportunity by providing ethnic
food for the Turks and to some extent for the Greeks. My observations
suggest that this and other ethnically based shops not only sold food, drinks
and vegetables but also offered jobs to the community whose members
sustained the economy of these shops. It seems that a reciprocal relationship
was established between the ethnic shops and their ethnic customers. During
my fieldwork in London, I have visited several shops owned by the Turks
and noticed that the same pattern of employment exists. One owner, for
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example, explained how such a pattern emerged when asked why all his
employers were Turkish. He said:
'When I opened this shop it was only me and my wife who worked
in the shop, which by then did not occupy such a large space. By the
time we observed that there was a demand for what we sell, which
largely comprised of Turkish products, and we decided to expand the
shop to offer a wider range of food. When we rented the adjacent
shop, there emerged a few vacancies which required Turkish-
speaking workers. So I told my relatives what kind personnel I was
looking for. My first employees were my close relatives whom I
really trusted. When the availability of jobs became known among
the community more and more Turks started making inquiries'.
As the business progressed, the shop owner decided to add new sections to
his shop. In subsequent years a bakery, a sweetshop and, a Helal meat section
were added. When these sections were opened, more skilled workers were
needed to take responsibility in running these departments. Such a
development resulted in seeking workers with some experience who were
not necessarily found within the immediate family or among close relatives.
Accordingly, a wider social network was involved in finding workers with
the required skills and in return for the services delivered by the social
network of the shop owner, he met his obligations toward his friends and
acquaintances by employing the people they recommended. This process is
summed up in the following explanation by the same shop owner:
'My supermarket is open between 8 a.m. to almost 11.00 p.m. and
always busy. Especially after adding bakery, sweet and Helal butcher
sections, I needed more people and it was impossible to fill the
vacancies with my relatives simply because there were no suitable
candidates. I needed people with some skills. What I did was to turn
to my friends and asked them to recommend me reliable people.
Now, most of my 20 employees were accepted through using such a
mechanism. I never advertised vacancies because you never know
who comes and applies'.
My interviews with some of the workers confirmed that especially those
skilled ones were not related to their employer either by descent or by kin
relations. In fact, most of the skilled workers were from Turkey whereas the
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owner was from Cyprus. This suggests that a social network may assume a.
different nature within a new social and economic setting, where the
marginal and peripheral status of an ethnic community forces it to forge new
and in most cases wider allegiances than traditional kin relations and social
networks. Following these discussions, which were drawn from my
fieldwork in London and in Berlin, I would like to suggest the following
three-stage model of a mechanism by which kin relations and social networks
worked within the context of a migration process (see also Chapter Three).
Figure 5.3: Three-stage model and mechanism of networks
Stage 1- Pre-migration and decision-making process:
-Providing information on advantages, disadvantages, earning potential and
ways of finding a job,
-Investments of migrant workers suggesting the high-earning potential,
-Promises of help in finding a job, accommodation and meeting on arrival,
-Beginning of a chain migration,
Stage 2- Migration and Settlement Process
-Financial support
-Chain migration gathers momentum,
-Issuing a letter of invitation or recommendation if needed,
-Paying for travel expenses,
-Meeting on arrival and providing accommodation,
-Finding a job,
-Helping to arrange a marriage,
-Helping to buy a flat or a house,
-Emergence of ethnic quarters or ghettos,
Stage 3- Post-settlement process
-Forming new relationships and expanding the social network,
-Establishing/strengthening familial relations, regular visits,
-Foundation of religious organisations as an expression of religious identity,
-Establishment of welfare organisations as indices of integration, and
participation in mainstream society,
-Schooling of children, establishment of private schools or supplementary
weekend classes,
-Establishment and expansion of ethnic businesses, joint-venture economic
adventures,
-Involvement in local politics,
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It should be noted here that several developments during these three stages
have an overlapping nature which could be recurrently observed at every
stage of the migration process. Kinship structure and social networks among
the Turkish community appear to have a dynamic characteristic which
suggests that kin and network institutions are reproduced within new
contexts in order to meet the needs of the emerging community. The dynamic
nature of the network institutions allows community members to widen the
scope of their activities and involvement in their new environment
Ladbury's (1977, p. 307) observation on the Turkish community in London
supports the above argument in that new relationships were formed during
the settlement and post-settlement stages. She notes that 'certain kin
relationships have been strengthened and completely new relationships
formed between individuals who now relate, not on the basis of where they
once lived in Cyprus, but on the basis of their present status. Thus, a Turkish-.
Cypriot family will quickly come to know and depend on other families
when it moves into a neighbourhood and the most relevant kin become who
live nearest and who visit most frequently'. In contrast to Turkish-Cypriots,
mainland Turks still attach importance to being from the same village, town
or even from the same city.
During my fieldwork, I observed that some of the social clubs and ethnic
organisations were overwhelmingly made up of co-villagers. A striking
expression of the attachment to the village of origin and generating
friendship among its members was observed during the month of Ramazan
when an Islamic organisation organised if-tars (dinner) during the course of
thirty days. When I looked at the publicity board inside the organisation's
office, I noticed that they had put up a list of those who were either willing to
finance or prepare the iftars. The list did not give any name but only the name
of a town or a city, suggesting that people from these particular cities would
sponsor the preparation of iftars. The first day was booked by people from
Adana, on the second day by people from Gaziantep (see Map 1). The same
pattern repeated itself for the remaining twenty eight days. Every morning,
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the organisers contacted those who had signed up for giving iftar and
reminded them that it was their turn to get the food ready by iftar time. Thus,
the thirty-day experience indicates that mainland Turks from the same village
or city met on at least one evening to share food and exchange conversation
during which hemsehrilik ties were renewed and the circle of hemsehris became
larger. In addition to that, people from the same city or village also had
chance to meet other Turks since everybody was invited to the iftar. This
enlarged the hemsehrilik ties by establishing a new circle of social networks by
interacting with Turks from other cities, facilitated by religious activities.
5.4. Marriage as a Process of Reproduction of Family Values, Kin and
Social Network
One of the outstanding features of socialisation within the Turkish
community is marriage. This means that marriage is expected from men and
women at a suitable age in their life cycle. The community owes its existence
and survival to the establishment of families through marriages. White's
(1994, p. 38-39) observations clearly explain this aspect of socialisation. She
notes that 'the basic prerequisite for the existence and the continuation of the
traditional Turkish family is marriage. Turkish social practices require that an
individual marry, and enormous social, personal, and economic pressure is
brought to bear that an individual does so'. What lies behind this pressure is
the proper duties and responsibilities of the adult stage of the life cycle. An
individual is thought to achieve an adult stage by marriage and performing
the duties generated by entering into married life. Delaney (1991, p. 112) calls
this process 'social adulthood'. Bainbridge (1986, p. 447), on the other hand,
observes that 'to be a wife or husband, from this perspective, is also to be a
woman or a man. One adult is neither youth nor man, neither girl nor
woman. Their status is indeterminate... Their marginal status renders them
dangerous. A person cannot be fully independent until they have established
their own household, and had their children'. Until they get married, no
matter how grown up they are, both boys and girls are under the control of
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their parents. Through marrying and taking the responsibility of running a
family they achieve 'social adulthood' and establish their independence.
Despite the changes in the wedding rituals and marriage prestations 4, the
establishment of fan-illy institutions based on marriage is still of central value
among the Turkish community in London. The meaning of marriage could be
seen in its large scale functions. Marriage means not only bringing two
individuals together. The meaning of marriage for Turks in London goes far
beyond that Marriage is seen as the first and foremost step for the ensuing
performance of duties conferred by the commitments of marriage. From this
wide perspective, marriage means establishing a new household, forging new
kin networks or restructuring the old ones, reproducing traditional family
values, procreation, child rearing and transmitting shared values to young
generations by reproducing conventional patterns of relationships and life
style within the Turkish family. It appears, however, that the migration
experience and diaspora situation has changed some facets of wedding rituals
and marriage prestations. Nevertheless, it is 'still seen as an indispensable
institution and perceptions related to the necessity of marriage persist
Social pressure on unmarried individuals increases when they are thought to
be mature enough to marry provided that they have sufficient economic
resources to cover expenses. Parents, relatives and friends put pressure on the
individual to get married. My findings suggest that achieving economic
independence, either by saving or starting a business, and educational
expectations such as graduating from a. school and finding a. job, delay the
entrance into the process of marriage. Economic dependence and lengthy
educational activity evoke discouraging feelings on the part of single
males/females as opposed to the social pressures brought upon them by
parents, friends and relatives. Here one sees a clash of pressures regarding
marriage which puts the individuals into a dilemma of either bowing to the
external pressure to establish a. household or continuing to carry out his/her
plans for the future. The involvement of kin and social network in the process
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of marriage begins even before such a decision is taken by an individual. The
kinship network extends its presence well beyond the marriage process.
Newly-weds find themselves surrounded by various types of kin and social
network relations. These are exchange of gifts and solidarity which constitute
the important grounds on which the relationships among families, relatives
and friends are sustained and consolidated. I would like to argue at this point
that the development of strengthened relations among thelamilies and kin as
smaller social units of minority ethnic groups and the diffusion of such
relations among the Turkish community reproduce a fertile ground over
which shared values and consciousness of an ethnic identity may be
nourished.
As a consequence of immigration new patterns of marriage have emerged
within the Turkish community. Arranged marriages still persist but often the
candidate has the right to veto the choice of their parents or relatives. In
addition to that, love marriages that are accepted and approved by the
parents, and also marriages of one's own choice despite family disapproval,
take place among the Turkish community in London. During the fieldwork, I
came across marriages of these kinds and also observed that endogamy is not
always practised under the new social and economic circumstances which
have led to the emergence of larger group allegiances beyond the immediate
family and kin network. While marriages take place between Turks living in
London, it is still common practice to arrange marriages between individuals
living in different countries. The current pattern of marriages is presented in
Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Types of Marriage between individuals in London and Berlin
1-Marriages between individuals living in England and living in Turkey; or vice versa
2-Marriages between individuals living in England and living in Cyprus; or vice versa
3-Marriages in London
a- Marriages between mainland Turks
b- Marriages between Turkish-Cypriots
d- Marriages between mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots
e- Marriages outside the Turkish community, English, Irish etc.
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What concerns us here is the involvement of kin and social networks in the
process of pre-marriage and post-marriage behaviour of individuals. The
above model suggests that at every stage of marriage families, friends and
relatives play their part in the performance of wedding rituals and marriage
prestations. During the fieldwork in London I came across all these types of
marriages. A similar pattern emerged in Berlin too, in terms of arranging a
marriage between individuals living in Berlin and in Turkey or vice versa.
Whether in Turkey, Cyprus or in London parents who would like to arrange
a marriage for their son look for namus (honour) in the prospective bride. At
the time of his research, Stirling observed that namus was by far the most
important characteristic sought The reputation of the girl depended on her
purity gained by not having contact with the opposite sex (Stirling, 1965, p.
189). Parents who are looking for a. suitable spouse as soon as their children
reach a marriageable age usually follow a pattern of search from inside to
outside. The first circle is close kin. Then comes making inquiries within a
larger circle among distant kin, friends, neighbours and fellow villagers.
When none of these possibilities bears fruit, then parents seek spouses
elsewhere outside the kin and spatial boundaries (Delaney, 1991, p. 108;
Bainbridge, 1986, p. 164) which is a common case within the Turkish
community both in London and in Berlin. However, one's own choice and
preference is also accepted provided that the candidate has a good
reputation, honour and conforms to the values that the family upholds. The
significance of namus still persists in London as an important criterion for
describing the moral state of a woman (Ladbury, 1979, p. 139).
Marriages that take place between individuals from different countries are
mostly arranged due to the unsuccessful attempts of the parents to find a
suitable spouse for their children in London and Berlin. When the parents
fail, the next step is usually to activate kin relations and social networks to
search for a match. Such a request is welcomed wholeheartedly by relatives,
fellow villagers and neighbours. During my fieldwork in London, I closely
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observed seven marriages in which kin relations and a wider network of
connections were involved. Five of these marriages took place between
families in London and families in Turkey. Three girls married boys in
Turkey and two boys married girls in their villages. All the spouses joined
their partners in London except one girl who moved to Turkey. I also came
across other marriages which took place between individuals living in
England and individuals living in Cyprus. In addition to these, I witnessed
two marriages, of which the first one took place between a Turkish man and
an Irish woman, and the second was between a Turkish man and an
American woman.
My research in Berlin gave me an opportunity to observe three marriages that
resulted in two brides joining their husbands in Berlin and one going back to
Turkey. One different pattern emerged in the case of a marriage between a
boy in England and a girl in Germany where the husband joined his wife in
Berlin. It should be noted here that my data on marriage patterns and
involvement of social networks in the various stages of this process is not
solely derived from observing such a small number of marriages, but rather,
it is based on a larger examination of already existing families. For example, I
did not come across a marriage ceremony during my fieldwork between a
mainland Turk and a Turkish-Cypriot However, I interviewed couples who
had married some years ago. Similarly, I managed to witness only two out-
marriages (Irish and American women) during the fieldwork but the data is
enriched by interviewing those who had married English women years
before, though in a few cases divorces had taken place. It should also be
noted that kin and social network involvement during the process of out
marriages is not very effective. Marriage of such girls to Turkish boys in
Turkey were primarily arranged, though the consent of the girls was a
precondition of starting the process.
One of the salient features of the post-settlement process is visiting the
country of origin at least once a year or once every two years. Regular visits
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to Turkey and Cyprus in the case of the Turkish community generate an
opportunity to renew and strengthen family and kin relations. Moreover,
these travels provide a chance for parents to find spouses for their children of
marriageable age. All three of the girls in my sample, for example, met their
husbands while they were on holiday in Turkey. One girl who married and
went to Turkey, explained how she was introduced to her prospective
husband by a relative:
'As soon as I finished my degree course, my parents started talking
about marriage. I had male friends at the college but none of them
were Turkish. At this time, the idea of marriage did not cross my
mind even if it did so I was not prepared to marry a non-Turkish.
After a year I went to Turkey with my parents on a long holiday and
I was introduced by a relative to a boy with a university degree and a
good career. Then he started coming around to give us company
while going out'.
When she met the boy this informant had no idea that her mother had asked
their relatives back in Turkey to look for a suitable candidate. This came to
light later during the holiday when the boy expressed his interest in her. She
explained what followed:
'As soon as he talked about things that one can easily relate to
marriage, I opened the subject to my parents immediately. They did
not seemed to be surprised and straightforwardly asked me what I
thought about the boy . Then my parents told me that they had asked
my aunt to make an inquiry about such a boy whom I may be
interested in marrying'.
One can see from the above account that the aunt had acted as a mediator
between the two families whose children got married later. The girl was
happy to settle in Turkey since her husband had a good job and it was also
important for her to live in Turkey where she found family relations much
closer arid friendship and neighbourhood more genuine. I felt at the time of
the interview that the existence of a large kin and social network in Turkey
played an important role in her decision, as she said 'if something happens to
me such as illness, economic need or marriage crisis, there are too many
people whom I can turn to and rely upon'.
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The second case is also a good illustration of the involvement of relatives in
arranging meetings between families living in Turkey and London. One
informant who married a boy in the village of her family's origin, told me
that she also met her husband through a relative and a love-relationship
developed between the youngsters during her consequent visits to Turkey,
followed by frequent correspondence. She said:
'I felt that we were introduced with the idea that we may like each
other and get married. Before I met my prospective husband, I knew
him by name only. But my parents never forced me to enter into
marriage with him. However, I remember that my uncle's wife was
always praising him and telling me that I would be very happy with
him if I marry this boy. Later, I discovered that she was the one who
acted as a go-between the families and in a way made preliminary
negotiations that if I marry, my husband should join me in London
etc'.
My informant admitted that had it not been for the mediating role of her
uncle's wife she would not have readily started a relationship that would
lead to marriage. This case suggests, therefore, that relatives are involved
during personal decisions and such an involvement is regarded as a duty by
the members of a social network.
In the third case of a girl who married in Turkey, a similar phenomenon was
observed whereby not only relatives but also neighbours as members of the
social network influenced the girl's decision in choosing a partner. When
asked how she met her spouse, the interviewee gave a familiar response:
'Like many other Turkish people living in London we visit Turkey and my
mother's home town at least once a year, and spend our holidays with our
relatives and my mother's close friends who are still very close to us. My
parents left it to me to decide when and whom to marry, as long as this is
within the acceptable boundaries of cultural and traditional values. Having a
boy-friend, for example, was discouraged'. This informant explained that
while studying, she enjoyed a relatively free life and did not feel too much
social pressure to conform to the practice of marrying right after school.
Nevertheless, social and parental pressure exerted itself in different forms as
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she grew older. According to her, social and parental pressure became more
intense in the following years. She explained the developments as follows:
'When I became twenty-six, I was still single which is not a suitable
status for a girl according to our tradition which impose marriages at
an earlier age. After this time, my parents started asking my plans
about marriage. Although they were not panicked about my single-
status and about what other people were talking regarding my case, I
felt that they were urging me by asking questions. With this state of
mind we went to Turkey and started a tour of visits. We received
always very good reception from our relatives and my mother's friends
whom I called aunt (teyze) as an expression of intimacy. Like my
parents they bombarded me with questions of marriages and reminded
me that I should not delay it any further'.
During the course of her holiday in Turkey she was introduced to the son of
her mother's friend. Later, he appeared to be the candidate for marriage as
her mother and relatives asked what she thought about him. As the informant
revealed, his manners and interests were likeable to her. The next summer in
1994, he visited her in London and meanwhile both families explicitly
encouraged them to get married. Then she accepted his marriage proposal of
her own free will. It should be pointed out that though she was not forced
into marrying this particular man against her will, one can argue that social
and parental pressure in the form of expressing expectations from her, the
unsuitability of becoming too old for marriage, and, the building up of
potentially damaging circulation of gossip, convinced her to reconsider
suggestions for marriage.
In a sense, institutions of kinship, friendship and neighbourliness have
socially conditioned her behaviour5. During the decision making process, she
negotiated that she wanted to live in London at least for the foreseeable
future. This was accepted by the prospective spouse and after the wedding
ceremony in Turkey the new couple moved to London where a second
marriage reception was held to which relatives and friends in London were
invited as a part of the marriage custom. Those who do not receive invitations
to the wedding feel isolated from a social network and usually retaliate when
--
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their son/daughter gets married. This is seen as a damaging action to social
ties, and marriage is always seen as an occasion for strengthening kin and
social ties; therefore a great deal of effort is made to make sure that
everybody who is related to the marrying couple is invited.
It seems that although families and relatives are trying to arrange suitable
candidates for the youngsters who are thought to be of marriageable age, the
children are given the right to accept or refuse. In the cases I have studied, I
have not come across a 'forced marriage'. As mentioned above, there is social
and familial pressure to get married but this pressure is not extended to force
a candidate to accept a marriage proposal if she/he does not approve.
Personal choice at this stage is also important, and it is clear from the
statements of the couples that being introduced to someone is only a
beginning leading to marriage only if both the candidates feel that their
personalities are compatible. As it will be seen in Chapter Six, young
generations are increasingly demanding to make their own choices in
marriage.
In one case, for example, which started as a friendship and developed into a
love relationship between a London born and bred Turkish-Cypriot couple,
whom I met before their marriage, it was clear that the choice of the youth
may receive the support of families if they knew each other and felt that
family reputation would not be damaged. Bainbridge (1986, p. 214), in her
study of Turkish-Cypriots in London, also observed a similar phenomenon of
'an increasing tendency for young people to make their own marriages'
though couples who make their own choices 'still go through the formal
procedures of marriage'. However, it should be noted here that families and
relatives show great concern even if the marriage process was started by the
couple themselves as opposed to an arranged marriage. This underlines that
kinship ties are renewed at the time of marriage. When asked what were the
reactions and the involvement of their families during the course of decision
making and the marriage process, this Turkish-Cypriot couple explained that
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a number of factors influenced their families who extended their support The
husband's account of the matter helps us to draw a framework which may
explain how various factors relating to kinship ties play a role in a marriage
of choice and approval rather than that of an arrangement When asked what
kind of remarks he received from his parents and relatives at the time of
disclosing his marriage plans with someone who was not arranged by his
own parents or relatives, the husband who works in a travel company told
me that
`Though I was born, brought up and educated in London, I was
raised in a Turkish-Cypriot household where certain values are being
constantly emphasised of which, protecting family reputation
through successful education, exhibiting good manners, having a
good job and marrying a reputable girl were important. Like many
other Turkish-Cypriots, I was convinced that whatever I do would
affect my family. In addition to familial influence, one is also exposed
to different kind of socialisation at the school; among peers and play
groups. Looking back, I could say that my schooling taught me to
take important decisions personally such as job, where to live and
more importantly whom to marry. But I should admit that I had
always taken my family's reactions seriously. In the case of my
marriage, I received their support because they were convinced that I
made a good choice of a girl whose family had also a good
reputation'.
The wife's account also confirms that the choice of the young generation is
now more tolerated and accepted as long as it conforms to certain traditions
and values. Her explanation suggests that a change is taking place within the
Turkish community allowing more space for the views and personal
preferences of the young generation. When asked how her parents and close
relatives reacted to her marriage to someone outside their kin, she replied:
'I had more or less same upbringing as my husband. Family values
and relations with relatives had always been important, therefore
when you are taking a decision you spontaneously are taking these
factors into account. When I opened the subject of marriage to my
mother, her first reaction was surprise and, maybe a shock rather
than that of happiness because it was something she was not used to;
and I think she had somebody else in mind for me to get married. My
close relatives argued that he was not known by the family because
he was out of our kin. Later, I found out that as soon as I told about
my husband-to-be's name and his family, my relatives started
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making inquiries about who he was and whether his family had a
good reputation. When the two families met upon our insistence,
they found out that both families had more or less same sets of
values and expectations. Although some close relatives expressed
their disapproval at the very beginning, my parents convinced them
that I made a good choice and they all participated in every stage of
my marriage'.
This explanation also suggests that social networks are activated right at the
beginning of a marriage process whether it is arranged by parents and
relatives or an individual's choice, as long as it is approved. The following
case study of a marriage between a young Turkish man from Berlin and a girl
from Antalya, Turkey, confirms that family, friends, relatives and neighbours
get involved at all stages of a marriage. The informant from Berlin was
interviewed when he was making preparations to go to Antalya for the
wedding ceremony. When asked how he found the prospective bride, he
gave a typical reply suggesting that arranged marriages still persist especially
for religiously oriented young people who do not favour male-female
courtship for religious reasons. This informant explained:
'It was not me who found my fiancée but my brother's friend who
lives in a nearby village to my parent's hometown. Though I did not
have strict religious education, I read too many books on Islam which
does not allow boyfriendship-girlfriendship relationships. I try to
practise Islam and observe religious rules. During my university
education in Berlin there were some girls around, but I was very
much preoccupied with my studies and with spreading the message
of Islam among my fellow Turkish students. When we started talking
about marriage in my family, it became obvious that I was not in a
position of finding a spouse. Then, we turned to my elder brother
who had stayed in Turkey when my parents were moving to
Germany. Before he started activating his contacts, I told him that I
wanted to marry a practising religious girl'.
This was the first stage at which his relatives in Turkey became aware that
their kin in Berlin had asked for their help which is of reciprocal importance
for those in Turkey, and for those who work and live abroad. The second
stage of the involvement of kin took place when the informant went to
Turkey to meet the girl. Before he flew to Turkey, his brother went with his
wife to see6 the girl and her family. This visit was arranged and accompanied
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by a friend of his brother from a neighbouring village. After the visit, it was
reported back to Germany that she was a suitable girl with good manners.
When the informant arrived in Turkey, he went to meet the girl on a pre-
arranged day. He was accompanied by his brother, uncle, his brother's friend
and their wives. At the first visit he did not exchange any word with the girl
but mostly replied to questions put forward by her family. After the meeting
both sides liked each other and the respondent expressed his desire to talk to
her before taking it any further. At the second meeting they talked about their
expectations of marriage and exchanged ideas about their plans for the
future. The meeting took place in the presence of the girl's older-married
sister and aunt After the meeting he told his brother that he wanted to marry
the girl if she also wanted this.
The next stage was to find out whether she wanted to marry him. The
informanf s sister-in-law talked to her and learned that the girl was ready to
accept the proposal. What followed was a request for the girl's parental
approval. When/if the girl's family approves of her decision then the male
side is supposed to ask for the girl's hand'. In the case under study, the
informant's brother and uncles visited the girl's family and formally told
them that the informant wanted to get married to their daughter. Upon the
approval of the girl's family, close family and kin members were invited to
an informal party at the girl's parental house where sweets were offered8.
Since the informant was on short leave, one week later a nisan (engagement)
ceremony was organised, attended by relatives, close/distant kin, friends and
neighbours to announce that these two youngsters had decided to get
married and their families had agreed to this.
Nisan is seen as a period given to couples to get to know each other more and
establish good relations. The significance of the engagement party as far as
the kinship and friendship networks are concerned is the attendance of a
large number of relatives at the ceremony. Relatives, acquaintances,
neighbours and villagers at the party-are expected to give presents to the new
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couple. Offering gifts (hediye vermek, taki takmak or para atmak/takmak) are an
important part of the marriage customs in Turkish society and this practice is
still observed by the Turkish communities both in London and Berlin. The
wedding ceremony (dugun), like the engagement party, provides a good
opportunity to renew kin relations. Bainbridge (1986, p. 376) sees each
wedding ceremony as 'a microcosm' of the Turkish community in London.
Therefore the offering of gifts by the kin and relatives of both sides is
repeated at the dugun ceremony.
As far as the network institutions among ethnic minority groups are
concerned, the importance of exchanging gifts has been well documented.
Anwar (1985, p. 67), in his study of the Pakistani community in Rochdale
mentions that Vartan Bhanji as a mechanism for kinship network, which is
based on gift exchange is widely practised and it strengthens the social
networks among the Pakistanis. In a later study Shaw, (1988, p. 112) also
shows that the practice of gift exchange known as lena-dena still persists
among the Pakistanis in Oxford. The underlying feature of such a practice is
the reciprocal nature of the gift exchange and the obligation it places on the
ones who offer a gift Shaw (1988, p. 124) notes that friends and relatives of
the respective parties in Oxford give gifts at the various stages of marriage.
Similar practices also takes place during Turkish weddings. At the wedding
of the informant referred to above various kinds of gifts were given to the
new couple as an expression of reciprocal concern of the relatives and family
friends. Host families also feel obliged to offer gifts to those who have
brought presents for their children when they are invited to similar
ceremonies by their guests in the future.
5.5. Marriage and Religious Networks
As mentioned above a new marriage pattern is likely to develop outside
Turkey when it takes place between individuals living in London and in
Berlin. At the time of my fieldwork, I noticed that there was a new type of
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network developing, in addition to that of kin and friendship networks. I
would like to refer to it as a 'religious network' originating not in blood
relations, neighbourhood or in village origin but by belonging to a particular
religious movement which has an organisational structure in many European
countries. Religious networks among Turkish immigrants in West European
countries are determined by the nature of religious movements and their
response to the problems faced by Muslims. Religious networks operate on
the basis of a large number of members who are scattered in many countries
but continue to communicate through visits, meetings, publications, common
enterprises and centres of learning.
Religious groups such as Suleymanci, Nurcu, Sufi movements and religio-
political groups such as the National Vision and the Turkish Federation,
manage to exchange information on every aspect of their activities and
problems (see Chapters Nine and Ten). Each group has centres in many
European countries that subscribe to their headquarters mostly based in
Germany due to the numerical intensity of the Turkish community in that
country. Institutional forms of these movements operate at two levels. Local
activities are organised within the reach of every organisation involving
religious ceremonies, wedding ceremonies, celebrations of birth and
circumcision, and observance of death rituals. Religious organisations try to
organise a wide range of activities that can cover as many aspects of a
minority community's life as possible. Social problems are at the forefront of
these activities and family issues, child rearing and establishing Islamically
sound marriages are frequently discussed within the local context Such
discussions could be translated into an international context at the time of
annual general meetings or during the regular visits of leaders to their
branches based in different countries, creating an excellent opportunity for
the flow of information. Activities of religious organisations at international
level require regular visits and frequent discussion of issues of common
interest among which family, marriage and child-rearing seem to assume
priority as the number of young people of marriageable age is increasing. At
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the meetings organised by religious groups, families are provided with an
opportunity to meet each other and encouraged to develop these relations
further by visits beyond the boundaries of the Mosques or meeting halls.
Religious families who have children of marriageable age may find it easier
to search for a suitable match within the religious network, which provides
an excellent reference by belonging to the same Islamic group.
My data suggest that religious families and Islamically educated young
people within the Turkish community would like to marry someone who has
similar tendencies. In many cases this is seen as the precondition of mutual
understanding and compatibility. My interviews at the Mosques on marriage
issues revealed that an ideal marriage is based on Islamic rules whereby
religious rituals are observed and children are brought up according to
Islamic principles. Such an approach to marriage and family life encourages
some members of the same religious group to look for 'in marriages' within
he group if/when it is possible. This kind of marriage may take place locally
between the members of the same religious group or in the same
neighbourhood or city. 'In group' marriage may also take place
internationally, which means that such a marriage can be arranged between
individuals living in different countries. The arrangement of 'in group'
marriages depends on the involvement of a member in group activities, and
the intensity and frequency of social interaction within a given religious
network.
The marriage of a young Turkish man from London, who defines himself as a
'religious person', to a girl living in Berlin is a good illustration of an
emerging pattern of marriage facilitated by the membership of a religious
group. This informant told me that his marriage was arranged by an Imam.
He said that he frequently visited the Imam and was an active member of the
Ja_ma'a. He knew that there were exchanges of visits between the Imam and
people from other countries. During one of his visits to the Mosque, the Imam
told the informant that he was hosting a family from Berlin. The visiting
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family was also associated with the same group. The Imam used to discuss
marriage issues with the Ja_ma'a. This time, he told the informant that this
family had a very good daughter and asked him if he would be interested in
considering marriage. When the informant agreed to the Imam's suggestion,
both families were informed. The Imam informed the parents of the girl and
recommended the informant to them as a very good match for their daughter.
The Imams, as religious leaders, are respected and their word is taken as a
reliable reference by the Jama'a. Issues around family and marriage are
always discussed and the Imams are asked how a Muslim family should
conduct themselves. Imams frequently mention the importance of family life
to the Muslim community. It appears that these concerns confer a
responsibility on Imams and senior members of the Jama'a. This
responsibility is sometimes translated into arranging marriages within the
same religious groups. It should be noted here that the involvement of an
Imam or other respected people does not necessarily lead to a marriage as the
consent of the two sides are seen as essential, because according to Islam
forced marriages are not accepted.
The role of religious networks in making matches and arranging marriages is
clearly seen among Sheikh Nazim's Sufi group in London. During my
fieldwork, I interviewed some followers of Sheikh Nazim and learnt that a
few of them had met their wives through their membership of the group. I
talked to three men who had married 'within the group'. It is worth noting
here that all these women were of national origin other than that of Turkish,
who had converted to Islam some years before through the message of Sheikh
Nazim and began to follow him at the meetings even in different countries.
One informant who had married a German woman convert told me that he
had seen her in London at a religious ceremony held in the Mosque where
the Sheikh had come to deliver a sermon.
-
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The informant who is of Cypriot origin joined the group in the late 1980s and
never missed a meeting in London whenever the Sheikh came. When he saw
the German convert, he approached one of the deputies of the Sheikh and
asked him whether he could help him to find out if she was single. He said:
'Since similar inquiries were made to the deputy Imam, he was not surprised
and forwarded this message to his wife who made the inquiry among the
women and found out that she was a single woman'. The Imam's wife who
was regarded by the informant as close as his own mother, played the role of
mediator between the two sides and the German convert told her that she
would consider marrying him 'if the Sheikh approved' it This matter was
taken to the Sheikh who is known as encouraging marriages between
members of his followers as he believes that his disciples are more compatible
with each other than to outsiders. The informant said that he had been called
by the Sheikh and asked if his parents would also accept this German convert
as a respectable bride. When asked for his reaction, the informant replied:
'I was thrilled when my Sheikh called me and my father who came
with me and told the Sheikh that they would be happy as long as the
Sheikh approves this marriage and pray (dun) for them. In fact this
call was a kind of urge for me to marry that woman who gave up her
religion and accepted Islam. The Sheikh's message to her was
conveyed by the Imam's wife and we got engaged after a while. As
this process was taking place, we received support from all around
us in the group because marriage is seen as an important institution
leading to the establishment of family as the basic unit of an Islamic
community'.
As soon as the engagement was announced, a religious wedding contract
(dini nikah) took place in order to enable the couple to see each other in
accordance with the Islamic rules. After six months engagement the couple
married in Germany and the wedding ceremony was repeated in London and
attended by the relatives, friends of the informant and some members of the
Sheikh Nazim Jama'a. A similar wedding took place between a Turkish man
and a French convert woman in the same community, facilitated by
belonging to the same religious network. As this respondent told me, his
marriage took place in almost the same way as the above case and went
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through the same process. These case studies suggest that 'out marriage'
between different nationalities and unrelated individuals is transformed into
'in marriage' in the context of religious networks which provide a broad basis
for belonging and proximity transcending nationality, ethnic background and
kin boundaries.
The analysis of ethnographic data collected in London and Berlin clearly
suggests that traditional family values, kin relations and social networks are
constantly reproduced and expressed in the countries of settlement As
explained at the beginning of this Chapter, the temporary character of
migration was replaced by permanent settlement as evidenced by the
participation of Turks in social and economic life in the countries of
immigration. Turks in London, as in Berlin, Cologne, Rotterdam, Paris etc.,
are no longer guest workers, but a permanent part of the wider society. One
of the consequences of the tendency for a permanent settlement is the reunion
of families and the re-establishment of Turkish family structures in London.
It is suggested in Figure 5.3., that kin and social networks are involved in
every stage of immigration, settlement and post-settlement of Turkish
immigrants. However, as a result of spatial movement, kin and social
networks expanded and new allegiances were established. The expanded
social networks were utilised in finding jobs, establishing joint-venture
economic investments and even in arranging marriages. Marriage is still
regarded as an important part of socialisation by the Turkish community. It is
a prerequisite step 'to become a man' and 'to become a woman'. From a wide
perspective, marriage means establishing a new household, forging new kin
networks or restructuring the old ones, reproducing traditional family values,
procreation, child rearing and transmitting shared values to young
generations by reproducing conventional patterns of relationships and life
styles within the Turkish family. Despite the concerted efforts of families
towards continuity, some changes are taking place in families and in
marriage practices. The young generation in particular, are trying to balance
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the effects of change and continuity. Chapter Six and Seven will further
explore the experiences of the young generation. It will be argued that young
Turks are constantly negotiating and redefining their identities.
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Chapter Five: Notes
1. For a list of kinship terms used in a Turkish village, see Stirling (1969) Turkish
Village, p. 152-153
2. Derived from the word Birader, brother, Biraderi refers to kinship networks
beyond the joint-extended family among Pakistani community (Anwar, 1979 P. 62).
Saifullah Khan (1977, p. 61) defines Biradari (brotherhood) as 'an endogamous group
whose members claim descent in the paternal line from a common male ancestor,
but in certain contexts the word is used to refer to individuals or groups with whom
there is a 'brotherly' and hence loyal relationship'. However, within the UK context,
the Biradari assumes varying definitions which indicate more flexibility as observed
by Shaw (1988, p. 99)
3. 'Trust' is seen a s an important 'social capital'. In his recent book, Trust (1995),
Fukuyarna tries to explain the central role of 'trust' as a social capital produced by
shared values for he mobilisation of economic resources. His views remind what
Weber tried to establish in his seminal work, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of
Capitalism, that the origins of Capitalism should be sought in Protestant ethics.
According to Fukuyarna, the economic development in South Asia is largely based
on social virtues such as social capital, common interest and shared values
embedded in trust. Union around shared values, it is argued, is an effective source
of solidarity which replaces individualism.
4. For a detailed exploration of wedding ritual and prestations in a Turkish village,
see Stirling (1965) p. 178-191; Delaney (1991), p. 99-146. For a description of
performance of wedding rituals among Turkish-Cypriots in London see Bainbridge
(1986) p. 397-437
5. Gossip about the family and the girls also influence attitudes. For the meaning
and role of gossip in a Turkish village community, see Stirling (1965), p. 240-246; A.
L. Epstein's (1969, p. 117-127) noteworthy essay analyses how gossip, norms and
social networks control the behavioural patterns.
6. This is known as gorucuye gitmek (to go to see the girl). At the first stage family
members or relatives of the male side go to female's family to see her. If they decide
that she should be seen by the their son, a second arrangement for goruculuk is made
if the girl's family decides to accept further negotiations. In this case, the male
candidate comes to see the girl (and to be seen by her) with his family elders.
7. This stage is referred as kiz istemek literally means 'asking for the girl'.
8. All close relatives (yakin alcraba) were invited to this small ceremony known as tatli
yemek/soz kesmek literally means eating sweet to mark the marriage promise
expressed.
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Chapter Six
Young Generation, Continuity And Change
The children of immigrant communities are variously referred to in the
literature on immigration, race relations and ethnic identity as 'second
generation', 'third generation', 'immigrant youth', or 'young generation'. In
this thesis, I prefer to use the terms 'young generation' and 'young people'
interchangeably to denote the children of immigrant Turkish communities.
My usage of the term, 'young generation', includes not only children who
were born in the country of immigration but also those who were born in the
country of origin but joined their parents, or migrated with them, at an early
age and participated in social and educational life in the receiving country.
6.1. Young Generation and Socialisation
Young generations are exposed to a different socialisation than that of their
parents in the new setting. Their socialisation is characterised by different
social and cultural values. In the case of the Turkish immigrant community,
the first generation was socialised in Turkey or Cyprus where they grew up
in a social and cultural environment surrounded by family, tradition and
religion from an early age. The content of Turkish-Muslim identity is
transmitted by the readily-found structural forces and agencies in the society
which passed on its values to the children and therefore, helped in the
construction of their identity.
Turkish parents who were born and raised in the country of origin did not
experience most of what their children experienced in the country of
immigration, where different social and cultural forces determine the
contents and boundaries of identity. Among the readily-found structural
forces and agencies in the country of origin, one can mention linguistic unity
with the society, the traditional family structure and educational institutions
that aim to create a national Turkish identity. Religious influences of the
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Mosques, mystical orders and Qur'an courses teaching the traditional Islamic
way of life may also be added to this list. In contrast to their parents, the
young generation in the Turkish diaspora lack the influence of many of these
institutions during the process of their socialisation while developing a sense
of identity and belonging. Although some of the above factors exert their
influence on the young generation, they are not only less persistent but also
loosely rooted compared to Turkey/Cyprus. It should also be pointed out
here that the influence of traditional Turkish and Islamic agents are countered
and contested by the establishments of the host society where Turkish
children spend the formative period of their life cycle.
The young Turkish generation experience continuity and change in the face
of their upbringing in British society which provides a social and cultural
order different from that of the Turkish environment The changes the young
generation experience are largely rooted in their socialisation and exposure to
contextual factors. As I discussed in Chapter Three, this means that the
identity development 'is not simply an intrapsychic process, but also an
interpersonal process, embedded in a social context" (Phinney, 1993a, p. 47).
The sociocultural context is recognised 'as a determining factor in the process
of ego-identity formation' (Watermann, 1992, p. 54). Markston-Adam's (1992,
p. 174) findings also lend support to my argument that 'social-contextual
factors' are influential in identity formation of the young generation.
Markston-Adam argues that 'identity formation is not wholly an
individualistic process; rather, social environment exerts its forms of power
and influence'.
In this Chapter, I will focus on the development of ethnic identity among the
young Turkish generation. The process of continuity and change will be
analysed in the formation of their identity. Since identity construction is a
dynamic process, the young Turkish generation is constantly renegotiating
and redefining their identity. The process of renegotiation and redefinition is
an ongoing process as far as my respondents are concerned.
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A number of studies have already been published on the Turkish young
generation, focusing on several aspects of their life such as identity conflict,
cultural clash, changes in their socialisation, educational problems,
generational differences and transmission of traditional values and attitudes2.
The research material of these publications with one exception3, were drawn
from a sample of young Turks who were living in several immigrant
receiving countries other than Britain. Whereas there is a lacunae of literature
on young Turks in Britain, there is, however, an increasing number of
publications on the young generation of other ethnic minorities in Britain. It
might be expected that such literature would help us to understand the
experiences of young Turks from a comparative perspective. Studies by
Anwar (1976, 1994), Ballard (1979), and Weinreich (1979) among others4 are
good examples of such efforts, providing an overview of other ethnic youth
in Britain. In this context I also undertook a survey of young Turks and
studied their attitudes and beliefs by using different variables of continuity
and change which are presented below.
6.2. Characteristics of the Sample
The following findings are based on a survey, in-depth interviews and
participant observation. As I have explained in Chapter Two, the survey was
carried out at supplementary schools for Turkish students. Some of these
students -21 males, 15 females- were interviewed at length. In the following
analysis, the quantitative and qualitative data (from London and Berlin) will
be presented together. The questionnaires were distributed among almost an
equal number of both sexes to assess gender differences in relation to several
variables (religion, culture, sexuality and birth control etc.). When the
completed questionnaires were analysed, I discovered that there were 42
males and 51 females in the sample.
Since most of the earlier studies of identity formation focused on an age
group of young people aged between 13 and 18 years old (Patterson et al.
155
1992, P. 15), I also tried to achieve a similar sample. Therefore, I chose
supplementary schools for the survey. However, depth-interviews included
young people outside the school. As Table 6.1. shows, a targeted sample of
young Turks was achieved. Of the male respondents, 57 per cent come from
the 12 to 15 age cohort whereas 43 per cent come from the 16 to 18 age cohort
As for the female sample, the 12 to 15 age cohort includes 71 per cent and the
16 to 18 age cohort includes 29 per cent of the female samples.
Table 6.1: Age distribution of respondents
Male % Female %
12-15 24 57 36 71
16-18 18 43 15 29
Total 42 100 51 100
The reason for choosing such an age cohort is the contention that adolescence,
and the years following are the formative period of identity acquisition.
Phinney (1993b, p. 75) notes that 'during adolescence, many minority youth
undergo a process of exploration and questioning about ethnicity in which
they attempt to learn more about their culture and understand the
implications of group membership. By exploring their culture, they can learn
of its strengths and come to accept their culture and themselves'.
There is an increasing tendency among researchers to use concepts such as
British-Pakistanis, British-Caribbeans, British-Muslims, French-Muslims and
Dutch Muslims. This suggests that the country of settlement creates an
hyphenated identity structure. As Table 6.2. shows, the majority of the
respondents (68 per cent) were born and brought up in London. Therefore, it
may be suggested that young Turks in Britain will also develop hyphenated
identity.
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Table 6.2: Birthplace of respondents
Male 70 Female 70
Turkey 17 41 3 6
Cyprus 6 14 4 8
London 19 45 44 86
Total 42 100 51 100
Among the male respondents, 41 per cent stated that they were born in
Turkey and had moved to London with their parents or joined them at a later
stage. Similarly, 14 per cent were born in Cyprus. Those among the male
respondents who were born in London comprised 45 per cent The
percentage with regard to female respondents and their birthplace, however,
appeared to be different Only six per cent said that their birthplace was
Turkey and eight per cent said that they were born in Cyprus. The
overwhelming majority of the female respondents (86 per cent) were born in
London.
The figures on birthplace in Table 6.2. indicate that the major part of the
respondents' upbringing and socialisation is taking place in British society.
As I discussed in Chapter Three, siblings of ethnic communities have to deal
with multiple identities within a multicultural society where they are likely to
adopt several aspects of different value systems. The young generation is
influenced by the social forces and civic culture of the birthplace to which
they develop an allegiance and sense of belonging. Therefore, it is highly
likely that the terms such as British-Turks, German-Turks, Dutch-Turks,
French-Turks, will soon appear in sociological literature.
It could be argued that the symbolic meaning and influence of the birthplace
are increased by the length of stay. A prolonged length of stay in a
multicultural society means a longer process of socialisation and
acculturation of the immigrants' children in terms of educational processes,
peer group relations and media influences. As presented in Table 6.3., 45 per
-
157
cent of male and 86 per cent of female respondents had lived in London since
their birth which means that Turkish girls had a longer period of socialisation
in London.
Table 6.3: Length of living in London
Male % Female %
Since birth 19 45 44 86
1-5 years 8 19 4 8
6-10 years 15 36 3 6
Total 42 100 51 100
It appears that more than half of the male respondents (55 per cent) came to
London at a later stage. Of these, 36 per cent who came with their families or
joined them later had been living in London for 6 to 10 years. A smaller
number of the male sample (19 per cent) had lived here for 1 to 5 years. As
shown in Table 6.3., the female sample (68 per cent) primarily consisted of
those living in London since their birth. Only six per cent of this gender
group had lived in London for 6 to 10 years. Those who had lived in London
between 1 and 5 years were also a small proportion of the female sample.
As mentioned earlier, this research includes both mainland and Turkish-
Cypriot Therefore it was expected that the respondents had different
parental origins. Table 6.4. shows that parents of the respondents largely
came from Cyprus and Turkey.
Table 6.4: Parental origins of the respondents
Mother Father
Turkey 28 30 32 34
Cyprus 53 56 51 54
Other 4 5 2 3
No reply 8 9 8 9
Total 93 100 93 100
It is clear from the above table that 30 per cent of the respondents' mothers
came from Turkey and 56 per cent game from Cyprus. There was a similar
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pattern of the fathers' origins i.e., 34 per cent of the fathers had migrated to
England from Turkey and 54 per cent had migrated from Cyprus. Among the
parents of non-Turkish/Cypriot origin, there were one American and three
English mothers, and one British-Italian father. Table 6.4. also suggests that
the marriage pattern among Turkish community is largely confined to the
country of origin. Although there are some marriages between Turks from
mainland Turkey and Turks from Cyprus, it seems that the marriages of the
first generation primarily took place in their own countries. It also appears
that the respondents are the first Turkish young generation because the
majority of the mothers (88 per cent) and fathers (90 per cent) came from
Cyprus or Turkey. This means that the parents of the respondents are still the
first generation, and that the respondents themselves comprise the first young
generation of the Turkish community in Britain.
6.3. Young Generation and Family
I argued earlier that the family is the first social context of socialisation for
children. In Chapter Five, I discussed the reproduction of traditional values
and the role of the family in the transmission of such values to the young
generation. This section will analyse the attitudes of the young generation
towards living with family, parental control and generational differences. All
the respondents in the sample were living with their parents at the time of my
research. As presented in Table 6.1., the sample included young people aged
between 12 and 18 who were not expected to leave home at an early age.
Nevertheless, as Table 6.5. shows, some of the respondents expressed their
wish to live on their own rather than with their parents.
Table 6.5: Attitudes towards living with parents
Male Female 0
Want living with parents 22 52 32 63
Want living on their own 11 26 19 37
No reply 9 22
Total 41 100 52 100
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When asked 'If you are living with your family, do you want to live on your
own?,' 52 per cent of the male and 63 per cent of the female respondents
replied that they would like to live with their family whereas 26 per cent of
the male and 37 per cent of the female respondents said that they wanted to
live on their own. As presented in Table 6.5., 58 per cent of the sample
wanted to continue living with their parents as opposed to 32 per cent who
did not want to live with their family for the reasons explained below.
When asked to explain why they wanted to live with their parents, a variety
of replies were given. 'Love' and 'attachment' towards parents, 'being loved'
by them, the 'need to be protected', 'lack of confidence' in living on their own
at this very young age, were frequently mentioned as reasons for living with
parents. One respondent (Female:14) said, 'I love my parents and at the
moment I do not have any problem with them. I know they love me as well.
We have really a good relationship and I do not see any reason to leave them
even if I become older'. Another respondent (Male:17) said:
• 'We have strong family relationships nurtured by respect and
sacrifice for the family. My parents are both working and they are
doing it for us, to provide us with good education and good future.
And I am aware of this. Time to time trivial problems occur as to
when and where to go, but I do not think that I would like to live on
my own for such simple matters'.
The 'need for protection' is another reason for living with parents as one
respondent (Female:16) said, 'I am only sixteen and I would like to continue
my education. I need my family to support me in that without which I would
not be able to finish my education. This is also their wish .and expectation'. A
similar pragmatic reason was voiced by another respondent (Female:17) who
said, 'I cannot live on my own yet I need my family and their protection until
I establish myself'. Those who ex-pressed their wish to live on their own
instead of with their families mostly gave reasons such as 'lack of
independence', 'to have more freedom' and 'proving their self'. One
respondent, for example, (Male:17) mentioned 'responsibility' as his reason
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for living on his own. He said 'I want to be responsible for my life and I want
to prove to my parents that I can manage looking after myself. Similar replies
came from some other males and females. This suggests that some young
people are trying to show that they have attained maturity which would
justify their claim for more freedom and responsibility. But the more common
reason 'to live on their own' appeared to be the 'constraints' exercised by the
parents on the behaviour of young people. An 18-year old girl summed up
her feelings in a paradoxical expression. She said:
'To be honest, I do not have big problems with my family except that
they are overprotective which sometimes becomes unbearable and
limits my social activities. I would like to have more freedom. I want
them to trust me. On the other hand, I understand that they want to
protect me and I respect it, but when it becomes too constraining I
wish that I was living on my own'.
Another respondent (Female:16) who thought that she was more confined to
domestic activities compared with her brother and wanted to have equal
freedom said: 'My parents allow my brother to go out and he wears whatever
he likes. When it comes to me, they always interfere. If I lived on my own I
could do what I wanted and when I wanted'. As this reply shows, some of
the girls do not want to be accountable for whatever they do and wish to
receive equal treatment with boys. One can suggest from these findings that
the girls in Turkish families are more strictly controlled than the boys. It
appears that the reputation of the girls is more central than the reputation of
the boys. If a boy is seen with a girl this is usually regarded as a matter of
temporary enjoyment for the boys and most of the families, except those
religious families who believe that chastity must be equally observed by both
sexes, tolerate such forms of behaviour as the community does not condemn
these acts. However, when it comes to girls, the preservation of chastity
suddenly becomes a centrally important issue and therefore girls' behaviour
is more closely watched over since any act of wrong doing, such as going out
with unrelated boys, would bring shame and damage the reputation of the
fa.mily5.
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Parental control is further documented by the findings in Table 6.6. which
show that 33 per cent of the male and 73 per cent of the female respondents
felt that their parents exercised 'too much' control over them.
Table 6.6: Parental control as perceived by the respondents
Male % Female %
Too much 14 33 37 73
Not too much 19 45 14 27
No reply 9 22
Total 42 100 51 100
The table shows that those who did not feel too much parental control
comprised 45 per cent of the males and 27 per cent of the females. Overall,
more than half of the respondents (55 per cent) found parental control 'too
much' whereas 35 per cent of the respondents felt that their parents did not
have too much control over their behaviour. The figures in Table 6.6. confirm
my earlier observation that parents place stricter control on the girls.
I have mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter and in Chapter Three that
the children of ethnic communities within a multicultural society face
different sets of cultural values. The young generation may sometimes adopt
the culture of the larger society which might conflict with the parental
culture. The existence of multiple identities may lead to disagreements
between parents and the young generation. As presented in Table 6.7.,
generational differences emerged between Turkish parents and the young
generation. This suggests that the Turkish young generation are developing
different attitudes against the wishes of their parents. Generational
differences on several issues give rise to disagreements and tensions between
parents and their children.
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Table 6.7: Disagreements between respondents and parents
Male % Female %
Have disagreements 29 69 46 90
Have no disagreements 5 12 5 10
No reply 8 19
Total 42 100 51 100
When asked whether they had disagreements with their parents, the majority
of the male (69 per cent) and female (90 per cent) respondents said that they
did have disagreements with their parents. Only 12 per cent of the males and
10 per cent of the females felt that they had no disagreements with their
parents. When the total figures are compared, one can observe that the great
majority of the respondents have some kind of disagreements with their
parents. Eighty one per cent of the total sample were experiencing
disagreements whereas only 11 per cent of them seemed to give in to parental
demands. When asked what kind of issues were at the centre of
disagreements, respondents mentioned several points of conflict most of
which may be directly related to the parental culture. Among the frequently
mentioned issues were the 'type of clothing', 'make-up', 'meeting and
socialising' with the opposite sex, 'spending time outside' the house,
'restriction of freedom', 'friendship with non-Muslims and non-Turks',
'schooling', 'plans for the future', and the ways in which their 'marriages'
would be arranged. Generational differences and conflicts rooted in cultural
and religious values of the parents appear to be a common feature of Muslim
communities. Anwar (1976, p. 20-35), for example, explored cultural and
religious attitudes of parents and children in a survey of Hindus, Sikhs and
Muslims in Britain. He also found differences between the generations on
several issues. In a. later research carried out on the Pakistani Muslims, he
reported (1985, p. 60) that at least three issues (wearing western clothes,
arranged marriages and limitation of freedom) emerged as areas of
disagreement which affected the relations between Pakistani parents and
their children.
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When the content of the disagreements and conflicts between young Turks
and their parents were analysed, two facts emerged: 1- Most of the issues of
conflict are rooted in the traditional and cultural values of the parents; 2- The
young generation are distancing themselves from some of the values of
parental culture by internalising social attitudes of the wider society. These
observations suggest that a process of change and deeper integration in the
surrounding society are becoming influential forces shaping the identity of
the Turkish young generation in Britain.
I discussed in Chapter Five how Turkish families try to keep their honour
intact The reputation and chastity of a girl is very important for the honour
of the family. Therefore parents watch their daughters' behaviour more
closely and limit their actions if they feel it necessary for the protection of
family reputation and honour. Table 6.6. and 6.7. showed that the young
generation, especially girls, feel that their parents are overprotective and have
too much control over them. Therefore they have disagreements with their
parents. One of the frequently-mentioned issues of conflict for girls was
parental disapproval of friendship choices. As seen in Table 6.8., a sharp
contrast emerged between parental approval/disapproval of girl/boy
friendships for boys and girls, as perceived by the respondents.
Table 6.8: Parental attitudes towards girl/boyfriend relationships as perceived by the
respondents
Male 0 Female %
Approve 27 64 6 12
Do not approve 6 14 45 88
No reply 9 22
Total 42 100 51 100
When asked 'Do you think that your parents would approve of your having a
girl/boy friend if they knew?', 64 per cent of the male respondents said that
their parents would approve of them having a girl friend. As opposed to the
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males, only 12 per cent of the girls thought that their parents would tolerate
such a relationship.
Findings on parental attitudes towards boy/girl friendship among their
children confirm the pattern I have proposed earlier that allows boys to have
more freedom whereas it presupposes stricter control over the girls. These
figures clearly indicate that boys were raised more freely and enjoyed a
wider toleration, whereas moral codes relating to boy/ girl friendships were
more strictly applied to the behaviour of the girls. When asked what might be
the reasons behind the disapproval of their parents, respondents generally
used value-laden terminology such as 'they are strict' (Female:15)., 'they are
typical Turks' (Female:13)., 'they do not expect us to do such things'
(Female:14)., 'because of religion' (Male:16)., 'they are not open minded'
(Female:14)., 'they are old-fashioned and do not trust boys' (Female:18)., 'they
think I am too young' (Male:15)., 'it is not right until you get married'
(Male:17)., 'they do not want me to go behind their back' (Female:17)., 'they
do not want me to get harmed' (Female:15)., 'they want me to concentrate on
my education and career' (Male:17). When the same question was asked to a
mature female university student she said:
'Problem of honour was the central issue for my parents when I was
15-16 years old. At times, I felt apart, dealing with conflicting family
values. I was mixing up with other young people who had different
attitudes towards sexuality. With the passage of time, excessive
protection of my parents subsided and since we did not have
immediate family who might talk behind us, my parents came to
accept my choice. But this was a difficult and painful experience'.
Parents who were interviewed were more concerned with the chastity of their
daughters than their sons. According to parents, girls are more vulnerable
and need more protection. One mother who has two daughters and one son
argued that 'girls need more control'. When asked why she thought that 'girls
need more social control', she said 'Streets are full of danger for our children,
especially for girls. Drugs, sex and prostitution are increasing. These are
threatening our children. We must protect them, especially girls, because they
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can be easily deceived'. While conversation was taking place the father
intervened and said: 'I do not want my daughters to go around with boys
and sleep with them. This is totally unacceptable. And if we allow them to go
out with boys and tolerate such loose behaviour, one day they will harm
themselves and us both. As you know, girls are the namus (honour,
reputation) of the family and namus must be protected'. This is a typical reply
of most parents who, more or less, used identical words and concepts when
referring to differences between boys and girls and explaining why girls
should be more closely watched over.
One can observe in the statement of parents that boys are not thought to
damage the namus and reputation of the family. In order to find the grounds
for parental justification of their different approach to boys, some parents
were asked why they treated boys and girls differently. But before asking this
question I reminded them that religious values discourage both sexes from
going out with the opposite sex, and male chastity is considered as important
as female chastity. The responses of parents led me to conclude that differing
attitudes towards girls have much to do with cultural practices, not
necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification of parents
cannot be based totally on religious grounds. Had it been so, they should
have developed the same attitudes spontaneously towards their sons because
religious principles apply equally to both sexes.
6.4. Language and Culture
It is argued that language is one of the first elements of immigrant culture to
disappear over the generations (Waters, 1990, p. 116). In order to
counterbalance this trend, one of the main concerns of the Turkish families
has always been teaching of the mother tongue to their children as language
is regarded as an indispensable part of Turkish culture. Turkish parents feel
that teaching the mother tongue will enable children to learn more about
Turkish society, its history and customs. More importantly it is believed that
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Turkish is regarded as a key to establishing effective communication between
the generations. Many parents feel that not being able to communicate in
Turkish is a strong sign of a loss of identity. I will explain in Chapter Eight
that in order to prevent such a loss of identity, supplementary weekend
classes were organised by the Turkish organisations and a number of teachers
were invited from Turkey and Cyprus. As it will be shown in Chapter Nine,
Mosques were also involved in teaching Turkish language in addition to
religious subjects. To what extent these efforts have born fruit is shown in
Table 6.9.
Table 6.9: Language fluency of respondents
English/Turkish 67 72
English 12 13
Turkish 6 6
No reply 8 9
Total 93 100
When asked 'in which language(s) are you fluent?', 13 per cent of the
respondents stated that they were fluent 'only' in English and six per cent
said that they were fluent 'only' in Turkish. As shown in the above table, a
great majority (72 per cent) of the respondents claimed that they were fluent
in 'both' English/Turkish. Nevertheless, these figures should be treated with
some caution for several reasons. First of all, the survey was carried out in
supplementary schools where children are taught Turkish. Therefore, the
findings on language represent the situation of young people who were
taking Turkish education. It is difficult to generalise these findings for those
who have not received such an education. The second reason is directly
related to the sample under question. Although 72 per cent of the
respondents claimed to be fluent in Turkish, none of them asked for a
questionnaire prepared in Turkish. All of the participants asked to have
forms prepared in English. Therefore, it can be argued that the young
generation might be fluent in spoken Turkish but they are not fluent in
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written Turkish as they refused to fill in the questionnaires in Turkish. This
argument is supported by the fact that children learn Turkish mostly at home
through conversations within the family. Therefore their Turkish language
skills are not attained through a formal education in reading and writing.
Therefore, children may not be expected to be as fluent in reading and
writing as they would be in spoken Turkish. The third reason for caution in
looking at these figures is the fieldwork observation recorded during the
research and after the interviews.
As I explained in Chapter Two, before the start of the in-depth interviews
with young informants they were asked whether they wanted to conduct the
conversation in Turkish or in English. As it happened, many started
conversing in Turkish, but when complex questions were asked on culture,
religion and identity most of them switched to English. Then interviews
continued in both languages. Questions that required straightforward replies
were answered in Turkish, whereas questions such as what religion meant to
them were answered in English. That led me to believe that in simple daily
conversations most of the respondents were fluent in Turkish but in the
exploration of ideas and expression of feelings they seemed to be more
comfortable using English.
Families who are concerned about the language education of their children
speak Turkish at home to encourage the younger members of the family to
improve their Turkish. In order to find out the extent to which the use of
Turkish and English dominates the family atmosphere, young people were
asked which languages they spoke at home. As Table 6.10. shows, a very
small number (only two per cent) of the respondents speak `only' English at
home, and 12 per cent speak 'only' Turkish.
1-
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Table 6.10: Languages spoken at home
Turkish/English 71 76
Only Turkish 11 12
Only English 2 2
No reply 9 10
Total 93 100
Table 6.10. also shows that both languages are spoken in most of the Turkish
households. Seventy six per cent of the respondents said that bilingual usage
of language was taking place within their families, van der Lans and
Rooijackers (1996, p. 181) reported contrasting findings over the use of
languages at home among young Turks in the Netherlands. They found that
Turkish youth with 'exclusive Turkish ethnic identity', almost 100 per cent,
preferred speaking Turkish at home whereas 37.5 per cent of the subjects
with 'dual ethnic identity' indicated that Dutch and Turkish were used
equally within the family context
As mentioned earlier, young Turks seem to be fluent in both languages in
daily conversations. They are able to deal with using both languages in the
family context where parents and the older generation prefer speaking
Turkish. Nevertheless, drawing upon my findings, I would like to suggest
that there is an increasing concern among the Turkish community about the
language fluency and communication between generations. The case of a
Turkish- Cypriot family typifies this growing problem among many families.
The parents in this family knew only a little English when they came to
London. As the father explained, there had not been a great deal of
improvement in his English since he was working in a car-repair shop owned
by a Turkish person where everybody spoke Turkish. He only improved his
English to the level he needed at work. His wife's case was much worse in
terms of learning English, as she was mostly confined to their council flat At
the time of interview this informant had four children, two of whom were at
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the school age, of which one was on the threshold of adolescence. During a
visit to their flat I noticed that English was the only language of
communication within the family, but neither the father nor the mother was
articulate in using English. Similarly, the children were not able to converse
in Turkish. When asked how they communicated and resolved problems, the
informant said:
'Well, this is our main problem. My English in not enough to explain
my opinions on matters such as their education, our culture, religion
and traditions. Neither can they understand Turkish properly. There
is certainly a lack of communication which is growing. And that
worries me quite a lot'.
Some families send their children to Turkish classes at supplementary schools
to overcome this lack of communication with their children. The number of
young people at supplementary classes is steadily increasing. According to a
recent estimate by the Turkish Educational Attaché in London, there are more
than 2,500 students attending supplementary classes on the Turkish language
and culture. As the figures in 6.10. imply, the first young generation seem to
have gained knowledge of Turkish. At least they have fluency in daily
conversations. But it remains a. question whether subsequent generations will
acquire adequate language skills in Turkish.
Tables 6.9. and 6.10. established that the young generation were bilingual and
that they used both languages in conversing within their families. However,
when they were asked which language they would 'prefer' in their daily
conversations with their family and Turkish friends, a different pattern of
attitudes towards the use of Turkish emerged, which suggests that the young
generation feel more comfortable and fluent in using English. As presented in
Table 6.11., 27 per cent of the respondents told that they would prefer
speaking Turkish whereas 63 per cent of them told that they prefer using
English as a medium of communication in their conversations.
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Table 6.11: Preference of language during daily conversations with family and Turkish
friends
N %
English 59 63
Turkish 25 27
No reply 9 10
Total 93 100
When asked why they would prefer a particular language in their
conversation with family members and Turkish friends, similar replies were
given which revolved around the issues of 'speaking and understanding
better', 'feeling more comfortable', 'being more fluent', 'expressing oneself
better', 'natural and spontaneous reaction', and 'one's own language'. A
fifteen year-old female informant said, 'Well I know English better than
Turkish. If it is convenient I prefer speaking in English'. A typical reply came
from a 17 year-old male respondent who said 'I can speak English better and
it comes naturally. When it comes to Turkish, I can speak it too, but not as
natural as my English'. A seventeen year-old interviewee also made a remark
that can be generalised for other young people. She said: 'Although I can
speak both languages fluently, I can express myself better in English. I think
our education, television, films and books all contribute to that When I want
to say something, English comes naturally and I feel more comfortable when I
use it instead of Turkish'.
As shown in Table 6.11., 27 per cent of the respondents stated their preference
for Turkish. One respondent (Male:16) gave the following reason for his
preference: 'Well this is our language and I want to improve it by practising'.
Another one (Male:17) said: 'We are Turkish and we must learn it Look at
Greeks and Pakistanis for example. They all know their language. Why then
should not we learn and use it in our daily conversations'. The high rate (63
per cent) of preference to use English by the Turkish young generation
suggests that, the mother tongue is gradually loosing its value as a medium
of communication.
_
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As I discussed in Chapter Three, immigrants and their children face
acculturation and assimilation as a consequence of living in a different society
where they are exposed to cultural influences. Chapter Five showed the that
Turkish community try to reproduce Turkish traditions and values. Chapters
Eight, Nine and Ten, on the other hand, explain that several organisations
were established for transmission of these values to the young generation
who have to deal with the cultural values of the Turkish community and with
the influence of British society. The identification of the young generation
with Turkish traditions and values can be seen as one of the indices of
cultural assimilation. To find out the young generation's attitude towards
their own cultural values, the following question was asked: 'Do you think
that Turkish traditions and values should be preserved while living in
Britain?'. As Table 6.12. shows, a significant number (76 per cent) of the
respondents said that Turkish traditions and values should be preserved.
Table: 6.12: Attitudes towards the preservation of Turkish traditions and values while living
in England
Should be preserved 71 76
Should not be preserved 10 11
No reply 12 13
Total 93 100
The question did not specify what Turkish 'traditions' and 'values' were. This
allowed the young people to express their views on what Turkish 'traditions'
and 'values' meant for them. The terms 'tradition' and 'culture' were
understood to include 'religion', 'Islam', 'language', 'chastity', 'family',
'religious and national festivals', 'respect', 'identity', 'marriage' and
'origin/roots'. These words were most frequently mentioned by the
respondents when they wanted to explain what they understood by Turkish
traditions and values, and why they thought that these traditions and values
should be preserved. One respondent (Male:18) referred directly to Islam
when this question was asked to him and said 'Islam is our religion, a way of
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life and a source of identity which is deteriorating. We should keep our
identity'. For some young Turks there was a direct correlation between
tradition, religion and identity as a 17 year-old male explained: 'You cannot
be a proper Turk without being a Muslim. Look at the Jewish people in this
country. They stick to their religion which keeps their identity strong.
Therefore we also have to respect our religion and preserve religious values,
celebrate religious festivals'.
Traditions as 'origin/roots' were mentioned by a number of respondents who
thought that traditions were the origins of their identity. One respondent
(Female:15) explained: 'It is important to know your tradition and your
culture. No matter where we live these are our origins/roots. Arid we have to
respect and preserve these origins/roots wherever we are. It should not make
any difference in what country you are living'. A seventeen year-old female
respondent went on saying, 'I have got to know whole my family, where they
come from, what they believe in. If I don't learn my cultural background I
will lose my identity. Therefore we should never forget our culture and
values'. These findings suggest that, parents and other family members
appear to have managed to persuade their children of the importance and
significance of traditional Turkish culture and values. Nauck's findings on
the children of Turkish immigrants in Germany confirm this observation. His
study on the intergenerative transmission of cultural values in Turkish
families in Germany found that
'in spite of all intergenerational differences in attitudes and
behaviour, the results reveal that intergenerative transmission is an
essential and integral part of the socialisation of the 'second
generation'. Despite all the differences between the generations in
their assimilation behaviour and their behaviour to the receiving
society, the dense interaction structure of the migrant families
obviously results at the same time in a high level of co-ordination
between generations in their basic value orientations and action
preferences' (Nauck, 1994, p. 134; 1995, p. 82,83)6.
Family life provides or imposes a social and cultural atmosphere for identity
development As Waters (1990, 13: 19) puts it, the 'ethnic identification
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involves both choice and constraint Children learn both the basic facts of their
family history and the cultural content and practices associated with their
ethnicity in their household'. A thirty year-old single female interviewee who
was brought to London when she was eight years old summed up the
attitudes of the young generation when I asked her how she felt about
Turkish traditions and values:
'I think that traditions and values are parts of my identity. They are
significant for me, not only because I was born in Turkey but also I
still live with my parents who stick to these values and more
importantly such traditions and values are the only part of Turkey
we can have even on a symbolic level. I understand that there is a
difference between Turkish and British identity, but I do not think
that having one of them necessarily negates and rejects the other one.
In my case for example, though I am fairly integrated into British
society and absorbed being British, it is still important for me to have
a Turkish identity'.
However, as seen in Table 6.12., 13 per cent of the respondents differed from
the majority and said that they would not totally support the preservation of
traditions and values. The differences in attitudes surface more in relation to
some cultural concerns that are regarded as constraining the choices of the
young generation. Arranged marriage was the most often mentioned
traditional practice that girls especially would like to see abandoned. One
informant (Female:17) expressed her partial disapproval of traditions as: 'I
am Turkish and respect the traditions but I feel that traditions should not be
so strict and our opinions should also be valued. Arranged marriage is one of
the traditions that I do not want it to be imposed on me. I do not refuse all the
traditions but some of them should accommodate changes at least'. Anwar's
(1994, p. 27) findings on young Muslims' attitudes towards arranged
marriages are similar to that of my findings. Anwar points out that 47 per
cent of his respondents disagreed with the custom of arranged marriage and
53 per cent thought that children's marriages should be arranged by
themselves. Another respondent (Female:16) ex-pressed her disappointment
with the unequal treatment of boys and girls. She saw the roots of
overprotection of girls in the tradition and wished that girls would be
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recognised for being as responsible as the male members of the family and
the community. She referred to the concept of chastity and honour of the
family and said:
'When we (girls) want to meet our friends and spend time with them
our mothers suddenly become our guardians and always limit the
time and they control whom we are meeting. They do not tell us but
we feel that they are checking on us. As you know, when a Turkish
girl is seen with a male friend, let alone a boyfriend, everybody starts
circulating a rumour about the girl. If a boy does the same thing,
nobody takes notice of his behaviour. If that is the tradition you are
asking about, it should be changed and not preserved at all'.
Restrictive parental practices towards the girls is not only peculiar to the
Turkish Muslim community in Britain. Ballard (1979, p. 117) and Joly (1995,
p. 167) observed a similar phenomenon among South Asians and the
Pakistani Muslim community. They note that some Pakistani Muslims are
more lenient to boys than girls. Boys are allowed to go to cafés and discos
and socialise with girls. Pakistani girls, however, are not allowed to follow
the same pattern of behaviour and are more closely controlled. Similar
findings on young people of Turkish and Pakistani origin suggest that both
communities have corresponding cultural values. These similar cultural
values seem to centre around chastity and the reputation of the girls and
family honour.
As presented in Table 6.2., the majority of the respondents (68 per cent) were
born and brought up in London. Thirty two per cent of the respondents, on
the other hand, were either born in Turkey or in Cyprus, but as Table 6.3.
shows they joined or came with their families at an early age. This means that
the young people in the sample spent their childhood in Britain and were
educated here. Therefore, it may be expected that the young generation might
have developed a sense of attachment to the country where they were born
and brought up. Families, on the other hand, constantly remind their children
about where they come from and take them to Turkey and Cyprus. As
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presented in Table 6.13., young people are developing multiple allegiances
and attachment to Turkey/Cyprus and England.
Table 6.13: Attitudes towards parent's country of origin and Britain. Where respondents feel
happier?
Cyprus/Turkey 28 30
England 26 28
No difference 39 42
Total 93 100
When asked 'where do you feel happier, in England or in Turkey/Cyprus?',
30 per cent of the respondents replied that they feel happier in
Turkey/Cyprus when they visit the country. A sixteen year-old male
respondent explained his source of happiness as 'There, it is easy to
communicate with people. I can make friends easily than here. I feel that I am
a part of the community in Turkey whereas here I am only an ordinary
individual'. Another respondent (Female:17) said that she felt happier when
she went to Cyprus. When asked why, she said: 'Because of the safe
environment I feel more safe and less protected in Cyprus where I am
allowed to go out more freely. I can not feel that much safe here and therefore
my parents are more strict'. As this reply suggests, the young generation are
given more freedom because of the nature of the society in the country of
origin where exposure to threat is thought to be much less. Another reason
for feeling happy in Turkey/Cyprus was expressed by a 17 year-old female
respondent who said: 'I like being with my own people who understand my
background. In Cyprus, there is no racism and you are treated equally'. It
seems that the experience of racism, discrimination and disrespect to one's
own culture alienate some young people from the society they live in and
encourage them to develop a positive attitude to the country of origin.
In contrast to those who felt more comfortable in Turkey/Cyprus, 28 per cent
of the respondents said that they were more at home in England. When asked
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why she felt more at home in England rather than Cyprus, a 15 year-old girl
who visits Cyprus every year with her parents, said that England was her
birthplace. She had spent all her life in England where she had made friends
and received her education. Although she enjoyed visiting Cyprus for a short
time, she did not feel a strong attachment to the country and its people as
much as her parents did. She said: 'I see Cyprus as a holiday spot I like being
there for sometime and see my relatives. But I cannot imagine living there for
a lifetime as I am used to a. different kind of life in England. My parents'
village is a very small one compared to London and not everything is
available there'. A seventeen year-old respondent expressed similar reasons
for his preference for living in England rather than in Turkey. He said:
'Well, it is fun to go to Turkey and have a holiday. But when I stay
there for a month or so I start missing our home in London and my
friends here. Since I go to Turkey once a year and stay in a small
village where my parents came from, I get really bored and want to
come back soon. Moreover, I feel less restricted here. When I am in
Turkey everybody tells me what to do, but here in London only my
parents remind me of things to be done or refrained'.
In addition to those who feel more at home in Turkey/Cyprus or England,
there is a significant number of Turkish young people who seem to have
developed a neutral attitude towards the country of their parents and their
own birthplace. As Table 6.13. shows, 42 per cent of the respondents said that
living either in England or in Turkey/Cyprus would not make much
difference. The explanation of a young girl, aged 18, clearly describes the
development of a balanced attitude towards both countries. When asked why
she did not feel any difference between these places, she said:
'I think that I learned to be capable of living in both countries and
both cultures. First of all, I was born in London and raised here. I feel
that I am a member of this society. But, there is also another side of
the coin. I remember that, since my childhood Turkey was a central
place of visit and was dominating the conversations at home. We
were always told that our rods were in Turkey and I felt that may
parents were right. As many of my friends, I came to the conclusion
that we did not have to get rid of what our parents presented to us as
national and cultural heritage. I can say now that, although I am not
an active member of the society in Turkey, I still feel that I am
member of the same culture'. -
177
Similar division of attachment and development of multiple allegiances are
observed among the young generation of Greek origin. It was reported in
Observer Life (4 February 1996, p. 21) that a young Greek man who was born
in Greece but who had spent most of his life in England experienced a
divided identity; a split sense of belonging between two places, his birthplace
and where he lived. When asked whether he felt English or Greek in an
interview, he replied: 'That is a very difficult [question]. I don't really know
how to answer it My heart and my soul are Greek, 'cos I was born there. Yet
my education and, I suppose, my business style are very much English. I
suppose I'm neither one nor the other. And yet, I am both'.
As mentioned earlier, parents exercise pressure on their children to develop
commitment to their own country, society and its values. As presented in
Table 6.13., 28 per cent of the respondents do not seem to have been
influenced by these pressures while 30 per cent seem to have developed the
desired attitude towards their parent's country. The majority of the
respondents, on the other hand (42 per cent) seem to have developed a
different strategy which accommodates both countries and both societies. In
earlier research, Liebkind (1988, p. 186) also found a similar pattern among
Turkish youth in Sweden regarding the country of origin. According to her
findings, 28 per cent of Turkish respondents felt more at home in Sweden, 26
per cent felt more at home in the country of origin and 39 per cent felt equally
at home both in Sweden and in Turkey.
6.5. Sexuality
I discussed in Chapter Five that traditional family values are reproduced
within the Turkish community. Earlier in this Chapter, I also noted that
parents try to control their children, especially girls are discouraged from
going out with unrelated males as this is thought to damage the honour of the
family. This section will analyse the attitudes of the young generation
towards relations with the opposite sex, sexuality and sexual behaviour. The
analysis of the young people's attitudes towards these issues will enable us to
-
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understand continuity and change in their perception of Turkish culture and
traditions. As Table 6.14. shows, despite parental insistence and cultural
discouragement, the young people are developing a more accommodating
attitude towards social meetings with the opposite sex.
Table: 6.14: Attitudes towards pre-marital male-female social meetings
Approve 50 54
Do not approve 12 13
Have no idea 31 33
Total 93 100
When asked 'Do you approve of pre-marital male-female social meetings?',
13 per cent of the respondents replied that they would not approve of such
relations. It seems that cultural values, family pressure and religious beliefs
have influenced this group. One respondent (Male:17) said: 'It is against our
religion and as I can see from my friends, such relations lead to too many
problems. I do not go out with other girls. And I do not want my sister to go
out with boys'. One female respondent, aged 17, on the other hand,
mentioned social pressure rooted in the culture of the Turkish community.
She said: 'I do not go out with boys because my family is strongly against it
If a boy goes out with girls and does whatever he likes, nobody talks about
him. But when a girl goes out and is seen in the street, even with a classmate,
everybody talks behind her and her family. I do not want to hurt my family
with the gossip around. Therefore, I refrain from socialising with boys and go
out with girls, and even this is limited'.
It seems that the circulation of gossip about the behaviour of girls has wide
implications, and functions as a social control on the female generation. de
Vries' (1995, p. 39) findings on Turkish girls in the Netherlands supports my
argument that gossip becomes an effective means of social control. de Vries
also found that young Turkish girls are in a situation similar to that of their
counterparts in England. After interviewing twenty five Turkish girls, aged
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between 16 to 25, de Vries analysed the implications of gossip for the girls
and for their families. She explains that 'most girls live surrounded, to a
varying degree by compatriots who see it as their task to keep watch over the
girls' behaviour: they must be chaste and remain Turkish..'., and if they
become a subject of gossip, 'this will be directed, not only against her, but
also against her parents' (de Vries, 1995, p. 39). As mentioned earlier,
involvement of some members of the community in the circulation of gossip
and the resulting damage to the parent's reputation produce social pressure
which forces the girls to behave along the lines laid down by cultural
attitudes towards male-female socialising.
Table 6.14 shows that 33 per cent of the respondents said that 'they have no
idea' about male-female outings whereas more than half (54 per cent) of the
youngsters said that 'they approve pre-marital male-female social meetings'.
The responses of the young generation indicate that a change is taking place
in the attitudes of London-born and bred children in contrast to family
pressure to conform to parental values. One respondent (Female:17), for
example, challenged her parents' views on male-female outings and said: 'We
are living in a different society. It might have been really wrong in their own
village, but here is not their village. What is wrong with seeing your male
friends? My parents say it is wrong. Why? Because that is the culture. I do not
believe that this is the culture. If it was the culture it should have been the
same for the boys as well'. Another respondent (Female:18) also argued that
parents must change their minds on certain issues such as male-female
relations. She said: 'What harm you can get by seeing your friends? I always
want to remain honest to my parents, but if they try to control everything,.
then I am forced to do things in secret I think our parents should be more
open minded and have more toleration as they have for my brothers'. This
was also mentioned by several other female respondents. Some of them
implied that their parents were using 'double-standards' in the treatment of
boys and girls. Many female respondents explicitly accused their parents of
not being fair to them and of being too restrictive on their social life. As
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shown in Table 6.14., young people are developing a more approving view
towards male-female social meetings which are not accepted by their
community. Table 6.8., on the other hand, shows that parents do not approve
of girls' relations with boys, whereas boys are tolerated if they have a girl-
friend. The findings in the following Table not only confirm the findings in
Table 6.8., but also indicate that young Turkish girls are trying to conform to
the attitudes of their parents.
Table 6.15: Having a girl/boy friend
Has a girl/boy friend 29 69 14 27
Do not have a girl/boy friend 13 31 37 73
Total 42 100 51 100
When asked, 'Do you have a boy/girl friend?', an expected pattern of reply
emerged. The analysis of the replies shows that there is a significant
difference between the genders in relation to boy/girl friendships. Sixty nine
per cent of the male respondents said that they had a girlfriend whereas only
27 per cent of the females admitted having a. boy-friend. In contrast to boys,
73 per cent of the girls replied that they 'have no boy-friend', whereas 31 per
cent of the boys said that they 'have no girl-friend'. These findings support •
my earlier argument that parents are more lenient towards their sons and the
community has less social control over the behaviour of its male members. As
Table 6.15. confirms, more social control is exercised over the girls.
The attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relations also indicate that there is
continuity and change among the young generation. Pre-marital sexual
relationships are strongly rejected by the traditional Turkish culture and
religious values. As presented in Table 6.16., some of the young people are
still conforming to cultural and religious values arid some of them are
developing new attitudes which are in conflict with parental culture.
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Table 6.16: Attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationship
% F
Approve 23 55 17 33
Do not approve 12 28 27 53
No reply 7 17 6 14
Total 42 100 51 100
When asked, 'Do you approve of pre-marital sexual relationships?', 14 per
cent of the respondents did not reply to the question on the grounds that this
was a personal matter. When the replies were analysed, a contrasting pattern
of attitudes emerged between the males and the females. Fifty five per cent of
the male respondents said that they would approve of pre-marital sexual
relations whereas 33 per cent of the female respondents expressed the same
attitude. In contrast to males, 53 per cent of the females said that 'they would
not approve of pre-marital sexual relations'. The contrast between males and
females can be attributed to the values of the Turkish community and to the
attitudes of parents and the community who set different social roles for boys
and girls.
It may be argued that a high approval rate of culturally and religiously
prohibited practice indicates a meaningful change in the attitudes of the
young generation towards sexuality. Forty three per cent of the total sample
expressed their approval of pre-marital sexual relations. Since respondents
were reluctant to talk about the subject, I can only make suggestions, based
on my observations, as to why a high number of the respondents approved of
such relations despite the strict Islamic prohibition. It may be argued that the
first generation was not very successful in transmitting religious values to
their children. It may also be suggested that the young people are adopting
some of the values of the larger society where such relations are regarded as
natural and practised by their peers. Nevertheless, while cultural changes are
taking place which influence the identity development of the young
generation, as much as 43 per cent of the respondents seem to display a
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continuity in their attitudes and behaviour. The tension between chance and
continuity will remain as long as the young generation is exposed to
conflicting value systems and multiple group belonging. However, whether
one of -or which of- these forces will overcome the other remains as an open
question
In addition to sexual relations, young people were also asked for their views
on birth control. They were asked if they approved of birth control. Eleven
per cent of the respondents gave negative answers as presented in Table 6.17.,
and said that they would not 'normally' approve of birth control. Twenty
seven per cent of the respondents stated that they would approve of birth
control 'under some circumstances'.
6.17: Attitudes towards birth control
Normally yes 50 54
Normally no 10 11
Under some
circumstances 25 27
No reply 8 8
Total 93 100
More than half of the respondents (54 per cent), on the other hand, said that
they would approve of birth control. During the interviews, only a few
respondents were willing to talk about the reasons behind their approval or
disapproval. Those who approved of birth control gave almost same reasons
emphasising 'choice' and 'control' over their own lives. One informant
(Female:17) who volunteered to talk about this said: 'I think that this a
personal issue which must be decided by the individual concerned. I do not
think that we can look after too many children. Personally, I approve of birth
control which means I decide and control my own life'. The reply was a
typical one which suggests that young people would like to be less influenced
by external agents when they are making their own decisions.
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6.6. Friendship Patterns and Identification Figures
Friendship patterns of the Turkish young generation suggest that the majority
of them still choose their peers from, or are encouraged to be friends with the
same ethnic group. In order to see whether a pattern of friendship dominated
by one group exists they were asked 'are your friends mostly Turks, English
or other minorities?' Although the analysis of in-depth interviews indicate
that they have friends from all ethnic backgrounds including English, it is
clear from the survey that Turkish young people mostly befriend children
from the same ethnic group despite some gender differences.
Table 6.18: Friendship patterns of Turkish young people
Male % Female ro
Mostly Turks 32 76 32 63
Mostly English 2 5 11 21
Other 8 19 8 16
Total 42 100 51 100
As presented in Table 6.18., the male respondents have a higher tendency (76
per cent) to be friends with Turks in comparison with the girls, of whom 63
per cent said that their friends were mostly Turks. There is a reverse tendency
among the youngsters in that while only five per cent of males had mostly
English friends, 21 per cent of the girls emerged as having mostly English
friends. Seventeen per cent of the total respondents on the other hand,
pointed out that their friends consisted mostly of other ethnic minorities
including, Greeks, Pakistanis and Caribbeans.
As the figures in the above table show, 69 per cent of the respondents claimed
that their friends were mostly Turks. In order to find out whether they had
mostly Turkish friends because of personal difficulties in making friends with
English and other minority children, they were asked 'Do you have
difficulties in making friends with non-Turks?' As Table 6.19. shows, only
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seven per cent of the males are having difficulties, whereas the rest (97 per
cent) of the respondents find no difficulty in making friends with young
people from other communities.
Table 6.19: Difficulties in making friends with non-Turks
Male % Female .
Have difficulties 3 7
Have no difficulties 39 93 51 100
Total 41 100 51 100
These findings suggest that, although friendship patterns are mostly
determined by the same ethnic background, Turkish youngsters have a
positive attitude towards making friends with the members of a larger society
and other ethnic communities. The emergence of non-biased and non-
prejudiced attitudes towards friendship with non-Turks may be taken as an
indication of the willingness of the Turkish young generation to interact with
the other sections of society.
To what extent does the young Turkish generation have role models with
whom they identify themselves? If there are role models, who are these
figures? To find out the possible impact of identification on the development
of young Turks, they were asked to reply to the following question: 'Who do
you identify yourself with most?'
Table 6.20: Identification figures for respondents
Male % Female %
Self 13 31 35 68
Brother/Sister 14 33 6 11
Famous player 4 10
Movie/TV star 3 7 1 2
Famous musician 2 5 -
Mother 4 8
Father 1 2 1 2
Political leader 1 2
Religious leader -
No reply 5._ 15 3 5
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As Table 6.20. shows, most of the respondents, 31 per cent of males and 68
per cent of females, said that 'they do not identify themselves with someone
other than their self. Almost identical replies were given when they were
asked why they did not look for a role model. They emphasised their
'individual personality' and referred to the processes of 'achieving an
independent identity' such as 'I want to be myself (Female:16)., 'I do not
want to imitate others' (Male:15)., 'I do not want to be copy of another person'
(Female:18)., 'I want to have my own personality' (Female:16)., 'I want to be
different' (Male:18)., 'I want to listen to my voice from inside and follow my
instincts' (Female: 18).
Identification with brother/sister as a role model was the highest Thirty
three per cent of male and 11 per cent of female respondents expressed their
identification with their sister/brother. Identification with other figures
varied as shown in Table 6.20. The reasons for identification are explained in
the following Table 6.21.
Table 6.21: Reasons of identification
Ideas 19 54
Common values 10 29
Stable life 4 11
Status 2 6
Total 35 100
Those who identified themselves with another person as a role-model gave
different reasons. These fall into four categories of which 'ideas' and
'common values' appear to be the most common reasons for identification
with another person. More than half (54 per cent) of the respondents
mentioned 'ideas', for identification while 'common values', (29 per cent)
stable life style, (11 per cent) and 'status' (six per cent) were also mentioned
as reasons for identification.
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The above analysis shows that change and continuity are the underlying
experiences of the Turkish young generation in London. Although they still
respect parental values and Turkish traditions, there is a tendency among the
young generation to change constraining customs. This means that they are
developing a. new identity in constant negotiation with parental values. The
negotiation and redefinition of identity as a dynamic process is influenced by
the socialisation of Turkish youth in a different cultural context It seems that
the Turkish youth are adopting some of the socio-cultural values of the larger
society. They are, for example, demanding more freedom and responsibility.
Girls, in particular, are complaining about parental control over their social
behaviour. Turkish youth are also developing different attitudes towards
sexuality in conflict with the values of their community. Generational
differences are the natural outcomes of these sociocultural changes and
negotiations which sometimes give rise to tension between parents and the
younger generation. Language, culture, sexuality, control and freedom on the
one hand and the multiple identity allegiance on the other, seem to be the
sources of tension and conflict
In the following Chapter, I will examine the religious dimensions of identity
of young Turks such as beliefs, attitudes and practices which will enable us to
see this change and continuity in a wider context
-
187
Chapter Six: Notes
1. Kellner takes the view that one of the persistent and underlying properties of
identity is its social character. Comparing identity in pre-modern and modern
societies, he suggests that identity remained as social. In Kellner's (1992, P. 141)
words 'in modernity, identity becomes more mobile, multiple, personal, self-
reflexive, and subject to change. Yet in modernity [identity] is also social and other
related'.
2. See Nauck (1988, 1995) for the changes that took place in parent-child relationships
and socialisation practices in Turkish migrant families. For the educational problems
of Turkish children, see Malhotra (1985) and Lindo (1995). For an analysis of identity,
religion and ethnicity, see Abadan-Unat, (1985), Mandel (1989), Lange (1989), de
Vries (1995) and Sunier (1995). On the employment chances of the Turkish young
generation, see Wilpert (1988) and Faist (1995)
3. Sonyel (1988) carried out a survey on educational problems of Turkish children in
schools.
4. Educational problems of Muslim children are dealt with by Parker-Jenkins (1992,
1995). Kelly's (1989) study compares ethnic identification among Pakistanis and
Greek Cypriots.
5. See also Ladbury (1977, p. 140)
6. For a discussion of variety in the orientations of ethnic youth, see Phinney, (1992);
Phinney et al. (1994)
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Chapter Seven
Young Generation: Religious Beliefs, Attitudes And Practices
Islam is one of the identity markers of the Turkish community as clearly
explained by one of the informants cited in Chapter Six who summed up a
common perception among the Turks that 'without being a Muslim, one can
not be a proper Turk'. This straightforward expression shows the extent to
which Turkish identity is linked to religion. Nevertheless, religious affiliation
and practices among the ethnic youth are under-researched issues (Phinney,
1990, p. 505). In this Chapter I will examine several dimensions of religious
commitment among the Turkish young generation because, as discussed in
Chapter Three, religion is one of the key sources of identity. Before analysing
the survey findings on religious beliefs, attitudes and practices of the Turkish
youth, I would like to discuss some of the earlier theories of the dimension of
religiosity and the concepts which are used to denote such dimensions. This
brief discussion will set an explanatory framework for the analysis of
religious commitment
7.1. Dimensions of Religious Commitment
Religious commitment entails more than one dimension. One's acceptance of
and position towards a supernatural being, towards an ultimate reality and
its manifestations, involve a multidimensional process such as attitudes,
beliefs, emotions, experiences and rituals. Research on religious commitment
indicates that religiosity is not a. unidimensional experience in individuals'
lives'. This means that religious orientation has different dimensions. One of
the earliest theorists on the dimension of religiosity proposed a. four-
dimensional model in approaching religious orientation and religious group
involvement? (Lenski, 1961, p. 21-24). The discussions on the
conceptualisation of religious orientation were also contributed by Glock
(1972, p. 39), who proposed a five-dimensional model3
 of 'conceptual
framework for the systematic study of differential commitment to religion...'.
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Glock argues that despite the great variety of detail, all world religions share
general areas in which religiosity is manifested. These are the five core
dimensions of religiosity: 'the experiential', 'the ritualistic', 'the ideological', 'the
intellectual', and 'the consequential'. According to Glock (1972, P. 40), the
experiential dimension of religiosity refers to the achievement of direct
knowledge of the ultimate reality or experience of religious emotions in the
form of exaltation, fear, humility, joyfulness and peace. The 'ideological
dimension' gives recognition to the fact that all religions expect that the
religious person should hold certain beliefs which followers are expected to
adhere to. The 'ritualistic dimension' includes specific religious practices
expected of religious followers. Among them prayer, worship and fasting can
be mentioned. The 'intellectual dimension', in Glock's framework, is
constituted by the expectation that the religious person should have some
knowledge about the basic tenets of his/her faith and its religious scriptures.
The 'consequential dimension', on the other hand, encompasses man's relation
to man. This means that the 'consequential dimension' includes religious
prescriptions which determine attitudes of the adherents as a consequence of
their religious belief. Glock's five dimensional approach was added several
sub-dimensions4 (Stark and Glock, 1968).
King (1967, p. 173-185) also developed a framework for the analysis of
religious commitment and proposed nine dimensions to measure religiosity5.
King and Hunt later (1969, pp. 321-323) revised the early findings and
subsequently proposed a new model on similar lines. On the King-Hunt
model Roof (1979, p. 24) notes that it provided the most comprehensive
conceptual framework to test the multidimensionality model. Instead of using
the concept of 'dimension' Verbit (1970, p. 26,27) proposed the concept of
'components' in his attempt to develop a theoretical framework to understand
religiosity. Verbit argues that 'religion has several 'components', and an
individual's behaviour vis-à-vis each one of these components has a. number
of 'dimensions". He identifies six components of religion including 'ritual',
'doctrine', 'emotion', 'knowledge', 'ethics' and icommunity' 6. Drawing upon
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earlier models, O'Connell (1975, P. 200-203) also proposed a seven-
multidimensional explanatory framework and tried to find out the
relationships between the dimensions of religiosity7. The same year,
Himraelfarb (1975, p. 606-618) invented a synthesised form of a typology of
religious involvement and argued that religious involvement has at least two
elements: 'doctrinal beliefs' and 'ritual observance's.
7.2. Young Turks and Religiosity
As the foregoing discussion establishes, religious commitment and
involvement are multidimensional phenomena. The core dimensions of a
religious commitment include belief, knowledge, practice and experience. It
should be pointed out that each dimension of a religious orientation may
have numerous sub-dimensions because of the nature of religious experience.
Therefore all the theories and explanatory frameworks for the analysis of
religious commitments are susceptible omitting some of the dimensions and
sub-dimensions of religiosity. Nevertheless, they are a useful means of
indentifying the general patterns. I will therefore analyse religious beliefs,
attitudes and behaviour of Turkish young people within the framework of
multidimensional typology of religiosity.
7.2.1. Belief in God
An overwhelming majority of the young Turks said that 'they believe in God'
(see Table 7.1.). Sixty two per cent of the male and 43 per cent of the female
respondents 'absolutely believe in God'. Nineteen per cent of the males and
47 per cent of the females, on the other hand, 'have some doubts' but still
believe in God. Those who rejected a. belief in God comprised six males (14
per cent) and two females (4 per cent). Only 2 females replied that 'they have
no concern about belief in God'.
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Table 7.1: 'Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing what you believe
about God?'
Male % Female %
I absolutely believe in God 26 62 22 43
Although I have some doubts, I feel that I believe in 8 19 24 47
God
I don't believe in God 6 14 2 4
I have no concern about belief in God 2 4
No reply 2 5 1 2
Total 42 100 51 100
Table 7.1. shows that 'belief in God' is significantly high. More than half of
the respondents (52 per cent) have 'absolute' belief in God, and 32
respondents (34 per cent) also have belief in God but with some 'doubt' as a
common characteristic of adolescent religiosity. When these two groups of
respondents are counted under 'believers' category, one can see that as much
as 86 per cent of the respondents believe in God. van der Lans and
Rooijackers, (1992, p. 61) also found a high rate of belief in basic principles of
Islam among young generation Turks in the Netherlands where 67.6 per cent
of the informants (total number: 65) expressed their belief in the tenets of
Islam. Thirteen per cent, on the other hand, were found to have an
'ambivalence' attitude while 9.2 per cent were reported to be experiencing
'scepticism'. The same research also indicates that 12.3 per cent 'reject'
traditional ideas regarding Islam.
In my London sample, atheists constituted 9 per cent of the respondents,
agnostics on the other hand, comprised a small proportion (2 per cent) of the
total sample. As pointed out earlier, as many as 34 per cent ex-pressed having
'some doubt' along with their belief in God. Such an attitude might be
ascribed to the fact that adolescence and the early period of youth are
characterised by intellectual questioning and critical thinking. Smith9 (1941;
cited in Hyde, 1990, p. 103) argues that religious development has emotional
and intellectual aspects. Emotional and imaginative enthusiasm of childhood
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is replaced by doubt during the development process which is a period
marked by fluctuations between idealism and realism. In his study of
religious development of adolescents, Bradbury m (1947, cited in Hyde, 1990,
p. 146) also found that religious doubt surfaced during adolescence and he
attributed the origins of doubt to the development of critical reasoning at this
period of the life cycle. It could be concluded from my findings that the
intellectual/doctrinal dimension of religious commitment is represented by a
high proportion of respondents who believe in God. During the interviews
only two respondents gave a reply when they were asked why they did not
have a. belief/interest in God. One girl based her agnosticism on the current
events taking place in the name of religion. She explained how she became
alienated from the idea of believing in an organised religion as:
'Although I was born in a Muslim family, gradually I lost my interest
in religion. I think extremism of some people and murders in the
name of religion were effective on my attitude towards religion. In
addition to that, when I was at the college, I began reading some
atheist philosophers who shaped my thinking. I should mention one
more reason which is the widespread indifference toward religion
and particularly to Christianity in this country'.
During the interview, this particular respondent frequently made references
to the media coverage of Islam and cited examples from Iran, Iraq and Libya
to support her argument that religious belief produces violence. Thus, she
rejected organised Islam and turned to practising meditation. It may be
argued that media coverage of Islamic movements and portrayal of Islam as
an extremist, violent, bloodthirsty and fanatical religion has created a
negative image of Islam even for the children of Muslim Turkish families. It
was a recurrent theme during the interviews on religion that some parents
and young Turks used the word 'asiri dinci', which literally means 'extremist'.
This term is frequently used by the media and soon picked up by people in
this information age. The Turkish media also use such terms with negative
connotations. When one make references to religion or religious people by
using the terminology as mentioned, it may be expected that, especially
young people in search of identity would not want to associate themselves
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with derogatory categories of religiousness. It appears that the media is
gaining more powerful influence on the young generation as information
technology and globalisation are turning the world into a 'small village'.
As discussed in Chapter Five, Turkish families try to transmit their cultural
and religious values to their children. In order to facilitate the construction of
Muslim-Turkish identity, several religious institutions and religio-political
organisations were established as will be explained in Chapters Nine and
Ten. The findings in Table 7.2. show that parents play the primary role in
their children's belief in God. As presented in Table 7.2., 65 per cent of the
respondents said that 'family members' had the most decisive impact on their
religious beliefs. Books (eight per cent), friends (eight per cent) and some
kind of private/personal experience (seven per cent) were also mentioned as
having the most important influence. It is observed that parental influence is
the most effective of the environmental and situational factors in the
formation of religious attitudes.
Table 7.2: 'Which of the following factors played the most effective role on your decision
about belief or disbelief in God?'
N
Family members 61 65
Books read 7 8
Friends 7 8
Private experience 6 7
No reply 5 5
Religious persons 4 4
Teachers/tutors 3 3
Total 93 100
Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, p. 30) and Hyde (1990, p. 226) report that
adolescent religious practice is strongly related to parental religiousness.
Faulkner and De Jong (1966, p. 251) also support my argument about the
influence of parental religious involvement on children. They carried out
research on 362 college students about their religious commitments and
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found that parents' religiosity influenced children's attitudes towards
religion. Faulkner and De Jong found a low ritualistic and consequential
dimension correlation among students who came from homes where neither
parent was a church member whereas a high consequential dimension
correlation was identified among students who came from homes where one
parent was a church member. When the efforts of Turkish parents to teach
their children Islamic values under the name of tradition, culture and
heritage, either at home or by sending their children to supplementary
schools, Mosques and on long holidays to Turkey/Cyprus, are taken into
account, it becomes clearer that parental control and nurture assume a
prominent role in the religious commitment of children and the young
generation.
There is no doubt that religious education in childhood and adolescence will
also have some influence on the transmission of religious beliefs and values
to the young generation. As shown in Chapter Six, most of the respondents
were born and brought up in London and they are all students at the schools
where there is no special provision for the teaching of their culture and
religion. Therefore, as will be explained in Chapter Eight, some Turkish
organisations have set up supplementary schools to fill this vacuum of
information. More religiously oriented people, on the other hand, send their
children to courses at the Mosques or, as I will discuss in Chapter Nine,
establish an Islamic school (Ikra) to teach their children principles of Islam
Table 7.3. shows that 48 per cent of the respondents received some kind of
religious education. This ranged from family and Mosque to private religious
education. Thirty three per cent, on the other hand, said that they had not
received any religious education.
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Table 7.3: 'Have you ever had religious education so far?'
Male % Female %
Only my parents taught me religion 11 26 20 39
I went to Mosque to learn from Imam 8 19 3 6
I had a private religious education 3 7 5 10
I did not have any religious education 12 29 19 37
Other 6 14 2 4
No reply 2 5 2 4
Total 42 100 51 100
Of those who received some kind of religious education, 33 per cent explained
that their 'parents taught them religion. This confirms the findings presented in
Table 7.2. that parents play the most prominent role in the formation of religious
beliefs. Twelve per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, said that they
were sent to a Mosque by their parents to take courses on Islam. It appears that
Mosques were not very successful in their appeal to a large number of Turkish
young people. This may be attributed to the divisions among Islamic groups and
to the teaching methods at the Mosques. However, it may be predicted that the
number of students at the Mosques will increase because they are increasingly
providing special education on a boarding basis at the weekends. The expected
increase in the number of students may be even higher should the Mosque
administrations modify their traditional teaching methods.
It may be argued that the religious education of young people may determine
their attitudes towards the religious education of their own children in the future.
When the replies were analysed, 36 per cent of the respondents appeared to have
a positive attitude towards the religious education of their own children in the
future whereas the majority of them were still 'not sure' about it As presented in
table 7.4., 43 per cent of males and 31 per cent of females think that they would
encourage their children to attend Islamic classes. In contrast, 14 per cent of males
and 12 per cent of females said that they were not thinking of giving their
children an Islamic education.
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Table 7.4: 'Would you like your children to have a good Islamic religious education?
Male % Female %
Yes 18 43 16 31
No 6 14 6 12
Not sure 16 38 27 53
No reply 2 5 2 4
Total 42 100 51 100
When asked why they wanted their children to receive religious education in the
future, similar replies were given which centred on 'self perception',
'community', 'belonging to a religion' and 'having an identity' of which Islam is
seen as an indispensable component whether it is practised or nominally
accepted. An 18 year-old male said: 'All Turks are Muslims. Religion is
important for us. Many of our families come from an Islamic background. I want
my children learn what Islam is'. Another informant (Female:17) said: 'Being a.
Muslim is our identity. Sometimes we may ignore practical aspects of it, but we
are still Muslims. I think the more we know about our religion the stronger
identity we will have. And I want my children to have a strong Turkish-Muslim
identity'. Lack of Islamic knowledge as evidenced by the findings (see Tables
7.5.; 7.6.; 7.7.) also seems to be a motivating factor for the young generation in
providing their children with religious education. As one respondent (Male:18)
explained: 'Personally I feel that I did not receive adequate religious education.
When my friends ask me about Islam and its practices I feel ashamed because
only then I realise that I know very little about Islam. I do not want my children
to fall into same situation'. Those who disapproved of giving their children a
sound Islamic education mostly argued that religion should be a matter of their
own 'choice'. Therefore they would allow their children to decide for themselves.
One of the interesting findings in Table 7.4. is the high number of respondents
who said that they were not sure about giving an Islamic education to their
children in the future. As shown in the same table, 38 per cent of the male and 53
per cent of the female respondents were uncertain about the religious education
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of their children in the future. It may be suggested that this uncertainty of the
young people will ultimately disappear. This means that the adoption of Islamic
values taught by the family and the community will motivate young people to
transmit these internalised values to future generations. Acculturation and
assimilation, on the other hand, will have a reverse effect on the development of
Islamic identity among young people.
7.2.2. Intellectual Dimension: Knowledge of the Basic Tenets of Islam
The intellectual dimension of a religious commitment refers to the knowledge of
the basic principles of a given religion. As Glock (1972, p. 40) explains, the
intellectual dimension is constituted by the expectation that the religious person
should have some knowledge of the basic tenets of his/her faith and religious
scripts. A few basic Islamic concepts and rules were used in this survey as an
index of measurement I have not come across these in any previous surveys. As
a first step to measuring the knowledge of the Turkish young people about their
religion, the respondents were asked to write down the five pillars of Islam
(Islamin sartlan).
Table 7.5: Measuring religious knowledge: 'What are the five pillars of Islam Uslam'in sartlarir'
N
Identified only 1
Identified only 2 3 3
Identified only 3 13 14
Identified only 4 6 7
Identified a115 26 28
Identified none 45 48
Total 93 100
As Table 7.5. shows, 28 per cent of the respondents correctly identified and
named all the five pillars of Islam; 23 per cent identified between two to five
items correctly. The majority (48 per cent) of the respondents, on the other hand,
failed to identify any of the five pillars of Islam. The lack of knowledge of the
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basic principles of Islam may be attributed to different factors. The indifference of
parents or their inability to teach the fundamentals of Islam to their children,
failure of religious organisations to attract a large number of young clientele and
a lack of information on Islam in schools are among the factors suggested as the
sources of insufficient Islamic knowledge.
Findings in Table 7.6. also support the figures presented in Table 7.5., that most
of the young Turkish people do not know the basic principles of Islam. The
respondents were asked if the weekly Friday prayer (Cuma Namazi) was
obligatory for male and female Muslims. The Friday prayer is held once a week
on that day and its performance is obligatory for male Muslims who have
reached puberty.
Table 7.6: Measuring religious knowledge: 'Cuma (Friday) prayer is obligatory (farz) for every
Muslim regardless of age and gender'.
True 17 18
False 19 21
I don't know 53 57
No reply 4 4
Total 93 100
The above shows that only 21 per cent the respondents gave a correct answer to
the question about the Friday prayer. The overwhelming majority (75 per cent),
on the other hand, either gave a wrong answer (18 per cent) or said that they 'do
not know' whether the Friday prayer was obligatory for male and female
Muslims. These findings also suggest that the majority of the Turkish young
people do not perform the Friday prayer simply because most of them do not
even know that its performance is obligatory for male Muslims.
A different picture emerged when a question was asked about the position of
Islam towards issues such as alcohol, gambling, interest, witchcraft and
consumption of pork meat As presented in Table 7.7., 64 per cent of the
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respondents gave the correct answer when asked if these were allowed according
to Islam. Fourteen per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, gave a wrong
answer whereas 18 per cent reported that they 'do not know'.
Table 7.7: Measuring religious knowledge: 'Alcohol, gambling, interest, witchcraft and eating
pork are regarded as sins in Islam'
N
True 59 64
False 13 14
I don't know 17 18
No reply 4 4
Total 93 100
Table 7.7. shows that, in contrast to the other issues concerning knowledge of the
basic Islamic principles, a higher number of respondents appeared to have a
correct idea about the above issues. These results might be attributed to the fact
that drinking alcohol, gambling and eating pork etc. are daily issues and children
as well as youngsters are constantly reminded to avoid such things.
Stark and Glock (1968, p. 147-155) used knowledge about the Bible as an index of
religious knowledge. In a. similar vein, the young Turks were asked if they had
the opportunity of reading the holy scripture of Islam, the Qur'an. As table 7.8.
shows, only five per cent of the respondents claimed to have read all of the
Qur'an; 16 per cent had read some parts of it and as much as 28 per cent said that
they had tried to read the Qur'an but soon gave up reading it because they could
not understand it Forty five per cent of the children, on the other hand, reported
that they never read the Qur'an. These findings suggest that Turkish young
people do not have basic knowledge of the Qur'an.
-
200
Table 7.8: Familiarity with the holy book of Islam, The Qur'an:' Have you ever tried to read the
translation of the Qur'an?'
N
I read all the Qur'an 5 5.5
I read some parts of Qur'an 15 16
I tried to read but I gave up since I couldn't understand 26 28
I have never read it 42 45
No reply 5 5.5
Total 93 100
The figures in Table 7.8. show that 28 per cent of the respondents made an
attempt to read the Qur'an but stopped reading it because they were not able to
understand it properly. The lack of young people's understanding of the Qur'an
may be attributed to the fact that the language used in its translation is beyond
the comprehension of the young generation. This means that the young
generation are not able to communicate in the language of the Islamic scripture,
neither in English nor in Turkish. In addition to such a shortcoming in the
linguistic domain, there is a significant lacunae of introductory books written on
Islam appraising to the intellectual capabilities of children and the young
generation. This lack of literary sources not only deprives young generation of
acquiring direct knowledge from the Qur'an but also discourages them from
reading the sacred scripture as they do not have adequate linguistic skills and
basic knowledge of it The teaching of the Qur'an in the Mosques supports my
argument that the young generation do not learn much about the contents of the
Qur'an. As I will explain in Chapter Nine, the Imams and other personnel in the
Mosques use mostly traditional and outdated methods of teaching. For example,
children are always told to memorise the verses in the Qur'an without knowing
what they mean. It may be expected that after a while young students of Islam
may lose interest in something that they do not understand.
The findings suggesting that the intellectual dimension of Islam is little known
by the Turkish young people are also confirmed by the findings presented in the
following table:
--
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Table 7.9: Measuring religious knowledge: 'The Qur'an consists of ayet and sure'.
True 23 25
False 9 10
I don't know 57 61
No reply 4 4
Total 93 100
The findings in Table 7.8., showed that knowledge of the respondents about the
sacred scripture of Islam is very limited because many of them either cannot
understand it or have not read it at all. Their knowledge of the Qur'an was
further measured as shown in Table 7.9. When asked if the Qur'an consisted of
'ayet' and ' sure' , only 25 per cent of the respondents gave the right answer,
whereas 71 per cent either did not know or gave a wrong answer.
7.2.3. Ritualistic Dimension: Religious Practices
The ritualistic dimension refers to specific religious practices expected of
religious followers. Prayer, worship and fasting are examples these religious
practices. As in other religious traditions, Muslims are also required to perform
specific practices. Daily prayers (rwmaz; five times a day), Friday prayers, (Cuma
ruzmazi), fasting (Oruc) during the month of Ramazan are among the obligatory
religious practices that followers of Islam are expected to observe. It appears
from the findings that most of the young Turks do not observe prescribed
prayers, at least on a. regular basis as required by the religious principles. Table
7.10. shows that only a small number of respondents 'try to perform prayers such
as Namaz and Oruc'
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Table 7.10: 'What is your idea about performing prayers such as Namaz (daily prayers) and Oruc
(fasting)?'
I can not pray because I don't know how to pray 40 43
I try in perform prayers such as Namaz and Oruc 17 18
I find it very difficult to perform prayers 15 16
I don't pray to avoid criticism from my environment 12 13
Other 6 7
No reply 3 3
Total 93 100
It is clear from the findings in the above table that young Turks are not very
interested in religious practices. Fifteen per cent of the respondents said that they
found it very difficult to perform prescribed practices while 13 per cent said that
they did not pray because of the environmental pressure which discouraged
them from observing religious practices. Only 18 per cent of he respondents
claimed to carry out religious duties. The most interesting finding in Table 7.10.
is the fact that 43 per cent of the respondents do not observe prayers, simply
because they do not know how to pray. That lends support to my earlier
observations (Tables 7.5. and 7.9.) that the intellectual dimension of religiosity of
Turkish youth is weak because they are not equipped with the basic knowledge
of how to perform prayers.
As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, Verbit (1970, p. 27) argues that
components (dimensions) of religious commitment can be measured along with
four dimensions: 'content', 'frequency', 'intensity' and 'centrality', of which
'frequency' refers to the constancy and prevalence of religious behaviour. A
question was included in the questionnaire to find out .the frequency of practising
religious rituals observed by the young Turks. My findings suggest that regular
fulfilment of prescribed Islamic practices in the daily lives of young adherents
does not seem to be a salient devotional/ritualistic dimension of their religiosity.
The respondents were asked about the frequency of their involvement in daily
prayers, Cuma/Bayram prayers, fasting and reading prayers (dun). Depending on
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the nature of the prayers, respondents gave replies that indicate varying degrees
of frequency in performing the practices. Daily prayers which are supposed to be
observed five times a day received the least frequency as shown in the following
table:
Table 7.11: 'How often do you perform the following religious duties?'
Daily prayers Cunna-Bayrato Fasting Reading dua
N % N % N % N
Always 2 2 3 7 .8 9 11 12
Sometimes 26 28 18 43 45 48 53 57
Never 57 61 17 40 31 33 21 22
No reply 8 9 4 10 9 10 8 9
Total 93 100 42 100 93 100 93 100
The findings presented in Table 7.11., show that 61 per cent of the respondent
said that they 'never observe daily prayers'. Twenty eight per cent, on the other
hand, replied that they 'sometimes' fulfil this duty, whereas only two per cent
seem to practice daily prayers (nanzaz) regularly. As pointed out earlier, one of
the underlying reasons for not performing prescribed prayers was the lack of
knowledge about how to pray. This may hold true for the daily prayers as well.
However, One can suggest that the lack of prayer halls at the colleges, designed
for the Muslim students, may be another discouraging factor along with the
environmental pressure in the form of criticism of religious practice. A similar
result emerged regarding the frequency of fulfilling Cuma and Bayrant prayers
which are obligatory for male Muslims.
However, as the figures in Table 7.11. show, fasting and reading prayers (dua) are
observed more frequently. Those who 'always' observe these rituals are 9 and 12
per cent respectively. Those who replied that they 'never' observe fasting and
reading dua, constitute 33 and 22 per cent of the respondents respectively. A
significant number of the respondents, on the other hand, is understood to
observe fasting (48 per cent) and reading dua (57 per cent). The higher frequency
of observation of fasting and reading prayer in contrast to daily, Cuma and
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Bayram prayers may be attributed to the nature of these prayers. Fasting and
reading prayer require less knowledge to observe them. More importantly
fasting and reading dua are personal experiences which escape social pressure
due to their private nature. Before moving further, a comparative remark is
necessary to see the differences between different Muslim communities. In
contrast to our findings on the frequency of performing Islamic rituals by the
young Turks, Anwatis (1994, p. 33) findings on the frequency of praying among
the Pakistani Muslim community appear higher. However, Anwai ls findings
also indicate that frequency rate is dropping among the young generation in
contrast to the frequency of parental observance of religious practices.
There are several important events in the Islamic calendar that Muslims either
celebrate or commemorate. Among them the birth of the Prophet Muhammad
(Mevlid Kandili), the beginning of revelation, and the ascension of Prophet
Muhammad (Mirac Kandili) to heaven can be mentioned. The days that these
events are thought to have taken place in the Islamic calendar are called Tandil'
days in Turkish society. Several religious celebrations and events are organised
on these days. To find out whether the young generation participate in these
communal gatherings, the young people were asked what they usually do
during Kandil days. As Table 7.12. shows, only 27 per cent of the respondents
usually participate in and pray during Kandil days. Fifteen percent of the
respondents, on the other hand, did not show interest in such ceremonies.
Table 7.12: 'What do you usually do during 'Kandil' days?'
N 7.
I usually don't remember Kandil days in this country 40 43
I pray during these days 25 27
I have no interest in Kandil days 14 15
Other 10 11
No reply 4 4
Total 93 100
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Table 7.12. also shows that 43 per cent of the respondents do not remember these
days of religious importance. These findings further confirm the earlier
conclusion that young Turks do not have a sufficient knowledge of Islam. These
findings also indicate that environmental and situational contexts influence the
religious awareness of the young generation. Kandil days are not celebrated by
the larger society. Therefore there are no preparations or publicity for the
celebrations. This means that there is no reminder of important events and
special days of the Islamic calendar. In contrast to the indifference of British
society to such Islamic events, in Turkey/Cyprus one cannot avoid coming across
the celebration of Karla days. At least live television programs on these days
remind the large section of society that some kind of religious celebration is
taking place. It can be argued that the extent of publicity in educational
establishments, in the neighbourhood and in the media leads to the creation of an
atmosphere of awareness of special events of particular significance. It seems that
the young Turks' lack of knowledge about Islam is perpetuated by the
deprivation of young Muslims from an awareness-raising social and cultural
atmosphere about for religious values.
7.2.4. Experiential dimension
I have discussed at the beginning of this Chapter that religious commitment also
has an experiential dimension. The experiential dimension of religiosity refers to
the experience of religious emotions in the form of exaltation, fear, joyfulness and
humility (Glock, 1972, p. 40). In that sense, prayer (dua) is truly a personal
religious experience which encompasses emotional reactions and feelings of the
individuals involved.
Table 7.13: Which of the following statement best expresses you idea about prayer (dua)11
I believe that the prayer is beneficial 45 48
I don't believe that the prayer is beneficial 6 7
I have no idea 40 43
No reply 2 2
Total	 _ 93 100
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The above table shows that 48 per cent of the respondents said that 'prayer is
beneficial'. Only seven per cent thought that 'prayer is not beneficial'. Forty three
per cent, on the other hand, appeared to have no clear idea about this issue. The
figures in Table 7.13. indicate that 48 per cent of the informants had a personal
experience that had led them to a positive attitude toward prayer.
According to the figures in the following table, different reasons were given by
the respondents as to why they pray. It appeared from the findings that many of
the respondents tend to have an 'extrinsic' attitude towards praying. The desire
to achieve happiness and success seems to be the main reason for prayer.
Table 7.14: 'Why do you pray?'
I pray for happiness in both this world and in hereafter 44 47
I pray to be happy in the hereafter 10 11
I pray because I want my worldly affairs be realised 7 8
Other 15 16
No reply 17 18
Total 93 100
Table 7.14. shows that 47 per cent of the respondents pray for 'happiness in both
this world and in the hereafter'; 11 per cent pray 'to be happy in the hereafter';
and eight per cent pray to achieve their worldly goals. Some of the respondents,
for example, mentioned 'being successful in the exams', 'getting A levels',
'happiness in the family', 'finding a good job', 'being in good mental and
physical health' as reasons for prayer. The high percentage of extrinsic attitude
towards prayer may be attributed to the nature of Islam according to which God
accepts prayers from believers. One can find numerous references in the Qur'an
and in the prophetic traditions related to the Prophet Muhammad whose sayings
and deeds are taken as an example to support our argument that Islam
encourages its followers to pray and ask for worldly and heavenly favours from
God. Thus, extrinsic orientation of young Turks is an expected result as justified
and encouraged by the religion itself:However, it should be noted here (Roof,
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1979, p. 20) that 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' orientations should not be seen as
'separate and distinct orientations but, rather alternative ends of the same
motivational continuum'.
I have mentioned earlier that the experiential dimension of religiosity
encompasses feelings, sentiments and emotions of a person in relation to
supernatural or ultimate reality. Prayer may be described as a personal
communication between an individual and the ultimate reality. Communication
with the ultimate reality or supernatural being, as perceived by the believer,
evokes varying emotions such as fear, awe, nearness, joy and unity with God.
Table 7.15: 'Which of the following statements most dearly describes your emotional state during
the prayer (dua)?'
I feel relaxation and tranquillity while praying 34 37
I feel much nearer to God while praying 19 20
I don't feel any difference while praying 29 31
No reply 11 12
Total 93 100
As Table 7.15. shows, young people have varying emotional experiences during
prayer. Thirty seven per cent of the respondents 'feel relaxation and tranquillity,
while 20 per cent of them seem to 'feel much nearer to God' at the time of
praying. Thirty one per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, expressed
that 'they don't feel any difference while praying'.
Religious ceremonies also evoke various emotional reactions among young
people. As shown in Table 15.16., emotional states they experience while
performing religious practices or during their participation in religious
ceremonies vary from happiness to disinterest
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Table 7.16.: 'How do you feel during religious ceremonies?'
I feel happy 38 41
I don't have any interest in such religious ceremonies 18 19
I feel very bored and want it finish soon 16 17
I don't like these ceremonies and don't participate 16 17
No reply 5 6
Total 93 100
The figures presented in Table 7.16. show that 41 per cent of the respondents
claimed to have a 'happy' emotional state at the time of involvement in a
religious ceremony. Religious ceremonies are boring occasions for 17 per cent of
the respondents. The same proportion of the respondents do not like such
ceremonies. Nineteen per cent of the respondents, on the other hand, do not seem
to have any 'interest' in participating in religious ceremonies.
Table 7.17: 'Have you ever had a response in prayer?'
Yes 26 28
No 58 62
No reply 9 10
Total 93 100
I mentioned earlier that prayer is an experiential dimension of religiosity which
may be described as a personal communication between an individual and the
ultimate reality. When asked if they had ever a response to their prayers, as
shown in Table 7.17., 28 percent of the respondents said that had they received
some kind of answer to their prayers, whereas 62 per cent said that they had not
had such an experience.
The analysis of survey findings on religious beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of
young Turks indicates that an overwhelming majority of them believe in God. It
appears that parents have played the primary role in the development of belief in
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God among young people. The findings suggest that there is not sufficient
religious education given to children in the family, in the schools or even in the
Mosques. This finding is supported by the fact that young Turks do not have
sufficient knowledge of basic principles of Islam. Therefore many of them are
unable to pray. It seems that the lack of written Turkish or English sources on
Islam this another reason for the lack of knowledge. Young people can not even
understand the language of the Qur'an and therefore they are deprived of access
to the original sources of Islam. However, despite this lack of knowledge,
generally young people display positive attitudes towards the experiential
dimension of Islam.
210
Chapter Seven: Notes
1. For a critical review of literature on research focusing on approaches to the
religious commitment, see W. C. Roof, (1979), pp. 17-45.
2. These dimensions are 1- 'associational' aspect which includes frequency of
religious involvement in worship and prayer services; 2- 'communal' dimension
which relates to the preference and frequency of one's primary-type relations; 3-
'doctrinal orthodoxy' which refers to the intellectual acceptance of the prescribed
doctrines of the church; and 4- "clevotionalism' which involves private or personal
communion with God through prayers, meditation and religious behaviour.
3. Glock's article 'On the Study of Religious Commitment' was first published in
July-August 1962, Research Supplement of Religious Education, pp. 98-110, The
Religious Education Association, New York City.
4- On the basis this five-dimensional explanatory framework, Stark and Clock (1968,
p. 62-80) attempted to document the nature of religious commitment in America and
added several sub-dimensions to the original framework. Concerning religious
belief, for example, 'orthodoxy', 'religious particularism' and Jethicalism! were used
as indicators for measuring the religious belief. 'Worship', 'communion',
'organisational participation', 'financial support', and 'saying table prayers' or
'grace', on the other hand, were used as the main indicators of religious practice-
ritual. Later, Faulkner and De Jong (1966, p. 246-254) devised items and developed a
scale criteria in order to test Stark and Clock's five-dimensional model of religiosity.
Faulkner and De Jong used 23 items of scale to see the interrelationship among the
five dimensions of religiosity. Their findings led them to conclude that these
dimensions were positively related. However, Faulkner and De Jong (Ibid.., p.. 253)
pointed out that "the degree of relationships differ for the various dimensions. This
diversity in degree of relationships lends support to the view that religious
involvement is characterised by several dimensions'. See also Ncidelman (1971, p. 46)
who also tried to measure the dimensions of religious commitment by using the
model proposed by Clock (1972), Stark and Clock (1968).
5. These dimensions are delineated (King, 1967) as 'Credal Assent and Personal
Commitment'; 'Participation in Congregational Activities'; 'Personal Religious
Experience'; 'Personal Ties in the Congregation'; 'Commitment to Intellectual Search
Despite Doubt'; 'Openness to Religious Growth'; 'Dogmatism and Extrinsic
Orientation'; 'Financial Behaviour and Financial Attitude'; and lastly 'Talking and
Reading about Religion'. These dimensions are similar to those proposed in the
earlier research. 'Credal Assent and Personal Commitment' includes, for example,
Clock's 'ideological', and Lenski's 'doctrinal orthodoxy' dimensions. Similarly,
'Participation in Congregational Activities' is related to Clock's 'ritualistic' and
Lenski's 'associational' dimensions. 'Personal Religious Experience' on the other
hand, corresponds to Glock's 'experiential' and Lenski's 'devotionalisin'
dimensions.
6. In Verbit's model, these six components of religion are measured along four
dimensions as 'content', 'frequency', 'intensity' and 'centrality'. Of these dimensions
'content' refers to the elements of one's religious repertoire and denotes the
'direction' of his/her religious behaviour, indicating participation or non-
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participation in any item of religion. Dimension of 'frequency', on the other hand,
measures the 'amounts' of involvement of a person in religious behaviours and
practices. 'Intensity', as argued by Verbit, refers to the degree of determination or
consistency in relation to one's position towards religion. The fourth dimension,
'centrality', measures the importance that a person attributes to religious tenets,
rituals and sentiments (Verbit, 1970).
7. His seven dimensions axe 'Orthodoxy'; `Devotionalism'; 'Social Consequences';
'Individual Moral Consequences'; 'Comfort Seeking', 'Communal Participation'; and
'Attitudes Toward Church Authority' (O'Connel, 1975).
8. Himmelfarb (1975), identified nine dimensions and three subdimensiorts of
religious involvement as 'Devotional'; 'Doctrinal'; 'Experiential' (these three
dimensions are oriented toward the supernatural); 'Affiliational' (including three
subdimensions: associational, fraternal, parental); 'Ideological'; 'Intellectual-
Aesthetic'; 'Affectional '(these two are cultural in orientation); 'Ethical' and finally
'Moral' (the last two encompass interpersonal relationship).
9. Smith, J. J. (1941) 'Religious development of children' in C. E. Skinner & P. L.
Harriman (eds.), Child Psychology, Macmillan, New York.
10. Bradbury, J. B. (1947) The Religious Development of the Adolescent, MEd Thesis,
University of Manchester.
11.Here prayer (dun) means requests from God, communication with words. Such
type of prayer is not necessarily accompanied by prescribed prayers which involves
physical movement as in daily prayers (rtanzaz) five times a day.
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Chapter Eight
Turkish Organisations In London
The emergence of ethnic institutions among immigrant groups is a part of
settlement and ethnic community formation. In the analysis of Turkish
organisations in London, several terms such as 'association', 'establishment'
and 'institution' will be used to denote social groupings among the Turkish
community within an organisational framework. These terms juxtapose and
overlap in the ensuing interpretation of the field data. Therefore they will be
used interchangeably. I argue that wherever social groups and categories
exist, both living and interacting with others, organisations become
prevailing aspects of virtually all individual beings and human collectivities.
Naturally, the Turkish community does not constitute an exception to this
widely observed reality.
8.1. Organisations as Social Vehicles among Turks
Organisations and associations of various kinds established by the Turkish
community present great variety of diversity with their differing
organisational structures, membership, clientele, strategies and purposes
epitomised by their activities among the Turkish community in London. This
reflection of organisational diversity is embedded in dual, if not manifold,
construction of the Turkish community itself and is shaped by the needs
generated within the wider society. Here we have at least two forces, if not
more, at work that not only guide but also fashion the shape of the
organisations under question. One of these emanates from within the Turkish
community. During the process of the formation of the Turkish community
from that of a fragmented ethnic group, specific needs of the community and
the strategies adopted left a mark on the structures of organisations and
associations. This inside stimuli is matched by an outside impetus originating
from being situated in a multicultural environment which has its own distinct
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social structures and organisational forms that are not available in the country
of origin.
Ethnographic data collected both in London and Berlin suggest that Turkish
organisations and issues surrounding their foundations, ideals, structural
features, activities and strategies, necessitate the adoption of a wider
approach, covering not only the British context but also other European
countries where a substantial number of Turks are living. Within the limited
scope of this Chapter, I will try to analyse complex relations between some
Turkish organisations whose roots can be traced to Turkey where daily
developments have an impact on the associations in Western Europe in
general, and in Britain in particular. This approach entails understanding the
politics of root organisations in Turkey that served as models in terms of
ideological and political composition for the associations in Europe. This
view is supported by Nielsen (1991, p. 48-49), who points out that political,
economic and social developments in the home country continue to have a
major effect on the Muslim communities in Europe. Ideological and political
proximity across organisations does not negate the significance of distinct
characteristics of associations established by immigrant Turkish communities.
As mentioned earlier, this problem stems from the fact that many of the
institutional formations were and still are, being influenced by various
dynamic sources. These include politics of the country of origin, changing
conditions and regulations in the host society, and the immigrants' own
experiences during the process of community formation. Globalising forces
spread by the development of media and information technology have also
influenced such organisations. Therefore, when looking at the associational
structure of the Turkish community, a wide range of discourses and
paradigms that are anchored in sending and receiving societies' minority
communities, should be taken into consideration in order to overcome this
complexity.
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8.2. The Process of Institutionalisation
During the early phase of immigration, the prevalent idea among immigrants
was to save money to buy property in the home country and accumulate
capital so that they could start a business back home. Their plans for the
future had always involved the idea of return as evidenced in remitting huge
sums of savings to relatives to enable them to invest in land, houses or other
forms of assets, from which, upon their return, they could gain financial
benefits. However, the history of migration and the ensuing trend to settle in
the receiving countries proved that the idea of return once prevalent in the
minds of immigrant workers, was merely a 'myth'. Even though many
immigrant workers have met their economic expectations by remitting money
and investing it in several ventures, the 'myth of return' has been replaced by
the tendency of settlement due to changing circumstances in both sending
and receiving countries. A survey carried out in 1980 found out that more than
40 per cent of the Turks staying in Germany wanted to settle down in this
country (Mehrlander, 1980, cited in Sen, p. 41). According to later research by the
Centre for Turkish Studies on Turkish migrants living in Germany, 39.4 per cent
of the respondents said that they did not intend to return Turkey and 21 per cent
revealed that they had no intention of going back within the next ten years. These
statistics suggest that at least 60 per cent of those interviewed displayed an
intention to stay in Germany either permanently or for a long period of time (Sen,
1989, p. 41). In 1992 the number of those who wanted to stay permanently
increased to 83 per cent Only 17 per cent of those interviewed expressed their
intention of returning to Turkey (Sen, 1993, p. 25) (see also Chapter Five).
During the early phase of immigration which comprised mostly single
people, there was not much need to form organisations as immigration was
thought to be temporary. As the table below shows, numerous Turkish
organisations were established in the latter phases of immigration and
settlement in European countries. It is reported that in Berlin alone, there are
currently more than 150 Turkish associations. These associations comprise
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welfare, cultural, political, religious and sports organisations. Table 8.1. gives
an estimated number of associations in various West European countries.
Table 8.1: Estimated number of Turkish associations and organisations in selected European
countries
Associations
Germany
	 1,432
Netherlands
	 230
France
	 210
Belgium
	 63
Denmark
	 56
Sweden	 30
England	 21
Federations
not available
8
not available
5
5
not available
1
Source: Annual Report (1993), Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, Ankara,
Turkey
A similar pattern was observed in London among Turks from Cyprus and
mainland Turkey. Much of the communal activities took place within a small
circle of people mostly in private domains because immigrants did not
perceive their existence as permanent However, they began to realise that
the period of their stay became longer than they had planned. In the early
seventies, family reunion dominated the agenda and temporary stay was
reversed to permanent settlement The process of family reunions changed
the perception of Turkish immigrants about their settlement plans. The
tendency towards a permanent settlement and the concomitant needs of
immigrants and their growing number of families conjured up the idea of
overcoming multi-faceted challenges that they had not encountered before
their arrival. Sander (1991, p. 70) in his study of Turkish Muslims in Sweden,
found a corresponding process of association formation'. He states that, 'as a
result of the growing presence of women and children in what the Muslims
themselves regarded in many respects as the hostile and decadent Swedish
society, new problems became pressing. Perhaps the most important can be
stated as that of reaffirming and legitimising their 'old' culture and religion
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for themselves and, even more important, transmitting them to the future
generations'.
The need for migrants to adapt to the new environment also appears as a
stimuli to the formation of organisations. In his study of Pakistani community
in Rochdale, Anwar (1985, p. 175) demonstrates that the process of adaptation
within a new setting, involving the adjustment of home values arid old ways
of dealing with daily life to the new environment, created a demand for
welfare associations. Lewis (1994, p. 19) writing on the Muslim community in
Bradford, also sees the investment in ethnic institutions and the proliferation
of Mosques, as an indication of both commitment to remain as a Muslim in
Britain and a determination to pass on to their children Islamic values and
traditional customs. As Shadid and Koninsveld (1991, p. 2) observe, this
resulted not 'only in a growing pressure on the existing infrastructural
provisions in these countries, but also made the creation of specific provisions
such as mosques and mosque-centred organisations, Islamic schools and
Islamic religious education indispensable'. Shaw's (1988, p. 139) findings on
the Pakistani Muslim community in Oxford also supports the preceding
arguments, that a need for protection from the threat of western values is
being expressed. Thus Muslims became involved in establishing
organisations and associations as soon as they felt that they were becoming a
part of the larger society.
8.3. Turkish/Cypriot Associations: Cultural, Educational and Welfare
Associations
Immigrant organisations are categorised in various ways. Anwar (1985, p.
174), for example, classifies Pakistani associations in Rochdale according to
their functions in the migrant community. His typology includes four types:
'welfare', 'religious', 'political' and 'professional' organisations. In a study of
Turkish associations in Stockholm (Lundberg and Svanberg, 1991, p. 14)
researchers used the objectives of the associations as an explanatory tool to
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analyse various aspects of Turkish organisations.
Turkish/Cypriot associations in London display diversity in terms of their
foundational purposes and subsequent activities. This visible diversity
derives from the founders, their background and the clientele who use such
services. The activities and services made available by the existing
organisations address various issues such as welfare, education, social and
cultural challenges and the religious needs of the Turkish community in
London. As mentioned earlier, these associations cluster around a set of
ideals and purposes. The names of the organisations indicate their priorities
and orientation, and the clientele/membership structure of Turkish/Cypriot
organisations. The classification and categorisation of the organisations
according to their functions, such as welfare, cultural, educational, political
and religious would be of little use since there is no clear cut differentiation
between ethnic-based formations. My findings suggest that there is a
juxtaposition and a proximity across the interests and activities of
Turkish/Cypriot associations. Nevertheless, Turkish organisations in London
will be examined in three Chapters because of their differing priorities and
objectives. In what follows I will examine Turkish/Cyprus organisations and
discuss their role in the reproduction and preservation of traditional Turkish-
Islamic values and also their role in mobilising the Turkish community in the
political domain of the home country and British society.
8.3.1. Cyprus Turkish Association (CTA) (Kibris Turk Cerniyeti)
The Cyprus Turkish Association (CTA) (Kibris Turk Cemiyeti) has been on the
scene since 4 February 1951 in close co-operation with the other Turkish
associations and the governments of both Turkey and Northern Cyprus. CIA
was established by a joint participation of Turkish-Cypriot students and
workers. Its name had been changed a few times over the years. The initial
name of the organisation was the Cypriot Turkish Club (Kibris Turk Kulubu).
This was changed to the Cyprus Turkish Union (Kibris Turk Birligi) in 1952.
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Political developments in Cyprus during the 1950s motivated the members of
this organisation to change its name again in 1955 to the Cypriot Turkish
Independent Association in order to express their disapproval of ENOSIS, the
movement which was trying to annex Cyprus to Greece. Its current name was
adopted in 1960 when Cyprus declared its independence. CTA has been
trying to mobilise the Turkish community on ethnic and national lines. As
stated by the Chairman of CTA during an interview, the fundamental issues
they address are the education of the young generation and political
mobilisation of the Turkish community in London regardless of the
Turkey/Cyprus dichotomy regarding national problems such as Cyprus, the
Turkic world in Central Asia and the other Turkish minorities in Europe.
CTA claims to have more than one thousand members. Its membership and
clientele profile suggests that Turkish-Cypriots outnumber the mainland
Turks. The Chairman and the majority of the executive committee of the CTA
have always comprised mostly Turkish-Cypriots. Therefore, Cyprus is one of
the central interests that recurrently surfaces in its activities. As mentioned
earlier, since its establishment, CTA has organised numerous public meetings
to try to mobilise the Turkish community in London. The purpose of these
attempts has been to raise money to send to Cyprus. More importantly, CTA
has encouraged members of the Turkish community to send letters to MPs
and policy makers to influence British public opinion in favour of the
Turkish-Cypriot side. Until 1960, CTA attracted many clients from the
Turkish community and remained as a central association. With the increase
of Cypriot immigrants and their settlement in a wider area, new
organisations were set up. Nevertheless, while different Turkish/Cypriot
associations were established in London in the following years, CTA failed to
become an umbrella organisation. Following the ethnic clashes in 1974 in
Cyprus, many displaced Turkish-Cypriots came to London. This urged
community leaders to establish an umbrella organisation to unite the Turkish-
Cypriot community. Accordingly, the Federation of Cypriot-Turkish
Associations (FCTA) (Kibris Turk Dernekleri Federasyonu) was established as an
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umbrella organisation in 1982. CTA, because of its commitment to the unity
of Turkish organisations, has joined the FCTA.
During the early years of its formation, CTA was primarily concerned with
the education of the young generation and took an active part in establishing
evening and weekend classes in neighbourhoods with sizeable numbers of
Turkish residents. In these classes the official policy of CTA was to promote
Turkish language and culture. It seems that teaching the Turkish language to
children dominated the contents of classes. As argued by the Chairman of
CTA, the priority of the early immigrants was economic and therefore they
were preoccupied with earning money. He said:
'When people from Cyprus started to arrive here, they were obsessed
with making money and saving as much as possible in a short span
of time so that they can go back soon. With the passage of time they
brought their families and kept working, buying houses and opening
their own shops at the expense of youngsters. Only a handful of
them knew the value of education and the majority were not able to
realise that cultural identity of their children was weakening.
Children were even not able to learn their native language. These
considerations surrounding cultural identify of Turkish children who
were in danger of losing touch with parental values prompted us to
take the initiative and negotiate with the parties concerned'.
CTA's annual report in 1982 states that a fourteen-page report on the needs of
Turkish children was forwarded to the Lord Swann Committee on 19
December 1981, in which 'mother tongue education' was emphasised. CTA
rented its first premises in the mid-1960s and started educating Turkish
children in different locations as diverse as Newington Green, Turnpike and
Elephant and Castle. These premises were given Turkish names as a symbol
of cultural identity. For example, one of the premises used for language and
folklore teaching was called the Independent School, (Hurriyet Okulu)
denoting the importance of freedom in Cyprus, while another one in
Turnpike Lane was called Ataturk School (Ataturk Okulu) as a mark of respect
for the founder of modern Turkey (CTA Newsletter, 16-31 May 1968, no: 20).
In 1982, the number of students at CTA's language and culture classes
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reached almost 500 in 14 different locations. The main purpose of the
educational activity organised by CTA was to 'raise a consciousness in
Turkish children to say 'Ben Turkum' - I am a Turk' (p. 43). It is stated in the
same unpublished manuscript (p. 46) that if 'we do not teach Turkish culture,
customs and language to our children in this foreign society, one day they
will lose their Turkish Identity'.
Educational activities of CTA were overtaken by the Federation of Cypriot
Turkish Associations in the following years. CTA's understanding of cultural
identity centres around linguistic issues and national days that mark the
important events in the history of the Turkish/Cypriot nation. CTA argues
that language and history coloured by the common experiences of the nation
are integral parts of the Turkish identity; and the only way to preserve
Turkish identity in a culturally different social setting is to transmit these
values to the young generation. CTA's policy to acculturate Turkish children
does not include the religious domain. In its activities, CTA remains neutral
to the teaching of religion. It is worth mentioning here that Turkish/Cypriot
organisations developed a tactful strategy concerning religious matters in
order not to jeopardise Islamic sensitivity among the Turkish community.
In recent years, however, a. policy change from education to that of political
mobilisation has been observed. During my fieldwork, I participated in
several functions of the CTA and I observed that during the last couple of
years it began to place more emphasis on political issues concerning Turks
around the world in contrast to its formative period. The involvement of
minority communities in the politics of their home countries is well
documented. Goulboume (1991, p. 7) calls this phenomenon cliasporic politics,
that is, the commitment of migrants and their offspring to the politics of their
original homelands'. Whenever Cyprus was debated in the British media and
the Turkish side was blamed for the current situation in Cyprus, for example,
the executive committee of CTA tried to organise an event that attracted the
attention of a significant number of .mainland and Turkish-Cypriots. On one
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occasion Bulent Ecevit who had been Prime Minister of Turkey at the time of
Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, was invited to London in
1992 to give a series of lectures to an English and Turkish audience on the
Cyprus issue. The invitation of Ecevit by CTA was a major event It stirred up
nationalist feelings among Turkish and Greek-Cypriot communities and
renewed hostilities. Ecevit delivered talks in two places, the first one at the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, attended by a British
audience. The purpose of this talk was to influence the opinion of academics,
journalists and policy makers on the issue of Cyprus.
The second talk had a popular purpose of renewing allegiance to Cyprus and
reaffirming the commitment of Turkish-Cypriots in London. Ecevit's visit,
sponsored and organised by CTA, highlighted the role of ethnic organisations
in mobilising community members politically. This meeting not only
mobilised Turks for a political cause but it also mobilised the opposition side
as evidenced during the meeting at which Greek-Cypriots, joined by some
Kurds, had protested to Ecevit strongly. The police were called in case of a
possible clash since nationalist feelings on both sides had been aroused by the
event The profile of the participants once more reflected the ethnic
dimension of clientele patterns of the association. The majority of the
audience were of Cypriot origin and men in their mid-thirties suggesting that
women were either less interested in political matters or were discouraged by
the cultural orientation of the society which requires role differentiation
between genders.
CTA's functions are not confined to the Turkish community in London.
CTA's political standpoint is categorically emphasised as being to facilitate
unity among all Turks which transcends the British context Global politics
seem to be shaping the organisation's structure, particularly the recent
developments in Bulgaria, Greece and Central Asia where Turkic people are
either in the minority (Bulgaria and Greece) or in the majority (Azerbaijan,
Uzbekhistan and Kazakhistan). Ethnic conflicts have global effects on the
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development of ethnic organisations. The influence of global politics is
illustrated by several activities of CTA. In protest at the racist attacks in
Germany2, CTA organised a meeting in front of the German Embassy in
London and handed a protest letter condemning racial abuse and demanded
tougher sanctions against it The protest march was attended by many
sections of the Turkish community. It can be argued that violent attacks on
Turks elsewhere helped overcome divisions and united community members
in London towards a common cause.
A similar phenomenon of unity was observed after the violent racist attacks
on Turks in Germany. On 21st November 1992 in Molln, a house where a
Turkish family had resided since 1976, being their first accommodation since
their arrival in Germany, was set on fire by extremist gangs. Bahide Arslan (51),
Yeliz Arslan (10) and Ayse Yilmaz (14) lost their lives in the fire (Der Spiegel,
49/1992, p. 15). Bade (1994, p. 86-87) argues that the racist attacks on foreigners
in Germany 'is more than a simple hostility toward foreigners and outsiders. It is
a xenophobic violence originating from a lack of perspective, lack of orientation,
and social fear, as well as frustration and aggression'. According to Bade,
'hostility toward foreigners', 'xenophobia', 'right wing extremism' or 'youth
violence', are tied to the continued disorientation of the population towards
social problems relating to immigration and integration, since Germany denies
emphatically that it has become a country of immigration in a social or a cultural
sense. Yet, continuation of the violent attacks on Turks contributed to the
culmination of a sense of unity among the Turkish community. At the end of
May 1993 another Turkish family fell victim to a racist arson attack in Sollingen.
The reaction of the Turkish community to this violent attack was spontaneous.
Angered by frequent aggression directed at its members, the Turkish community
filled the streets of Sollingen and demanded protection and punishment of the
aggressors. In many parts of Germany where there are a significant number of
Turks, liberal and Islamically oriented Turkish organisations were united and
took unified action in protest at the violence. The tragic events in Moan and
Sollingen united the diverse sections of the Turkish community members, from
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secular to religious ones, around the same issue. The diversities and varieties of
political and religious orientation were overcome by the common concern about
the future of the Turkish community in Germany. As mentioned earlier such
concerns also caused united action in London.
8.3.2. Turkish Youth Association (TYA) (Turk Genclik Deruegi)
The Turkish Youth Association (TYA) (Turk Genclik Dernegi) was established
in 1981 to address various needs of Turkish/Cypriot youth in a multicultural
society. TYA is located in Green Lanes in north-east London, where there is a
large concentration of the Turkish community. TYA had employed six paid
workers and several volunteers at the time of this research. Apart from a
general director and a secretary, TYA's employment policy was based on its
targets and projects. At the time of my interview in 1994, I was told that one
HIV officer, one education officer, one drugs worker and one youth worker
were being employed by TYA. The duties of these officers inform us about
the nature of TYA's principle concerns regarding Turkish children. TYA's
main aim is to educate Turkish children and increase their level of academic
success and self-confidence by means of educational activities. Therefore,
TYA organises supplementary classes to overcome difficulties at school under
the scheme of 'Homework Club'. Parents are encouraged to send their
children to these classes. Young students are given advice on many aspects of
education, such as helping them with applications for grants and degree
courses available to them.
The presence of an HIV officer clearly indicates that TYA has a different
approach to sexuality among Turkish youth. TYA frequently organises
awareness meetings on HIV and health issues. At first, this seems to be
offensive to some Turkish-Muslims due to their religious viewpoints which
disapprove of premarital or extramarital sexual relationships. TYA also had
an officer dealing with drug use among youth who was in a close contact
with the local authority that funds_the projects. TYA's dependence on the
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funding made available to them seems to influence its policy when drawing
up projects. The effect of economic resources coincides with the position of
TYA in regard to multiculturalism and the place of Turkish culture within the
British context As one of the TYA officials explained during an interview,
'TYA does not teach Turkish language and culture because we (TYA) believe
that what other Turkish associations are doing by teaching Turkish language
and culture is not designed to achieve real success in a multicultural society.
What they are teaching is not compatible with the needs of children who
were born and brought up here'. As this statement explicitly informs, TYA is
more concerned with the day to day problems of Turkish children and it tries
to offer practical solutions to these problems, predominantly in the field of
education. While addressing the challenges stemming from being a minority
community, TYA tries to make use of the concept of multiculturalism and its
policy is directed to the incorporation of Turkish youth in the larger society.
Although TYA seems to avoid tackling the teaching of Turkish language and
culture • as the core issues, clients of the association influence the policies of
TYA. Parents, for example, still want their children to learn Turkish.
Responding to the demands of parents, TYA organises youth camps where
young children are also taught Turkish. This case exemplifies the effect of
clientele on the associations whose social base of recruitment is drawn from
the Turkish speaking community. The knowledge of funding regulations and
the focus of its projects enable this association to obtain financial support
from local authorities. As mentioned above, sources of funding sometimes
determine the functions of TYA. In one case, TYA had co-operated with the
Drug Advisory Unit based at St Ann's Hospital in Haringey to raise
awareness of drug related issues among the Turkish speaking community.
Seven part time Turkish speaking workers were employed for a period of six
months to work among the Turkish community to inform them about drugs
and advise them where to go whenever they need help (in this project, the
Drug Advisory Unit at St Ann's Hospital). An anthropologist and a drugs-
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training expert were involved in the project which was totally funded by the
local authority.
Like CTA, TYA is indifferent to religion. It does not organise any function in
any way related to religion. Neither does it repudiate religious values in
public. When asked why TYA does not organise any activity for the
propagation of Islam among the young Turkish generation one official at
TYA clearly expressed their position as follows:
'Religion is an obstacle for Turkish youth to become adjusted to the
British society. We endorse multiculturalism, therefore we do not
teach something that excludes others. We hear that some Turkish-
Cypriots are joining religious groups. There is a growing trend
among some Cypriots towards religion, especially some young
people are joining Sheikh Nazim's group'.
This explanation indicates that the policies of TYA are dedicated to the issues
of integration into and adjustment to British society. Religion is seen as an
obstacle to integration, because it creates a distinct identity which is not
desired by TYA which emphasises a British identity vis-à-vis Islamic identity.
8.3.3. Turkish Education Group (TEG) (Turk Egitim Birligi)
The Turkish Education Group (TEG) (Turk Egitim Birligi) also has similar
aspirations to those of TYA. Education and welfare services are the main
priorities of TEG as stated in its constitution:
'The Group is established to benefit the Turkish Community in the
Greater London area and in particular within the London Borough of
Islington and to promote the good race relations by the advancement
of all ages, relief of all aged persons, protection of health and the
provision of facilities in the interest of social welfare with the object of
improving the conditions of life of those Turkish people who have
need of such facilities by reason of their age, infirmity, disability,
poverty or social and economic circumstances' (TEG's Constitution).
TEG's activities cover a range of areas centred around educational and
welfare issues. Its membership is open to all Turkish speaking persons. TEG's
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social base of recruitment is also characterised by ethnic and national origin.
Turkish is the commonly used language at meetings, reflecting the origins of
its clients. TEG's financial resources are drawn mainly from grant giving
bodies such as local authority funds and foundations, and to a lesser extent,
from membership fees. TEG runs four main projects to realise its aspirations
as expounded in its constitution: the education project, the women's project,
the elderly project and culture, art and youth projects. These receive funding
from the local authority. As its annual report reveals, the primary concern of
TEG is to give advice on education, employment and welfare benefits to
immigrants and refugees, to support language classes, both Turkish and
English and organise courses on fine arts and traditional Turkish folk dance.
TEG also takes part in the political mobilisation of the Turkish speaking
community. For example, in October 1991, TEG organised a meeting in front
of the Home Office to support the separated immigrant families for their
unification. Although there are overlapping areas of interests and activities,
TEG's political mobilisation differs from that of CTA. TEG mobilises the
Turkish community on immigration policies, whereas CTA mobilises its
members on national issues such as Cyprus, Turks in Bulgaria and Greece. In
contrast to the nationalist stand of CTA, socialist tendencies and Third-World
concerns are expressed by TEG, through joining solidarity day functions with
other groups. Third-World identity is emphasised more than Turkish identity
in several functions of the group as exemplified in December 1991 when TEG
joined forces with the Cuban solidarity committee to organise a joint event
Cultural activities revolve around reviving a Third-Worldliness rather than
Turkishness. Two film nights in May and June 1992 highlighted the affinity
and proximity of TEG and its identification with the Third-World as
symbolised by films on guerrilla fightings in Eritrea, Ethiopia and in al-
Salvador.
However, TEG also organises short outings to enable the Turkish speaking
community to share experiences. As far as TEG is concerned, it endorses a
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mixture of identity construction among the Turkish community in London.
Its recent leaflets make reference to the 'Turkish speaking' community rather
than 'Turkish people'. The arrival of Turkish speaking Kurds and Alawite
people claming to have a different identity has influenced TEG, which has
changed its identity discourses to include Kurds and Alawites from Turkey.
The shift in the strategy of TEG as a Turkish association is also evidence of
outside influence on the politics of an organisation. The changing political
landscape in Turkey and identity politics among Kurdish and Alawite people
have had repercussions among the Turkish community in London. A distinct
identity claim of Kurds and Alawites has facilitated the fragmentation of an
already heterogeneous Turkish identity on ethnic lines in London. The
fragmentation and the expression of different identities illustrate the fact that
global developments can have diverse effects through communication, as
Beyer points out very succinctly:
'The globalization thesis posits, in he first instance, that social
communication links are world-wide and increasingly dense. On
perhaps the more obvious level, this means that people, cultures,
societies, and civilisations previously more or less isolated from one
another are now in regular and almost unavoidable contact. This
leads to a twofold result On the one hand, we see the conflicts that
arise as quite diverse and often contradictory cultures clash within
the same social unit. On the other hand, globalizing social-structural
and cultural forces furnish a common context that attenuates the
differences among these ways of life' (Beyer, 1994, p. 2).
When applied to TEG's case, this approach shows that while two multiple
identity claims might clash with each other in the home country, they may
also press for reconciliation in the British context As far as the activities,
ethnic origins of its members and clients are concerned, TEG has increasingly
widened its ethnic base to include anyone coming from Turkey or Cyprus.
Therefore its documents and statements refer to 'Turkish speaking
communities' rather than the 'Turkish community' as a single category.
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8.3.4. Waltham Forest Turkish Association (WFTA) (Waltham Forest Turk
Birligi)
As the Turkish minority community finds new settlement areas and ethnic
concentration reaches a significant degree, there seems to be a tendency
among community members to initiate new ethnic organisations to address
the needs of their members within that new surrounding. Within this context,
it can be argued that the emergence of the Turkish community, as a result of
settling in a new environment, leads to the establishment of ethnic
organisations to meet social, cultural, educational and religious needs of the
Turkish minority in London. The establishment of the Waltham Forest
Turkish Association (WFTA) (Waltham Forest Turk Birligi) is a typical case
which illustrates the developmental pattern of Turkish organisations in new
settlement areas. In the early 1980s the number of Turkish speaking people
started to increase in the Waltham Forest area. This increase has changed the
settlement pattern of the area in terms of ethnic population distribution. As
the Turkish speaking groups within the area reached over five thousand
(estimated by the community leaders), the creation of 'WFTA followed. It was
established mostly by Turkish-Cypriots in 1988 for charitable purposes
giving primary emphasis on the education of children. The constitution of
WFTA clearly indicates the ethnic characteristic of the organisation in its
stated objectives. It reads: '... in particular to benefit people of
Turkish/Cypriot origin and their families resident in the United Kingdom..'.
WFTA's membership is also drawn on ethnic lines as an annual report for
1991-1992 indicates. According to the report, VVFTA had 192 full members in
that year, of whom the overwhelming majority, 171, were Turkish/Cypriots.
It had only two members from the Caribbean community, four members of
Pakistani origin and the remaining members categorised by the association as
'white/ UK' .
It should be noted here that the number of registered members do not reflect
the real number of those who are involved in the services and activities of
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such organisations. Membership requires filling up application forms,
registration, payment of membership fees, voting in the committee elections
and in some cases providing references. This procedure is seen as a burden
for many people in addition to the fact that there is no tradition of registered
membership among the Turkish community. My observations lead me to
argue that the majority of the clients of the associations are not full members
which means that the volume and strength of an organisation should not be
measured by only looking at the registered members of that organisation.
The figures in the same animal report lend support to this argument The
report indicates that although VVFTA had only 192 full members, the users of
the services reached 633 within the same year an excess of 441 persons, two
times more than the actual number of registered members. As with
membership patterns on ethnic lines, the same pattern repeats itself with
regard to the background of clients. The annual report states that 612 of a
total 633 clients were Turkish/Cypriots. The remaining fifteen were
white/UK, two were Caribbeans and four were Pakistanis.
Although WFTA is involved in welfare activities such as giving advice on
immigration, housing, health and issues concerning women and the elderly,
its main emphasis is on a supplementary school project as education is seen
as a means of transmitting traditional values to the young generation and
strengthening their ethnic identity. WFTA's constitution describes this
commitment as 'to acquaint the children of our (Turkish) community with the
basic principles and values of our culture'. To realise this aim, WFTA opened
a weekend school. The purpose of opening such a supplementary school was
explained by one of its founders as follows:
'our children go to English schools and take classes on English
language, culture, history and geography. They are taught of nothing
about their background, their own language and culture. So they are
exposed to an education that is dominated by the values of the
English society. If we do not acquaint our children with our values,
one day, they may even forget where Turkey or Cyprus is, let alone
our language and cultural heritage. With these concerns in mind we
decided to set up this school to -teach our children Turkish language
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and culture so that their Turkish identity is not lost. We also wanted
to contribute our children's academic achievement in their education
by providing supplementary classes'.
This statement reflects a. widely shared view among Turkish parents that
education is the key to the transmission of traditional values to the young
generation and to countering the cultural exposure they come across in the
larger society by evoking a self-consciousness about Turkish identity vis-à-vis
'other's identity. Thus, the Waltham Forest Turkish School (WFTS) (Waltham
Forest Turk Okulu) was established in 1988 with an enrolment 30 Turkish
children. The number of students at WFTS, based at Stoneydown Park
Primary School, had reached 214 (96 boys and 98 girls) by 1993. The
continuous increase in the number of students at this Saturday-only school
indicates that parents are worried about the identity of their children. When
asked why she was taking her daughter to WFTS, mother of an eleven year-
old girl expressed her feelings as follows:
'Well, when my daughter was a baby I had no worry about her
because she was with me all the time and I thought that I could teach
her our language and family values. I was not aware the effects of TV
programs and play groups at the nursery. Quite later, I realised that
she inclined to speak English with me. It was easier for her to
communicate in English rather than Turkish because she was talking
to her friends in English and whatever she watched on TV was in
English as well. Then I began worrying that she would forget her
mother tongue and values attached to it. As soon as I found out that
WFTS was there to offer classes, though only on Saturdays, I decided
to bring her along'.
When asked what changes had taken place since she first brought her
daughter to the school, the mother replied: 'Now it has been three years that I
bring my daughter here. I feel that she is more confident than before in using
Turkish language. She gave up talking to us in English at home. She is also
developing an interest in Turkish folklore which is a very good thing that she
enjoys our culture. And also she is making more and more Turkish friends to
socialise'. A fourteen year-old teenage boy who was taking supplementary
classes admitted that the school environment and classes on Turkish history
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and culture enabled him to discover his own identity. When asked what kept
him coming to VVFTS, he said:
'When my parents asked me to come here at the weekends, I felt that
this would be a great burden on me while seeing other kids playing.
But I needed some help in my mathematics classes and there was
supplementary classes at this school. So, I started coming here with
the hope of getting some help. School administrators and teachers
showed a close interest and enthusiasm by listening to our needs and
problems. There I saw other Turkish youth learning to play
baglama/ saz (a traditional Turkish musical instrument) and to
perform folk dance which until then I have never seen in my other
school. For the first time I took interest in learning to play this
musical instrument. While getting help in mathematics I improved
my poor Turkish and learned few Turkish songs. Now I am happy
that I know more about Turkish culture, before that I did not know
much about Turkish traditions when asked by my non-Turkish
friends'.
The same student expressed aspirations to learn more about Turkish music
and folklore in Turkey and to teach them to Turkish youth here in London.
He was also seriously considering doing a degree on a similar topic. These
cases illustrate that the transmission of traditional values and symbols such
as language, music and other specific components of cultural heritage can
evoke a sense of identity and spark a feeling towards discovering one's own
background and ethnic differences. The transmission of Turkish culture and
tradition to the younger generation through education is thought to be an
effective way of countering the loss of identity among Turkish youth.
Research findings suggest that those who attended the weekend schools can
speak better Turkish and do know more about Turkish culture than those
who did not show any interest in taking such classes. The self-understanding
of the first group seems to be much clearer than in the second group, as the
first group is more able to locate their place by exhibiting a sense of
belonging to the Turkish community, whereas the second group seems to
have ambiguities in their sense of belonging.
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8.3.5. The Halkevi
The case of the Halkevi, and its transformation in terms of ideology,
membership and activities during the course of its development is a good
illustration of the extent to which political changes in the country of origin
can influence the immigrant associations. The Halkevi literally means 'House
of People' or 'Home of the People' denoting a social function where people
are supposed to socialise and discuss community issues thereby
strengthening ethnic ties and developing social networks among the
community members. The Halkevi was founded in 1984 as a Turkish
community centre in Stoke Newington, Hackney.
The name of the organisation 'Halkevi' was taken from a. very well known
network of associations established by Ataturk, the founder of modern
Turkey, during the early years of the republican era, to disseminate ideals of
westernisation by using these associations as centres of education and
proselytising. From its inception the HalkeVi in London adopted a similar
ideological standpoint towards western civilisation. Ataturk's strong
nationalism inspired the founders of the Halkevi in London to readily express
their ethnic and national pride by displaying the name of the organisation
'Turkish Cultural Association' with a large and visible board on the facade of
its large premises. As reported by the informants, the members and clients of
the Hallcevi Turks during the early years of its establishment were
predominantly mainland. This pattern may be attributed to the fact that
Turkish-Cypriots were mostly using their own associations and also because
there were not as many Kurdish refugees then as there are today. The Hallcevi
has received almost all its financial support from Hackney Council and
provided Turkish speakers with advice on health, education, social benefits.
It has also offered classes on Turkish culture and language to strengthen
Turkish identity among the Turkish youth. As informers pointed out, during
the early years of the organisation, the Halkevi was not overwhelmed by
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political concerns. Rather it was predominantly involved in welfare activities
and cultural functions.
As the ethnic pattern of immigrants coming from Turkey has changed and
claims to different national identity on the part of Turkish speaking Kurdish
people are being more frequently spelled out, the Halkevi has undergone
several transformations. An increase in the number of Turkish speaking
Kurdish immigrants forced existing patterns of organisations to change in
order to accommodate these new corners. Politically conscious Turkish
speaking Kurds slowly took over the administration in the early 1990s. This
change was promptly reflected in the ideological preferences of the
organisation. First, the name of the organisation at the entrance to its
premises was slightly altered from Turkish Cultural Association to that of
Turkish-Kurdish Cultural Association. As reflected in the new name of the
Halkevi, Ataturk's strong Turkish nationalism lost its significance and
importance for the administrators.
During subsequent years, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism within the
ideological framework of the Halkevi and its involvement in the political
problems of Turkey alienated most of the Turks from the organisation,
paving the way for a change of client patterns and membership structure.
While many Turks distanced themselves from the Halkevi, the politics of
Kurdish nationalism achieved a forum and used the facilities available at the
Halkevi. The Halkevi introduced Kurdish language classes along with Turkish
as a result of an increase in the number of its Kurdish members.
The most provocative activity to alienate Turks, as far as its nationalist
politics is concerned, was the invitation of an ardent Kurdish nationalist,
Leyla aria, as a speaker at a meeting held at the Halkevi in 1993. Z,ana, at the
time of her visit to London, was a. Member of Parliament in the Turkish
Grand National Assembly representing the city of Diyarbakir in south-east
Turkey, where the majority of the population are of Kurdish origin. During
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her speech, she accused the Turkish Government of stripping the cultural
rights of the Kurdish people in Turkey. She condemned the political strategy
of Turkey in its east and south-eastern regions. Her main arguments were
centred around the distinctiveness of Kurdish identity from that of the Turks
in language and customs. Paradoxically, she delivered her speech in Turkish,
which some of the audience found confusing. Zana's remarks seem to have
caused disappointment among many Turks who used to go to the Halkevi and
socialise with Kurds from Turkey.
One informant gave a typical reply when asked about his opinion of her
speech. He said: 'I can not understand why these people are trying to divide
Turks and Kurds. We need each other here in a foreign country more than
anybody else. I do not support these kinds of activities at the Halkevf
Another one recalled the above-mentioned conflict between a distinctive
identity claim and the use of Turkish instead of Kurdish by saying: 'Look!
Which language she is using. She delivered her speech in Turkish not even in
Kurdish. Isn't that falsification of her claim that Turks and Kurds are
completely different? I believe that if we (Turks and Kurds) are left alone on
our own and not provoked by the politicians we would prove how
peacefully we can live together'. An informant of Kurdish origin also
disagreed with Zana's argument about the characters of these two groups. He
underlined one important issue which according to him Zana seemed to have
overlooked. When asked what she had overlooked, he replied: 'Well, there
are numerous common values between Turks and Kurds that they have been
sharing for centuries. First of all both Turks and Kurds are Muslims. I believe
that our shared belief, Islam, left an important mark on both Turkish and
Kurdish identity. Secondly we shared the same geographical locations as
towns and villages. Moreover, there have been and still are intermarriages
between Turks and Kurds both in Turkey and in London. So, I regard myself
as a member of the whole society rather than of single unity. This is not a
denial of being Kurdish'.
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As reflected by these informants, political engagements of the Hallcevi played
a destructive role with respect to the ethnic integration of Turks and Kurds
from Turkey. Symbols such as flags and posters supportive of a Kurdish
armed separatist terrorist group known as PKK (Kurdish Workers Party)
which were displayed during the politically charged meetings at the Halkevi
discouraged many Turks from going there again. Transformation of the
Hallcevi, as a consequence of pressures by the changing nature of immigrant
community, first from a Turkish Cultural Association to a Turkish-Kurdish
Cultural Association, and then to a Kurdish nationalist association as
evidenced by its interest in and focus on Kurdish politics, illustrates the
effects of general political developments in the country of origin. The
increasing influence of politics at home seems to dominate the agenda of
some Turkish and Kurdish organisations. Goulbourne's (1991, p.126469)
analysis of the political behaviour of the Sikh community in Britain supports
the foregoing argument about the influence of diasporic politics on minority
communities in Britain. Goulboume shows that Sikhs in Britain were
concerned with political developments in their 'homeland s . The Khalistan
movement which is demanding an independent state in the northern Indian
state of the Punjab, for example, has received support from the Sikh
community in Britain. These developments indicate -thatl politics in the
country of origin are still important for some ethnic groups in the diaspora.
8.3.6 Other Organisations
So far, I have analysed the data on five main Turkish/Cypriot associations.
However, the Hallcevi can no longer be defined as a Turkish association, as
many Turks claim that this organisation has become a solely Kurdish
organisation with strong pro-Kurdish nationalistic views which exacerbate
ethnic division between Turks and Kurds. Despite its current status however,
it is still relevant to include the Halkevi in the analysis of the role of Turkish
organisations in identity politics since this group was established by Turks,
and over time, transformed into _a Kurdish organisation with a larger
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clientele. These five organisations, CTA, TEG, TYA, WFTA and the Halkevi,
are representative organisations in terms of their establishment, clientele,
membership, policies and activities. As it is clear from the foregoing
discussions culture, identity, education and identity politics are the main
concerns of these organisations. The other organisations which are recognised
with less degree of significance within the Turkish/Cypriot community are:
the Turkish Cypriot Cultural Association (TCCA) (Kibris Turk Kultur Dernegi)
established in 1977; the Cypriot Community Association (CCA) (Kibris Turk
To plum Dernegi) established in 1976; and the Mustafa Kemal Association of
London (MKAL) (Londra Mustafa Kemal Dernegi) established in 19923 . All of
these address a range of issues related to the Turkish community. Among
these issues the welfare of the community, education of children,
preservation of Turkish culture and identity are the prominent concerns.
CCA, for example is concerned with the transmission of Turkish culture to
the young generation. Therefore it organises seminars and lectures on
Turkish language and culture. Youth groups are targeted by CCA through
sports projects. As one worker explained: 'Turkish-Cypriot youth is on the
verge of losing its identity and self-confidence. What we are hoping by
organising sports projects is to enable them to come together and develop a
sense of closer affinity with fellow youth. We also believe that these kinds of
projects will strengthen their sense of confidence and assertiveness of their
Turkish identity'.
One can see from the above statement that the reconstruction of Turkish-
Cypriot identity among youth groups is supported by CCA. The Mustafa
Kemal Association of London (MKAL), on the other hand, is trying to lobby
interested parties to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) (Kuzey Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti) as an independent state. Its activities
are marked by patrio-tic ideology centred around evoking feelings of
solidarity among the Turkish community. Through enlarging the political
concerns from a national and ethnic line to that of the international arena by
identifying the Turkish community-with the Muslim World, MKAL is also
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campaigning for the protection of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya and Western
Thrace where atrocities are constantly being committed.
This Chapter would be incomplete if we did not mention the
institutionalisation of women's issues among the Turkish community in
London. The foundation of the Union of Turkish Women in Britain (U'TVVB)
(Ingiltere Turk Kadinlar Birligi) goes as far back as 1974. Since its establishment,
UTVVB has dedicated itself to family matters and women issues especially
supporting women with family problems. One worker at urws explained
the main problems facing Turkish women in a new cultural atmosphere
where the lack of language is rampant She informed that
'...many of our clients seem to experience the effects of immigration.
First of all they came to a society where they have virtually no
contacts except a few kin, if they are lucky enough to have some
relatives here. Many of the Turkish women feel lonely and are
discouraged to go out on their own. In addition to that, language
problems and lack of communication are adding more stress on
women's life, making them totally dependent on husbands or on •
their children who can speak English'.
Services available at UTWB are illustrative of the problems Turkish women
face in London. UTVVB offers English language classes to reduce the effects of
lack of communication and organises seminars on childcare, and health issues
concerning women. Social and cultural activities are also organised to enable
women to form a social network and solidarity along ethnic lines. One
specific area that U'TVVB is concerned with is domestic violence and
matrimonial problems in Turkish families. One worker mentioned that
'UTWB is trying to keep the family together when a family problem arises
between the couples. We encourage women to be more assertive and open to
their partners'. One can argue that this kind of constructive approach can
increase women 's self-confidence and they would become more resistant to
immigration pressures. Two other women's organisations function in a
similar way. Haringey Cypriot Turkish Women's Project (Haringey Kibrisli
Turk Kadinlar Projesi) and Islington Turkish Women's Association (Islington
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Turk Kadinlar Dernegi) provide more or less the same services and receive
funding from the Local Council. The client patterns of these three Turkish
women's organisations have similarities. As explained in Chapter Three,
ethnographic data on women's organisations and interviews were
problematic due to the nature of the Turkish/Cypriot community. Being
male, I would say, prevented me from reaching a wider and more
representative group of women informants. Nevertheless, the data on this
organisation reveals a common pattern on issues concerning the
institutionalisation of women issues among the Turkish community in
London.
In sum, Turkish/Cypriot organisations in London appear to be important
social, cultural and educational centres with different emphasis on the politics
of identity among the Turkish community. Ethnographic data presented in
this Chapter indicate that Turkish/Cypriot organisations are not only diverse
in terms of their orientation, clientele and politics but also dynamic because
they are open to change to adapt to new situations and address new
challenges.
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Chapter Eight: Notes
1. For the historical development, the scope of participation and activities of Turkish
voluntary organisations in Sweden, see Ingrid Lundberg & Ingvar Svanberg (1991)
Turkish Associations in Metropolitan Stockholm, Uppsala Multiethnic papers 23, Centre
for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University.
2. With the unification of two Germanys, The Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic a new phase started in gastarbeiter phenomenon with a
renewed significance. Since the demolition of Berlin Wall in 1989, thousands of people
from the Past entered the West This flood into the West German labour market is said to
have posed a threat to the 'already fragile position of the Turks and other non-German
migrants in Germany' (Kudat, 1993, p. 153). The process of unification has also a
weakening effect on the position of foreigners and heightens their feelings of insecurity
(Ashkenasi, 1990, p. 314). As Bade (1994, p. 85) points out, after unification in 1990,
growing fear of foreigners regarding aggressive xenophobia and violence was
heightened. First in the Pastern and then in the Western parts of the Germany, foreigners
were attacked in the streets with racist slogans such as 'foreigners out' and 'Germany for
Germans'. Skrypietz (1994, p. 133) notes for example that 49 people lost their lives in
racist attacks between 21 October 1990 and 25 May 1993. During the initial tide of violent
attacks primarily asylum seekers were victimised. It is noted that 2,600 violent criminal
offences in 1992 alone were reported as having been racially motivated (Baringhorst,
1995, p. 225). Since 1992 such kind of attacks have increasingly aimed at the largest
group of foreigners living in Germany; the Turks. The Turks became the primary targets
for racist attacks as 'the skinhead 'culture' praises the ruthless mercenary who polices
the streets to make them iturkenfrei' (free of Turkish people) as the true German hero'
(Skrypietz, 1994, p. 139). The extent of racism which developed a turkenfrei Germany
discourse evidently confirms Wallersetin's observation on the nature of racism and
xenophobia in the capitalist world economy. Wallerstein (1991a, p. 32-33) argues that
racism is not simply a matter of having an attitude of dislike for other groups on the
basis of physical or cultural criteria. Racism is more than that and it seems that modern
world is reproducing its old practice of ejecting the 'barbarians' from the physical centre
of the society. The old practice aimed at cleaning the 'others' and purifying the
environment
3. A short note on a different organisation which was established by Turks would be
timely, though it was marginalised by the Marxist ideology it espouses and by its
disinterest in cultural affairs and identity discourse within the Turkish community in
London. Union of Turkish Workers in Britain (UT'WB) (Ingiltere Turk Isci Birligi) was
established in 1979 by a group of Turkish workers in response to growing problems
the Turkish workers. The main activity of the UTBW centred around giving advice
to employees and offering interpretation to both Turks and Kurds. Leaflets
distributed by U'TWB reveals the strong affiliation of the organisation to a leftist
ideology. There is a very discernible political tone in the language they use and
Marxist influence on the ideology of UTWB that draws a boundary vis- -via non-
Marxist Turkish workers. The UTWB's ideological paradigm derived from what is
called in Turkish 'asiri sol' (far left) distances Turkish workers with right-wing
ideological tendencies from UTWB. This apparently leads us to a conclusion that
institutionalised form of Turkish work-force is far from being completed.
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Chapter Nine
Religion Among Turks In London
This Chapter examines the development of institutionalisation of religion
among Turks in London. In the light of three case studies, the role of Islamic
organisations in the construction of a shared identity will be analysed. The
rationale behind the analysis of institutionalised Islam is the contention that
religion influences the formation/maintenance of ethnic identity. This
contention is also held by Yinger (1994, p. 255) who argues that 'there is a
close and natural affinity between religion and ethnicity. This affinity is
strongest where the sense of a primordial attachment to an ancestral group
and its traditions is most deeply felt.. Almost nowhere, however, can an
ethnic order be described and analysed without reference to a religious
factor'. Parks's (1994, p. 153) approach which notes that 'religious and ethnic
identities are usually closely intertwined, and often cannot be readily
separated from the other' echoes a similar view. The equation between being a
Turk and being a Muslim has been a landmark of the Turkish identity. As Lewis
(1961, p. 418) observes, Islamic values are deeply rooted in Turkish society. He
points out that despite the striking changes the Turkish society has faced, Islamic
imprint on the fabric of society still remains alive:
'Islam has profound roots among Turkish society. From its foundation to
until its fall, the Ottoman Empire was a state dedicated to the
advancement or defence of the power and faith of Islam. Turkish
thought, life and letters were permeated through and through by the
inherited traditions of the classical Muslim cultures, which, though
transmuted into something new and distinctive, remained basically and
unshakeably Islamic. After a century of Westemisation, Turkey has gone
under immense changes greater than any outside observer had thought
possible. But the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture are still
alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still
unchallenged' (Lewis, 1961, p. 418).
These observations indicate the strong influence of Islamic values on the identity
of the Turks. The embed dedness of Islam among Turkish society is self-
evident White (1994, p. 37) points out that 99 per cent of Turks are Muslims
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and to varying degrees they try to practice the prescribed rituals such as daily
prayers and fasting in Ramazan (the month of fasting). She also notes that
moral values are vigorously upheld within the patriarchal structures of
traditional Turkish families. As will be seen below, in the analysis of Islamic
organisations among Turks in London, religious and political developments
in the country of origin still influence Islamic movements abroad (see also
Chapter Ten). Therefore, before moving on to the institutionalisation of
religious values and their effects on the formation and maintenance of
Turkish ethnicity and identity, I would like to give some background
information about religion in Turkey. Without such information, it would be
difficult to understand the ideological diversity among Islamic organisations,
among Turks in Europe in general and in London in particular.
9.1. Religion in Turkey
Political, social and religious developments in modem Turkey were marked by
the ideals of modernism and secularism. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first
President of modem Turkey, introduced sweeping changes in Turkish society,
inspired by the principles of modernisation. Aiaturk's main aim in the process of
modernisation during the early years of the Turkish Republic was to change the
basic structure of Turkish society (Toprak, 1981, p. 39) and to redefine the
political community by trying to draw society from an Islamic framework into
that of national belonging as a newly defined 'Turkish nation' (Eisenstadt, 1984,
p. 9). In order to achieve this target, as Mardin (1981, p. 217) notes, Ataturk
launched a movement of cultural westernisation in order to provide the Turkish
nation with a new view of the world that would replace religious worldview and
culture. Separation of religion and politics was seen as a prerequisite step to
opening the doors to western values. Therefore, secularism was adopted as one
of the foundation stones and central tenets of Ataturk's program because it was
thought to be an indispensable necessity to accomplish this modernisation
(Welker, 1981, p. 105; Akural, 1984, p. 126)1.
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As a part of this secularisation policy, a major westernisation campaign was
launched against the institutional and cultural basis of religion in society to
disestablish Islam as the state religion, and to prepare the climate for the
introduction of secularism in the Turkish constitution (Turan, 1991, p. 34). It is
argued that (Mardin, 1988, p. 142) secularisation refouns which were undertaken
during the first decade of the new republic, founded in 1923, aimed at
minimising the role of religion in every walk of Turkish society. Moreover, the
motive behind the secularisation program was to reduce the societal significance
of religious values and eventually to disestablish cultural and political
institutions stamped by Islam.
This program was implemented in a four-phased programme. The phases are
symbolic secularisation, institutional secularisation, functional secularisation and
legal secularisation. Symbolic secularisation involved enforced changes in
various aspects of national culture or societal life which had a symbolic
identification with Islam (Toprak, 1981, p. 40-1). This phase of secularisation was
designed to transform the connotation of a set of symbols, perceived as sacred by
the masses, to the profane, to disestablish Islam as a source of symbolic
identification. The most significant secularisation reform in the symbolic sphere
took place in 1928 which resulted in changing the alphabet from the Arabic script
to that of Latin (Lewis, 1984, p. 195; Lewis, 1961, p. 398). The new regime
regarded language as one of the communicative means with history, culture and
the sacred scripture. Therefore, the Kemalist regime sought to break the
continuity of the Ottoman-Islamic heritage in Turkish society. The acceptance of
the western hat and western styles of clothing in 1925; the adoption of the
Gregorian calendar in the same year; the introduction of Western music in
schools and the change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday in 1935
(Akural, 1984, p. 127; Toprak, 1981, p. 45) were also meant to facilitate symbolic
secularisation in Turkey.
Institutional secularisation, on the other hand, was designed to reduce the
institutional strength of Islam and its influential role in the political affairs of the
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country (Toprak, 1981 ,p. 46). The first step in 1924, was to abolish the Caliphate,
to start a transformation from Ummet (Umma, Community of believers) a to
national entity which was meant to eradicate religion as a common bond of
solidarity. With the abolition of the Caliphate, the principles of political
legitimacy were changed as to exclude Islam as a source of legitimacy and
political loyalty to the state (Mardin, 1981, P. 210). The abolition of the office of
Seyhu'l Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations was
put into effect in 1924. The basic goal of the Kemalist elite, Heper (1981, p. 350)
notes, was 'to completely free the polity from religious considerations. Islam was
not supposed to have even the function of 'civil religion' for the Turkish polity;
Islam was not going to provide a transcendent goal for political life'. Institutional
secularisation continued in the ensuing years. The Sufi movements
(Tarikatlar/ Tasavvufi harelcetler) and their activities were outlawed in 1925. The
Tekkes and Zaviyes of widespread Sufi movements such as the Mawlarvi (Me-vlevi),
the Bektashi, the Nakshbandi and the Kadiriye were closed.
Functional secularisation was the third stage of the four-phased secularisation
programme in Turkey. Functional secularisation was carried out in two stages
(Toprak, 1981, p. 48) of which, the secularisation of the court system through the
adoption of western codes was the first step by because the Seriat law (Sharia)
was regarded as an obstacle to the westernisation programme. The main purpose
of the pro-westernisation elite in implementing such a strategy was to reduce the
functional influence of Islam in the community. The second stage of functional
secularisation was carried out in the educational system in order to implement a
program of functional differentiation of institutions, primarily of Medreses
(Madrasas). With the introduction of the law for the unification of instruction
(Tevhid-i Tedrisat) in 1924, all educational establishments, came under the strict
control of the state (Winter, 1984, p. 186).
Legal secularisation, on the other hand, was designed to firmly establish
modernisation reform in Turkish society. Legal secularisation was accomplished
by the adoption of a new civil code based on a Swiss cantonal code in 1926 as a
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replacement of Seriat (Shariah) law. Modernisation and secularisation reforms
were also implemented by Ataturk's successors during the one-party period and
as Arkourt (1984, p. 97) argues, these reforms 'introduced a certain mobility into
political, institutional and cultural life, but at the cost of a serious break with
Islamic heritage'.
9.2 Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey
The transition to multi-party politics in the late 1940s was a turning point in
relaxing the official attitude towards religion. The multi-party period ended the
implementation of 'militant secularism (Ahraad, 1991, p. 10). The first election in
1950, after the transition to the multi-party system was won by the Democratic
Party (DP) (Demolcrat Path). This underlined the centrality of Islam in Turkish
society and its potential force in shaping the political behaviour of the
community. Turan (1991, p. 45) attributes DP's election victory in 1950 to the
tolerant attitude of the party officials towards religion and to the response of the
party to the pragmatic needs of the population including those in the religious
domain. In the first multi-party general election, religious groups sought to
influence parties by giving support to them. Of these, a well known example of
alliance between the political leadership and a religious group is the Nurcu
movement and its support of DP in the interest of Islam (Ahraad, 1991, p.11;
Landau, 1981, p. 375).
The emergence of political ideologies inspired by the religiously oriented world-
view began to enter the public domain towards the end of the 1960s.
Nevertheless, the accommodation of religiously-based political ideologies was
against the ideals of modernisation and secularisation. Therefore the politics and
expression of Islam through a political language have always been a source of
tension and controversy. The case of the Welfare Party (RP) (Refah Partisi), in
contemporary Turkey is a prominent example of the fact that religion has been
one of the oft-observed elements of political life and culture. RP has its origins in
The National Salvation Party (MSP) (Milli Selamet Partisi) whose origins lie in The
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National Order Party (MN-P) (Milli Nizam Paths"). MNP was founded in 1970
and, following a military intervention, it was closed down in 1971 by the
Constitutional Court (Mardin, 1988, P. 145) on the grounds that the party was
using religion for political purposes and was therefore violating fundamental
provisions of the constitution concerning secularism. But another party, under
the MSP banner with the same political ideology emerged before the 1973
election, led by Necraeddin Erbakan. MSP was the direct descendant of the
former MEW and its political philosophy was identical with that of MNP.
According to the results of the 1973 general election, MSP had acquired a key role
to form a government, because none of the parties had gained a sufficient
majority to establish the government on its own. Neither the right nor the left-
wing parties were able to form a government without the support of MSP. The
MSP was once more dissolved by the military regime that came to power in 1980.
Along with other parties, all political activities of the MSP were outlawed and its
leader was banned from involvement in politics. Until its closure in 1980, MSP
played an important role in Turkish politics as a coalition partner. MSP's
contribution to the political development of Turkey ranged from ideological
principles of the party programme to the implementation of its policies while it
was a coalition partner in the government
MSP's political stand was expressed in a formula, named as National Vision
(Milli Gorus) that was claimed to be rooted in religious, moral and traditional
values of the Turkish society. One of the principle tenets of the party was its
opposition to the dissemination of Western materialist ideas which were thought
to shake the fabric of society in terms of religious, moral and family life of the
nation. As soon as the political ban, imposed by the military regime in 1980, was
lifted by a referendum, Necmeddin Erbakan turned to politics. He assumed the
leadership of the Welfare Party (RP) (Refah Partisi) and entered the elections in
1987, but RP could not achieve parliamentary representation. RP had to wait
until the 1991 general elections to achieve representation in parliament
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The issues referred to as revivalist Islam, resurgent Islam and fundamentalist
Islam drew the attention of politicians, journalists and scholars to the global
phenomenon of rising Islamic awareness. A plethora of semi-scholarly and
scholarly literature was produced to examine different aspects of Islamic
revivalism and movements of return to religious values. Especially after the
Iranian revolution in 1979, numerous publications appeared with differing
approaches to understand and explain the nature of the Islamic resurgence in
Muslim societies (Kucukcan, 1991, p. 71-74). Along with many other Muslim
societies, Turkey had also witnessed the revival of religious values among
different segments of the society. The westernised elite in Muslim countries seem
to have failed to establish a viable economic and political system during their
long stay in power after the establishment of independent nation-states.
Moreover, they were not very successful in providing workable solutions to the
depressing problems prevalent in Muslim societies such as poverty,
unemployment, education and equal political participation. In the grip of these
unresolved problems, Muslim intellectuals began to question the value and
viability of regimes in their countries. Islamic movements appealed to a large
segment of society arguing that the Western-inspired regimes had all failed to
produce and sustain a just process of development Muslim intellectuals also
promoted the idea of seeking alternative sources of development and progress in
the social, economic and political construction of Muslim societies. This meant a
return to the Islamic idioms and root-paradigms, and to rediscover the Islamic
ideology as a world-view rooted in anic paradigms in the face of modern
developments'.
As mentioned earlier, Islamic values are deeply rooted in Turkish society and
despite the striking socio-political changes as a result of modernisation and
secularisation, the Islamic imprint on the fabric of society still remains alive. The
revival of Islam in Turkey gathered momentum after the 1980s. Heper (1981, p.
361) attributes the revival of Islamic values to the failure of the Kemalist effort to
replace religion with totally modern secular values. He argues that Kemalism
could not perform the metaphysical function of a religion. It could not provide a
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system of beliefs and practices which would enable people to struggle with the
ultimate problems of life. Kemalism failed in its approach to religion because, as
Mardin (1981, p. 128; 1989, p. 229-30) observes, it undermined the role of Islam
for Turks in the building of identity. Ataturk's intention to make religion purely
a private concern in an individual's life has not been materialised because the
boundaries of private daily life have assumed a wider profile in Turkish society.
While private daily life increasingly gained new variety and richness, religion
acquired a more effective role and a. central focus in societal life. Private religious
education, development of Islamic fashion and dress, production of religious
music, publication of Islamic journals as aspect of the privatisation wave, gave
Islam a new up-lift by making it pervasive in modern Turkish society. The
spread of universal education in Turkey and rapid developments in
communication technology in everyday life, transformed the message of the Sufi
Orders into mass religious movements which can be described as faith
movement, with new distinctive characteristics from that of local and
particularistic beliefs. These developments have also resisted the forces that
attempted to make religion a private mat-tr. Social changes such as migration
from rural to urban to settlement areas, rapid demographic change, multi-party
politics, economic and industrial developments that Turkish society had
experienced within the last three or four decades, have all affected the revival of
Islam in Turkey in varying degrees.
9.3. Recent Developments in Islamic Politics and their Possible Impacts on the
Turkish Community
The general elections on 24 December 1995 were closely monitored by many
Turks in Europe. The political developments soon after the elections and the
efforts of the Welfare Party (RP) to form a government preoccupied the Turkish
community regardless of their political preference and the degree of religiosity.
As the foundation of the Turkish Republic RP, as an Islamist party, had for the
first time claimed a majority. This development caused concern on the part of
secularists but conversely joy on the part of Islamists. The rise of RP meant that
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political Islam managed to receive large popular support (see Table 9.1. which
shows the electorate support for various political parties between 1987 and 1995
in Turkey).
Table 9.1: Parliamentary Elections and the Rise of Welfare Party in Turkey
1987 1991 1995
Islamist party % seats % seats seats
Welfare Party 7.2 — 16.9 62 21.3 168
Centre-Right
True Path Party 19.1 59 27.0 178 19.1 135
Motherland Party 36.3 292 24.0 115 19.6 132
Centre-Left
Democratic L. P. 8.5 — 10.8 7 14.6 76
S. D. P. P. 24.8 99 20.8 88
Republican P. P. — 10.7 49
This table shows that RP has steadily increased its votes during the last three
general elections. Since there was a national threshold of ten per cent in the 1987
elections, RP could not win any seats despite its 7.2 per cent share in the results.
In order to avoid such a result in the 1991 elections, the RP leadership negotiated
with the Nationalist Action Party (MIIP) (Millitetci Harelcet Partisi) who also
sought an electoral partner to beat the ten per cent threshold. As soon as the
elections were over, in which both parties managed to enter parliament, an
electoral coalition ceased and RP assumed its particular stance in Turkish politics.
Table 9.1. also shows that RP had 168 seats in 1995 and was the largest party.
After an initial failure to form a coalition government.;. RP eventually succeeded
in becoming the bigger partner of the government in June 1996, following the fall
of Motherland Party - True Path Party coalition. Necmeddin Erbakan, as an
Islamist politician, became the new Prime Minister of Turkey. RP's achievement
was attributed to its integration into the political culture of Turkey; its respect for
the republican principles and the legal systems as well as its advocacy of the
market economy (Rouleau, 1996, p. 76). The rise of RP or political Islam in
Turkey can not be understood by referring to RP's respect for democratic values
249
and acceptance of the market economy. The Islamic revival or 'return of Islam' is
a much more complex phenomenon which involves social, economic and
political developments in the past and increasingly in the present Islamic
movements and Muslim politics do not have a monolithic nature. Therefore
Islamic revival should be viewed within the context of a current global revival of
religion which is not peculiar to the Muslim world'.
One of the interesting aspects of the last elections and subsequent developments,
in relation to this thesis, is the expected impact on the Turks abroad as RP
categorically claimed to follow a determined policy to negotiate for the protection
of their rights. As it will be documented in more detail in Chapter Ten, RP has a
close connection with and control of National Vision, a grass-root religio-political
organisation in Europe. This connection once more became sell-evident in the last
general elections. The Director-General of National Vision, Osman
Yumakog-ullari, was elected as MP on RP's ballot The second person in the
leadership hierarchy of National Vision, Ali Yuksel, was also a candidate on RP's
list Nevertheless, he was not as successful as Y-umakog-ullari, yet he succeeded
him and was elected as the Director-General of National Vision in its 1996 annual
meeting at which the ex-Director-General attended as an honorary guest The
1995 general elections in Turkey have also produced new alliances with potential
implications for the Turkish Muslim communities in Europe. The establishment
of such an alliance has escaped the attention of observers.
I would like to conclude this analysis of religious and political developments in
Turkey with several suggestions on how such an alliance may influence Turkish-
Islamic organisations in Europe in general and in London in particular. As I will
argue later, almost all Turkish organisations, whether they are of a religious,
secular or political nature or be it independent self-sufficient, off-shoot or state
sponsored, compete over economic and human resources. As far as these
organisations are concerned, it appears that rivalry, competition and conflict
rather than negotiation and co-operation are prevalent features of their politics.
Such a state of affairs was inherited from the conflicts in Turkey and reproduced
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in Europe. In the midst of conflicting political interests, however, RP negotiated
successfully with the Suleymanci leadership in Turkey before the elections and
persuaded them In support RP, at least partly. In return, the Suleymanci group,
which is one of the most influential religious movements among Turks in
Europe, was offered a secure seat at the elections in Antalya. At these elections, a
well known figure from the Suleymanci group was put at the head of RP's list
and entered parliament with other MPs of RP with whom the Suleymanci group
had never previously politically affiliated. Moreover, both groups were in subtle
rivalry, if not in animosity, to attract clients both in Turkey and in the European
countries with a sizeable Turkish community. I argue that the religious coalition
between RP and the Suleymanci group will have some implications for the
Turkish communities in Europe.
I suggest that there might be two principal effects of this religious coalition First
of all, the Suleymarici group will enjoy more protection from the political
establishment in Turkey, under the premiership of RP leadership. In return, RP
will continue to receive political support from a large and effective religious
group. The second principal implication will be directly related to Turks in
Europe where the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) has
been in open contest with both groups. Diyanet is trying to curb the influences of
both the National Vision and the Suleymanci group with its large resources
provided by the Turkish government It is expected that the RP government may
press to ease the grip of Diyanet which will be very beneficial for both groups. A
note of caution is that the religious coalition between RP and the Suleymanci
group will not necessarily lead to the disappearance of differences in their
approach to Islam and its organisation among the Turkish communities in
Europe in general and in London in particular.
9.4. Institu.tionalisation of Islam Among the Turkish Community
I will analyse the cases of three Islamic groups among Turks in London.
These are Aziziye jama'a (Aziziye Conaati), Valide Sultan Jama'a (Suleymanci
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group) and Sheikh Nazira Jama'a (followers of the Nakshbandiya Order). In
this Chapter, I will analyse the institutionalisation, ideology, leadership, and
membership structure of these different Islamic groups and their politics of
identity among the Turkish community in London. In Chapter Ten the
analysis will focus on two religio-political organisations which will then
complete the analysis of the institutionalisation of religion and its relation to
identity construction among Turks.
9.4.1. Aziziye Jama'a (Aziziye Cenuiati)
The foundation of the Aziziye Mosque (Aziziye Camii) in Stoke Newington
High Road in north-east London is an illustrative case to understand how
and why the Turkish community established an institution in the form of a
Mosque whose origins can be traced to the formative period of Islamic
history. Aziziye Jaraa'a is a part of the prevailing religious diversity within
the community which accommodates different Jama'as (Cemaatler) with their
own Islamic discourses. The founders of the Aziziye Mosque had established
the United Kingdom Turkish Islamic Association (UKTIA) (Ingiltere Turk
Islam Birligi) in 1979 as a first step towards institutionalisation of Islam among
the Turkish community in London. The UKTIA's aim was to find long-term
solutions to the problems surrounding religious education, practices and
publications as its constitution mentions. The aims and objectives of the
UKTIA are set as 'to further the religion of Islam, to provide places of
worship for all Muslims in the United Kingdom, to provide both spiritual
and material assistance to those in need, to advance education in accordance
with the tenets and doctrines of Islam and traditions of Turkish culture].
(The Constitution of UKTIA).
As the UKTIA addresses the Turkish community, its members comprised 100
per cent Turks, suggesting that ethnic background, national and linguistic
identity are important factors of affiliation. In 1995 the UKTIA had 96
registered members all of whom were Turkish. The membership structure of
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the UKTIA appears to have played a decisive role in the formation of ethnic
identity of the Aziziye Mosque as a 'Turkish Mosque' and the religious
activities it has offered since its establishment The Turkish ethnic identity of
the UKTIA was enshrined in its constitution as article 4 reads: 'to advance
education in accordance with the tenets and doctrines of Islam and traditions
of Turkish culture'. Moreover article 4a states, 'to promote Islamic and
Turkish arts and culture' suggesting that national and religious identity of the
Turkish community are inseparable and inextricably intertwined. The
references to Islam and Turkish culture imply that Turkish identity lies at the
confluence of both national traditional values and Islamic beliefs.
As soon as the UKTIA was established, the executive committee began
looking for a suitable premises which could be used as a proper place of
worship and religious education of children. It is observed that, (Brothers,
1971, p. 44) 'a minority group unable to afford its own premises may borrow
a hall or church from another group'. Similarly, until suitable premises were
found, Turks in London used the facilities of other Mosques in their
neighbourhood. My informants said that they went to these Mosques mainly
for three occasions; to perform weekly Cuma Namazi (Friday prayers) and to
perform two annual prayers Bayrant Nanzazi at the end of Ramazan (Idu'l Fitz)
and during the feast of sacrifice/slaughter (Idu'l Adha). They did not go to the
Mosques for other purposes except during the mentioned occasions and for
prayer for the deceased which is supposed to be performed before the burial.
One informer attributed his behaviour of not going to the 'non-Turkish'
Mosque as follows:
'When I came to England I knew no English but a few words, neither
Arabic as well. So I was not able to understand the hutbe (khutba
sermon) since the Imams either were reading it in English or in Arabic.
But I still felt obliged to go to the Mosque for Friday prayers but not for
other occasions. Although we were all Muslims, they were speaking
their own languages. Since the opening of Turkish (Aziziye) Mosque, I
have always been coming here because I can understand the hutbe
properly and participate in other activities'.
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In parallel with the increase in the number of Turks, who took their religious
life so seriously as to form a Jama'a among themselves, halls were rented to
perform Friday and Bayram prayers. This development was also the
beginning of the formation of a. Turkish Muslim Jama'a in London in addition
to those of other Muslim Jama'as divided on ethnic lines. The statement of a
fifty year old Turkish man who had lived in London for more than twenty
years supports this observation. When asked how he felt about getting
together with his fellow Turkish men in a Turkish congregation, he said: 'I
really welcomed the organisations of prayers led by Turkish the Imams even
if they were in the halls. You know why? Before, I used to go to pray with
other Muslim brothers. Although it is a good feeling being with them, you
don't really enjoy the prayer because you just pray and leave. No socialising,
nothing. But when I started to pray with our Jama'a, I felt myself more
stronger and more self-confidenf. . The cycle of going to non-Turkish Mosques
and subsequently renting halls for congregational prayers with a Jama'a was
completed with the purchase of an old cinema building which was later
turned into Aziziye Mosque in north-east London within the vicinity of the
Turkish neighbourhood.
Premises of the Aziziye Mosque were bought in 1983. The UICTIA had raised
£80 000 to purchase a derelict cinema building. Funding was received in the
forms of membership fees and large sums of donations from Muslim
businessmen both in England and in Turkey. Many volunteers took part in
the clearance of the theatre by removing the seats from the building. One of
them, a man aged forty five, said:
'I discovered my Islamic identity in England. During the early periods
of my life in London I was living according to my desires regardless of
the Islamic criteria. This took more than five years, then I realised that I
had no significant purpose in my life. I also realised that I had only
little knowledge of my religion. With the encouragement of my friends
I decided to learn more about Islam and meet other Muslim Turks. My
first inquiry to find a Turkish Mosque was disappointing. But when
heard the activities of UKITA to purchase a building to establish a
Turkish Mosque, I rushed to contribute because that meant I could go
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there to improve my knowledge and also send my children later so that
they would learn their religion when they axe young'.
The foregoing description of the event by the informant who participated in
the fund-raising activities and worked physically in the construction of the
Mosque indicates that the institutionalisation of Islam evoked a sense of
affiliation to a collectivity.
Similar feelings were expressed by other informants who took part in the
establishment of the Mosque even though some were disillusioned and
distanced themselves at a later stage as a result of developments within the
administration of the Mosque. As soon as the Aziziye Mosque was founded, a
Turkish Imam was brought from Turkey in 1983 to lead prayers and to teach
both children and adults. During the early phase of its establishment, the
Aziziye Mosque took a fairly neutral approach to religious groups since
people from various religious backgrounds had contributed to the formation
of Aziziye Jama'a. That means that the Aziziye Mosque was neither affiliated
to a sectarian group nor was its Jama'a fashioned on a particular model of a
Muslim religious group in Turkey or in Europe. The independent character of
the Aziziye Mosque attracted a large segment of Turkish Muslims in north-
east London due to its non-affiliation and its receptive attitude towards all
groups. My informants stated that all the functions taking place in the
Mosque were well attended and it played a constructive role in uniting the
Turkish community around common concerns such as Helal food, animal
slaughtering during Kurban Bayrand and Islamic education of children.
Until the late 1980s this status continued without much interruption and
disagreement The first signs of transformation from the neutral identity or
non-affiliation of the Aziziye Mosque to that of an attachment to a religious
group in Turkey were observed when the Imam changed his appearance. The
Imam started growing a beard and wearing a particular type of dress with
sank (turban), salvar (baggy trousers) and cubbe (robe). This change took the
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Jama'a by surprise, as it implied a change in Aziziye's neutrality. One ex-
member of the Aziziye Jaraa'a described this transformation as follows:
'The Imam did have no beard when he came from Turkey and he used
to ask us if it was bothering the Jama'a. Neither did he wear sank, salvar
and cubbe. Some years later, he began wearing these things and started
imposing the dress code upon the Jama'a. At first, we did not realise
why he had changed his clothing but it was revealed later that the
Imam affiliated himself with a religious group in Turkey and adopted
their way of practising Islam, apparently very visible in the dress code
and appearance'.
The transformation from familiar and conventional Islamic practices to that of
unfamiliar practices, as if the Aziziye Mosque was a branch of a group in
Turkey not only took many members of the jama'a by surprise but distanced
some of them from the Aziziye Jarada. When asked why he had left the
Aziziye Jama'a, an ex-member gave a typical reply:
'Well, in the beginning the Imam himself had no beard. He grew it
later and all of a sudden he started to preach us that we must grow
beard and dress like him. As though this was not enough, he began to
impose the same code of dress upon our children as young as ten years
old. I did not understand why a particular way of dressing and
growing a long beard became so important as if they were fundamental
parts of Islam. I did not want to be forced into something I would not
feel comfortable with'.
These accounts imply that sudden and unfamiliar changes within the Jaraa'a,
especially when imposed from above, result in divisions among its members
and lead the dissatisfied group to reject the authority of the Imam.
Accordingly, they either leave the Jaraa'a voluntarily in response to the
change that involves all the Jama'a in an unfamiliar version of Islamic
practice, or they are forced to leave by the Jaraa'a as a result of a growing
pressure put on them to accept the changes.
The Imam of the Mosque who introduced these fundamental changes among
the Janaa'a, is a graduate of Islamic Studies in Turkey and worked as a Mufti
for the Directorate of Religious Affairs. He left his official duty in Turkey and
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came to London where he was neither paid by the Turkish Government nor
had he to observe any rules set by the Directorate. In a sense, he freed himself
from the limitations of a state institution by coming to London, where he did
not have to preach official Islam to his Jaraa'a. This non-dependency on the
state and accompanying freedom from the limitations of binding regulations,
enabled the Imam to change his discourse after establishing himself among
the Aziziye Jaraa'a. The Imam's new discourse in teaching Islam to his Jama'a
implies that he was aware of the effect of total submission to a group identity
and its leader which would strengthen his charisma.
The following account of the group to which the Imam decided to affiliate
lends support to our argument that unquestioning adherence to the teaching
of a religious leader and his Halife (representative, vicegerent) produces
similar effects across different geographical and cultural maps of the Jama'a
formation. At the expense of distancing some of his Jama'a, the Imam of the
Aziziye Mosque declared himself as the Halife of a well known Sheikh,
Mahmud Hoca, leader of an Islamic g-roup4 based in Istanbul that enforces a
strict dress code for both men and women. The charismatic leadership and
unquestioning authority of the leaders and Sheikhs of the Sufi Orders have
played a decisive role during the course of social mobilisation by deriving
their legitimacy from the religious beliefs of the masses, and in return have
strengthened the status of the Sheikhs even further (Mardin ,1991, p. 123). A
similar structure and source of charismatic authority and legitimisation were
transferred to London by the declaration of the Imam that he was
representing Mahmud Hoca. The Imam's sell-designation of being Mahmud
Hoca's Halife in London was translated into a suggestion that the Aziziye
Jaraa'a were to recognise the Imam as the sole mediator between the Sheikh
and the Jaraa'a. The Imam's authority over the Jama'a was further established
by Mahmud Hoca's visit to London on April 24th 1992. Mahmud Hoca's visit
to the Aziziye Mosque and his sermons were crucial for the confirmation of
the legitimacy of the Imam's explicit allegiance to Sufi teachings which
require unquestioning attachment ta.and acceptance of his authority.
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Reactions to the Imam's affiliation to a Sufi group, which advocates the
acceptance of the authority of the Sheikh or his Halife, were expressed by
some members of the Jaraa'a. and the Imam's authority was challenged
during the annual general meetings and executive committee elections
thereafter. Nevertheless, the Imam appears to have managed to keep his
position and strengthened his position even further during the elections by
having himself elected to the executive committee. Although the Imam had
gained the control of the Mosque administration, the conflict over the
affiliation to a. group in Turkey caused divisions among the Jama'a. Thus, the
Aziziye Mosque lost a sizeable number of its Jama'a who were attracted to
other Turkish Mosques. It was pointed out by several informants that, as a
result of division and schism within the Jama'a, the Aziziye Mosque had lost
the wide influence it had had during its formative years. However, it should
be noted that although the Aziziye Mosque distanced some Jama'a members,
it has formed a smaller but more tightly-knit Jama'a clustered around the
teachings of a Sufi group which by its very nature presupposes closer
fraternity and stronger identification with the group. A similar observation
on religious group identity was also made by Brothers who argues that
'It is a fundamental presupposition of religious institutions that
beliefs should influence the behaviour of the adherents in some way,
and in fact much of the effort of religious personnel is directed
towards encouraging members to orient their activities in accordance
with their beliefs, sometimes in general terms of caring for other
people, sometimes in definite prescriptions about the observance of
particular rituals. Groups often require distinctive patterns of
behaviour from their members with the manifest function of keeping
some religious law; this has the latent function of distinguishing the
group from the remainder of society' Brothers (1971, p. 7).
In line with the foregoing observation it can be argued that the Aziziye
Mosque with its particularistic appeal created a strong group identity within
the confines of Sufi teachings. The specificity of dress code and behavioural
patterns render Aziziye Jama'a a distinct identity within the Turkish
community in London.
258
An analysis of activities held at the Mosque will also confirm the above
observations that these activities are designed to reawaken a 'particularistic
Islamic identity' among the Jama'a and to transmit traditional values to the
young generation. In order to achieve this objective, the Aziziye Mosque
offers religious classes to women and children. Weekend courses for children
are encouraged and between 20 to 30 children are brought by their parents to
the Mosque. Parents are constantly reminded that children will be defenceless
against the moral threats of Western society if their religious identity is not
strengthened. One leaflet, distributed by the Aziziye Mosque which was
titled 'Child Education' (Cocuk Terbiyest) reads as follows:
'Almighty Allah provided human beings with uncountable bounties, of
which children are the greatest source of hope and future for a nation
(millet). Nations that do not educate their children properly can not
expect their future to be safe and bright. According to Islam, children
must be provided with physical and spiritual education. And a sense of
love for religion (din), faith (iman), sacred values (nutkaddesat) and for
one's county (vatan) must be evoked and installed in the minds and
hearts of children. Education of our children is not only a concern to
one family but a concern relating to all our nation'.
The leaflet ends with a statement of a self-reminder that, '... unfortunately we
are in state of ignorance and neglect in regard to the education of our
children'. This leaflet and others inform us that national and religious
identity are mentioned together and love for one's homeland is a reminder to
foster a distinctive character of Turkish-Muslim identity in London vis-à-vis
others. It can be argued that Mosque activities play an important role in
reproducing traditional Islamic values and in re-evoking sentiments of
national belonging as the basic sources of ethnic and collective identity.
The Aziziye Mosque advocates some social functions to be held at the
Mosque premises such as weddings and religious nikah (marriage contract)
on condition that the strict segregation of men and women is observed.
Wedding ceremonies are regarded as important social events in fostering
traditional family values which bind the family to the larger Turkish
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community. In a leaflet, entitled 'Our Weddings' (Dugunlerimiz) the Jama'a is
once more reminded that
'Islam does not consist of belief principles only. It is a sacred system
based on revelation that covers both individual and social aspects of
life. Therefore, Muslims have to observe its rules in all aspects of their
life including weddings. Unfortunately, many Muslims seem to have
forgotten our religious and national traditions, thus our wedding
ceremonies are shaped by demonic practices. Consumption of alcohol,
dancing and mixing between the sexes are all corrupted customs of the
West. They have nothing to do with Islam and with our national
customs... Imitation of others stems from an inferiority complex'.
As the above statement clearly establishes, the sources of Muslim Turkish
identity are contrasted to Western values and customs. Boundaries of Turkish
identity are drawn by referring to the 'others' as well as to the 'self'. A fine
line is drawn between Turkish and Western identity by praising the virtues
of Islamic values and national traditions on the one hand, and demonising
the values of Western society on the other.
In addition to distribution of leaflets and lectures during his sermons, the
Imam constantly reminds his Jama'a of the identity construct of Muslim
people in contrast to the Western world which represents a Christian identity.
To differentiate Muslim identity and Christian identity, he makes frequent
references to current developments in the Muslim world. To facilitate the self-
definition of community members as Turkish-Muslim, he makes use of
current political developments in the globe. For example, he informs his
Jama'a about the plight of fellow Turkish-Muslims in Azerbaijan where
'Christian Armenians' are attacking them. Islamic identity of the Turkish
community is linked with 'Umma identity' which implies that the Turks are
part of the Muslim World. To evoke these feelings, the Imam gives
illustrations of how some Muslim nations around the world are targeted by
the 'Christian West'. In one of his Friday sermons, he said:
'...that is a recurrent theme in Muslim history that whenever there is a
revivalist tendency in Muslim countries non-believers are there to curb
this resurgent wave and try to distance Muslims from practising
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Islamic precepts. Behind the onslaught of Westerners/Christians on
Muslim people lies the fact that a strong Muslim Umma and their unity
around Islamic ideals poses a serious threat to the interests of the West
The fear evoked by the possible unity amongst Muslims against non-
Muslims is the main reason for intervention in the affairs of Muslims
by the West and the America'.
In this context, the Imam attributes the misfortunes and sufferings of Muslims
in Bosnia, Palestine and Somalia to the Western World and the Americans. In
one instance, for example, he was very critical of the American presence in
Somalia under the pretext of a peacekeeping force with its other Christian
allies. He argued that Christian missionaries were out in Somalia to
undermine the Islamisation of the country.
9.4.1.1. Institutionalisation of Islamic Education
The first generation of immigrant Muslims who are convinced that they are
no longer immigrants but settlers, is now much more concerned with
facilitating the religio-cultural education of the young generation (Anwar,
1995a, p. 243). Similarly, the Aziziye Jama'a is also concerned with the
education of their children in an Islamic environment In order to achieve
this objective, the administration of the Mosque decided to open a school to
facilitate the religious education of children.
The institutionalisation of Islamic education has been a serious concern for
Muslims in Europe generally and in Britain particularly. An increasing
number of private and state funded Islamic schools are being opened to
counterbalance the cultural effects of education on the young generation as
'some Muslims regard 'separate' schools as essential not only for the religious
instruction of their children but for their cultural survival' (Haw, 1994, p. 72).
Despite local opposition, Muslims in The Netherlands succeeded in opening
state-funded Islamic schools in Rotterdam and Eindhoven in 1988, and over
the last six years, the number of Islamic schools has steadily increased in this
country to six in 1989-1990, 22 in 1991-92 (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1992,
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p. 109) and 29 in the 1993-1994 school-year. All of these are primary schools'
(Dwyer and Meyer, 1995, p. 40-41).
Muslims in Britain are also exerting efforts to provide Islamic education for
their children. The Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO), The UK Islamic
Mission and The Muslim Educational Trust were established to address
educational concerns of Muslims at organisational level (Nielsen, 1989b, p.
234). However, the awareness of Muslim parents regarding the religious
education of the young generation was heightened by the 1988 Education Act
which requires that all new agreed syllabuses 'must reflect the fact that the
religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian whilst taking
account of the teaching and practices of the other principal religions
represented in Great Britain' (section 8(3)). The 1944 Education Act did not
specify the religion to be taught within Religious Education (RE) 6. The daily
act of collective worship and the content of religious education have become
important concerns for Muslim parents. One of the responses to the recent
developments in the area of education was to establish their own private and
independent Islamic schools where not only secular subjects but also cultural
and religious subjects would be taught Muslims also wanted to make use of
state funds which are presently available to denominational and Jewish
schools. In order to become voluntary-aided schools the Zakaria Girl's School
in Batley and the Islamia School in London, for example, made applications
in 1982. However, Zakaria Girl's School failed to receive recognition as a
voluntary-aided school and nor did the Islainia School whose application was
rejected in 1993 after ten years of campaigning (Dwyer & Meyer, 1995, p. 45).
The first independent Turkish Primary School, IKEA, was opened on 12
September 1994. The opening of IKRA is a significant development because
the school project illustrates Aziziye's politics concerning religious education
and the concerns of the families regarding the formation of Islamic identity
and its maintenance through education.
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The developments surrounding the opening of the IKRA Primary School
suggest that the Aziziye Jama'a realised that the religious education in the
Mosque environment and weekends-only, was not conducive to creating a
strong Muslim identity among the young generation. The experiences since
the establishment of the Mosque have revealed the shortcomings of
traditional Mosque education. These considerations seem to have played an
important role in introducing a more systematic way of teaching children
which requires a proper school and expertise. As explained by the project
workers, the IKRA Primary School project was launched to fill the
institutional vacuum in the field of education.
As the school project matured it came to the attention of project workers that
the newly acquired premises for the use of IKEA primary school adjacent to
the Aziziye Mosque would not be available by the time of the opening of the
school. The first set back was overcome by converting two rooms of the
Mosque into classrooms and one room into an administrative office. IKRA
Primary School began its teaching with eight registered pupils whose ages
ranged between six and nine. The number of students increased to 13 in the
second week. At the time of its opening, IKRA employed six part-time
teachers to teach National Curriculum subjects with some additional Islamic
classes. As far as the Turkish community was concerned, my findings suggest
that almost nobody out of the Aziziye Jama'a was aware of the developments
for the establishment of a school within their neighbourhood. The Mosque
administration did not try to appeal to a wider audience of parents. Some
parents were pleased to see the opening of the first Turkish Muslim Primary
School with an additional curriculum covering Turkish language and
teaching of Islamic topics. One of the informants who sent his child to IKRA
said:
'I have been living in this country for more than twenty years and I
have established myself as a citizen in England. I feel that there would
be no return to Turkey because I have a factory and bought a house
here. I do not see any reason to give up all these achievements after
such a long time. Neither do I want to abandon my Turkish and
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Islamic identity. I came to this country as a Muslim Turk and I will do
everything to remain so. It is also my responsibility to provide my
children with an Islamic education. I had to send my first son to a
school in Turkey where he could have a good religious education
because there is no such place in England where my children can go to
learn Turkish language, traditions and Islamic values. I believe that our
children should be educated here. Therefore, I regarded the opening of
IKRA as a first step towards the foundation of an educational
institution that enables our children to learn their own language and
culture while living in England'.
This typical response reveals the expectations of parents of the staff and
teaching program of the school. Parents send their children to IKRA Primary
School with the hope that their children will be educated not only in line with
the national curriculum but also in accordance with traditional values
incorporating classes on Turkish culture and Islamic principles that will
evoke a sense of identity and belonging to the Turkish-Muslim Community
as is the case with some other minorities in Britain'. The question of how far
such a school education can construct or strengthen Turkish Muslim identity
is a tentative issue and one cart only speculate about the nature of its likely
effect on the attitudes and behaviour of children by looking at the stated
policy of the school and the contents of the classes as well as the teachers'
own approach to Islam. IKRA primary School announced that
'the aims of establishing a primary school was to provide and educate
Muslim children according to the highest educational standards and
principles of Islam. Good education is essential for Muslim children to
enable them to live, study and work in a multi-cultural, multi-religious
environment The aim of the EKRA Primary School is to teach the
National Curriculum and some additional topics related to religio-
m oral values'.
In order to achieve its aims the school curriculum was designed to meet the
requirements of the National CUrriculum and religious education. It is stated
in the prospectus (p. 3) that 'the School follows the National Curriculum
while maintaining its basic Islamic ethos. It follows the National Curriculum
with some additional Islamic subjects'. The national curriculum subjects (18
hours a week) comprise 75 per cent of educational activities. The rest is
allocated to Turkish culture and Islamic subjects (8 hours per week). It is the
expectation of both parents and the- teachers that classes on Islam, Qur'an,
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claim to follow the teachings of Suleymart Hilmi Turtahan s (1888-1959). When
Tunahan died in 1959, the leadership of the group was passed to his son-in-
law, Kemal Kacar, who established close relations with the politicians and
became an MP for the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi). However, after 1980 the
Suleymanci group supported the Motherland Party and the True Path Party,
successor to the Justice Party. Therefore, the group enjoyed political
protection which enabled them to continue their activities under an umbrella
organisation known as the Federation of Welfare Associations for Course and
School Students (Kurs ye Okul Talebelerine Yardim Dernekleri Federasyonu). It has
been reported (Cakir, p. 32) that the number of member associations to this
Federation has risen to 909 in the early 1990s. The estimated number of
boarding courses under the Suleymanci group is almost one thousand in
which more than one hundred thousand pupils are thought to be educated.
From 1974 onwards, the Suleymanci group has also established similar
organisations and opened Mosques in several West European countries to
meet the needs of the Turkish immigrant population. The Suleymanci group
in Germany, known as Islaraisches Kulturzentrum (Islamic Cultural Centre)
controls more than 210 local centres in this country. The institutionalisation
of the Suleymanci group in London was delayed until the mid-eighties. Two
main reasons might be suggested for this delay, of which the first is that the
emergence of the Turkish community and the coming of the young
generation to the scene occurred much later than those of other Western
European countries where Turkish immigrants organised themselves earlier
and provided economic resources to acquire premises and pay for the salaries
of religious personnel. The second reason might be attributed to the rise of
sectarian and ideological differences in the Turkish community. In the early
period of community formation and establishment of a Mosque, divisions on
ideological lines were largely ignored and relative unity was achieved.
However, in the following years the convergence of interests failed to sustain
the initial unity and disputes about the control of resources led to the
divergence that resulted in disagreement among the groups on ideological
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lines. The Suleymanci group opened its first Mosque, Valide Sultan, in
London in 1992 with the assistance they received from the umbrella
organisation in Germany.
The attendance at the opening ceremony of Valide Sultan Mosque confirms
my earlier observation on the existence of international networks among
particular Islamic movements. My findings indicate that there is an
international Suleymanci network in Turkey, Western Europe and London.
The trustees of TICCT invited their leader from Turkey and other leading
figures of the Suleymanci movement both from Turkey and European
countries. Representatives from Turkey, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands
and France were present at the opening ceremony to boost publicity in the
Turkish community. The leadership structure in Turkish community is also
recurrent In the case of TICCT, the chairman of the board of trustees has been
there since its foundation, implicitly presenting himself as the vicegerent of
the main leader of the group in Turkey. A similar pattern of life-long claims
to leadership may also be observed in the organisational structure of other
Turkish institutions.
9.4.2.1. New Approach to Tradition
The Suleymanci group differs from other Islamic groups in London. The
differences are embedded in the priorities of the group and in their
interpretation of religious traditions. These differences become more visible
when the Suleyinanci group is contrasted with Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim
Jarrta'a. The most noticeable difference relates to the dress code that the
Suleymanci Jama'a adopts. Members of the Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama'a
define Islamic dress in a very strict manner and encourage its members to
wear a certain type of dress and grow a beard. The Suleymanci Jama'a see the
dress as an external element tin Islam although their first leader wore totally
traditional gowns similar to that of the Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim group.
Members of Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama'a sharply criticise Suleymanci's
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approach, accusing them of ignoring the Surma of the Prophet When
reminded of these accusations, a prominent figure of Suleymanci Jama'a
rejected the charge and argued:
'This is a matter of priority. We are not saying that growing beard or
wearing traditional dresses should be frown upon or discouraged.
What we believe is that we have got more urgent problems to address
than disputes over dress. We also argue that Muslims should have a
good image in a society they are a part. And I think, the way we dress
up wearing a tie and tidy clothes is more approachable and in touch
with the community'.
It is very unusual to see a member of Aziziye or Sheikh Nazim Jaraa'a
attending prayer in Valide Sultan Mosque since, as they argue, the Imams of
this Mosque wear Western dresses in an open transgression of the Islamic
dress code. A more significant dividing line between the Suleymanci group
and others is that Aziziye and Sheikh Nazim Jama'a claim to adhere to the
principle of mystical Islam whereas the Suleymanci group appears to have
incorporated its early claims to adherence to Sufi Islam in the modern politics
of Turkey. This suggests that the Suleymanci group have changed its strategy
and religious discourse in accordance with the social and political
developments taking place since the death of their first leader, Tunahan. As
mentioned earlier, the current leader, Kemal Kacar, continues to give support
to right wing political parties, having sympathisers among MPs in the True
Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) and
most recently the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). In contrast, the Aziziye and
Sheikh Nazira Jama'a do not approve of supporting a political party. Neither
Aziziye nor Sheikh Nazim Jaraa'a have such a policy.
In contrast to other Islamic groups, the Suleymanci Jaraa'a appears to have
adopted a more flexible method in dealing with religious matters to appeal to
the wider Turkish community. One of the recent initiatives of TICCT was to
apply to the Hackney Council for authorisation to register weddings in the
Mosque. The right to register marriages by the Mosque authorities was
granted to TICCT on 24th August 1994 and the first wedding ceremony took
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place in January 1995. Social and cultural functions at the Valide Sultan
Mosque are as varied as to include circumcision parties and Mevlut
ceremonies. These are not strictly religious rituals, therefore those who are
not affiliated to the Mosque are also invited to participate. Such a policy not
only allows the Suleymanci group to present their particular understanding
of Islam but also help the group to crystallise their different image in the
community. These findings suggest that the Mosque as a religious
organisation is not confined to strictly defined prayers and religious activities
as in Turkey. Rather, the functional variety indicates that the Mosque is not
an institution isolated from the concerns of the community but a place with a.
wide range of social and cultural functions. Similarly, on the Sikh community
in Britain, Goulbourne (1991, p. 161) observes that 'for the faithful living
abroad, it is not surprising that the g-urdwara becomes a central, multi-
functional meeting place where the weary renew his/her strength through
mutual companionship and worship'.
9.4.3. Sheikh Nazim Jama'a: Mystical Islam
Diversity of Islamic organisations in London is enriched by the
institutionalisation of a Turkish-Cypriot dominated religious group known as
Sheikh Nazim Jama'a that adheres to the modern interpretation of the
Naqshbandiya Sufi Order'. The group is led by the Cypriot-born sufi and
charismatic leader, Sheikh Nazim Kibrisi who is aged about eighty. Sheikh
Nazim was born in Cyprus but went to Turkey for his university education in
the late 1940s and early 1950s where he came under the influence of a Sufi
group which he soon joined. His interest in religion took precedence over his
university education. Therefore, he left his engineering course to acquire a
deeper knowledge of Islam. As he told me in an interview, his search for a
centre of religious learning in Turkey did not bear any fruit because of the
republican attitude towards Islam during the one party regime which
undermined religion and closed down traditional learning centres of both
Sufis and no-Sufis alike. As mentioned earlier, in the early years of the
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republican regime, all the Tarikat (Sufi Order) activities were outlawed and
teklces and zavi yes (dervish lodges) for spiritual education were closed as a part
of institutional secularisation. After having realised the impossibility of
gaining Sufi knowledge, Sheikh Nazim decided to seek the irfan (gnosis) in
another Muslim country. He went to Damascus in Syria where he lived in a
dervish lodge for years improving his knowledge of the Qur'an, Arabic and
Sufi teachings. He stayed in the lodge as a murid (disciple) seeking
knowledge and left as a guide and Murshid (spiritual teacher). When asked
why he had left the lodge after such a long time Sheikh Nazim said:
'After having mastered the gnostic knowledge and struggled to purify
my nefs (soul) as a disciple for more than fifteen years at the hand of a
Murshid, I was told that I became matured and told to be capable of
establishing a Dervish lodge in Cyprus where I could guide Muslims
there. This duty was given to me by my Murshid. Therefore I left
Damascus and I came to Cyprus'.
Sheikh Nazirds return to Cyprus with a new mission was quickly noticed. As
his acquaintances from Cyprus told me, they immediately observed the
radical transformations Sheikh Nazim displayed. Sheikh Nazim recalled the
immediate reactions and later developments as follows:
'When I returned to Cyprus towards the middle of 1960s, I realised that
people were very much surprised by the way I dressed up with long
beard and a sank (turban) symbolising the chain of our Sufi Order. It
was not an easy process to spread the message of Islam to people who
were living on the margins of religion. When people found out that we
were peaceful believers trying to teach spiritual purification of souls,
their negative reaction at the outset began to die out and our approach
attracted a large number followers among Muslims and non-Muslims
both in Cyprus and abroad'.
Sheikh Nazim established his authority gradually and his charismatic
leadership grew unchallenged as total obedience to the authority of the
Sheikh is considered to be one of the indispensable prerequisites of Sufi
teachings. The Sheikh as a spiritual guide (Murshid) has absolute authority
and control over his disciples (Murid). The absolute authority of the Sheikh is
derived form his status in the long chain of Murshids. It is noted that
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'the Sufis can trace an unbroken chain (silsiLah) of masters, going to
the source. It is this historical chain which provides the link, or
channel by which 'heavenly' knowledge, wisdom and love can be
transmitted. The last Grand-Sheikh in the chain of Naqshbartdiyyah
is al-Daghistani who passed away in 1973. With the death of the
Grand-Sheikh, Sheikh Nazim became the carrier of this transmission
and barakah (grace or blessing) and marked as the 40th master in the
chain. It is believed that there is a spiritual connection between the
Grand-Sheikh and Sheikh Nazim. This contact brings light, blessings
and protection. So Sheikh Nazim expresses that his heart is connected
to that of his Grand-Sheikh' (Kose, 1994, p. 167).
These observations help to explain the sources and grounds of Sheikh's
charisma that enabled him to reach a considerable following among the
Turkish community in London. After establishing himself in Cyprus, Sheikh
Nazirct started his mission of spreading the message of Islam in London in the
early 1970s. He started coming to London as a visitor to see his acquaintances
from Cyprus. Such annual visits were the beginning of the formation of a
small group which was gradually enlarged. The meetings with Sheikh Nazirci
in private houses were extended to the larger community as his messages
achieved to have a broader following. When asked about the early
developments of the group, one of Sheikh Nazim's Cypriot acquaintances
who hosted him in his house said:
'When our Sheikh decided to come to London there was no Turkish
Mosque where we could organise a religious meeting. There were also
only few Turkish-Cypriots as his disciples. Therefore, we used to host
him in large houses during his stay in London. By the time new murids
(disciples) had joined the Tarikat (Order) from Turks, other Muslim
communities and from non-Muslims, then we started to look for a
proper place of worship'.
His followers said that Sheikh Nazim's visits to London had become an
organised annual event since 1973. Sheikh Nazim usually comes to London
just before the beginning of the month of Ramazan and leads prayers and zikr
(recitation) ceremonies in three centres; Peckham Mosque in South London,
Shaklewell Sheikh Nazim Mosque and Sheikh Nazim Kibrisi Naqshbandi
Centre in north-east London. The arrival of Sheikh Nazina is a significant
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event for his followers since he comes to London once a year and stays here
only for about two months.
In contrast to other religious groups among Turks in London, the Sheikh
Nazim Jama'a is ethnically mixed and heterogeneous in terms of race, colour
and national background. Although Turkish-Cypriots outnumber others in
the group in London, Sheikh Nazim Jama'a is comprised of people as diverse
as Turks from both Cyprus and Turkey, Pakistanis, Indian Muslims, and
Europeans from several Western countries such as Germany, France and
Britain. Sheikh Nazira's charismatic leadership melts this diversity in the pot
of Sufi teaching that stresses the importance of spiritual cleansing and the
significance of attaining a higher state of mind and heart towards the
LT1timate Reality; all transcending racial, ethnic and national boundaries of
human beings.
The Islamic discourse on humans as equal beings before God regardless of
race, colour and nationality is a recurrent theme in Sheikh Nazim's sermons
which attract followers from diverse traditions. Nevertheless, there seems to
be a paradox in the discourse of Sheikh Nazim when he addresses a Turkish
audience and a mixed audience separately. When he addresses the Turkish
community, for example, he makes references to Turkish history, particularly
to the Ottoman Empire and he mentions the role of Turkish people in Islamic
history. According to him, Turks were the guardians of Islam and should be
so again. The Islamic identity of Turks and their national identity are not
separable. This means that religion is an indispensable part of Turkish
identity. In his sermons to Turks, Sheikh Nazim evokes a sense of belonging
to a Turkish-Muslim community. However, when he addresses non-Turkish
Muslims, he makes no reference to national history because of the ethnic
diversity of his audience. His emphasis falls upon issues surrounding faith
and belief (iman) and spiritual purification of the soul. In addressing an
ethnically heterogeneous audience, the Sheikh appears to have a different
discourse that aims at evoking a sense of belonging to a larger Muslim
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community (LImma). It can be argued that the two types of identity
construction are discernible from Sheikh Nazim's Sufi discourse as: 1- an
ethnic-religious identity (as in the case of Turkish-Muslim identity) and; 2- a
universal religious-collective identity (as in the case of belonging to Umraa
transcending the national and ethnic particularities of the followers).
During my regular visits to three centres used by the Sheikh Nazim group, I
noticed that a large number of Jama'a comprised Pakistani, Arab, Africans,
German, French and British Muslims in addition to the presence of Turks, at
religious ceremonies and meetings led by the Sheikh. It seems that a regular
following of the Sheikh has enabled his followers to establish an international
network of Sufi brotherhood. At the time of writing the thesis, the Sheikh
Nazinn group had already opened centres (dergah/lodge) in Germany, the
United States and Britain in addition to their dergahs in Turkey and Northern
Cyprus. My observations suggest that this international Sufi network will
broaden because, as mentioned earlier, Sheikh Nazim not only addresses
Turks but all humanity. The composition of clientele among the Sheikh
Nazim group shows that inter-ethnic relations are established on the basis of
shared beliefs and values and this would also support the foregoing
argument The diversity of backgrounds is moulded by the universal message
of Islam as all Muslim believers are considered brothers to each other.
Initiation into and acceptance by the group lead to the formation of a
collective identity around the concept of Umma. It was one of Sheikh's
international links, for example, that enabled the group to purchase a large
premises for a. Sufi centre in Seven Sisters. The funding for the purchase and
renovation came from the Sultan of Brunei. At the time of writing the thesis,
the same centre started an advertising campaign for an independent primary
school which is said to be planned to open in 1996-1997 term.
With reference to the Turkish community in London, it can be argued that
Sheikh Nazim's personality, charisma and his teachings play an influential
role in the construction of Islamic identity and in the reproduction of
273
traditional values among certain segments of the Turkish community,
particularly among Turkish-Cypriots. My observations indicate that Turkish-
Cypriots are more inclined to join the Sheikh Nazim group in comparison
with the mainland Turks. This trend might be attributed to the origins of the
religious groupings in London. Sheikh Nazira attracts more clientele from
Turkish-Cypriots whereas other Turkish Islamic organisations draw their
members overwhelmingly from the mainland Turks. This pattern of
membership suggests that there is a subtle ethnic categorisation and
preference in joining religious groups.
9.4.3.1. Mosque as a Market Place
As explained earlier, the Turkish Mosques in London are used for various
purposes. Worship, Islamic education, religious wedding contracts and
circumcision ceremonies are held in the Mosques if approved by the
administration. The case of Sheikh Nazim Mosque presents a different aspect
of the Mosque as a market place. Some of Sheikh's followers have their vans
parked around the Mosque or come with their sleeping bags. Those who
travel with their travel bags are provided with a space for living, in a corner
of the Mosque, forming a temporary group within the Mosque itself.
Although men and women are provided with separate areas of
accommodation divided by curtains, they have to use the premises and large
hall together as some of them are married and bring their children with them.
In addition to the provision of accommodation, small-scale economic
activities are also allowed to take place within the Mosque which creates an
atmosphere in which men and women mix together in the sacred space of the
Mosque. Especially at the end of largely-attended prayers, an economic
activity begins in the Mosque where several stalls form a small Mosque-
market Whatever is available at the small Mosque-market is somehow
related to the group identity as their symbols and the articles on sale indicate
their affiliation to the Sheikh Nazim group. Among the items available at the
Mosque-market established within_ the sacred space, are posters, books,
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video-filmed sermons and preachings of Sheikh Nazim, special garments
such as turbans, headscarfs, baggy trousers and, long and wide dresses for
both men and women. Silver rings, rosary and perfume are also available.
The identity of the followers and their desire to express this to others
determine the market structure as these items are used by members of the
groups not only to identify with the group but also to distinguish themselves
from the identity of outsiders. On the one hand, economic activity works to
strengthen the economic solidarity, though on a small scale, and on the other,
it crystallises the external symbols of belonging to a religious group that offer
a distinct identity. As the Mosque-market addresses the needs of both sexes,
men and women freely walk in the Mosque following the prayers. A certain
degree of intermixing of genders takes place, in contrast to the gender politics
of the Aziziye and Valide Sultan Mosques which observe strict segregation of
men and women. This situation has been a matter of dispute that led to an
exchange of criticism in that while Sheikh Nazim and his followers see the
mixing of sexes in the Mosque as a tolerant attitude of Islam, the opposition
charges the group with the violation of Islamic rules. Although these
exchanges of accusations and charges of transgressions take place at times,
the dispute remains on an individual level, confined to a small, group since
Jama'a members of each group rarely go to others' Mosques and confront
each other. The Imams and religious leaders also ignore such accusations and
distance themselves from situations that might lead to divisions among the
community.
Nevertheless, some leaflets which were distributed by the followers of Sheikh
Nazim during my fieldwork indicate that in some non-Turkish Mosques, the
tone of criticism levelled against Sheikh Nazim's teachings and practices is
much stronger. A leaflet handed out by a group calling themselves Ahle
Sunnat Wa'l Jamaat claims that a number of Wahhabi", Deobandi" and
Tablighi Imams are misleading their congregations about Sheikh Nazim.
These the Imams, according to the leaflets titled 'Sufism, Myth or Mysticism?'
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and 'Sheikh Nazim, A Sufi Sheikh?' preach that Islam has no place for Sufism
and adherence to a Sheikh. The leaflets try to legitimise the existence of
Sufism in Islam by citing several early scholars. They also cite Sheikh Nazim
in an attempt to produce counter arguments in defence of Sufism. Sheikh
Nazim is quoted to have said: 'People are against the truth (Hakikat). The
whole non-Muslim world is against the truth and the Muslims themselves are
also heedless and ignorant The non-Muslim world is putting their agents
within the Muslim world, amongst these foolish ignorant Muslims]. The
dispute between the Wahhabis, or those who support the Wahhabi ideology,
and Sufis seems to continue because the Wahhabi ideology strongly rejects
Sufism, maintaining it was an innovation (hurafe) which did not exist in the
formative period of Islam, but was invented by some ignorant Muslims.
9.5. Diversity Reproduced
Muslims in Europe display an ethnic and national diversity characterised by
the country of origin on the one hand, and a prevalent religious diversity on
the other hand, mirrored by the numerous Islamic movements, sects and Sufi
groups. Even those who come from the same country may also display a rich
diversity of Islamic persuasion since Islamic movements do not have a
monolithic character. The first and foremost source of heterogeneity among
Muslim communities lies in the backgrounds these communities have. The
present diversity in understanding Islamic history and politics can be
interpreted as the continuity of traditional attachments and interrelationships
across the communities concerned. Like the Pakistani community which
accommodates groups as diverse as Jamaat-i Islarai, Deobandis, Barelwis and
Ismailis in Britain, the Turkish community is comprised similar religious
variety ranging from purely religious to politically motivated movements.
Although I have analysed the cases of three Islamic groups among Turks in
London, it should be pointed out that religious diversity among Turks in
Europe is much wider. It also includes the politically motivated the National
Vision and the London Islamic-Turkish Association (see Chapter Ten); Nurcu
_
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movement; Kaplancilar, a marginal group led by the late ex-mufti
Cemaleddin Kaplan who declared an Islamic caliphate in Germany; and
Alawites.
Religious diversity and current political tension between official Islam
propagated by the state, and various religious movements which are
regarded as a threat to democracy in Turkey, are also reproduced in major
European cities. The official Islam is represented by the Attaché for religious
affairs and the Imams appointed by the Turkish Directorate of Religious
Affairs (Turkiye Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi). Besides providing religious services
to Turkish speaking communities in Europe, the Turkish Directorate of
Religious Affairs aims at curbing the influences of Islamic movements. Fierce
competition between state-supported religious establishment and Islamic
groups originated in Turkey, continues in several forms.
In terms of official Islam represented by state appointed Imams, the Turkish-
Muslim community in London is a different case. The Turkish Directorate of
Religious Affairs has not appointed any Attaché responsible for religious
affairs in London'. During a meeting with the President of the Directorate in
London in 1992, I asked him whether there would be an appointment of any
Attaché for London. He told me that there would be no appointment for the
time being. During a. later visit to Turkey at the end of 1994, I inquired
whether the Directorate was planning to appoint a representative in London
to challenge the other Islamic movements that were gaining ground among
the Turkish community. At the time of writing this thesis, there was no plan
to this effect This suggests that for the foreseeable future, Turks in London
will not face a confrontation between the state supported official Islam and
other Islamic movements.
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Chapter Nine: Notes
1. Toprak (1981, P. 2) observes that Kemalist version of secularisation differs from its
historical development in the West where church and state became independent from
one another. The West relegated religion to the private sphere and its active interference
in public life was reduced considerably. In contrast, the Kemalist regime did not truly
separate religious institutions from the state but rather made them subservient to its rule.
Instead of granting independence to religious institutions from the state, the Kemalist
regime attributed new meaning to secularisation by supervising and controlling
religious activity. The organisational links between state bureaucracy and religious
establishments were not ceased but only modified.
2. According to Mardin (1989, p. '..the reproduction of Islamic societies is linked to a
common use of an Islamic idiom by the members of such societies'. He sees the Islamic
'idiom' pervasive to the extent that it covers all aspects of life in society, and compared to
its equivalents in the West, Islamic idiom, which frames the daily life strategies through
its wide-spread usage, is shared more equally by both upper and lower classes (p. 6).
Borrowing from Victor Turner, Mardin uses the root-paradigm as a term 'to characterise
dusters of meaning which serve as cultural maps for individuals; they enable persons to
find a path in their own culture.:. (p. 7).
3. Religious revivalism is a widely observed phenomenon and societies other than
Islamic also experience the rise of religious expression and polity. For a general
assessment, see Mary Elaine Heg,land (1987), 'Conclusion: Religious Resurgence in
Today's World - Refuge from Dislocation and Anomie or Enablement for Change' in
Richard T. Antoun & M. Elaine Hegland (eds.), Religious Resurgence, Contemporary Cases
in Islam, Christianity and Judaism Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, pp. 233-256; Peter
Beyer (1994), Religion and Globalization, Sage Publications, London.
For Jewish revivalism, see Ehud Sprinzak (1981) 'Gush Em-unim: The Tip of the Iceberg'
Jeruselam Quarterly, No. 21, pp. 28-47; J. David Schnall (1987) 'Religion and Political
Dissent in Israel! in Richard T. Antoun & M. Elaine Hegland (eds.), Religious Resurgence,
pp. 169-193; Eric Davis 'A Political Economy of Religious Radicalism in Egypt and Israel!
in Richard T. Anto-un & Mary Elaine Hegland (eds.), Religious Resurgence, pp. 145-166
For the analysis of religion and politics in America see, Allen D. Hertzke (1988)
Representing God in Washington, The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity, The
University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville; Benton Johnson, (1985) 'Religion and Politics in
America: The Last Twenty Years' in Philip E. Hammond (ed.), The Sacred in the Secular
Age, Berkeley, pp. 301-316.
4. Followers of Mahmud Hoca are known as Ismail Aga Cemaati, deriving its name
from the name of the Mosque where he is the Imam. Mahmud Hoca, aged more
than seventy, was a pupil of a leading Sheikh, Ahiskali All Haydar Eferidi who lived
during the late Ottoman and early republican periods. Mahmud Hoca, following his
mentor, affiliated himself with the Naqshbandiya Taxiqa (Sufi Order) which adheres
to Hanafiya school of law. Mahmud Hoca argued that Muslims must accept the
authenticity of Abu Hanifa's teaching without questioning and imitate his practice
of Islam. Thus, Mahmud Hoca dismisses the teachings of modernity and rejects
critical approach to Islam and translate it to the modern times (Cakir, 1993, p. 62).
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5. For a comparative study of the status of Islamic schools and policies, see K.
Wagtendonhk (1991) 'Islamic Schools and Islamic Religious Education' in W. A. R.
Shadid, and P. S., van Koningsveld (eds.), The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in
Western Europe, Kok Pharos Publishing House, Kampen, pp. 154-173; for the case of
Germany see Rotraud Wielandt (1993) 'Islamic Religious Education in a Pluralist
Society', British Journal of Religious Education, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 50-57; for Australian
case, see S. Balic (1993) 'Religious Education for Muslims within State Schools: the
Example of Austria', British Journal of Religious Education, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 44-49.
6. For a discussion of 1944 and 1988 Education Acts and their impact on RE, see
Colin Hart (1991) Religious Education, From Acts to Action, Cats Trust, Heaton,
Newcastle upon Tyne; Maini Levitt (1996) 'Nice when they are young' Contemporary
Christianity in families and schools, Avebury, Aldershot, pp. 21-49.
7. Recent reports suggest that schools that were established on the lines of religion
generate a distinct identity amongst students. An 18 years old student at the
Hasmonean Jewish grant-maintained school in north London, for example, describes
himself as a Zionist. He is more concerned with the events in Israel as his homeland
rather than what is happening in England. His political view is also indicative of the
kind of education he receives at this school. He states that 'I suppose I would vote
for a party if they had some good policies for the Jews or Israel:. (The Independent
Magazine, 25 May 1996, P. 12). Another young student who is also studying at the
same establishment and taking compulsory classes on Hebrew, the Talmud and the
Bible portrays an identity choice of an 18 years old who seems to be happy following
a code of modesty, no trousers, and uniforms covering elbows. At this point one can
incline to think that fourteen hours of religious education per week may have an
effect on the formation of young Jewish identity embedded in the traditions and
values purported by the school. The case of young students at the Swarninarayan
School in north-west London lends support to the argument that religion may instill
a sense of identity and sense of belonging. The Swaminarayan School is 'the
brainchild of Pramukh Swami Mharaj, guru of the Swaminarayan sect, who, on his
visit from India, was alarmed by what he saw as Britain's moral decline'. This
indicates that he ordered or advised his followers that their children should be
protected from such a moral decline through the institutionalisation of Hindu
education. This is the first Hindu school in the UK founded in 1992. Educating their
children in a Hindu school and teaching of Hindu religion and values seems to be
paying off as an 18 years old girl who is student at the school asserts that '[I] get
more moral guidance at a Hindus-only school... Now, being Hindu is more
important to me. I have sense of belonging, whereas my friends who are not
believers seem confused' (The Independent Magazine, 25 May 1996, P. 14).
8. Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan was born into a religious family. He was educated in
classical centres of learning, known as Medrese, at the end of Ottoman era. With the
closure of Medreses by the new Turkish Republic in 1924, he engaged in business for
a short time and then started working for the Directorate of Religious Affairs as a
preacher. Tunahan's central area of activity was to teach Quran to young generation
since he firmly believed that the early republican era was marked by outlawing the
teaching of the Qur'an. The ban on the teaching of the Qur'an was lifted in 1946
following the transition to a multi-party system. The new era allowed Tunahan and
his pupils to embark upon a concerted effort to establish mostly boarding centres for
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the teaching of the Qur'an known as the Qur'an Schools (Kuran Kurslari). After his
death in 1959, his followers attributed him spiritual powers (Keramet) as he was
believed to be Murshid who was granted a mystical intuition from the
Naqshbandiya chain of Sufi masters.
9. For an anthropological study of Naqshbandi movement in London, see All Tayfun
Atay (1994) Natishbandi Sufis in a Western Setting, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, School
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; For the development of
mystical Islam in the Dutch context, see N. Landman (1992) 'Sufi Orders in the
Netherlands. Their role in the institutionalisation of Islam' in W. A. R. Shadid, & P.
S. van Koningsveld (eds.), Islam in Dutch Society: Current Developments and Future
Prospects, Kok Pharos Publishing House, Kampen, pp. 26-39.
10. For the historical development and ideology of Wahhabi movement, see George
Rentz (1969) 'The Wahhabis' in A. J. Arberry (ed.) Religion in the Middle East, Vol. II,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 270-285; Christine Moss Helm (1981)
The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Ayman A.
Yassini (1982) 'Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom of Islam' in Carlo Caldarola (ed.) Religion
and Societies, Mouton Publishers, Amsterdam, pp. 61-84.
11. For the origins and historical development of Deobandi movement in India and
Pakistan, see Barbara D. Metcalf (1982) Islamic Revival in British India, 1860-1900, New
Jersey; Aziz Ahmad and G. E. Grunebaum (1970) Muslim Self-Statement in India and
Pakistan 1857-1968, Wies Baden.
12. In contrast to London, The Directorate established a noticeable presence in other
Western European cities. According to 1991 Activity Report of the Directorate, 604
mosques were under Diyanets control in Germany. The Directorate paid the salaries of
418 imams while 186 imams were appointed by the Directorate but paid by local
organisations. According to the same report, The Directorate employees 838 personnel
outside Turkey mainly located in Western Europe. Apart from permanent
appointments, Diyanet sends temporary imams and preachers in certain periods of the
year. Activity Report states that temporary appointment of religious personnel had risen
to 426 in 1991.
-
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Chapter Ten
Religio-Political Organisations
In Chapters Eight and Nine, the process of institutionalisation in the Turkish
community in London was analysed. The formation of various organisations,
their structures, clientele patterns and politics of identity were discussed in
order to examine their role in the reproduction of traditional values and in
the construction of Turkish/Turkish-Islamic identity. In this Chapter, I will
go one step further and present two organisations which are of a religio-
political nature. The analysis of religio-political organisations will then
complete the discussion on the process of institutionalisation and politics of
ethnicity, identity and religion in the Turkish community in London. Some of
the ethnographic material collected in Berlin and observations during my
visits to Belgium on two occasions will also be used in this Chapter. This will
contribute to our understanding of religio-political movements in a wider
context
Similar to religious organisations in London, religio-political organisations
were established as branches of umbrella organisations based in Germany
having close links with the political parties in Turkey. Two organisations of
this kind, the London Islamic-Turkish Association (LITA) (Londra Islam-Turk
Cemiyeti) and the London Islamic Culture and Recreation Society (LICARS)
(Londra Islami Kultur ye Egitim Teskilati- Milli Gorus) are widening their scope
of influence by recruiting an increasing number of clientele among the
Turkish youth in London. I would like to discuss these organisations in
historical order in order to describe the continuity and change in their
structures, membership patterns and strategies about various issues related to
the politicisation of a shared identity underlined by Islamic ideology.
10.1. Islam and Nationalism: Idealist Youth (111kucu Genclik)
The first organisation I will focus on is the London Islamic Turkish
Association (LITA) which has a long history of continuity and change. The
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establishment of LITA in Green Lanes, goes back to the late 1970s. LITA was
set up as a cultural and religious organisation without any particular political
alliance with a political party in Turkey. From its establishment to the early
1990s, it remained as a non-political cultural organisation offering Islamic
activities on a small scale and providing a small Mesjid, a place of worship.
Until March 1993 a. graduate of Islamic studies who retired in Turkey, had
served as an Imam and Director of LITA. The Imam, who is mostly referred
to as Hoca, came to London by invitation in 1983, after serving as an Imam
both in Turkey and in European countries like Germany and Belgium under
the employment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Hoca was authorised
to plan all the activities of LITA after his arrival.
My first visit to LITA was in 1989 when I was an MA student at SOAS,
University of London. I recall that during my first visit there was nobody at
LITA. Later, I made an appointment and realised that the association was
solely managed by Hoca who refrained from giving responsibilities to other
people. This was one of the reasons for having a. small number of visitors. It
had also come to my attention during the early visits that his family's
continued existence on the premises discouraged those who tend to observe
segregation of men and women. On several occasions his wife freely came
into the common room and made offerings. In our conversations Hoca argued
that Islam was a religion of tolerance that discouraged rigidity in religious
matters. By referring to other Mosques and attitudes of Imams, he seemed to
try to justify his position on Islamic behaviour. He said:
'Turkish Mosques are losing their jarria'a because of the hard-line
attitudes of their Imams. Their method of teaching Islam and
presenting it to the Jama'a make people go away from the Mosque
since these Imams were concerned primarily with the external elements
such as appearances, dress code, beard and turban. Even the small
children are exposed to same kind of rigid Islamic ideology. I feel that a
mild, tolerant and soft method of teaching should be employed.
Children should be taught religious music, art and mevlit. This would
be a reward for children those who come to the Mosque.'
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The Hoca's remarks are dismissed by other Mosques, and they accuse him of
being loose on religious teachings. As mentioned earlier, the diversity among
Turkish-Islamic organisations prevails in this context too. It sometimes is
translated into dispute and conflict
As pointed out on the previous page, LITA, in contrast to other Islamic
organisations that offer religious and cultural services, could not manage to
get much support due to the Hoca's attitude towards Islamic issues. The
opening of other Islamic centres as alternative places also worked against the
Hoca who increasingly lost clients. The success of the Valide Sultan Mosque
in forming a large Jama'a, for example, typifies LITA's failure in developing a
community of believers. The Valide Sultan Mosque was opened in 1992, some
ten years after the establishment of LITA, but was able to mobilise numerous
Turks to join its Jama'a, even recruiting members of LITA. With people
deserting LITA, the Hoca realised that he was losing his respectability and
the legitimacy of his position as an Imam and a religious leader. Without
followers he would no longer be able to continue to enjoy the facilities at his
disposal. The decline of interest in LITA motivated the Hoca to take new
steps to attract young people to his circle. Therefore, from 1990 onwards he
started inviting Turkish youth around Green Lanes to LITA. As a result, a
group of young people started to come to LITA during the evenings and at
the weekends. Since then, LITA has revived its activities thanks to these
young people who at the beginning showed great respect to the Hoca but
later began disagreeing with him over what kind of activities should be
organised at LITA.
The young people who started coming to LITA by Hoca's invitation also
started challenging the Hoca over the political alliance of LITA. Although the
Hoca also had nationalist tendencies, as pointed out by him during an
interview, he did not want to associate with a particular ideology of a
political party. The dispute between the Hoca and new young members of
LITA known as Idealists or Grey_ Wolves (Ulkuculer or Bozkurtlar), was
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translated into a political conflict that has weakened the Hoca's authority and
credibility among LITA's members. The number of members rose sharply to
150 and Hoca was removed from the administration at the executive
committee meeting in March 1993
It appears that the 1993 executive committee meeting was a turning point in
producing a political identity for LITA which blended with Islamic ideology.
Since then LITA has been politicised and has become a branch of the Turkish
Federation (Turk Federasyonu) in Germany, an umbrella organisation of
nationalist associations supporting the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
(Milliyetci Harelcet Partisi) in Turkey. The new political identity of LITA was a
synthesis of Turkic and Islamic values.
As soon as a new framework of identity had emerged, some members left
LITA and joined the Jama'a of other Mosques. The replacement of the
executive committee has transformed the politics of LITA and its membership
pattern a great deal. The number of young members soared and visitors
overwhelmingly comprised these idealistic youth while the activities centred
around political issues in the country of origin. New posters that are being
displayed on the walls represent the symbols of their political ideology.
Among them, a. photograph depicting the current leader of MHP, Alparslan
Turkes, is hung on the wall. Video films of speeches delivered by Turkes are
being constantly played for the visitors. Political issues such as Bosnia,
Cyprus, Western Thrace, the Turkic world and the Kurdish problem have
become the central focus of meetings. Speakers from academia, journalists
and politicians were invited from Turkey and Europe to address these issues
from the MHP's point ef view. In one case, the deputy chairman of MHP,
Riza Muftuoglu was invited as a speaker to a meeting held on 5 December
1994. Muftuoglu devoted considerable time to the Kurdish issue during his
talk. He said:
'Unfortunately enemies of Turkey are inciting our people of Kurdish
origin to revolt against the state. Sadly enough some Kurds seem to
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believe that they can divide Turkey and establish a separate state. We
believe that only a small number of people believe in such an utopia.
We also have a firm belief that overwhelming majority of them want to
live with us. We would like to remind those who are trying to evoke a
sense of hatred between Turks and Kurds that it is impossible to draw
a sharp line between them for the fact that Turks and Kurds lived
together for more than 900 years during which they intermarried,
fought against enemies side by side. Now, I ask how such an historical
amalgamation and strong integrity would be dissolved?'
As this statement implies, MHP does not want an open confrontation with
Kurds nor does their nationalism accommodate a. recognition of Kurds
having a different identity. Muftuoglu also made remarks about Turkey's
relations with the West When asked whether Turkey should enter the
European Union (EU) he gave the following reply:
'New economic and political alliances are emerging today. We are not
particularly against all these new formations. However we believe
that before joining any camp, Turkey must become a very strong
country. This is a prerequisite of nationalism. Unless you prove to be
strong, no matter whichever alliance you enter, you will have no
power and authority in decision 'making. Therefore before rushing to
join EU, Turkey must lead to the establishment of "Turkish Common
Market' or the 'Union of Turkic World' which would enable Turkey
and other Turkic countries to achieve economic independence. Then
Turkey can enter EU where it can defend its interests.'
The foregoing explanation indicates that in the hierarchy of relations with
other states, economic co-operation with Turkic countries of the former Soviet
Union assumes priority in the MHP's ideology. MHP's sympathy with the
Turkic world is also expressed in London. The newly elected executive
committee has quickly established relations with the Turks from Western
Thrace, Azerbaijan, Kazakhistan and Turkemans from northern Iraq. It seems
that a small political unity has been achieved by bringing the leaders of these
communities to London. LITA's ideologist youth denounce Kurdish
separatism in Turkey and organise meetings to defend and publicise their
views. Sometimes this leads to a political clash with people of Kurdish origin
who came from Turkey. LITA became a target of political violence twice in
the past A group of people wanted to burn down LITA's premises by
throwing petrol bombs. The first attack occurred in November 1993,
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damaging the building badly and the Mesjid was closed to prayers. The
second attack took place in the month of Rarnazan in March 1994. In a press
release sent to Turkish newspapers, LITA. responded to these attacks. It stated
that
'These deplorable attacks on our Mesjid and association in such a holy
month will never stop our activities. These kinds of attacks do not
scare us at all. We believe that any attack on the sacred premises of
Muslims like our small Mesjid will strengthen our commitment to our
ideals and beliefs.'
As these events unfold, politics in Turkey influence the political behaviour of
the Turkish community in London. This has had a paradoxical impact on
maintaining the community as a unity. It appears, on the one hand, that
political conflict in Turkey consolidates the identity of particular groups as in
the case of LITA's idealist youth and Kurdish activists. On the other hand,
political affairs in the country of origin create a sharper line of division
between Turks and Kurds to the extent that an atmosphere of compromise
evaporates.
Political activities of LITA are not confined to the Kurdish issue. LITA has
organised several meetings to support the plight of other Turkish people
around the world. In June 1993, for example, LITA organised a protest
meeting in front of the German Embassy in London to condemn the tragic
events in Sollingen, handing a petition to the Ambassador asking the German
government to take more serious measures to protect Turks and others
foreigners in Germany. LITA has also showed solidarity with Turkish-
Cypriots and demanded recognition from the English for the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. Since its beginnings, Bosnia has been an
important issue. It appears that religious sentiments and Islamic brotherhood
motivated many LITA members to take part in almost all the demonstrations
to publicise the plight of Muslims in Bosnia. It can be argued that all these
events have strengthened the collective identity of LITA's young members
because such issues evoke a strong sense of shared ideals.
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The idealistic youth of LITA regard Islam as an indispensable component of
Turkish identity. They believe that Turks rendered a great service to Islam in
history and in return, God elevated the position of Turks and made them
victorious over the non-believers. To facilitate the teaching of Islamic
practices, LITA employed a retired Imam from Turkey who served a year in
1993. During his stay, the Imam organised religious classes for young Turks
and children in the neighbourhood. During several of my visits to their small
Mesjid, I observed that it was packed, especially on Fridays. In a relatively
short time the Imam's authority was recognised and regular meetings on
Islam and the Muslim world were held.
An examination of LITA and LICARS reveals that political developments in
Turkey have had a. direct effect on religio-political organisations since their
raison d'être and survival very much depend on umbrella organisations. Every
stage of political developments such as internal divisions, ideological
transformation and changes in the political discourse of umbrella
organisations, is easily heard among the members in London through
constant exchange of visitors, availability of the Turkish press in London and
satellite dishes that exist in almost all Turkish households. In this context
Goulboume (1991, p. 7) observes that 'groups and individuals separated by
thousands of miles of ocean and land mass can now establish close links with
fellow-religionists, fellow-ethnics and fellow-adherents to a particular
ideology'. Various organisations and groups among Turkish communities in
Europe in general and in London in particular appear to be having a similar
experience.
After the 1992 general elections in Turkey, MHP followed a policy of
supporting the coalition government formed by the centre-right True Path
Party (TPP) and the centre-left Social Democratic Populist Party. Although
MHP did not get any ministerial position, it gave explicit support to the
formation of a coalition government whose partner happened to be a centre-
leftist party with an opposing ideology to MHP. MHP's outright support for
-
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a coalition government that included art ideologically irreconcilable party
was the beginning of serious debates within the ranks and files of MHP. A
group of newly elected young MPs raised their disapproval of the party
leadership on the grounds that Islamically oriented right-wing political
ideology was being undermined by supporting the coalition government
The opposition group within MHP claimed that their party appealed to the
religious sentiments of voters as well as national feelings, yet the party
leadership seemed to have ignored the Islamic component of the political
identity of the party. Nevertheless, their voice was silenced by the veterans of
MHP and the first divisions occurred within the party thereafter. The
opposition was led by Muhsin Yazicioglu who challenged Alparslan Turkes
arguing that the Islamic approach to political developments must be one of
the indispensable elements of MHP's political ideology. Then, seven MN
resigned from MHP and founded a new party called the Great Union Party
(BBP) (Buyuk Birlik Partisi).
Political divisions that occurred in Turkey were simultaneously felt in
European countries where there are numerous followers of MHP and newly
established BBP, including London. Without exception, all organisations
affiliated to MHP in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and
England experienced similar conflicts that resulted in divisions within the
umbrella organisations in Europe. These issues, originated in the country of
origin, dominated the agenda of LITA and its members were divided into
two groups. One group supported the foundation of a new party while the
other vehemently disagreed with such an initiative. One informer who
supported the views of Muhsin Yazicioglu, leader of BBP: 'I am not happy
with the division in the party. But such a step became necessary vis-à-vis the
authoritarian attitude of the old politicians. If you can not do anything in a
political group in accord with your line of thought, I think it is a wise thing to
leave the group. And that is what Yazicioglu had done.' Another young
member who used to come frequently to LITA before the division legitimised
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his preference to back Yazicioglu by referring to Islamic ideology. When
asked why he supported the opposition, he said:
'Islam has been undermined by the MHP leadership in designing a
political strategy. We were always told that Turkish identity was
moulded by Islamic beliefs. If you do not take religious principles
seriously when making politics then you lose your mission and no
longer can you claim that Islam is an essential part of your political
identity. That was the case with MHP when its leadership supported
TPP-RPP coalition at the expense of Islamic criteria. The opposition in
the Party was stimulated by religious concerns. When BBP was
founded I felt that my political ideals were closer to that party in
contrast to MHP.'
As the expression of this ex-member of LITA suggests, the ideological
dilemma within the body-politic of a mother organisation in the home
country determines the reactions of its sympathisers in London. The
polarisation of political groups epitomised by the divisions in the Turkish
community, lends support to my argument that political behaviour in the
society of origin is reproduced in London. This observation suggests that,
although the majority of the members seem to have settled in London, it is a
recurrent theme that political values and behaviours in the country of origin
still shape the political identity of the Turkish community in London.
10.2. Transplantation of Political Islam: National Vision (Mi//i Gorus)
So far, I have tried to establish that West European countries with sizeable
Turkish residents became an arena of competition to recruit people for
religious and political movements. Germany, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands were the first areas of a contest that was introduced into the
British context in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Of these emerging
politico-religious movements, the European Associations of National Vision
(EANV) (Aurupa Milli Gorus Teskilatlari) with its headquarters in Cologne, in
Germany, has branches in almost all the European countries and cities with
Turkish immigrant groups, including London. The establishment of a branch
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organisation in London in 1995 will be my second case in art analysis of the
relationship between religion and politics within the British-Turkish context.
The first attempts to open a branch of National Vision in London can be
traced to the late 1980s. Since my arrival in England in 1989, I have always
taken an interest in the Turkish community in London and have tried to keep
in touch. Therefore, I participated in many meetings where community issues
were discussed and I was able to meet several Turkish politicians who
expressed their interest in the affairs of the Turkish community in England.
This means that, in a sense, my fieldwork and participant observation started
a few years earlier than the formal start of this project for my Ph.D. As I
explained in Chapter Two, this background provided me with a longer
history of the institutionalisation process. My first encounter with the efforts
for the establishment of National Vision was in late 1989 when I met
Necmeddirt Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party, to which National Vision is
closely affiliated. It could be argued that National Vision was established as
the European branch of the Welfare Party. Necnaeddin Erbakan held a
meeting in the spring of 1989 at the premises of the Islamic Council of Europe
in London with young students and some academics. After the meeting it
came to light that Erbakan's efforts to recruit Turkish students and academics
had failed despite his assurances of financial assistance from National
Vision's headquarters in Cologne.
The first setback did not put Erbakart off opening a new branch in London.
Therefore, they tried to convince or infiltrate the existing associations which
were already established in the Turkish community. The Aziziye Mosque, for
example, was targeted by Erbakan and his advisers in Germany. The Imam
of the Aziziye Mosque was approached several times in the early 1990s to
convince him that the Mosque should become a base for National Vision. The
Director General of National Vision from Germany negotiated with the Imam
and offered him vicegerency of Erbakan, but the Imam refused the offer.
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During 1992 and 1993 there were frequent exchanges of visits between
Germany and London for further negotiations and planning for the opening
of the London branch. In March 1994, Erbakan's nephew came to London to
speed up the process of establishing the London branch. During the meeting
Erbakan's nephew outlined their strategy:
'We, as the Head Office based in Germany, are ready to provide you
whatever necessary in terms of advise, planning and finance as soon
as you take decisive steps towards the setting up of an organisation. I
advise you that you carefully look at the structure of our organisation
and try to form same or at least similar one. You should keep in mind
that the problems you might address might differ from that of
Germany where there is a large and very well established group of
our followers. Therefore, try not to alienate general public and adopt
a constructive discourse towards all sections in the Turkish
community.'
As the contents of the above speech establish beyond any doubt, there are
cross-country relations among religio-political organisations as in the case of
National Vision. This meeting also unfolds the complex relations involving
financial transactions between groups based in different countries. Almost
one year after this meeting, a place was rented in the vicinity of Newington
High Street where there are Turkish Mosques and a significant number of
Turks. The opening of the London branch of National Vision took place on 5
February 1995 under a different name as the London Islamic Culture and
Recreation Society (LICARS) (Londra Islami Kuli-ur ye Egitim Teskilati).
Although LICARS presented itself in the beginning as not being identical
with National Vision, attendance by the Director General of National Vision,
its representatives from main European cities and a Welfare Party MP from
Turkey at the opening ceremony disclosed the religio-political identity of
LICARS as the London branch of National Vision. This observation was later
confirmed by the fact that the president of LICARS always refers to this
organisation as National Vision and displays the symbols and posters clearly
confirming an affiliation to the umbrella organisation.
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The opening ceremony of LICARS also revealed the nature of relations
among Islamic organisations. The nature of attendance at the ceremony
suggested that transnational Islam is broadening its institutionalisation in
Europe. The organisers had invited a range of representatives from several
establishments including The Muslim Parliament, The Islamic Party of
Britain, The Muslim World League, Islamic Cultural Centre and presidents of
Turkish Islamic organisations as well as ambassadors of Muslim countries.
Guests were also present from several branches of National Vision in
Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, France and Germany including its
Director General. The opening ceremony of LICARS also exposed the political
tensions among the Turkish speaking communities in London, rooted in the
divergence of political and religious identity. The resurfaced religio-political
tension has its roots in Turkey and it re-emerged in London just as other
behavioural patterns are reproduced. At the opening ceremony there were
protests by opposition groups formed by the alliance of Alawites and some
Kurds from Turkey who support different religious and political ideologies.
The protesters threw eggs and tomatoes at the participants and chanted
'Death to Erbakan', 'Death to Sharia', 'Fundamentalism will die in London'.
The banners they carried read 'Turkey will not become Iran', 'No to the
Sharia organisation'. Similar incidents are recurrent themes of political life in
Turkey. This incident shows the nature of religio-political conflict within
already diversified Turkish speaking communities in London.
10.2.1. Origins of Political Islam in Europe: National Vision as an Umbrella
Organisation
National Vision came into existence in 1985 as the outcome of a merger of
three associations defending similar ideas that were established in the 1970s
in Germany. The European Turkish Union (ETU) (Avrupa Turk Birligi), the
Cologne Islamic Centre (CIC), (Koln Islam Merkezi) and the Islamic Union of
Europe (IUE) (Aurupa Islam Birligi) have all promoted Islamic education and
established Mosques to address the religious needs of adults and nourish the
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Islamic identity of children. According to a booklet published by National
Vision in 1993, these three organisations decided to unite under an umbrella
organisation in 1985 on the grounds that they were not only in harmony with
each other regarding religious and political views but also because their voice
to promote their ideals would be heard better (AMGT, Avrupa Milli Gorus
Teskilatlari, 1993, p. 9) Following the unification of these three organisations,
National Vision expanded throughout Europe in the late 1980s and even
spread to USA, Australia and Central Asia in the first half of the 1990s. Since
its establishment, National Vision has been involved in a wide range of
activities and organised itself to address various problems of the Turkish
Muslims.
The description of the organisational structure will reveal the large spectrum
of issues National Vision is concerned with. National Vision 's organisational
structure and managerial set-up' include the General Headquarters, Regional
Directorships and Branch Directorships. The organisational structure of
National Vision shows that a vast number of sections and sub-sections were
formed to address various issues confronted by Turkish immigrants in
Germany and elsewhere. The organisational complexity informs us that
National Vision is one of the firmly organised Turkish religio-political
institutions in Western Europe. The range of functions it hosts or supports
both in Germany and in other European countries, with significant Turkish
immigrants, draws considerable interest and participation from the Turkish
community.
I will now analyse the contents of two documents which describe National
Vision's raison d'être, its purposes, functions, aspirations and plans as an
institutional force for the reproduction and maintenance of Islamic political
identity among Turkish immigrants. The first document informs us of the
foundational aspirations and goals of National Vision and its approach to
current status and conditions of Turkish Muslims in particular and Muslims
in Europe in general. National Vision organised its 11th annual general
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committee meeting on 3rd June 1995 in Frankfurt The following highlight
from the opening speech of the General Director at the meeting to a crowd of
almost ten thousand supporters and a handful of representatives from non-
Turkish Muslim organisations clarifies National Vision's policies. The
speaker starts off by acknowledging the permanent status of second and third
generations of Turkish immigrants. Since the young generation is a
permanent part of the host society as evidenced by the establishment of so
many economic, educational and cultural organisations, the Turkish
community should be granted the following rights:
'Islam as the religion of Turkish community should be recognised
officially by the German authorities as in other European countries
such as Belgium, Austria and Spain. Turkish children should be
given the right for bilingual education. Members of the Turkish
community should be able to participate into politics fully during the
elections. Turkish immigrants should be granted dual nationality.
citizenship should be granted not on he lines of blood but on the
basis of birthplace.' (Speech text, p. 4, 1995)
National Vision's Director, similar to other Turkish community organisations
(see Chapters Eight and Nine), places special emphasis on the reproduction
and maintenance of Turkish identity in a foreign land and suggests ways in
which this can be achieved. He argues that
`If we want to live without losing our identity we should do the
following: We should organise special courses for the mother
language and the language of the host country. In order to increase
the success rate of our children in primary and secondary schools we
should establish pre-school courses for their preparation. Advisory
bureaus should also be founded to help youngsters to find their way.
In order to lead a life in harmony with the receiving society, cultural
centres should be opened for common events. Society is full of evils.
For the protection of our children from these evils we should
establish youth clubs offering facilities in sports, music and folklore.
Moreover, we should also co-operate with recognised organisations
to fight against drug use and help them found centres of drug
rehabilitation' (p. 4-5).
This statement clearly shows that National Vision's plans and activities are
not purely religious activities. From this perspective, it differs from other
religious organisations. For example-it supports the teaching of music and art
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to children and organises courses on karate and similar sports so that young
people can find something that draws their attention to National Vision's
activities. In addition, National Vision organises supplementary classes for
the Turkish children. It is difficult to find in other Turkish organisations such
a policy of varied activities that extends the religious domain.
Political participation has always been encouraged by National Vision to
secure the rights of immigrants. To this effect, the Director especially draws
attention to political participation in the existing parties as political
involvement is seen as an effective way of gaining rights and protecting them.
Although gender difference is strictly observed during the meetings in the
form of segregation of males and females, National Vision takes the position
of including Muslim women in all the aforementioned activities .National
Vision is also concerned with the increasing rate of racist attacks on Turkish
immigrants. All kinds of racism are condemned by the Director as these are
shameful events occurring in the modern world.
National Vision takes a different position with regard to Turkey's application
for full membership of the European Union. In contrast to the Welfare Party
of Turkey, National Vision sees no harm in integrating with Europe. It is a
well known phenomenon that the Welfare Party strongly opposes Turkey's
membership in European Union. Paradoxically, National Vision argues that
there is no obstacle for a closer relation with Europe. The Director's statement
unfolds this point as:
'From a religious-philosophical point of view, there is in no difficulty
in accepting integration and establishing closer ties with Europe for a
Muslim believer. It is hoped that such an integration in and drawing
close to the larger society should not be used as a means of
oppression and total dependency. Incorporation and integration with
the Christian world is suggested by the Qur'an, let alone rejected.
The Qur'an had invited humanity to such a union. This message is
addressed not only Christians but also their spiritual kin, i.e. Jewish
people. The Qur'an calls upon Christians and Jewish people
described as 'people of the book' (aid al-kitab) along with Muslims not
to pray other than one God. The Qur'an denotes Christian world as
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the most possible ally of affinity in love. When one looks at he
current practices in the contemporary Christian world from the
viewpoint of how universal values of the Qur'anic teachings are put
into practice, it can be concluded that the Christian world is more
closer to the Qur'an than the Muslim world. Therefore, the benefits
that one expect from integrating with Europe are not much lesser
than the gains from integrating with the contemporary Muslim
world. In conclusion, we should enter into European Union if our
benefits require to do so. But on the other hand, we should no go as
far as to say 'if there can be no membership, there will be no life' (p.
10-11).
The different approach to Turkey's application for full membership in the
European union, it seems, has not caused a rift and conflict between National
Vision and the Welfare Party. The leadership of the Welfare Party does not
mention its adamant disapproval of European Union membership to an
immigrant audience as I observed during my fieldwork in Berlin. I have
followed the Welfare Party's current leader Necmeddin Erbakan's two long
public addresses during large meetings that took place in Belgium in which
he pointed out that Turkish immigrants have become a permanent part of the
European society forming an increasingly larger group than other Muslim
minorities. During his speeches Erbakan encouraged the Turkish minority to
participate in the life of the host societies in Europe rather than living in
isolated social and political ghettos. In contrast to this stand, Erbakan used a
completely opposite discourse in domestic politics designating the West as a
Christian Club. National Vision and the Welfare Party seem to have an
opportunist position towards relations with Europe, in that while the Welfare
Party demonstrates a rejecting political stand towards the West, National
Vision endorses closer relations with Europe and fosters positive feelings
towards integration with the host society of which the Turkish immigrants
are considered to be a permanent part
The second document used in this analysis is the 1994-95 Annual Activity
Report, prepared and presented by the General Secretary of National Vision
during the 11th general committee meeting on 3rd June 1995 in Frankfurt
This document outlines the main areas of National Vision's activities and the
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extent to which it has reached its goals and aspirations set out in the former
document whose content was analysed above. The Annual Activity Report
starts off with an assertion that National Vision has succeeded in becoming
one of the largest civic-religious organisations with substantial within ten
years. Five areas of activity, institutionalisation, education, publicity,
publication and general projects including establishing external relations and
supplementary organisations were explained in the document The Annual
Report declares that National Vision has several regional branches in more
than 40 countries, of which 15 are based in Germany, 18 in other European
countries, three in Asia, two in USA, one in Australia and one in London
which was opened in 1995. Table 10.1. shows the details of organisations and
membership of National Vision.
Table 10.1: Number of National Vision's branch organisations, members and estimated
number of congregation attending Mosques run by National Vision.
Year Number of Branches Members Congregation
1985/86 163 9344 33890
1986/87 180 9765 36460
1987/88 214 13970 54590
1988/89 229 16184 55835
1989/90 277 18387 56515
1990/91 372 22482 59546
1991/92 437 26877 61276
1992/93 688 32108 84989
1993/94 766 38128 102830
1994/95 791 477'5 112323
Source: The Annual Activity Report, Frankfurt, 1995; Milli Gazete, Special Issue on National
Vision, 3.6.1995
The number of branch organisations includes Mosques and all other
institutions at district, regional and national level. The total membership
comprised all members of these branch organisations. As Table 10.1. shows,
the number of branch organisations and members has steadily increased over
the years. 1
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As it was indicated in the first document, National Vision considers the
education of young children conducive to the establishment of better relations
with the host society in terms of furnishing children with linguistic abilities
for better communication and providing them with opportunities to improve
their academic success and professional talents. According to the 1994-95
Activity Report, 2885 students attended various summer courses organised in
59 centres. In addition to summer and short courses National Vision initiated
the establishment of private schools. Bergkam.en Girls College (Bergkamen Kiz
Koleji), Belgium-Hensies Ibn-i Sina Institute (Belcika-Hensies), Berlin College
of Islamic Sciences (Berlin Islami Rimier Okulu), Duisburg Girls College
(Duisburg Kiz Koleji) and Schiedam Girls College (Schiedam Kiz Koleji) were
established by 1994.
During my fieldwork, I visited Berlin College of Islamic Sciences (BCIS)
which offers Islamic classes to Turkish children. BCIS's teaching programme
was similar to that of Imam-Hatip Schools in Turkey. Students, aged between
twelve and sixteen are encouraged to follow an Islamic curricula outside their
formal school hours. Recitation and interpretation of the Qur'an, prophetic
traditions, Islamic history and Turkish culture and language are among the
main core topics taught at BCIS by the graduates of Islamic Studies in Turkey.
The current facilities and physical conditions imply that National Vision does
not allocate significant amounts of money to educational investments. This
observation is supported by the youth interviewed in Berlin. A Turkish
university student made a critical evaluation of National Vision's educational
policy. When asked how far National Vision succeeds in its educational
endeavours he made the following comment
'National Vision claims that we are permanent here. Therefore,
education of young generation should be given considerable weight
I totally agree with this position as a student who did not have much
support so far. Nevertheless, I have the impression that National
Vision is not doing enough in proportion to the support it receives
from people. Many people rush to raise money National Vision
talks about educating their children. For years, our parents made
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substantial donations for educational causes but one can easily
observe that only a little amount of this money had been channelled
to the foundation of educational establishments.'
Another young Turkish student took a more critical position regarding
National Vision's use of its funds. About the spending of National Vision's
funding he said:
'I was brought to Germany in 1975. My parents were virtually
illiterate and not very helpful in my educational life despite their
wish for my success. So they were willing to support any kind of
initiative that might likely to help children like me. National Vision
is one of the organisations that realised how vulnerable the parents
were in these matters. Whenever they asked for donation, my parents
donated willingly, hoping that they can establish educational
institutions. As you know, National Vision was established in 1985
and since then it has collected huge amounts of money. Where was
that money invested? Certainly not in Germany. You see, we have
not a proper school or a course funded by National Vision though
there was a desperate demand for quality colleges. I believe that if
they had wanted to materialise their promises they could have done
so because there was enough funding and support and also legally
there was no obstacle for self-financed colleges. Instead of investing
in our future in Germany, National Vision channelled a bulky
amount of the funds to Turkey for the use of electoral propaganda. I
feel betrayed by this policy.'
The foregoing suggests that the young generation, at least some of them, are
becoming more critical of National Vision and other Turkish community
organisations. It appears that young Turks are developing a critical attitude
towards the policies and practices of Turkish institutions. The development of
a questioning frame of mind may be attributed to their education in
Germany. Policies of National Vision and similar organisations which do not
give young generations' concerns a priority, have contributed to the
emergence of such attitudes. As far as my informants in Berlin were
concerned, it appears that educated young Turks especially are disassociating
themselves from organisations affiliated directly to a political party or an
institution based in Turkey. These disaffiliated young people from
organisations such as National Vision were taking new initiatives to form
small but independent groups. A number of young people whom I talked to
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during my fieldwork in Berlin told me that they were in search of genuine
solutions to their problems 'within the European context'. 'Made in Turkey
solutions' were not accepted any longer; therefore, young people tended to
initiate 'German based' institutions rather than 'Turkey based' organisations.
When asked why they were not willing to join the existing organisations and
change their nature by participating in their decision-making committees and
possibly leadership contests, the typical answer was 'the gap between young
generations and older generation in this context is growing. Communication
lines are cut off because both generations have different mental maps.'
This widespread perception among youth indicates that there is an ongoing
tension between the young generation and their elders. But despite the
tensions and generational conflicts, National Vision still manages to draw
several members from young people because Islam is used as a. powerful
vehicle for propagation. Nevertheless, my findings, as presented above,
suggest that there is an emergent identity construction among the young
generation (Phinney 1993a, p. 47-48; Weinreich, 1986b, p. 304) This emergent
identity is not shaped by 'Turkey based perceptions' but rather it is
increasingly based on 'local, European based perceptions'. This argument
might be taken a step further to suggest that German-Turkish, Dutch-Turkish,
French-Turkish and British-Turkish identities are emerging (see Chapter Six).
National Vision tries to achieve a representative role not only for Turks living
in Europe but also for the Muslims of other national origins. To achieve such
a status National Vision is trying to establish good relations with other
Muslim communities and organisations. National Vision is attempting to
establish its international credibility by organising international meetings.
These meetings are organised as huge conferences attended by a large
audience of National Vision supporters, and representatives of Muslim
communities from around the world. National Vision holds two main
conferences annually in different cities of Europe. These two conferences are
called 'Conference on the Problems_of European Muslims' and 'Conference
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on Introducing Islam To Europe'. The first of these conferences was held in
1987 in Rotterdam and has been repeated annually in different European
cities.
As its title 'Conference on Introducing Islam To Europe' suggests, these
conferences aim at acquainting non-Muslims with the religion of Islam which
had a 'decisive effect on the attitudes and behaviours of Turkish people and
other Muslims living in Europe' as one official from National Vision argued.
The expectation from organising introductory seminars and conferences is to
familiarise the larger community with the values and traditions of Muslim
ethnic communities. It seems that proselytising non-Muslims is not the
driving force behind spreading information on Islam. Thus, National Vision
does not claim to have a proselytising stance. It can be argued that seminars
and meetings of such a nature might produce results which could contribute
to ethnic conflict resolution. It may also be expected that by eradicating
stereotypes and prejudices, intra-ethnic relations could be established which
would facilitate mutual understanding between various communities.
As a part of its effort for international recognition, National Vision also
participates in the meetings of other Muslim organisations in Europe.
National Vision also initiated the idea of establishing a Centre for European
Islamic Unity (Aurupa Islam Birligi) in Cologne in 1993 and held a meeting on
28-29 August of the same year in Davos, Switzerland which was attended by
134 representatives of 38 Muslim organisations in Europe. The delegates of
Muslim organisations met again in Basel, Switzerland to discuss the position
of Muslims in Europe and decided to co-operate in the future. At the time of
writing the thesis the decision to build the Centre in Cologne was still waiting
to be implemented. National Vision modified its name during its 11th Annual
General Assembly meeting in June 1995 in Frankfurt, Germany. The name
was changed from European Association of National Vision to that of
National Vision Islamic Community in order to strengthen its claim to be the
representative of not only Turkish Muslims but the Muslim nation 'Unzind.
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It is clear form the above analysis that political Islam is also transplanted
among Turkish communities in Europe. As part of their expansionist policy,
two grassroots political organisations with Islamic ideology, LITA and
National Vision, were also established in London of which LITA's political
ideology was shaped by Islam and strong Turkish nationalism, which has
two paradoxical implications for the identity construction. The religio-
political ideology of LITA strengthens the group identity, but on the other
hand, produces a marginalised identity which exacerbates political
polarisation among the Turkish speaking communities in Europe. National
Vision's political identity was also marked by Islam, but instead of
nationalism the idea of Umma is emphasised. Therefore, it supports the
formation of transnational Islamic political identity among Turkish
communities and other Muslims in Europe.
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Chapter Ten: Notes
1. National Vision: Organisation of General Headquarters includes a Board of
Governors consists of a General Director and seven Deputy-General Directors each
is responsible for a designated sub-section as shown below:
Board of Governors
General Director
1- Deputy-General Manager as General Secretary
2- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Organisation
3- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Education
4- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publicity
5- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Personnel
6- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publications
7- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Pilgrimage
Below the Board of Governors there is a Management Committee comprised of
general director, seven Deputy-Generals and Directors of sub-sections as:
Management Committee
1- General Director
2- Deputy-General Manager as General Secretary
3- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Organisation
4- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Education
5- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publicity
6- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Personnel
7- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Publications
8- Deputy-General Manager as Director of Pilgrimage
9- Director of Legal Affairs
10-Director of Higher Religious Commission
11-President of University Students
12-President of Youth Organisation
14-President of Women Organisation
15-President of Workers' Association
The organisations of sub-sections which operate under the administration of
directorates an presidencies are devised to reach a maximum effectiveness by
sharing responsibilities within the organisational structure of National Vision's
headquarters in Cologne.
General Directorate
-Deputy-General Directors
-Directorate of Higher Religious Commission
-Directorate of Legal Affairs
-Directorate of Accountancy and Finance
-Directorate of Evaluation and Monitoring
General Secretariat	 _
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-Presidency of Women Organisation
-SEDAM Research Centre
-Presidency of Workers Association
-Department of Workers Union
-Presidency of External Relations
-Department of Press and Archive
Directorate of Organisation
-Presidency of Youth Organisations
Directorate of Education
-Presidency of University Students
-Schools
-Permanent Schools
-Summer Schools
-Short Courses
Directorate of Publicity
Directorate of Personnel
Directorate of Publications
-Video Club
-Book Club
-Book Fair
-Publication of Books and Publicity Material
Directorate of Pilgrimage
Chapter Eleven
Conclusions
I have argued in Chapter One that European countries are increasingly becoming
multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious as a result of immigration and
s
settlement of non-indigenous people. This means that European cities are
accommodating an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous population. The
settlement of immigrants in European countries gave rise to the establishment of
permanent ethnic minorities with varying linguistic, cultural and religious
differences. These communities have reproduced their distinct value systems in
the midst of social and cultural structures of receiving countries. The
institutionalisation of ethnic minority cultures exacerbated the heterogeneity of
host societies to a certain extent by expressing their own languages, religions,
food, music and dress. This means that new identities have emerged in Europe.
Among these new communities, Muslims constitute a significant group with an
estimated number of 6.8 million who live in the European Union countries'.
Although the presence of Muslims in Europe is not a new phenomenon, it
could be argued that the expression of Islamic identity has become more
pronounced in recent years. The growth of Western-educated young
generations and the rise of global/transnational Islamic movements are
important sources of motivation for Muslims in Europe to express their
identity in Western countries. For example, in recent years, Muslims in
Europe have become more concerned with the religious education of their
children (Anwar, 1995a, p. 243); they have shown strong reactions against the
prohibition of headscarfs in schools and demanded legal recognition on local
levels. Expression of Islamic identity has also taken place in the face of
international events concerning Muslims such as in Bosnia, Palestine, and
Kashmir. The marginalisation of Muslims on local levels and their
victimisation on a global level, mobilised Muslims in Europe and
strengthened their sense of belonging to the Muslim Umma. However, as I
have mentioned throughout the thesis, Muslims in Europe accommodate a
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great deal of diversity (Vertovec and Peach, forthcoming). Even a cursory
look at the Muslim communities such as Pakistanis, Algerians, Moroccans
and Bangladeshis in the West would reveal that all these communities have
diversities of Islamic movements within themselves. The Turkish community
in Europe is a part of emerging 'European Islam' and has its own diversity in
the expression of Turkish-Muslim identity. However, this research has shown
that Turks in Britain are one of the under-researched ethnic communities.
A proper understanding of Muslim communities in Europe depends upon the
analysis of 'Islams' rather than 'Islam'. As I have argued in Chapter Three,
identity construction is a multidimensional phenomenon. National history,
myths, language, shared values and a. sense of solidarity all influence the
formation of ethnic and religious identities. The construction of Islamic identities
also goes through a similar process, underlined by the diversity of variables
which make Muslim groups heterogeneous. Therefore, Turkish-Muslim identity
as expressed by the Turkish community in London should be seen as a micro-
unit of an already diversified Muslim entity.
My research presented in this thesis, I believe, fills a vacuum in research on
micro-Islamic communities in Britain. I mentioned in the introductory Chapter
that the overwhelming majority of research on Muslims in Britain has focused on
Asian Muslims. It seems that Islam in Britain is usually equated with Asian
Muslims in the public imagination This clearly indicates that the Turks as a
micro-community within the larger Islamic limma are generally not included in
studies of Muslims in Britain This means that any generalisation about Islam
and Muslims in Britain, drawing upon studies on micro-communities, would
be misleading due to the diversity within Islamic communities. Therefore, I
suggest that before making any generalisations about Muslims, 'Islaras'
should be studied because there is no single expression of 'Islam' even within
the same ethnic or national group.
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I explained in Chapter One that the focus of this thesis would be on the
politics of ethnicity, identity and religion among Turks in London. Therefore,
issues related to family, marriage, reproduction of cultural values and their
relation to identity construction were analysed in Chapter Five. The re-
establishment of Turkish families facilitated the institutionalisation of culture,
religion and language in London. The analysis of identity politics within the
Turkish community revealed that family, marriage and social networks have
played an important role in every stage of immigration. I have demonstrated in
Chapter Five that family, kin and social networks were involved in three
overlapping stages of Turkish experience of *migration I have suggested (see
Figure 5.3.) that pre-migration, migration/settlement processes and post-
settlement stages were marked by the involvement of various networks and by
the reproduction of traditional sets of relationships rooted in shared values. I
have explained in that Chapter, for example, that family, friends, neighbours and
village men helped each other in finding jobs and accommodation during the
course of migration and settlement Kin and social networks were and are being
reproduced after the family reunifications.
My findings suggest that contextual factors led to the establishment of networks
not necessarily confined to family, kin and village origin. This means that social
networks were expanded by the influence of situational elements so as to include
people previously not related on the basis of descent or village origin (Ladbury,
1977, p. 307; Werbner, 1995, p. 214). Different areas were mentioned which have
generated new social relations. I have explained, for example, that adherence to a
particular religious group creates a 'religious network'. Economic activities can
also be mentioned as a facilitating factor for widening the social networks. I have
argued in Chapter Five that the 'trust' derived from belonging to the same
ethnic/national/religious/ideological group can facilitate the establishment of
partnership among Turkish people. Marriage and reconstruction of Turkish
families also widen existing social networks through new alliances.
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The establishment of family and marriage practices in the Turkish community
inform us that traditional values are constantly reproduced as an expression of
Turkish identity. First of all, marriage is still seen as an important institution for
socialisation. Therefore considerable social pressure is brought on single
individuals to get married (White, 1994, p. 38-39; Delaney, p. 112; Bainbridge,
1986, p. 447). Parents who would like to arrange a marriage for their son, for
example, are still seeking for intact 'honour' and 'reputation' of the girl
candidate. Therefore, girls are encouraged to avoid situations which may
damage their honour and family reputation. However, the meaning of honour
and reputation is changing for the young generation. In contrast to parental
attitudes they do not see, for example, social outings with unrelated male friends
as damaging their honour and reputation. And increasingly they want to make
their own choices for marriage. The findings in this thesis also suggest that
'control' over the girls, in contrast to boys, has much to do with the cultural
practices, not necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification
for parental control can not be based totally on religious grounds. Had it been
so, they should have developed the same attitudes spontaneously for their
sons because religious principles apply to both sexes equally.
The generational differences are not confined to the issue of marriage. It is
argued in Chapter Three that migration experience might cause 'paradigm shift'
(Jackson, 1986, p. 2). This means that traditionally-loaded meanings of some
concepts may loose their importance with the fusion of novel ideas through
acculturation, social interaction and schooling in Britain. The analysis of in-depth
interviews and survey results suggest that such a paradigm shift is taking place
between generations. As mentioned earlier (p. 167), Turkish parents are deeply
concerned with the transmission of traditional values to the young generation in
order to protect their identity from 'cultural contamination'. Therefore, parents
consistently put pressure on them to 'absorb' and 'internalise' the cultural values
of the Turkish community.
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Although there is no whole-sale rejection of traditional values, it appears that the
young generation are developing different attitudes towards parental values. I
discussed in Chapter Six, for example, that although most of the Turkish young
people agree with the preservation of parental culture, they seem to attribute
different meanings to some of the elements of traditional values. There is a
tendency among young Turks to see marriage, social relations and sexuality in a
somewhat different way to that of their parents. The overwhelming majority of
young people claim that they have disagreements with their parents over
'meeting and socialising with the opposite sex', 'type of clothing', 'spending time
outside the house', 'restriction of freedom', 'friendship with non-Turks and non-
Muslims' and 'the way marriages are arranged' (see Table 6.7.).
The development of different attitudes towards these issues may be attributed to
the socialisation experience of the young generation in Britain. In contrast to their
parents, young people have to deal with multiple identity choices. Parents as the
first generation maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host
society's social and cultural values. Therefore, reactionary response curbs the
fusionary effect of assimilation among the first generation members of the
Turkish community. Young Turks, on the other hand, as a 'bridge generation',
(Human (1933) cited in Lewis 1982, p. 187) seem to have ambiguous tendencies
towards some of the values and habits of their community. They have a desire,
on the one hand, to preserve parental values at home, and on the other, to adopt
some elements of the host culture outside. This means that there is an emergent
identity construction taking place among the young generation. This
emergent identity is not exclusively shaped by 'Turkey/Cypriot inspired
perceptions', but rather is increasingly based on 'local/British inspired
perceptions'. This argument might be taken a step further to suggest that
British-Turkish identities are emerging among young Turks in London. My
findings support the theoretical approaches of Markston-Adams (1992, p. 174)
and Phirmey (1993a, p. 47) who argue that 'social-contextual factors' on
identity formation should be taken into account in the analysis of how
identities are shaped. Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that the emergent
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Turkish identity among young Turks in London is expected to be influenced
and shaped to a certain degree by the 'British social and cultural context'.
I have argued throughout the thesis that religion is one of the significant markers
of Turkish identity. Therefore, the first generation of the Turkish community
established Islamic institutions as soon they acquired sufficient resources. These
institutions were meant to facilitate the transmission of religious values to young
Turks. My findings, as presented in Chapter Seven, suggest that attitudes of
young people towards religion are also changing. Although almost all young
Turks still believe in the basic principles of Islam, it seems that religion is
becoming a symbolic attachment for many of them. The survey analysis on the
intellectual dimension of religious commitment among young Turks clearly
indicates that young people know very little about Islam (see Tables 7.5; 7.6; and
7.9.)
The lack of knowledge about the basic principles of Islam might be attributed to
several factors. It can be argued, for example, that they do not learn much about
their religion in the schools because there seem to be no special provisions for the
leaching of Islam and Turkish culture. Another reason may be the failure of
Islamic institutions to address a larger young audience because of their mostly
out-dated teaching methods. Findings on the ritualistic dimension of religiosity,
on the other hand, show that only a small number of young people perform
prescribed Islamic practices. Young Turks know little about their religion and
they generally do not fulfil the required religious duties. Yet, most of them still
believe in it This means that a symbolic religiosity is developing among the
Turkish youth who seem to be increasingly feeling the tension generated by
continuity and change. It appears that young Turks will experience this tension at
least for the foreseeable future. Parents and religious organisations will continue
to teach the young generation the importance of religion and will try to inculcate
an Islamic belief in their sense of belonging to the Turkish-Muslim community.
However, social and cultural effects of the British context will also influence the
young generation throughout their life which will inevitably induce changes in
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the emergent Turkish identity the among young generation to a certain extent,
which would enable them to accommodate a sense of belonging to the
multicultural community in Britain.
The role of cultural, religious and religio-political organisations in the
construction and maintenance of Turkish identity is also relevant in this
context Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten showed that the organisations and
associations of various kinds were established and used by the Turkish
community in London as a response to changing social and cultural
conditions. These organisations have different membership and clientele
profiles, different administrative structures, strategies and purposes. The
foundational aspirations and priorities of Turkish organisations, reflected in
their activities and functions, reveal that there are overlapping as well as
dissimilar, even conflicting concerns among the Turkish community. This
means that the institutionalisation of identity politics of assumes diverse
meanings according to the cultural, religious and political orientations of
Turkish organisations. As pointed out in Chapter Eight, the process of
community formation with its own 'cultural boundaries' from that of
fragmented individuals through family unions and marriages, was
accompanied by the process of institutionalisation in various areas. The raison
d'être of Turkish organisations lies in the fact that settlement and post-
settlement processes generated numerous problems for the community and
these challenging problems needed to be addressed. The issues around
culture, language, religion, welfare and education of the young generation
preoccupied parental and familial concerns. It can be argued that Turkish
organisations emerged in response to these concerns which are related to the
expression of ethnicity and identity.
The analysis of Turkish/Cypriot organisations suggests that there is a subtle
differentiation between mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots which could
be seen as the two poles of Turkish identity. My findings confirm that
minority organisations are established on ethnic and national lines. In
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addition to that, even within the same ethnic or national group there is a
discernible degree of internal differentiation rooted in the geographical
origins of an ethnic group. The membership structure and clientele profile of
the Turkish/Cypriot organisations in London suggest that such a
differentiation exists between mainland and Cypriot Turks. This
differentiation can be explained by 'self ascription' rather than an external
attribution. Both groups define themselves as 'Turks' and 'Muslims' vis- -vis
'others'. They also attribute more or less the same characteristics to Turkish
identity. They would argue, for example, that Turks are 'Muslims', and
'culture', 'tradition', 'family', 'kin' and 'honour' are important elements of
Turkish identity. The concern over the Cyprus issue is central to both groups.
Transmission of traditional values to the young generation concerns equally
mainland and Cypriot Turks and has lead them to join forces to reproduce
Turkish identity. However, internal differentiation emerges when Turkish-
Cypriots define themselves vis- -vis mainland Turks. Therefore, I would
suggest that Turkish identity is diversified in London in contrast to Turkish
communities in other West European countries and it seems to be plausible to
suggest that the self-ascribed duality prepares a ground to discuss 'Turkish
identities' rather than a single 'Turkish identity' in London. However, these
self-ascribed boundaries (Barth, 1969, p. 1046) between Turks from the
mainland and Cyprus have become diluted during confrontations between
'Us' versus 'Them' (Ringer and Lawless, 1989, p. 18,19; Jenkins, 1990, p. 174).
Almost all Turkish/Cypriot associations place a special emphasis on
education because education is seen as a key to transmit traditional values to
the young generation and to generate a sense of belonging to the ideals of
Turkish community. It is a widely held view among the first generation that
their children are exposed to the cultural influences of the larger society.
Schooling, peer-group relations and media are constantly exerting cultural
influences on young people and presenting new identity choices in conflict
with the Turkish culture and Islamic values. Turkish/Cypriot organisations
with few exceptions are devising policies and strategies to counterbalance the
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acculturation of young Turks in order to prevent their assimilation because
assimilation would mean the loss of Turkish identity. However, although the
meaning of Turkish identity is the same in principle, Turkish/Cypriot
organisations seem to emphasise different components of their identity as the
most basic and indispensable element Some organisations, for example, place
priority on teaching the Turkish language as it is perceived to be the most
effective means of communication with the culture which defines
Turkish/Cypriot identity. As I will discuss later some organisations, on the
other hand, seem to place more emphasis on Islam because they believe that
religion is the most significant source of strength against the forces of
assimilation. Political issues are also important ingredients of identity politics
within the community as shown in Chapters Eight and Ten.
The Turkish Educational Attaché and some Turkish organisations in London
claim that the number of young Turkish students at the supplementary
weekend schools has reached 2,500 and it is estimated that their size will
steadily grow. Increasing attendance in classes on Turkish 'language',
'culture', 'music' and 'folklore' indicates that parental concern about the
future of their children is growing. They do not want to see young Turks lose
their 'Turkish identity', therefore the first generation is trying to mobilise
Turkish community to prevent 'cultural contamination' of children. It seems
that institutionalisation of education is regarded as one of the most effective
ways of reproducing Turkish culture and instilling an identity among the
young generation by transmitting 'reproduced values' within the British
context However, my findings suggest (see Chapter Six) that despite parental
pressure and organisational efforts, the meaning of Turkish identity is
changing for the young generation.
I have suggested that Turkish/Cypriot organisations sometimes resort to
political mobilisation of the community to revive the 'collective identity' ( see
Chapters Eight and Ten ). The rationale behind such a strategy seems to be
the expression of political identity_which is considered a prerequisite to
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becoming a 'politically conscious community' rather than that of a 'silent
ethnic community'. Therefore, some organisations keep the issue of Cyprus
alive because it is expected that such issues reawaken nationalist feelings and
aspirations as sources of political identity. Political mobilisation inevitably
requires involvement in the politics of the country of origin. Involvement in
the politics of the country of origin in the diaspora reproduces attachments,
alliances and hostilities which crystallise 'identity boundaries'.
Identity politics of Turkish/Cypriots organisations seem to generate at least
twofold effects on their members and clientele. The first of these effects
relates to the strengthening of 'in-group' solidarity. The second one relates to
the polarisation of identity boundaries to a further extent As I discussed in
Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten, political concerns of some Turkish/Cypriot
organisations appeal to nationalist feelings and utilise political events both in
Turkey/Cyprus. The organisations administered by Turkish-Cypriots, for
example, regularly mobilise their members to publicise the Cyprus issue and
encourage them to send letters to MPs and the Prime Minister asking for their
support for the Turkish side. The invitation of speakers from Turkey and
Cyprus clearly indicates that politics in the country of origin are used to
generate a strong group identity in the community. It is expected that public
meetings and addresses of Turkish/Cypriot organisations on political issues
will also mobilise 'others' to protest against these events. I gave some
examples in Chapter Eight and Nine to explain that 'identity confrontation'
and escalation of 'identity conflict' were rooted in politics. These examples
showed that confrontation of political identities crystallise Turkish/Cypriot
identity vis- -vis 'imagined enemies' in London because historical hostilities
are renewed and national/political/ethnic allegiances are re-expressed. This
means that polarisation between 'Us' and 'Them' adversely consolidates
collective identity.
My findings also suggest that not only the politics of the home country but
also politics on an international _level cause concern for the Turkish
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community. Turks in Europe constitute a micro-community within the
Muslim communities in Europe. Therefore, political events related to
Muslims also enter into the politics of Turkish/Cypriot organisations in
London. The reactions towards tragic events in Bosnia is a good illustration of
the expression of 'Islamic identity'. Victimisation of Turks in other parts of
the world and especially in Europe also produces an emphasised identity
expression. I explained the effects of racist attacks on Turks in Germany in
Chapter Eight The reactions towards these events showed that racism and
xenophobia caused a 'unified action' among Turks throughout Europe. In
many parts of Germany where there are significant numbers of Turks, diverse
sections of the Turkish community members, from secular to religious ones, were
united around the same issue. The diversities and varieties of political and
religious orientation were overcome by the common concern over the future of
the Turkish community in Germany. The collective consciousness and reactions
strengthened the ethnic bond among the community members. These
developments had transnational effects as Turkish/Cypriot organisations
showed in London by arranging solidarity meetings, distributing leaflets
explicitly thinning a belonging to Turkish communities in Europe.
I have argued throughout the thesis that Islam is one of the indispensable
components of Turkish/Cypriot identity. Even those who defined themselves as
'not religious' or 'nominal' Muslims, feel that religion has had public and private
influence on the formation of Turkish identity. Institutionalisation of Islam and
the growth of Islamic movements among the Turkish community confirm that
this perception is widely held. This means that Turkish ethnicity, identity and
Islam are closely intertwined and can not be readily separated from one another.
Therefore, it is almost impossible to analyse Turkish identity without reference to
Islam. However, it should be born in mind that Turkish Islam is as diversified as
Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Arab Islam. This means that national and religious
identity influenced each other throughout history and it is this factor that lies at
the heart of the non-monolithic nature of Islamic movements. Even within
Turkish Islam there is a wide diversity of expression of Islamic identity in
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Europe. The Islamic organisations among the Turkish community in London also
display such a diversity as I have shown in Chapters Nine and Ten. I argued that
almost all Turkish Islamic organisations were off-shoots of umbrella
organisations/ groups in Turkey or Cyprus and that they implicitly, and more
often explicitly, claimed allegiance to the 'national-model' organisations.
As far as the Islamic organisations in London are concerned, it appears that
rivalry, competition and conflict rather than negotiation and co-operation are
prevalent features of their politics. Such a state of affairs was inherited from the
conflicts in Turkey and reproduced in Europe. The influence of 'model'
organisations is very well documented on the institutionalisation of religious
groups among Turks in Europe and in London. Therefore, I argue that without
understanding the current developments in Turkey, it would not be possible to
analyse the diversity of approaches to Islamic identity and politics among Turks
in London. This argument is justified by the simple fact that the origins of Islamic
groups among the Turkish community are rooted in the politics of religious
movements in the country of origin. However, I suggest that for the young
Turkish generation, the focus of Islamic politics seems to be changing. The young
generation are increasingly becoming disillusioned by the priorities of these
organisations (see Chapters Nine and Ten).
The establishment of the Mosques has always been a priority for the Turks as
they are considered traditional centres of Islamic learning, religious socialisation
and education which contribute to the construction of Turkish-Islamic identity.
Activities held in Mosques are designed to reawaken Islamic identity among the
Jama'a and pass the traditional values onto the young generation. My findings
suggest that the growth of the young generation especially seems to be causing
some changes in the traditional politics of the Mosques. Some of the Islamic
organisations, for example, seem to have recognised that classical teaching
methods were not very fruitful within the British context Therefore, they
introduced new strategies for teaching, recruiting and appealing to a wider
audience. I explained in Chapter Nine, for example that, one of the Mosques
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opened an independent primary school despite its ongoing insistence on
traditional teaching methods. Another Mosque, on the other hand, had
negotiated with the Local Council and was granted permission to register
weddings in the Mosque. The novelty was even extended to allow the formation
of small market places in one of the Mosques. It should be pointed out that these
are significant changes in the politics of Mosques compared to Turkey or Cyprus
where Mosques are only used for prayers under the strict control of the state
apparatus. This also suggests that Islamic groups in Europe enjoy more freedom
of expression since they do not challenge the state system.
The development of new strategies indicates that Islamic groups in London are
aware of the social and cultural influences of the wider society. Nevertheless,
new policies and strategies also carry the imprint of particular groups who have
different approaches to Islamic issues. This means that as I have shown in
Chapter Nine and Ten, Turkish Islamic organisations in London display a
differentiation rather than convergence in terms of their methods of teaching,
ideological standpoints and expression of Islamic identity. I have outlined three
main Islamic groups among Turks in London and discussed the differences in
their membership and leadership structures. I have shown, for example, that
Islam as represented by Aziziye, Suley-manci and Sheikh Nazim Jama'a varies
and they differ in their interpretations of what Islamic behaviour really is and
what an authentic Islamic identity means.
One of the overlooked aspects of Islamic organisations among Turks in London
and Europe in general is their contribution to the development of 'Islamic
networks'. The development of Islamic networks seem to be taking place on two
levels. The first level relates to Turks as a micro-Muslim community. As I
explained in Chapters Nine and Ten, almost all Islamic organisations among
Turks in Europe have their origins in Turkey. Islamic groups such as Suley-manci,
National Vision and the Nurcu movement are widening their networks in
Europe. My observations of these groups in London and Berlin indicate that in-
group relations are constantly renewed between Turkey and Europe. The second
317
area of network development relates to Muslim communities in Europe. Some of
the Turkish Islamic organisations are also contributing to the widening of
transnational Islam. Political and mystical Islam especially do not confine their
appeal to one ethnic/national group, but rather they try to recruit Muslims from
all national origins. Sheikh Nazim Jama'a, for example, is comprised of Muslims
who have different racial, ethnic and national origins. National Vision, on the
other hand, is increasingly trying to involve themselves in the affairs of Muslims
in a wider context All of these groups have already opened branches in major
European and American cities to widen their sphere of influence.
The analysis of family, kin and social networks, and various kinds of Turkish
organisations has clearly shown that the politics of ethnicity, identity and religion
have centred around the reproduction of traditional social and cultural values
within the British context where the Turkish identity was perceived to be
threatened. Therefore, despite the diversity of attitudes towards Turkish culture
and differences in the strategies of institutionalisation, the elements of Turkish
identity was and still is reproduced in order to preserve and transmit these
values to the young generation. However, young Turks were and still are
exposed to contextual social and cultural forces which are different from and
oft.n conflicting with the parental values. This situation is producing tension
between parents and young generation who appear to be adopting some
attitudes and values of the British society. This means that the young generation
is developing a somewhat different identity from that of their parents.
Nevertheless, the emergent identity construction among young Turks still carries
the imprint of Turkish tradition and culture but increasingly in the form of
symbolic attachments. It appears that this trend among the young generation will
continue as the Turkish ethnicity and national identity are not fixed categories,
rather they are undoubtedly imagined, but equally felt, known and lived.
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Chapter Eleven: Notes
1- For a numerical analysis of Muslims in Europe see Peach, C. and Glebe, G. (1995)
'Muslim minorities in Western Europe' Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18: 26-45. For the
number of Muslims and their ethnic/national origins see Anwar (1993).
_
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Glossary
A_kraba	 Relative, kin
Alcrabalik	 Relatedness
Arkadaslik Friendship
Ayet	 Qur'anic Verse
Bayram Namazi Prayer, marking the end of Ram azan
Coral
	
Mosque
Cum a Namazi Friday Prayer
Cemaat (Jama'a) Congregation, follower
Dua	 Prayer
Dugun	 Wedding
Farz	 Obligatory
Hajj	 Annual pilgrimage to Mecca
Hoca	 The leader in prayer
Hutbe	 Religious sermon
Imam	 The leader in prayer
Mar	 Dinner, ending the fast in Rantazan
Islam	 Submission to God
Kurban	 Sacrifice, slaughter
Kurban Bayrami The greater festival, commemorating the Abraham's sacrifice by
the slaughter of a sheep
Komsuluk Neighbourhood
Mecirese	 Centre of Islamic learning
Mevlut
	 Prophet's birthday celebration
Mesjid	 Mosque
M-urid	 A Sufi disciple
M-ursid	 A Sufi spiritual guide
Namaz	 Prayer
Namus	 Honour
Nisan	 Engagement
Oruc	 Fasting
Ramazan	 The ninth month of the Islamic calendar. The month of fasting
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Ramazan Bayrami The lesser festival, celebrating the end of Ramazart. A time of
feasting, gift-giving and unity
Seriat (Sharia) Islamic Law
Sheikh	 Sufi master
Sufi	 Muslim mystic
Surmet	 Circumcision
Sure	 Section of the Qur'an
Tarikat	 Mystical Order
Tekke	 Sufi lodge
Ununet (Umma) Muslim Nation
Zaviye	 Sufi lodge
Zikr	 'Remembrance'. Sufi discipline involving recitation of the
names and Attributes of God
-
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Appendix
Questionnaire used in the survey
Dear Friend,
I am doing a research on different aspects of Turkish Community living in Britain. The
main purpose of my research is to understand the structure of Turkish Community and to
identify social, cultural and political problems it encounters in British society.
This questionnaire was designed to gather relevant information for a scholarly analysis of
Turkish Community in Britain. Your answers will be strictly confidential and will not be
used for any other purpose. You don't have to write your name on the form.
You are asked to answer all the questions sincerely. Please try to answer all the questions
without consulting others. Tick your choice which describes your idea best. Reliability of
our research depends on sincerity.
Thank you very much for your co-operation and help.
Talip KUCUKCAN
Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
Father Mother
PART I
Please answer all the questions
1. Where is your birth place?
1( ) Turkey 2( ) Cyprus 	 3( ) England
2. Are you male or female?
1( ) Male	 2( ) Female
3. How old are you?
4. What is your marital status?
1( ) Single
	 2( ) Married
	 3( )Divorced
	
4( ) Widow
5. How long have you been living in England?
6. Where do your parents come from? 	 Mother	 Father
1( ) Turkey
2( ) Cyprus
3( ) Other (please explain) 	
7. Where do you live?
1( ) Owned flat/house
2( ) Rented flat/house
3( ) Council accommodation
4( ) Other (please specify) 	
8. How much is overall weekly income of your family?
1( ) less than 200 pounds
2( ) 200-300 pounds
3( ) 300-400 pounds
4( ) 400-500 pounds
5( ) more than 500 pounds
9. Education: (please thick the appropriate one)
Self	 S ouse
1. School 0116	 .
2. School till 18
3. College/University 18+
4. Postgraduate
5. No formal education
1
10. Em lo ment-Work
	
Self
	 S ouse	 Father	 Mother
1. Still student
2. Working(state job)
3. Unemployed
4. Housewife
5. Retired
11. With whom are living currently?
1( ) Alone
20 With my spouse
3( ) With my girl/boy friend
4( ) With my family
5( ) With my college friends
6( ) Other (please specify) 	
12. If you are living with your family do you want to live on your on own?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
Please give reasons for your choice 	
13. How often do you visit Turkey/Cyprus?
14. Where do you feel happier and at home, in England or in Turkey/Cyprus?
1( ) In England
20 In my homeland
3( ) It doesn't make any difference
Please give reasons for your choice 	
15. Do you think that Turkish traditions and values should be preserved while living
in England?
1( ) Yes
2Q N0o
Why ? 	
16. In which of the following languages are you fluent?
1( ) English
2( ) Turkish
3( ) Both
4( ) None
17. Which languages do you speak at home?
1( ) Only English
2( ) Only Turkish
3( ) English and Turkish
-
2
Yes	 May be	 No
1. Turk
2. Muslim
3. Non-Turk
4. Non-Muslim
Yes	 May be	 No
1. Turk
2 Muslim
3. Non-Turk
4. Non-Muslim
18. Which language do you prefer in your daily conversations with your family and
Turkish friends?
1( ) English
2( ) Turkish
Why ? 	
19. If you are single will you be willing to marry the following
20. Would you be happy to see your child(ren) to marry the following?
21. Which of the followings are important in the person you marry(ed)? (You can
tick more than one)
1( )Rich	 6( )Open-minded
2( )Famous	 7( )Good-looking
3( )Educated/Intellectual 	 8( )Caring
4( )Religious	 9( )Attractive
5( )Honest	 10( )Turkish
22. Do you approve of birth control?
1( ) Normally yes
2( ) Normally no
3( ) Under some circumstances
Please give reasons 	
23. Do you approve of pre-marital male-female social meetings?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
3( ) I have no idea
Please give reasons 	
24. Do you approve of pre-marital sexual relationship?
1( ) Yes
2Q No
Please give reasons 	
3
25. If you are single do you have a boy/girl friend?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
26. Do you think that your parents will approve of your having a girl/boy friend if
they know?
1( ) Yes
2( )No
Why?	
27. Do you think that your parents' control on your life is too much?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
28. If your answer is 'yes' why do you think they are trying to control your
behaviour? (please explain)
	
29. Do you sometimes have disagreements with your parents?
1( ) Yes
2Q NoNo
30. If your answer yes can you please explain over what kind of issues you disagree
with your parents? 	
31. Are your friends mostly Turks, English or other minorities?
1( ) Turks
2( ) English
3( ) Other ethnic minorities (please specify)
	
32. What do you have in common with your friends?
Please state	
33. Do you have difficulties in making friends of non-Turks?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
If yes, what kind of difficulties? 	
34. What do you usually do with your friends?
1( ) We study together
2( ) We go to pubs/discos
3( ) We do sports
4( ) Other (please specify) 	
_
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35. Who do you identify yourself most?
1( ) Famous player 6( ) Movie/TV star
2( ) Famous musician 7( ) Political leader
3( ) Mother 8( ) Religious leader
4( ) Father 9( ) Myself
5( ) Elder brother/sister 100 Other	
Please give reasons for your choice
36. Why do you identify yourself with someone and try to imitate his/her behaviour?
1( ) For their ideas
2( ) For their jobs and status
3( ) For they have a stable life and a philosophy of life
4( ) For I feel that we have some ideals and values in common
5( ) Other (please explain) 	
37. How do you usually spend your free time?
1( ) I read books, magazines, journals etc.
2( ) I watch TV or go to cinema
3( ) I do sport or go to see a game
4( ) I go to pubs, bars and discos
5( ) Other (please explain)
	
38. How often do you go to pubs, bars and discos?
1( ) Regularly
2( ) Occasionally
3( ) Never
Please give reasons
	
39. How do you spend your Christmas time?
1Q ByBy giving parties at home
2( ) By going out to clubs and pubs etc.
3( ) I rest during Christmas
4( ) I don't care about Christmas and carry on my daily work
5( ) Other (please explain)
	
40. How do yo feel during Christmas andwhat do you usually do?
_
5
PART 11
Please answer all the questions
1. Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing what you believe
about God?
1( ) I absolutely believe in God
2( ) Although I have some doubts, I feel that I believe in God
3( ) I don't believe in God
2( ) I have no concern about belief in God
2. Which of the following factor or factors played most effective role on your decision
about belief or disbelief in God?
10 My family members
2( ) Books that I have read
3( ) My tutors
4( ) Some friends
5( ) Attitudes and behaviours of some religious persons
6( ) A private experience (please explain) 	
3. 'Which of the following statements best expresses your idea of prayer (dua)?
1( ) I believe that the prayer is beneficial
2( ) I don't believe that the prayer is beneficial
3( ) I have no idea
4. Which of the following statements most clearly describes your emotional state
during prayer?
1( ) I feel relaxation and tranquillity while praying
2( ) I feel much nearer to God while praying
3( ) I don't feel any difference while praying
5. Why do you pray?
1( ) I pray to be happy in the hereafter
2( ) I pray because I want my worldly affairs be realized
3( ) I pray for happiness in both this world and in hereafter
4( ) Other (please explain) 	
6. Have you ever had a response to your prayer?
1Q N0o
2( ) Yes (please explain) 	
7. How do you feel during religious ceremonies such as mevlid?
1( ) I feel happy
2( ) I feel very bored want it finish soon
3( ) I don't have any interest in such religious ceremonies
4( ) I don't like these ceremonies and don't participate
6
8. What do you usually do during Kandil days?
1( ) I pray during these days
20 I have no interest in Kandil days
3( ) I usually don't remember Kandil days in this country
4( ) Other (please explain) 	
9. What is your idea about performing prayers like Namaz and Oruc
1( ) I find it very difficult to perform prayers
2( ) I can not pray because I don't know how to pray
3( ) I don't pray to avoid criticism from my environment
4( ) Other (please explain) 	
10. How often do you perform the following religious duties?
Always	 Sometimes
Never
1( ) Daily prayers (Namaz)
2( ) Cuma and Bayram Prayers
3( ) Fasting (Oruc)
4( ) Prayer (Dua)
11. If you are performing your prayers why are you doing all these prayers?
1( ) In order to go to heaven in hereafter
2( ) In order to fulfil my duties towards God
3( ) In order that my work succeeds
4( ) Since I got used to doing it
5( ) To avoid criticism from my social environment
12. Have you ever looked at the Ku'ran and fried to read its translation?
1( ) I read all the Kutran
2( ) I read some parts of Kur'an
3( ) I tried to read but I gave up since I couldn't understand
4( ) I have never read it
13. How often do you listen to the religious cermons/preaching?
10 Very often
2( ) Seldom
3( ) Never
Please give reasons	
14. Have you ever had religious education so far?
1( ) I went to mosque to learn from Imam
2( ) I had a private religious education
3( ) I did not have any religious education
4( ) Only my parents taught me religion
5( ) Other (please explain) 	
-
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15. Would you like your children to have good Islamic religious education?
1( ) Yes
2( ) No
3Q 1
 am not sure
Please give reasons	
16. Cuma prayer is obligatory (farz) for every muslim regardless of age and gender
1( ) True
2( ) False
3( ) I don't know
17. The holy book Kuran consists of ayet and sure
1( ) True
2( ) False
3( ) I don't know
18. Alcohol, gambling, interest, witchcraft and eating pork are regarded as sins in
Islam.
1( ) True
2( ) False
3( ) I don't know
19. According to you:
1() Everybody is on the wrong path except muslims
2( ) Non-muslims will go to hell
3( ) God might forgive everybody
4( ) Anyone who believe in God and perform good deeds for mankind will go to heaven
regardless of their religion
5( ) Other (please explain) 	
20. Please write down five pillars (Islamin sarflari) of Islam
1 	
2 	
3 	
4 	
5 	
Please write your comments here about this research and questionnaire:
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